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Foreword
The awareness that an integrated well co-ordinated management of water resources is the ultimate
sustainable approach has a long history. This has led to the global paradigm of Integrated Water
Resources Management (IWRM). One of the connected problems is the choice of adequate temporal
and spatial scales. Worldwide, concerned authorities propagate the water management on a river
basin scale; very early concepts were realised in Central Europe which were harmonised in the
European Water Framework Directives 60/2000. Increasingly these approaches are also introduced in
developing countries.
However, without neglecting the positive progress achieved all concepts known lack generally
applicable approaches for the integration of land, energy and water resources on regional and local
scale - for a good reason: The enormous interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary complexity of the
problem. This has found the interest of the scientific and public community involved and a very large
number of recent publications.
In conclusion, a critical dilemma is the fact that the generally accepted global approach needs to be
implemented on a local and regional scale determined by political i.e. community boundaries. Local
and regional actors, however, have been rarely part of theoretical considerations.
Somehow independent from IWRM the concept of payments for hydrological ecosystem services
(PHES) has developed aiming at the stabilisation of ecosystem functions to maintain or provide water
for different purposes, ranging from environmental protection to concrete provision of water for
downstream users. It is overdue to integrate the PHES concept into IWRM.
Jochen Hack has recognised the need for a common knowledge base. Without claiming to be
complete he analysed the existing highly interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary literature with more
than 600 contributions, filtered out similarities and contradictions and drew valid conclusions. Based
on this scientific analysis he developed his own ideas and concepts for a combined view and practical
approach. This work was finally enriched by a case study in Nicaragua which he observed and
accompanied for several years.
The supervison of Jochen Hack’s thesis is my last active contribution during my academic career,
which gave me a great pleasure. I hope his convincing thesis will also be the basis for his own academic
career. I also hope that he will continue to work on timely interdisciplinary teaching and research
concepts which are so much harder to develop and implement than pure disciplinary ones.
Perdifumo, Italy, April 2014
Manfred Ostrowski
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Abstract
This dissertation documents, analyzes and interprets the state of knowledge of the global Integrated
Water Resource Management (IWRM) implementation process. Based on a comprehensive assessment
of global implementation reports and the scientific discourse of two decades general problems
of implementation and specific constraints to the process in developing countries are identified.
Moreover, present IWRM trajectories and recommendations towards improvements of implementation
and operationalization are derived from scientific and practitioner’s experience. Hence, the principal
contribution of this dissertation in this basic problem analysis is a detailed clarification of the problem
statement of IWRM implementation in developing countries and the provision of guiding principles
for improvements.
Identified solution approaches are further conceptualized methodologically by applying the theoreti-
cal concept of institutional fit and interplay. In the following, this dissertation asserts that problems of
institutional fit and interplay need to be solved interdependently with due regard to specific opera-
tional constraints of local contexts in developing countries in order to successfully implement IWRM at
an operational management level, i.e. operationalization of IWRM. Hence, this dissertation compares
different policy instruments to achieve this based on an actor-centered incentive approach. It is argued
that improvements require a mix of policies with specific instruments to enhance institutional fit and
interplay suitable for context-specific operational constraints. This dissertation exposes that traditional
command and control approaches for IWRM operationalization are insufficient and complementary
instruments are necessary to address the prevailing implementation gaps. The instrument of Payments
for Hydrological Ecosystem Services (PHES) is identified as a potentially suitable policy instrument
because it combines several beneficial characteristics of communication / diffusion and economic
instruments with characteristics of collaborative agreements. Applying the concept of institutional
fit and interplay in the context of operational constraints of developing countries to identify suitable
policy instruments for improved IWRM operationalization, as done in this dissertation, is a particularly
novel approach.
In order to assess the potential contributions of PHES schemes to the operationalization of IWRM,
the concept of ecosystem services and their valuation as its theoretical basis, are examined concerning
the solutions it provides to address the governance challenges of institutional fit and interplay. In this
context, hydrological ecosystems services and the their valuation are addressed specifically. Thus, this
dissertation contributes to understanding how the application and valuation process of hydrological
ecosystem services inherently define spatial relationships between potential service providers and
beneficiaries based on functional ecosystem linkages. Subsequently, it is illustrated how the concept
can positively influence the identification of appropriate context-specific scales for operational IWRM
as a result of fit and interplay interdependence. Additionally, a cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdictional
integration effect of the concept is acknowledged. The concept of hydrological ecosystem services
has not yet been considered in relation to problems of fit and interplay in IWRM implementation as
presented in this work. Hence, this dissertation provides additional insights in this regard.
In a further theoretical analysis, this dissertation documents, analyzes and interprets the state of
knowledge of the economic conceptualization of the PHES instrument. It brings forward supporting
arguments for a less market-based and therefore a stronger multi-faceted incentive-based interpretation
of PHES. Based on a broad meta-analysis of global and regional PES scheme assessments, the principal
characteristics of the instrument and its implementation are identified. A comprehensive instrument
characterization of this kind is a further significant contribution of this dissertation which has not
been done yet to a similar extent. The characterization and instrument assessment provides important
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insights with regard to the typical roles of different actors and the provision of incentives for behavioral
change towards IWRM. Moreover, it contributes to understanding how the instrument can potentially
address institutional challenges of IWRM operationalization in the context of general operational
constraints. However, locally user-(co-)financed PHES schemes as a particular type were identified as
especially conducive to engaging stakeholders and to promoting public participation.
Finally, the role of the PHES instrument in the context of a national IWRM process is assessed
based on an empirical example taken from Nicaragua. This dissertation provides a comprehensive
documentation of the national IWRM process in Nicaragua and its principal implementation gaps.
The generalization of implementation gaps and specifically operational constraints made before can
be confirmed for the Nicaraguan IWRM process. Moreover, the shortcomings of a formal top-down
implementation approach based on command and control instruments alone are highlighted as well.
Further valuable findings can be derived from this dissertation for other developing countries with a
similar IWRM process through the analysis of contributions of locally user-(co-)financed PHES schemes
to solve the problems of institutional fit and interplay in Nicaragua. Additionally, this dissertation
reveals how the PHES instrument fits into an existing policy mix in Nicaragua and how it interacts
with traditional regulations.
Hence, this work provides guidance on how to improve context-specific fit and horizontal interplay at
the operational level of IWRM as well as on how to complement the primarily top-down directed IWRM
implementation from bottom-up. Hence, this dissertation documents that the PHES instrument is more
than a tool to finance nature conservation. Indeed, it shows that the implementation and execution
process of PHES schemes fulfills several other tasks which are essential for the operationalization of
IWRM.
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Zusammenfassung
Die internationale Gemeinschaft hat sich das Integrierte Wasserressourcen Management (IWRM)
zum Ziel gesetzt, um der übergeordneten Bedeutung der Wasserressourcen als integrierende Land-
schaftkomponente und für die sozio-ökonomische Entwicklung der Menschheit Rechnung zu tragen.
Bisher konnten die Ziele dieser integriert und partizipativ organisierten Bewirtschaftung auf Flus-
seinzugsgebietsebene, insbesondere in Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern, jedoch noch nicht
zufriedenstellend erreicht werden. Eine Folge davon ist u.a. die fortschreitende Degradierung von
Ökosystemen und damit ein Verlust der Dienstleistungen, die diese der Gesellschaft erbringen. Eine
Vielzahl von Initiativen bemüht sich um die Inwertsetzung dieser, bisher als kostenlos wahrgenomme-
nen, Ökosystemdienstleistungen und der Etablierung von Zahlungssystemen, um deren Erhalt zu
finanzieren. Besonders Zahlungssysteme für hydrologische Ökosystemdienstleistungen werden als eine
vielversprechende Alternative zu traditionellen Umweltpolitikinstrumenten angesehen, um externe
Effekte nicht nachhaltiger Landnutzung zu adressieren. Der Ökosystemansatz verbindet sie dabei mit
dem IWRM-Prozess.
Die im Rahmen dieses Dissertationsvorhabens realisierten Untersuchungen befassen sich mit dem
Anwendungspotenzial von Zahlungssystemen für hydrologische Ökosystemdienstleistungen im Kontext
eines Integrierten Wasserressourcen Managements in Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländern.
Aufbauend auf einer Analyse des Entwicklungs- und Implementierungsprozesses von IWRM im
globalen Kontext (Kapitel 2) werden zunächst Kritik und Hürden in Bezug auf den Implemen-
tierungsprozess diskutiert. Weiterhin wird der aktuelle Stand der Forschung und Praxis in Hinblick
auf die Fortentwicklung des IWRM-Konzepts und aktueller Implementierungsansätze erörtert.
Der aktuelle Stand der Forschung zum IWRM-Implementierungsprozess (Hürden und aktuelle
Implementierungsansätze) bilden den Rahmen für eine strukturelle Konzeptualisierung der Imple-
mentierungsproblematik in Kapitel 3. Im Rahmen der Konzeptualisierung werden basierend auf
der Fit und Interplay - Theorie generelle institutionelle Anforderungen und konkrete operationelle
Rahmenbedingung in Bezug auf Entwicklungs- und Schwellenländer erarbeitet. Abschließend wer-
den mögliche Kategorien von Steuerungsinstrumenten beschrieben und konkrete Anforderungen an
IWRM-Implementierungsinstrumente abgeleitet.
Kapitel 4 beschreibt zunächst theoretisch das Konzept der Ökosystemleistungen im Allgemeinen als
Lösungsansatz, während Kapitel 5 anschließend Zahlungssysteme für hydrologische Ökosystemleistun-
gen im Speziellen als potenzielles Instrument zur IWRM-Implementierung behandelt. Im Rahmen einer
Auswertung des prinzipiellen Implementierungsvorgangs international angewandter Zahlungssys-
temen für hydrologische Ökosystemleistungen wird die grundlegende Eignung des Instruments in
Hinblick auf die in Kapitel 3 entwickelten Anforderungen an IWRM-Implementierungsinstrumente
in einem ersten Analyseschritt beurteilt. Dabei wird insbesondere untersucht, ob die genannten
Zahlungssysteme mit den Prinzipien und Zielen des IWRM übereinstimmen, sie eine zweckmäßige
Ergänzung zu bestehenden umweltpolitischen Instrumenten darstellen und ferner den IWRM-Prozess
auf Einzugsgebietsebene begünstigen bzw. fördern. Es ist somit die funktionale Rolle der Zahlungssys-
teme für hydrologische Ökosystemdienstleistungen Untersuchungsgegenstand sowie die Synergien bei
der Implementierung solcher Zahlungssysteme mit dem lokalen IWRM-Prozess.
In einem weiteren Untersuchungsschritt (Kapitel 6) wird die Eignung des Instruments zur Unter-
stützung des IWRM-Implementierungsprozess am Beispiel Nicaraguas untersucht. Nicaragua hat in
den letzten Jahren wichtige Schritte für einen nationalen IWRM-Prozess eingeleitet, die Umsetzung
der IWRM-Prinzipen zum nachhaltigen Flusseinzugsgebietsmanagement auf lokaler Ebene steht jedoch
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noch aus. Anhand eines Fallstudienvergleichs einzelner, voneinander unabhängiger Projekte von
Zahlungssystemen für hydrologische Ökosystemleistungen, sowie einer intensiven Prozessbegleitung
bei der Implementierung einer Fallstudie, wird die funktionale Rolle der Zahlungssysteme untersucht
und die Bedeutung des Instruments für den nationale IWRM-Kontext erörtert.
Die Arbeit schließt mit einem Fazit und Ausblick zu weiterem Forschungsbedarf in Kapitel 7 ab.
Es werden Chancen und Einschränkungen der Anwendung von Zahlungssystemen für hydrologische
Ökosystemleistungen zur Implementierung von IWRM im Rahmen der Diskussion der Ergebnisse der
Kapitel 5 und 6 analysiert und ausgewertet.
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1 Introduction to the problem context and relevance of the investigation topic to be investigated
The subordinate importance of water for humans and nature as well as its complex interconnections with other media
such as air and soil has led to the recognition that the management of water resources requires a holistic approach. In
contrast to the sectoral approach to water management taken in the past, the international community now broadly agrees
on the need for a general concept aiming at the integration of different environmental media across all sectors of society
that use or have an impact on water resources. This concept, known as Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM),
has become a global paradigm for sustainable water resources management.
However, efforts to implement the concept started in the 1990s, but after two decades successful steps towards imple-
mentation remain limited mainly to developed countries, e.g. member states of the European Union (EU) implementing
the European Union Water Framework Directive (WFD) or Integrated Catchment Management in Australia and New
Zealand. Despite being recognized as a substantial means to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and
sustainable development in general, IWRM still needs to be successfully implemented in most developing countries.
The global Status Report on the Application of Integrated Approaches to Water Resources Management from 2012, for
instance, stresses that since 1992, when IWRM was postulated as part of the Agenda 21 as a paradigm for sustainable
water resources management, 80 % of all countries of the world have embarked on reforms to improve the enabling
environment for water resources management based on the application of integrated approaches (UNEP, 2012). Despite
these considerable efforts in the establishment of enabling environments for IWRM through new water legislation, there
has been much less success, especially in developing countries, in the management of water resources on the basis of the
river basin, the cross-sectoral involvement of stakeholders, the establishment of participation mechanisms and integrated
environmental conservation.
Implementation of IWRM has been hindered, on the one hand, because there is no consistent definition that can be
made operational with measurable criteria (Van der Zaag, 2005; Jeffrey and Gearey, 2006; Biswas, 2008; Medema et al.,
2008; Merrey, 2008; Molle, 2008b; Cardwell et al., 2009). Despite the controversy with regard to its proper definition,
IWRM is in essence an approach to water management that seeks to integrate physical systems with human systems to
shift away from fragmented planning. On the other hand the constraints of real-life political, social, and physical factors
make IWRM difficult to achieve in practice without considering the specific natural and human system contexts (Pahl-Wostl
et al., 2007; Merrey, 2008; Lankford et al., 2007; Medema et al., 2008; Moss and Newig, 2010; Butterworth et al., 2010;
Beveridge and Monsees, 2012). This is partly due to the fact that IWRM implementation is an inherently complex task
requiring additional financial and personal resources as well as new forms of governance. Adequate resources are often
lacking in developing countries and natural resource management takes second place compared to economic development.
Moreover, the IWRM paradigm is based on coordination, cooperation and integration. The implementation of IWRM
requires supplementary actions in the way how water and land resources are managed. Although widely accepted and with
several requirements for implementation already taken, the progress of IWRM on the river basin level is still not satisfactory.
A recent study of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on IWRM implementation, thus,
comes to the conclusion “while the need for integrated water policy is widely acknowledged, it has not yet totally been
achieved on the ground. In many countries, water governance is still in a state of confusion. In both developing and
developed nations, water policy, to a greater or lesser degree, intrinsically raises governance challenges” (OECD, 2011b).
Traditional environmental governance has not led to the desired result in this respect, thus alternative governance
elements seem necessary.
In the field of environmental conservation the ecosystem services concept has gained substantial assent within a broad
community of scientist, politicians and different societal organizations. The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA)
in 2005 strongly influenced the increasing recognition of ecosystems as potential providers of services essential for
human well-being (MEA, 2005). The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) study launched by Germany
and the European Commission in 2007 takes a further step by drawing attention to the global economic benefits of
biodiversity and ecosystems in order to enable practical policy actions. Further evidence of the relevance of the concept of
ecosystem services and biodiversity is reflected in the recent foundation of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform
on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) in April of 2012 which, analogous to the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) for climate change issues, “will respond to requests for scientific information related to biodiversity
and ecosystem services from governments” (IPBES, 2012).
Unsurprisingly, there have been several attempts to develop policy instruments that aim to account for the economic
value of ecosystems and the services they provide. Payment or compensation for Ecosystem Services have evolved as
a promising policy instrument to improve environmental conservation based on the valuation of ecosystem services
(Mayrand and Paquin, 2004). Especially in the context of watershed protection, several attempts have been made on
different policy levels to achieve this goal through Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services (PHES).
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Although already implemented at several sites, PHES are still an ongoing subject of investigation. Current research on
PHES is mainly focused on efficiency or equity aspects, to a much smaller extent on bio-physical relationships of land use
changes and the provision of ecosystem services. Often the focus is on efficiency concerns rather than other environmental
policy action, and the valuation of ecosystem services itself is also a matter of investigation. The consideration of PHES
in the context of IWRM has gained much less attention and if so PHES are usually assessed as an alternative policy
instrument, without thorough examination of the broader functional role that PHES may play in the context of IWRM
establishment or improvement on the river basin level. Hence, from a water management perspective within IWRM little
progress has been made on the assessment of PHES.
General aim of this thesis is to investigate how and to what extent PHES fits in the IWRM process and what role
PHES can potentially play to further operationalize IWRM. Against this background, this dissertation aims to address the
following aspects (structural role of the aspect within the context of the dissertation is stated in parenthesis) :
• Why is IWRM still not widely implemented, despite having been promoted strongly by the international community
over the past three decades?
(Problem analysis and general problem statement)
• What are the principal implementation gaps and core problems of the concept’s operationalization in developing
countries? What are the specific requirements for instruments to improve IWRM implementation?
(Methodological conceptualization of the implementation problem)
• Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services (PHES) have gained significant popularity in the field of natural
resources management in developing countries. Do the ecosystem services concept and PHES, in general, bear
potential to contribute to improvements in IWRM implementation?
(General theoretical analysis of a solution statement)
• What are the contributions of PHES schemes in a specific empirical context of IWRM implementation?
(Specific empirical analysis of the solution statement)
• Can general recommendations be made on how PHES may contribute to the IWRM process?
(Generalization of results)
2 1 Introduction to the problem context and relevance of the investigation topic to be investigated
1.1 Structure of the thesis and applied methodology
The general structure of this dissertation consists of five principal parts: a definition of problem statement and identification
of the state of the art (Chapter 2), a methodological conceptualization and the development of a solution statement
(Chapter 3), a general theoretical analysis of the proposed solution statement (Chapters 4 and 5), a specific empirical
analysis of the solution statement (Chapter 6), and finally a presentation and assessment of the main results (Chapter 7).
Figure 1.1 illustrates the general structure with its principal parts and corresponding chapters.
Methodological conceptualization and solution statement 
General theoretical analysis 
Specific empirical analysis 
Presentation of results and assessment 
Problem statement and analysis 
Chapter 2:  Evolution and implementation of Integrated Water Resources Management: 
State of the art of implementation, scientific discourse on the concept, identification of 
implementation gaps and solution approaches. 
Chapter 3:  Methodological conceptualization of IWRM implementation problems: 
Identification of the core problems of IWRM implementation, identification of 
requirements on implementation instruments. 
Chapter 4:  The concept of Ecosystem Services and their valuation: 
State of the art of the Ecosystem Services approach and valuation methods, potential to 
improve IWRM implementation at the governance level.  
Chapter 5:  The concept of Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services: 
Analysis of Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services as a potential instrument to 
improve IWRM operationalization at the management level.  
Chapter 6:  Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services and IWRM in Nicaragua: 
Analysis of the contribution of the implementation process of Payments for Hydrological 
Ecosystem Services to the operationalization of IWRM in Nicaragua.  
Chapter 7:  Conclusions  
Figure 1.1: General structure of the dissertation
The assessment of the functional role of Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services (PHES) in the context of
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) is the general subject of this dissertation.
In a first step, the historical evolution and main principles of IWRM are analyzed. Based on this a definition of problem
statement and identification of the state of the art concerning the implementation and operationalization of IWRM
is accomplished. Thus, Chapter 2 summarizes the historical development of IWRM departing from traditional water
resources management dominated by separated sector policies. It highlights the underlying motivation for IWRM and the
present status of IWRM implementation while focusing on prevailing obstacles. At the end of Chapter 2 the most recent
developments of the IWRM concept and possible improvements in its implementation are discussed in order to develop a
general problem statement.
Based on the findings on the state of the art of the IWRM implementation process, a methodological conceptualization
of the core implementation problems of IWRM is carried out in Chapter 3. The conceptualization of the problem of IWRM
implementation considers the two general governance problems of achieving appropriate institutional fit and interplay.
Furthermore, the chapter includes an analysis of general operationalization constraints to IWRM in developing countries at
the management level. Following this, a comparison of contributions made to the operationalization of IWRM by different
policy instruments is realized on the basis of the methodological conceptualization and the identified operationalization
constraints. The chapter concludes with the identification of Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services as a potential
instrument to improve IWRM operationalization in developing countries.
1.1 Structure of the thesis and applied methodology 3
Chapter 4 takes up the ecosystem approach with a brief introduction of the ecosystem services concept especially in
the context of environmental and biodiversity conservation policy, including the principle theoretical basis of ecosystem
processes, functions and service provision. Furthermore, the valuation and prevailing state of the art valuation methods
are reviewed. Following this documentation of the state of the art of the ecosystem services approach and methods of
valuation with special focus on hydrological ecosystem services, an analysis of potential contributions of the approach to
address the core governance problems of fit and interplay in the context of IWRM implementation is carried out.
The following chapter 5 deals with Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services as a potential policy instrument to
improve IWRM operationalization at the management level. As a first step, a theoretical conceptualization of the state
of the art of Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services and their implementation is carried out. Subsequently, their
potential to improve IWRM operationalization at the management level is analyzed in a practical application context.
The theoretical argumentation of Chapters 4 and 5 forms the basis for a more specific empirical analysis of the PHES
implementation, using a case study in Nicaragua as an example Chapter 6. In order to identify the specific IWRM
implementation gaps and operationalization constraints in Nicaragua, the national IWRM process of the country is
described and analyzed. This is followed by a documentation and analysis of the implementation process of a local
Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services scheme. At the end of this chapter, an analysis of the contribution of local
Payment for Ecosystem Service schemes to the operationalization process of IWRM and its functional role as part of a
broader policy mix is realized.
Chapter 7 discusses the general potential of Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services to contribute to operational-
ization of IWRM and assesses their specific role within the policy mix for IWRM implementation in Nicaragua. Moreover,
recommendations for PHES implementation to foster the IWRM implementation process are presented. The dissertation
concludes with additional final remarks.
An overview of the chapters of this dissertation and a brief summary of their content is presented in Table 1.1.
Chapter Brief description of chapter content
Chapter 2: IWRM introduction,
problem analysis and state of the art
implementation
Introduction to the concept of IWRM, its historical evolution and general princi-
ples; general analysis of the international implementation process; documenta-
tion and analysis of special implementation problems in developing countries;
state of the art scientific discourse on the concept; principal trajectories and
implementation gaps of the concept
Chapter 3: Methodological concept-
ualization of the core problems of
IWRM implementation, identifica-
tion of implementation instruments
requirements
Methodological conceptualization of the core problems of IWRM implementa-
tion as the basis for the identification of specific requirements on complementary
implementation instruments, identification of general operationalization con-
straints in developing countries, comparison of contributions of different policy
instruments to the operationalization of IWRM, identification of PHES as a po-
tential instrument to improve IWRM operationalization in developing countries
Chapter 4: State of the art of the
Ecosystem Services approach and
valuation methods, potential to im-
prove IWRM implementation at the
governance level
Documentation of the state of the art of the Ecosystem Services approach and
methods of valuation with focus on hydrological ecosystem services, analysis of
potential contributions in addressing the core governance problems of fit and
interplay in the context of IWRM implementation.
Chapter 5: Analysis of PHES as an
instrument to improve IWRM oper-
ationalization at the management
level.
Theoretical conceptualization of the state of the art of Payments for Hydrological
Ecosystem Services and their implementation, analysis of their potential to
improve IWRM operationalization at the management level.
Chapter 6: Case study analysis: con-
tribution of the implementation pro-
cess of PHES to the operationaliza-
tion of IWRM in Nicaragua
Documentation and analysis of the national IWRM process in Nicaragua, identi-
fication of implementation gaps and operationalization constraints, documenta-
tion and analysis of the implementation process of a local PHES scheme, analysis
of the contribution of local PHES schemes to the operationalization process of
IWRM in the context of a policy mix.
Chapter 7: Conclusions Assessment of the general potential of PHES to contribute to operationalization
of IWRM, specific assessment of the role of PHES within the policy mix for
IWRM implementation in Nicaragua. Concluding remarks on the main findings.
Table 1.1: General structure of the dissertation with its principal parts and content of corresponding chapters
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2 Evolution and implementation of Integrated Water Resources Development and Management
The foundation of this dissertation constitutes a thorough analysis of the historical evolution of the concept of Integrated
Water Resources Management (IWRM), the general principles it contains as well as its pathway towards implementation in
practice. This analysis of the evolution of the concept and the status of its global implementation is followed by an analysis
of the scientific discourse on the background of the limited implementation success. Finally, the chapter closes with the
state of the art of the present IWRM trajectories towards improvements in implementation and identified implementation
obstacles. The objective of this chapter is to provide a clear problem statement and analysis
2.1 Evolution of a management framework
In order to understand the evolution of the concept of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) and the persisting
challenges of its implementation it is necessary to look at the history of water management, including the main actors and
focuses of action.
IWRM (and other similar terms such as Total Water Management, Comprehensive Water Management or just Integrated
Water Management) have been developed as a response to the shortcomings of traditional supply-based water management
and are broadly compatible approaches. The application of these approaches at the river basin level as management unit
is referred to as Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM) (also called Integrated Catchment Management in some
countries). Traditional water management used to focus on technical solutions, with individual and often unconnected
as well as uncoordinated projects, designed and implemented by different agencies representing different sectors, e.g.
agriculture, energy, transport etc. (cf., Jones et al., 2006). As a result of this traditional approach, the management of
water became highly fragmented, with multiple, sometimes overlapping, administrative and management responsibilities.
Additionally, the traditional approach has been characterized by focusing on supply fixes, with little regard paid either to
managing demand or to minimizing adverse environmental and social impacts. Besides a segregation of management
approaches between different sectors, traditional water management has typically also been fragmented spatially, with
administrative and political boundaries determining decisions about water use (Jones et al., 2006).
In the context of the evolution of IWRM as an internationally accepted framework for the sustainable management of
water resources, it is not quite appropriate to refer to it as a new approach to water resources management, because IWRM
is rather a comprehensive incorporation of good management practices that have been applied for a while to different
degrees at different places and times to address a globally prevailing water crisis. Traditional versus integrated or improved
management approaches are probably better terms for a conceptual distinction. According to Grigg (1999), it is the
balancing of different goals and views of interdependent players that distinguishes this integrated form of management
from other forms of management practices. Therefore, Grigg introduces the terms disintegrated and integrated for a clearer
conceptual distinction.
Accordingly, there have been several forerunners of IWRM in different countries where water management has been
institutionalized in an advanced and integrated way over centuries. Rahaman and Varis (2005) note that in Valencia, Spain
“[...] multi-stakeholder, participatory water tribunals have operated at least since the tenth century”. The river basin as
reference for water management was probably also first applied in Spain with the system of hydrographic confederations
(confederaciones hidrográficas) in 1926 (Embid, 2003). In the 1930s the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in the United
States became the first institution of water resources development integrating several sectors (integration of flood control,
pollution control, water supply and conservation) in order to secure the efficient use of water resources of a whole region
based on rational comprehensive planning as a centralized top-down and expert-driven approach by a single central
authority (White, 1957; Mitchell, 1990)1. Moreover, at the United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and
Utilization of Resources in 1950 agreement was reached on the comprehensive development of river basins as the most
important method not only of conservation but of harnessing the vast power and water resources of the world’s great rivers
(United Nations Department of Economic Affairs, 1950). In 1956 the Secretary-General United Nations (UN) declared that
river basin development was an essential feature of economic development. White (1957) highlights subsequently that the
comprehensive river basin management approach “[...] focused on the full utilization of rivers, multi-purpose dams, and
wider regional development planning”.
Relative to the availability of water resources (supply side) and the degree of utilization of them (demand side),
a gradual transition has been observed in the way water resources are managed, as a response to increasing scarcity
1 According to Teclaff (1996) this idea of river basins as economic development regions was later exported to Asia and also South America (e.g.
Cauca Valley Authority in Colombia, São Francisco Valley Authority in Brazil). Later on similar authorities were establish at the international
level in order to coordinate the development of transboundary river basins (e.g. La Plata River, The Amazon River).
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and competition among uses. Mar (1998), for example, describes this transition as different eras of water resources
management - from an exploitation era of unlimited availability and technology-based provision at the lowest possible
economic costs, over an era of management of optimization of increased competing uses (including new concerns for water
quality and groundwater exploitation) to a third and final era of protection, when demand “[...] becomes so great that
a small increase in demand can destroy the supply” (Mar, 1998) and parts of the resource base are protected from use.
The allocation of environmental flows to protect the natural habitat are a typical action that delineates the protection era
according to Mar (1998).
Thus, several elements of integrated management of water resources had already been implemented, when a more
holistic view on water resources management, described as IWRM, began to develop in the 1970s with the United Nations
Conference on Water held in Mar del Plata in 1977, when IWRM was recommended as an approach to incorporate the
multiple competing uses of water resources. Less attention was paid in the 1980s to the topic of water resources, thus,
the famous “Brundtland”-report from 1987 (WCED, 1987), for instance, did not deal with it at all, although it paved the
way for the following conferences on sustainable development (Earth Summits) and promoted the general discourse on
sustainable development which later on began to focus strongly on water as an important cross-cutting issue. Accordingly,
Lenton and Muller (2009) claim that considering IWRM as the water element of a broader sustainable development
approach is quite appropriate. The three key strategic objectives of IWRM (the three E’s) that have to be balanced reflect
the sustainability goal of the approach:
• Efficiency to make water resources go as far as possible;
• Equity, in the allocation of water across different social and economic groups;
• Environmental sustainability, to protect the water resources base and associated ecosystems (GWP, 2013a; Lenton
and Muller, 2009).
The development of IWRM gained further momentum in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 20th century (cf., Savenije
and Van der Zaag, 2008). Important milestones towards an international consensus on IWRM as a means to achieve
sustainable water resources management were the Informal Consultation on Water Resources in Copenhagen in 1991,
where the demand driven approach (as opposed to the traditional supply-led approach) and the subsidiarity principle (to
manage water at the lowest appropriate level, calling for more decentralized decision-making and participation) were
launched (DANIDA, 1991) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Symposium on Water Sector Capacity
Building in Delft (also in 1991), where the essential role of capacity building was recognized and the concept of IWRM
further elaborated (UNDP and IHE-Delft, 1991). At the International Conference on Water and Environment, an expert
meeting held in 1992 in Dublin, IWRM was broadly adopted by all of the conference parties. Hence, the conference called
in the Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development:
“[...] for fundamental new approaches to the assessment, development and management of freshwater resources,
which can only be brought about through political commitment and involvement from the highest levels of
government to the smallest communities. Commitment will need to be backed by substantial and immediate
investments, public awareness campaigns, legislative and institutional changes, technology development, and
capacity building programmes. Underlying all these must be a greater recognition of the interdependence of all
peoples, and of their place in the natural world” (ICWE, 1992).
The conference report’s recommendations for action at local, national and international levels are based on four guiding
principles (so called Dublin Principles):
Principle No. 1:
Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development and the environment.
Principle No. 2:
Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and
policy-makers at all levels.
Principle No. 3:
Women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water.
Principle No. 4:
Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good.
The Dublin Principles became an important input to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and are therefore often referred to as Dublin-Rio Principles, which culminated in
the adoption of the Fresh Water Chapter (Chapter 18) of the Agenda 21. The Fresh Water Chapter deals with water
resources under the title “Integrated Water Resources Development and Management” and states that “[...] Integrated
water resources management is based on the perception of water as an integral part of the ecosystem, a natural resource
and a social and economic good, whose quantity and quality determine the nature of its utilization” (UNCED, 1992). This
definition of IWRM underlines the importance of water resources as an integral part of ecosystems and the bio-physical
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limitation of the resource. Moreover, the Dublin-Rio Principles place a strong emphasis on governance aspects by stressing
the need for participation of all stakeholders, awareness raising and addressing competing uses of water.
2.1.1 Starting the implementation of IWRM - Refining the concept and goal setting
The period until 1992 can certainly be described as a conceptual phase for IWRM on the international political agenda.
The Dublin and Rio conferences clearly mark a milestone for the international evolution of IWRM, with the Dublin-Rio
Principles representing a first conceptual agreement upon the way how water resources ought to be sustainably managed.
Rio’s Agenda 21 already included a first international goal setting element with the recommendation to all states to begin
to implement IWRM principles by the year 2000 (Petit and Baron, 2009). Furthermore, IWRM as a policy approach was
assigned a central role for the achievement of international sustainability and development goals.
An early phase of implementation followed the conceptual phase from 1992 onward until 2002. During this decade
important steps towards international implementation of IWRM were taken and also much effort was made to clarify
the IWRM concept in (more) practical terms. After Dublin and Rio, with the call for integrated management, the high
degree of fragmentation of the water sector in the international community, and in particular the UN family, became
obvious (cf., Savenije and Van der Zaag, 2008). One important step in the process towards more coordination within
the water sector of the international community, since there is no UN organization that deals specifically with water
resources, has been the formation of the Global Water Partnership (GWP) and the World Water Council (WWC) in 1996.
Both organizations aim to coordinate the implementation of IWRM principles and practices worldwide. By providing a
platform to encourage debates and exchanges of experience, the WWC aims to reach a common strategic vision on water
resources and water services management among all stakeholders in the international water community. An important
instrument of the WWC is the World Water Forum taking place every three years. The GWP focuses on the implementation
of IWRM concepts at the operational level and advises countries, especially developing and newly industrialized countries,
in the process of IWRM establishment.
The establishment of the GWP and the WWC a few years after the international consensus on IWRM in 1992 reflects
the awareness of the international community of the forthcoming implementation challenge posed by this ambitious water
management paradigm. From 1998 onward the GWP published several background papers on IWRM focusing on how to
implement the principles agreed on in Dublin and Rio. With its Background paper No. 4 (GWP, 2000) the GWP published
a comprehensive description of the IWRM concept and its implementation process. The publication provides advice and
guidance on how IWRM could be implemented under different conditions. Moreover, it contains the following definition:
“IWRM is a process, which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and related
resources in order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems“ (GWP, 2000).
This definition is broadly accepted and describes IWRM as a process, often also referred to as the establishment of a
normative framework for sustainable water resources management. Moreover, the definition emphasizes that coordination
in (infrastructure) development and management of water resources is required, and water as well as land and related
resources have to be considered together. The IWRM process is further attributed to be an open, flexible process bringing
together decision-makers across the various sectors that affect water resources, and bringing all stakeholders to the table to
set policies and make balanced decisions in response to the water challenges faced. Finally, it highlights the sustainability
goal of economic and social welfare without compromising the ecosystems that sustain it. Based on this definition, the
IWRM concept explicitly challenges traditional, sectoral water management concepts and places emphasis on an integrated
approach with more coordinated decision making across water use sectors as well as across temporal and spatial scales.
Although different organizations have found alternative IWRM definitions (see Huppert (2005) for a detailed discussion
of IWRM definitions and their degree of intra- and intersectoral integration), the above quoted GWP definition, although
neither unambiguous nor officially accredited, is broadly regarded as the most authoritative one in existence (cf., Snellen
and Schrevel, 2004; Lankford et al., 2007; Medema, 2008).
The GWP Background paper No. 4 on IWRM was published because of a perceived “[...] need for a clarification
and formulation of certain principles and recommendations within integrated water resources management - serving a
general purpose of contributing to the implementation of IWRM, but also an internal purpose of establishing a common
understanding within GWP and Technical Advisory Committee of the Global Water Partnership (TAC)” (GWP, 2000). Thus,
the paper represents the “corporate view” of the TAC on integrated water resources management. Nevertheless, and
taking into account the pioneer and widely accepted role of the GWP, the document provides several clarifications on the
principles underlying IWRM, its definition and how to implement it in general terms.
Because the Dublin-Rio principles have found universal support among the international community as the guiding
principles underpinning IWRM, the GWP provides in its background paper more detail regarding the meaning of each
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of the principles (see below). This can be interpreted as a reaction of several controversies, above all about the exact
meaning of water as an economic good, about the principles.2
• Principle I: Water as a finite and vulnerable resource
– A holistic approach to management is needed, recognizing all the characteristics of the hydrological cycle
and its interaction with other natural resources and ecosystems, is needed. Water is required for different
purposes, functions and services - holistic management involves consideration of the demands and threats
placed on the resource.
– Resource yield has natural limits as the hydrological cycle on average yields a fixed quantity of water per
time period; the resource may be regarded as a natural capital asset, which needs to be maintained to ensure
that the desired services it provides are sustained.
– Effects of human activities have an impact on the productivity of the water resource, reducing the availability
and quality of water by actions, e.g. mining of groundwater, polluting water and changing land use which
alter flow regimes within surface water systems.
– Need for recognition of the linkages between upstream and downstream users of water. This implies
that dialogue or conflict resolution mechanisms are needed in order to reconcile the different needs.
– A holistic institutional approach is needed to coordinate between the range of human activities which
create the demands for water, determine land uses and generate water-borne waste products.
• Principle II: Participatory approach
– Real participation; stakeholders need to be part of the decision-making process (directly at the local
community level, democratically by elected or otherwise accountable agencies or spokespersons or through
appropriate pricing in market processes) depending on the respective scale of water management decisions.
– Participation is more than consultation; it requires that stakeholders at all levels of the social structure
have an impact on decisions at different levels of water management.
– Achieving consensus; a participatory approach is the only means to achieve long-lasting consensus and
common agreement. Stakeholders have to recognize that the sustainability of the resource is a common
problem and that all parties are going to have to sacrifice some desires for the common good.
– Creating participatory mechanisms and capacity; governments have to make participation possible at all
levels by creating mechanisms for stakeholder consultation at all spatial scales. However, the creation of
consultative mechanisms as such will not lead to real participation. Creating participatory capacity involves
awareness raising, confidence building and education, and also the provision of the economic resources
needed to facilitate participation and the establishment of good and transparent sources of information.
– The lowest appropriate level; participation is an instrument that can be used to pursue an appropriate
balance between a top-down and a bottom-up approach to IWRM.
• Principle III: The important role of women
– Involvement of women in decision-making; operational mechanisms and actions to ensure an equitable
participation of women in IWRM are needed to ensure women’s participation at all organizational levels.
– Women as water users; need for mechanisms to increase women’s access to decision-making since they are
important water users.
– IWRM requires gender awareness; need to ensure that the water sector as a whole is gender aware.
• Principle IV: Water as an economic good
– Water has a value as an economic good; many past failures in water resources management are attributable
to the fact that water has been - and still is - viewed as a free good, or at least that the full value of water has
not been recognized.
– Value and charges are two different things; to avoid confusion over this concept there is a need to
distinguish clearly between valuing and charging for water. The value of water in alternative uses is important
for the rational allocation of water as a scarce resource (using the ‘opportunity cost’ concept), whether by
regulatory or economic means. Charging for water is applying an economic instrument to affect behavior
2 The notion of the economic value of water rather than water as a universal right is highly contested by NGOs and human rights activists,
because until the present day the Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development is still the only binding UN document that makes a
statement on the issue. However, in November 2002, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted General Comment
No. 15 recognizing water not only as a limited natural resource and a public good but also as a human right. Adopting General Comment
No. 15 is seen as a decisive step towards the recognition of water as a universal right, although the document has no legally binding power
(Woodhouse, 2004). Finally, in 2010, through Resolution 64/292, the United Nations General Assembly explicitly recognized the human right
to water and sanitation and acknowledged that clean drinking water and sanitation are essential to the realization of all human rights. Besides
a detailed description of the quantity, quality and accessibility properties of water, it states that affordability of basic water needs requires costs
that should not exceed 3 per cent of household income.
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towards conservation and efficient water usage, to provide incentives for demand management, ensure cost
recovery and to signal consumers’ willingness to pay for additional investments in water services.
– Useful water value and cost concepts; the concepts of Total Economic Value / Costs taking into account use
and non-use (intrinsic) values and costs has been found useful within IWRM.
– The goal of full cost recovery should be the goal for all water uses unless there are compelling reasons for
not doing so.
– Managing demand through economic instruments; treating water as an economic good may help balance
the supply and demand of water, thereby sustaining the flow of goods and services from this important natural
asset.
– Financial self-sufficiency versus water as a social good; to be effective water resources management
agencies and water utilities need to ensure that they have adequate resources to be financially independent of
general revenues. At the same time direct subsidies for targeted groups (disadvantaged water users) may be
required, but they need to be transparent (GWP, 2000).
Moreover, with its IWRM definition, the GWP background paper offers a way to tackle the challenge at the operational
level to translate the agreed principles into concrete action. Acknowledging “[...] that the concept of IWRM is widely
debated and an unambiguous definition of IWRM does not currently exist” (GWP, 2000) the paper goes further and
highlights that IWRM implementation has to occur context-specific. By focusing on describing what integration means it
offers guidance to further work in IWRM. An important statement then is that “integration is necessary but not sufficient” -
integration per se cannot guarantee development of optimal strategies, plans and management schemes. One the one
hand, the paper points out two basic categories where integration has to occur both within and between these:
• the natural system, with its critical importance for resource availability and quality, and
• the human system, which fundamentally determines the resource use, waste production and pollution of the
resource, and which must also set the development priorities.
Integration within the natural system (based on GWP, 2000) incorporates:
• Integration of freshwater management and coastal zone management; reflecting the continuum of freshwater
and coastal waters.
• Integration of land and water management; an integrated approach to the management of land and water takes
as its departure point the hydrological cycle transporting water between the compartments air, soil, vegetation,
surface and groundwater sources. As a result, land use developments and vegetation cover [...] influence the
physical distribution and quality of water and must be considered in the overall planning and management of the
water resources. [...] The promotion of catchment and river basin management confirms that these are logical
planning units for IWRM from a natural system perspective. Catchment and basin level management is not only
important as a means of integrating land use and water issues, but is also critical in managing the relationships
between quantity and quality and between upstream and downstream water interests.
• Green water and blue water; a conceptual distinction can be made between water that is used directly for biomass
production and ‘lost’ in evapotranspiration (green water) and water flowing in rivers and aquifers (blue water).
Management of green water flows holds significant potential for water savings (crop per evaporated drop in rainfed
and irrigated agriculture), increasing water use efficiency and the protection of vital ecosystems.
• Integration of surface water and groundwater management; the hydrological cycle also calls for integration
between surface and groundwater management. The drop of water retained at the surface of a catchment may
appear alternately as surface- and groundwater on its way downstream through the catchment.
• Integration of quantity and quality in water resources management. The deterioration of water quality reduces
the usability of the resource for downstream stakeholders.
• Integration of upstream and downstream water-related interests; an integrated approach to water resources
management entails identification of conflicts of interest between upstream and downstream stakeholders. The
consumptive ‘losses’ upstream will reduce river flows. The pollution loads discharged upstream will degrade river
water quality. Land use changes upstream may alter groundwater recharge and river flow seasonality. Flood
control measures upstream may threaten flood-dependent livelihoods downstream. [...] Recognition of downstream
vulnerability to upstream activities is imperative. Once again management involves both natural and human
systems.
Integration within the human system (based on GWP, 2000):
• Mainstreaming of water resources; when it comes to analyzing human activities or service systems, virtually all
aspects of integration involve an understanding of the natural system, its capacity, vulnerability and limits.
• Cross-sectoral integration in national policy development; water resources management systems must include
cross-sectoral information exchange and co-ordination procedures, as well as techniques for the evaluation of
individual projects with respect to their implications for the water resources in particular and society in general.
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• Macro-economic effects of water developments; in situations where large amounts of capital are mobilized for
water sector investments the macro-economic impacts are often quite large and deleterious to overall economic
development.
• Basic principles for integrated policy-making; land use policy-makers must be informed about the water conse-
quences downstream and the external costs and benefits imposed on the natural water system, consideration of the
effect of water developments on water demand and other water uses, be aware of the trade-offs between short-
term benefits and long-term costs and application of the precautionary principle, subsidiarity in water resources
management is essential so that different tasks are undertaken at the lowest appropriate level.
And on the other hand it presents the following important complementary elements for the implementation of IWRM
(see also Figure 2.1):
• the enabling environment - the general framework of national policies, legislation and regulations and information
for water resources management stakeholders;
• the institutional roles and functions of the various administrative levels and stakeholders; and
• the management instruments, including operational instruments for effective regulation, monitoring and enforce-
ment that enable the decision-makers to make informed choices between alternative actions. These choices need to
be based on agreed policies, available resources, environmental impacts and the social and economic consequences
(GWP, 2000).
Jønch-Clausen (2004) states, on behalf of the GWP, that “[...] implementing an IWRM process is in fact, a question of
getting these three pillars right” and the development of national IWRM plans should be based on those.
Integrated Water Resources Management
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Figure 2.1: General framework for IWRM according to the GWP (2000)
These change areas are general in terms and may be applied on different political levels. At the national level general
guidelines, institutional roles and management instruments need to be defined and established. On the one hand, this
process inevitably has some top-down characteristics when creating a favorable enabling environment. By setting overall
national policy and development goals, building an adequate legislative framework and by installing financing and
incentive structures, pathways towards IWRM on the lower policy levels and institutional roles may be defined as well as
management tools proposed or even prescribed. On the other hand, the change areas in terms of basin-wide cross-sectoral
cooperation and conflict resolution, stakeholder involvement, public participation and recognition of the river basin as the
basic unit for planning primarily represent a complementary bottom-up process.
Since the international agreement on IWRM in 1992, numerous reaffirmations and attempts to foster its implementation
by the international community have followed. There have been reaffirmations to the IWRM concept, for instance, at
the Second World Water Forum in The Hague, in 2000, with the formulation of the World Water Vision “[...] not just to
end up the implementation of the Dublin Principles, but also to propose a comprehensive set of practical principles for
10 2 Evolution and implementation of Integrated Water Resources Development and Management
implementation” (Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000). Furthermore, the GWP launched its IWRM ToolBox as an online-
platform at the World Water Forum in The Hague (from 2001 on also available as a print version) intended as “[...] an
information exchange platform where experiences are shared to help develop the body of knowledge which can enable all
those engaged in water issues to work together to build water security and sustainable water for all” (GWP, 2012). The
ToolBox builds on the above mentioned three IWRM implementation pillars enabling environment, institutional roles and
management instruments. Within these three categories it offers 54 tools, i.e. guidelines, how to implement IWRM related
to 193 cases of actual application of the tools in practice (GWP, 2013a). Moreover, the ToolBox contains 178 references in
form of support documents, manuals, papers, and external IWRM knowledge databases. The tools part is the fixed part
(revision possible, e.g. change from version 1 to version 2) and the case study and reference part is evolving dynamically
with inputs from collaborators around the globe.
Jønch-Clausen and Fugl (2001) attempt to firm up the conceptual basis of IWRM as a reaction to the fact that “[...]
IWRM has degenerated into one of these buzz-words that everybody uses but that means many different things to different
people”. Their paper is a summary of the GWP’s background paper on IWRM with additional comments in order to improve
the conceptual understanding of the concept. Most importantly, Jønch-Clausen and Fugl stress that IWRM is essentially a
process and not a goal in itself and focus on what should be integrated. For them the integration within the human system
is especially challenging. In their conclusion, Jønch-Clausen and Fugl emphasize that IWRM must not be interpreted as
a universal blueprint for water resources management worldwide and therefore practical implementation must reflect
local conditions of the natural and human system. The authors argue further that one should not be overwhelmed by the
complexity of the IWRM concept. In practice, prevailing challenges should be at the center of IWRM implementation.
However, getting the different actors to agree on an integrated approach and to act in a co-ordinated way may be much
more difficult (Jønch-Clausen and Fugl, 2001).
In addition to the promotion of IWRM through the WWC and the GWP, the international community agreed on further
measures to confront the difficulties in IWRM implementation. Based on the stated need for regular, global assessments on
the status of freshwater resource at the Sixth Session of the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) in 1998 the
member organizations of UN-Water founded the World Water Assessment Programme (WWAP) in 2000 to coordinate the
production of the triennial UN World Water Development Report (WWDR) in conjunction with the World Water Forum.
The WWAP’s objective is to report on the status of global freshwater resources, changing management challenges and the
progress achieved in reaching the Millennium Development Goals related to water. The first World Water Development
Report was released in 2003.
In 2000 at the Millennium Summit of the United Nations the concept of IWRM was strongly related to the achievement
of the MDG. Finally, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, in 2002, the UN adopted the
establishment of national IWRM plans as an instrument to achieve the MDG. As a follow-up to the MDG based on the
Millennium Declaration adopted by the heads of State in 2000 it was further agreed at the Summit in Johannesburg in
2002, through the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation (JPI), to ‘develop integrated water resources management and
water efficiency plans by 2005, with support to developing countries, through actions at all levels“. The former deadline
for IWRM implementation of IWRM plans was extended to 2005 at the 2002 Johannesburg conference (Article 18 of the
summit’s declaration). This extension was relayed by numerous international institutions such as the UNDP, the United
Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), the World Bank, the WWC and the GWP. UN-Water was founded in 2003 to
foster greater co-operation and information sharing among UN entities and other relevant stakeholders.
The first phase of IWRM implementation revealed that IWRM implementation is a difficult and complex task. Besides
first successful steps towards IWRM implementation, for instance in the EU, Canada, South Africa, and Australia, there has
been little progress on implementation in other parts of the world. While important groundwork on the IWRM concept, of
what it implies and how it may be implemented could be realized, the need for much more investigation on success factors
and the overcoming of implementation obstacles became apparent. The need to know more about the global status of
IWRM implementation and to foster the experience exchange process among practitioners is reflected in the establishment
of the World Water Assessment Programme and the GWP IWRM ToolBox launch at the end of the first implementation
phase.
2.1.2 Assessing the global status of IWRM implementation - Progress, obstacles and recommendations
During the period from 1992 to 2002 IWRM gained even more importance within the international community. At the
Johannesburg Summit IWRM obtained the status of a means to achieve the MDGs and the international community agreed
on the development of national IWRM plans by 2005. With the establishment of the GWP and the WWC, communication
and experience exchange of the IWRM concept was fostered. Especially in developing countries the GWP has assisted, as
in the case of South Africa, in IWRM implementation and the GWP ToolBox provided important guidance for practical
steps towards IWRM.
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The subsequent period of IWRM development from 2002 onward can be described as a second phase of implementation.
This period reveals a shift towards a stronger focus on the implementation progress of IWRM in practice. During this third
period several actions to improve implementation, e.g. through capacity building and promotion of extensive experience
exchanges, as well as to monitor and assess the IWRM implementation process were realized. The importance of capacity
building can be seen in the formation of the Cap-Net, a nonprofit international capacity building network for Integrated
Water Resource Management(IWRM) initiated by UNDP.
Since the Second World Water Forum in 2000 the topic of water governance has become increasingly prominent and is
now regarded as one of the most important issues to achieve IWRM implementation (Rogers et al., 2003; Rogers and Hall,
2003; Kidd and Shaw, 2007). A dialogue on effective water governance was undertaken by GWP in partnership with the
UNDP and the International Council for Local Environment Initiatives (ICLEI) in 2002 in order to gain more experience on
what makes water governance more effective (Rogers et al., 2003). A key conclusion from this dialogue was that water
governance cannot be isolated from development in society at large. In conclusion, the dialogue report recommends that
water governance should build on existing governance arrangements wherever possible, capitalize on opportunities to
improve coordination and redefine roles and responsibilities, and develop capacity among individuals and institutions in
order to govern water resources more wisely (Kidd and Shaw, 2007; Rogers et al., 2003). Additionally, a broad scientific
dialog on IWRM has commenced, presenting critical views on the applicability of the concept and the struggles for its
implementation.
As called for at the end of the first IWRM implementation phase, the development progress of national IWRM plans has
been monitored using country surveys at repeating intervals. The first two surveys in 2003 and 2005 were carried out by
the GWP and had mainly informal character. The surveys focused on the formulation process of national IWRM plans
without regard to their respective implementation status.
The surveys carried out in 2007/2008 and 2011 by UN-Water became the basis of official status reports on the
implementation of IWRM plans to the UN CSD whereas the 2012 “report [based on the survey realized in 2011] is more
extensive, covering more countries and addressing the development, management and uses of water resources, as well as
the possible outcomes and impacts of integrated approaches” (UN-Water, 2012b).
The survey results of 2003 documented - for the first time and on a broad analytical basis - that the IWRM implementation
progress is slow and had to be monitored in order to identify its main obstacles. In order to carry out the survey, GWP
regional contact persons were asked to provide a “[...] relative assessment of countries’ maturity relating to the adoption
of an IWRM approach. This assessment was to identify countries as having reached three different maturity levels (good
progress, some steps, and initial stage) and to be qualified by short summary statements based on the survey data” (GWP,
2004). This first snapshot survey of the GWP in 2003 revealed that only about 10 % of the 108 surveyed countries (45 in
Africa; 42 in Asia and the Pacific; 22 in Latin America) had made good progress in developing their IWRM and Water
Efficiency plans, 50 % had taken some steps toward developing their plans, while the remaining 40 % were only in initial
stages of the process (GWP, 2004).
The first UN World Water Development Report (WWDR) of 2003 confirms the progress towards IWRM implementation
as being quite slow. Nevertheless, the report highlights “[...] encouraging trends in the needed reforms, and in three
areas in particular: 1. recognition of the need for sound water governance and of certain required reforms of policy and
institution, plus enforcement of laws and regulation, that are essential to sustainable water development; 2. reform of
water institutions and policies is now taking place in many countries, but progress is slow and limited; 3. the IWRM
approach is accepted in principle, but implementation is partial in both developed and developing countries” (WWAP,
2003).
In 2005 the GWP again conducted an informal survey, similar to the one in 2003. It focused on policies, laws,
plans/strategies and other planning documents prepared by the 95 surveyed countries. The purpose of the survey was to
capture the status of IWRM policies, laws and plans, but not to assess what is actually being implemented (GWP, 2006).
The survey report summarizes the results as follows:
“The survey indicates that approximately 21 % of the countries have plans/strategies in place or well underway
and a further 53 % have initiated a process for the formulation of an IWRM strategy/plan. Therefore, according
to the definition provided by the MDG Task Force it can be concluded that about three-quarters of the countries
surveyed have met the target of initiating a process for the development of national strategies/plans. In these
countries the survey indicates that the IWRM approach appears to be well accepted as the way forward for better
water resources management and use. The remaining 26 % have made only limited progress and in many cases
have expressed a wish to move forward but need support in this process” (GWP, 2006).
Moreover, the survey identified that “constraints to planning and implementation of IWRM include a lack of political
will to foster needed policy changes and to allocate needed financial and other resources, as well as inadequate awareness
of water issues, and inadequate institutional capacity” (GWP, 2006).
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The initial surveys by the GWP as well as the first WWDR of 2003 document the broad acceptance of the IWRM
concept among national governments, however, both assessments already highlight that a formal reform process based
on IWRM-oriented policies, laws and plans is not enough to implement IWRM. While the formulation of IWRM plans,
strategies and laws is described as slow and sometimes partial, the next step of actual implementation of IWRM is still
absent at large.
Additional findings presents UN-Water (2006) presents additional findings in a report from the 4th World Water Forum
on the subject of “Implementing Integrated Water Resources Management” from two global surveys, one being the
GWP survey of 2005 and the other one a survey of the Japan Water Forum (JWF) (JWF, 2006), and six additional
regional overviews that had collected and analyzed information on the progress of incorporating IWRM principles into
national planning around the world. Despite “[...] that the basic principles of IWRM are being introduced into legislative
and institutional reform, albeit in some cases slowly,” the report highlights that more attention needs to be paid to
implementation: “Moving from planning to the follow-up phase of concrete action appears to be a stumbling block for
many countries” (UN-Water, 2006). Moreover, it concludes “[...] that despite the admirable progress made in initiating
IWRM planning and establishing an enabling institutional environment for IWRM in many countries, the slow progress
made after success in the initial stages indicates that the realization of the IWRM target set in Johannesburg may in fact
take many years to achieve. The type and level of change required, a shift in mindset as well as operational approaches,
demands widespread institutional as well as social change, at all levels” (UN-Water, 2006). Thus, the UN-Water report
reaffirms the findings of the former implementation assessments. As a conclusion, the report identifies key areas for
improvement: capacity enhancement, civil society involvement, international support and coordination, monitoring and
indicator development and environmental sustainability.
In 2006, the WWAP once again published a World Water Development Report. This second report mirrors the global
survey results of 2005 by stating that there is a significant gap between policy-making (e.g. through establishing formal
IWRM plans and the development of new water legislation) and its implementation in practice, especially in developing
countries. The report identifies serious gaps in developing countries between land and water use policies and governance.
Furthermore, in spite of the need to localize water management, many governments “[...] fail to delegate adequate powers
and resources to make it work. On the other hand local groups are often without access to information, are excluded from
water decision-making, and thus lack a capacity to act” (WWAP, 2006). The report continues to highlight that “[...] there
is, in reality, limited practical experience of how it [IWRM] can be implemented. In the overall context of IWRM, relevant
challenges to and opportunities for an improved integration of land and water governance have, surprisingly, received
little attention. It has proven difficult to integrate or coordinate land and water in a meaningful way, particularly for the
rural and urban poor who have been socially and politically marginalized, and largely excluded from access to land, water
resources management and related services” (WWAP, 2006). The report stresses further that recent achievements in the
development of sophisticated water policies and plans (e.g. European Union Water Framework Directive or the IWRM
process in South Africa) need to be balanced, however, by a recognition that policy changes at national levels have often
been only imperfectly followed through to effective implementation (Zimbabwe is a recent example). The report sees
“[...] a tendency to separate policy-making processes from implementation” (WWAP, 2006). Taking these statements into
account, the WWDR provides a much deeper and much more detailed analysis of practical implementation obstacles than
former assessments. Effective decentralization, integration of land and water management, coordination and participation
at the local level are revealed as having a central role for successful IWRM implementation. Furthermore, it seems to
be unclear how, i.e. through which (management) instruments, implementation can be successfully achieved (limited
practical experience). Hence, the report points out major questions that still need to be worked out to put effective IWRM
into practice. The report summarizes the following points explicitly linked to governance issues:
• Who is in charge of integration? Who implements integration?
• Who decides what interests should be reflected in IWRM plans and policies? How should policy processes be
governed to ensure that relevant stakeholder interests are duly reflected?
• How should conflicting interests and disputes be resolved? What are the appropriate formal and informal institutions
and conflict resolution mechanisms for efficient and equitable water decisions?
• Is there really a need to integrate all water issues?
Aside from highlighting the implementation gap of IWRM, the second WWDR presents several recommendations on
how to overcome this gap: “There is no blueprint for improved governance. This suggests that specific solutions - the
ideal solution - may be less relevant and emphasizes the importance of enabling processes and frameworks that can be
applied to resolve certain issues in situations of economic or other constraints and in contexts of change, that is, ‘second
or third best’ solutions” (WWAP, 2006). Thus, the report highlights clearly that the local context matters for practical
implementation. Moreover, implementation should occur while addressing the most felt ecological and social constraints,
even if this may promote second best solutions: “New management approaches will be based on regional cooperation
principles, focusing on river basins and aquifer systems, with an emphasis on social needs and environmental sustainability.
They will focus on interrelated natural resources problems, reduce potential points of friction and stress, and eliminate
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conflicting demands through risk management and vulnerability assessment. Classical legal tools and more informal
approaches both have important roles to play in defusing conflict and developing cooperation” (WWAP, 2006). The key
recommendation that “IWRM has to be tailored to prevailing socio-economic conditions”, though, can encounter obstacles:
- lack of proper coordination of management activities and appropriate management tools - inability to integrate water
resources policies - institutional fragmentation - insufficiently trained or qualified manpower - shortfalls in funding -
inadequate public awareness - limited involvement by communities, NGOs and the private sector (WWAP, 2006).
The second WWDR provides important findings on how to overcome the encountered implementation gap of IWRM.
There appears to be a general agreement that, apart from the establishment of a (national) enabling environment and
the assignment of institutional roles, for practical implementation the local context and the specific problem-setting in
both its socio-economic and ecological dimension matter. Accordingly, blueprint solutions or all integrating solutions are
not useful. In order to achieve practical implementation the report’s recommendations make clear that more pragmatism
seems more promising.
In 2008 UN-Water prepared a first official global status report on the implementation of IWRM for the 16th session of
the Commission on Sustainable Development. According to UN-Water the report “[...] provides the best and most objective
comprehensive overview of the current status of water resources management” (UN-Water, 2008) at this time. The report
is based on survey results of questionnaires by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA)
and UNEP from 2007, covering 104 countries of which 77 are developing or countries in transition and 27 are developed,
i.e. member states of the OECD and EU. The report explicitly addresses the need “[...] to assess the extent to which
countries have been able to go beyond simply having plans in place to the stage of implementing those plans and the
extent to which tangible outcomes have been forthcoming” (UN-Water, 2008). Earlier surveys by the GWP had an informal
character and assessed only the establishment of IWRM plans without considering their implementation.
UN-Water’s 2008 status report illustrates that developed countries make good progress in almost all aspects of IWRM
implementation, and further improvement is mainly needed in public awareness and gender mainstreaming. In developing
countries “there has been some recent improvement in the IWRM planning process at national level but much more needs
to be done to implement the plans”. This supports the findings of the WWDR and UN-Water of 2006 (WWAP, 2006;
UN-Water, 2006). 17 of the 77 developing countries surveyed (22 %) have national IWRM plans in place and partially
implemented; a further 2 countries (3 %) have these plans fully implemented.
Table 2.1 illustrates a selection of important national government actions (documents that guide and regulate the use,
conservation and protection of a nation’s water resources) towards IWRM in developing and transitional countries. The
status report highlights that “[...] there are many illustrations of the tangible benefits of implementing plans that have
adopted the IWRM approach. There are examples at the national and international levels; of particular significance are
the examples at the community and provincial levels for it is at these levels that so many societal gains can be made”
(UN-Water, 2008). As recommendations for improvements in IWRM implementation, the report highlights the importance
of water management within natural hydrological units and the need for approaches to be tailored to the individual
circumstance of country and local region. This implies again that different countries will need a set of actions suited to
their particular needs and that time schedules for implementation will differ from country to country depending on specific
country circumstances.
In 2009, the third World Water Development Report once more takes stock of IWRM implementation and recalls
on the fact that “[...] implementing integrated water resources management is proving more difficult than envisioned”
(UN-Water, 2009). Having said this, the report concludes that even in the case of adequate policies and laws being in
place, development of water resources will not take place without adequate funding of infrastructure and the institutional
and human capacity of the sector. Besides the need for sufficient funding, institutional and human capacity development,
the report additionally recommends consultation with stakeholders and accountability in planning, implementation and
management to build trust, Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) as an incentive for improving water management
efforts and for supporting sustainable ecosystems and water security (UN-Water, 2009). The report highlights the need to
take increasing uncertainty in water management into account, improving monitoring of water quantity and quality to
properly manage water resources and risk management are suggested as suitable solutions (UN-Water, 2009).
The issues of risk management and uncertainty in complex water management, caused by both socio-economic
developments and climate change, are taken up again in the fourth World Water Development Report of 2012 (UN-Water,
2012a). As a response to prevailing challenges, the fourth report explicitly calls for an adaptive management approach
towards IWRM. This implies that “as IWRM becomes more adaptive it will involve more multi-sector and multi-disciplinary
collaboration. It will also be necessary to look beyond what is traditionally considered water management and link it
with decisions made in other linked domains such as land management, agriculture, mining and energy” (UN-Water,
2012a). Hence, it requires a shift towards more emphasis on the management of processes and people as well as policies
based on institutional reform, incentives and behavioral change (UN-Water, 2012a). The traditional command-and-control
approach is regarded by the report as “less effective in many situations” compared to the promoted adaptive approach
that calls for “learning to manage by managing to learn”. The report explains how this has to be understood: “In a more
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Country IWRM related government action (strategy, plan, policy, law)
Eritrea Integrated Water Resources Management and Water Efficiency Plan - Ministry of Land Water & Environ-
ment (draft 2007)
Egypt National Water Resources Plan - Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (2004)
Botswana IWRM Strategy and Action Plan - Ministry of Minerals, Energy and Water Resources (2006)
Burkina Faso
Decree No.2003-220: Action Plan for IWRM in Burkina Faso (PAGIRE) - Ministry of Agriculture,
Hydraulics & Fishing Resources (2003)
Burkina Faso Water Vision - Ministry of Agriculture, Hydraulics & Fishing Resources (2000)
Water Law No.002-2001- Government of Burkina Faso (2001)
Costa Rica
National Strategy for Integrated Water Resources Management - Government of Costa Rica (2006)
National IWRM Action Plan - Government of Costa Rica (2006)
National Water Law (No. 14585) - Government of Costa Rica (draft 2006)
Honduras IWRM Action Plan - Honduran Water Platform (2006)
Nicaragua
General Law on National Waters - Government of Nicaragua (2007)
Environmental Action Plan - Ministry of Environment (1994)
IWRM Action Plan - Ministry of Environment (1998)
Argentina IWRM Roadmap - Sub-secretariat of Water Resources (2007)
Brazil
National Water Policy (Law No. 9433) - Government of Brazil (1997)
National Water Resources Plan - Ministry of Environment, National Water Council (CNRH)
National Water Agency (2007)
Philippines
Medium Term Philippine Development Plan (2004-2010) - Government of Philippines (2004)
Clean Water Act - Government of Philippines (2004)
Integrated Water Resources Management Plan Framework - National Water Resources Board (2007
Syria
National water Policy - Government of Syria
National Water Law (No.31) - Government of Syria (2005)
IWRM and Water Efficiency Plan - In place but partially implemented
Table 2.1: Evidence of adoption and use of the IWRM approach in di erent countries; based on (UN-Water, 2008)
adaptive approach towards IWRM, knowledge needs to be multi-disciplinary, based on an understanding of society and
nature, and able to facilitate integrated approaches so that water institutions and management actors can absorb, adopt
and implement new forms of management” (UN-Water, 2012a).
Besides the social dimension of the described shift towards an adaptive IWRM, it apparently has a strong ecological
dimension as well. Thus, the report highlights the central role of ecosystems in sustaining the water cycle. This role needs
to be understood in order to facilitate effective water management:
“An inclusive, holistic and participatory approach to water policy and management permits identification of the
full range of ecosystem services involved, where the risks are, and who is vulnerable to them and why. The role of
land cover (vegetation) and soil in reducing hydrological risk illustrates the need to rethink water storage in
ecosystem terms. The use or restoration of ecosystem infrastructure to sustain or improve water quality is already
a widespread practice with a proven track record. Using ecosystem infrastructure to manage risks associated
with flooding is another area in which interest, practice and demonstrated feasibility are rapidly developing”
(UN-Water, 2012a).
At the implementation level, the report proposes a three-step process to identify opportunities for a proactive manage-
ment of ecosystems in order to reduce uncertainty and manage risk:
1. Identify the water management objectives as opposed to focusing on infrastructure (e.g. objectives are water storage
or clean water, not dams or treatment plants).
2. Explore what ecosystems offer in terms of meeting the identified management objective(s) (e.g. storing water,
reducing pollution), including through their conservation and/or restoration.
3. Reduce the uncertainties and risks involved in decisions by considering all ecosystem services directly involved or
potentially impacted by various management options. This includes valuing multiple co-benefits, and examining
trade-offs between them to determine desirable courses of action.
Moreover, the report states that to develop and implement an effective water resources management programme ideally
both a top-down and a bottom-up approach are incorporated. While “a top-down approach, being more strategic in
orientation, offers a general framework within which a water management activity or programme can be developed and
implemented. A bottom-up approach, being more operational in orientation, can provide an accurate picture of relevant
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’on-the-ground’ water issues, needs and uncertainties experienced by a wide range of actors and stakeholders” (UN-Water,
2012a). Once again special importance is assigned to the local level for addressing water-related issues, “as this is closest
to the point of actual impact, thereby facilitating acceptance of needed actions, provided that it is adequately positioned
and has the capacity to effectively deal with the issues” (UN-Water, 2012a).
In 2012 UN-Water presents the most comprehensive global status report on the implementation of IWRM so far for
the UN CSD meeting in the same year. While the main purpose of the UN-Water report of 2008 was to take stock of the
development and implementation of IWRM and Water Efficiency Plans, from the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation,
the purpose of the 2012 report is to focus on progress in the application of integrated approaches to the development,
management and use of water resources (UN-Water, 2012b). Hence, the report addresses planning and implementation as
well as the possible outcomes and impacts of integrated approaches.
Again this report sees progress in IWRM implementation, but also further need for improvements when it states that
“while there is still a long way to go, progress towards the goal of sustainable water resources management is undoubtedly
being made” (UN-Water, 2012b). As an example, the report points out that of the 130 countries included in the survey,
64 % have developed integrated water resources management plans and 34 % report an advanced stage of implementation.
In low and medium Human Development Index (HDI) countries, however, progress appears to have slowed, or even
regressed, since the last survey carried out in 2008. Thus, the report reaffirms that “much remains to be done to finance
and implement plans in many low and medium HDI countries” (UN-Water, 2012b).
The status report uses the three key change areas enabling environment, institutional roles (i.e. governance and
institutional frameworks) and management instruments, developed by the GWP (see also Section 2.1), to assess of the
IWRM implementation status. According to the survey results presented in the report, most of all progress has been best
in the two first mentioned areas: Since 1992, 80 % of countries have embarked on reforms to improve the enabling
environment for water resources management based on the application of integrated approaches as stated in Agenda 21
and affirmed in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. Institutional reforms have been undertaken in many countries
and correlate well with countries implementing legal and policy reforms (enabling environment). Nevertheless, translating
policy and legal changes into implementation is a slow process and only a minority of countries indicate progress with
stakeholder participation in their institutional reforms. The most common constraints to the development of appropriate
institutional arrangements reported are related to clarity of mandates, cross-sector coordination, capacity, and participation
as well as general awareness of the concept.
Through the application of management instruments on the ground, water policies and laws are put into practice. Thus,
the effectiveness of the policy and the law is largely seen from the effectiveness of its management instruments. The report
reveals that despite success stories (e.g. Uganda, Brazil, Australia) it seems that integrated approaches do not arise by
decree, but from mutual trust, appropriate mechanisms and gradual acknowledgment of the benefits (UN-Water, 2012b).
When applying management instruments in terms of efforts to manage water resources based on the river basin problems
of spatial fit often arise because existing political-administrative territories often have different boundaries (UN-Water,
2012b). Furthermore, the report concludes that “even when mandates are relatively clear coordination and cooperation
between management organizations can still be a challenge, as reported by almost one quarter of countries reporting on
constraints, including Cambodia, Greece, Uganda and Panama” (UN-Water, 2012b). Fragmented approaches to water
resources management are acknowledged as a general cause for the perceived lack of coordination and cooperation that
countries reported. Besides this institutional fragmentation there is also a lack of capacity resulting in the inability to
regulate and enforce laws and policies (UN-Water, 2012b). Moreover, inadequate participation and awareness of decision
makers, users and other key stakeholders were noted by almost one third of the countries reporting on management
constraints (UN-Water, 2012b).
The UN-Water report of 2012 also indicates - in the majority of countries - a high degree of adoption of management
approaches at the level of the basin or sub-basin, as recommended in Agenda 21 twenty years ago. Around half of
the countries being at an advanced stage of implementation of this river basin approach. Besides these decentralized
management structures, however, “[. . . ] the country response is mixed and in many cases unclear with regard to
stakeholder participation” (UN-Water, 2012b). Although, basin management structures often provide a mechanism and
means for good coordination and integration to take place, the country responses summarized in the report suggest that
formal structures are not enough; thus, coordination also requires trust and willingness to share information and resources
(UN-Water, 2012b). Finally, the report concludes that “it is evident from the survey that a truly integrated approach is a
long term process that requires on-going political commitment. There is clearly a move to follow through the legislative
and policy changes with action on the ground but more effort and support is needed to operationalize improvements to
water resources management” (UN-Water, 2012b).
With 104 countries having embarked on IWRM implementation it has become a strategic instrument for sustainable
water management around the globe. This strategic importance was reaffirmed last year at the United Nations Conference
on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in Rio de Janeiro as a political commitment:
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“We reaffirm the commitments made in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation and Millennium Declaration
regarding halving by 2015 the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation
and the development of integrated water resource management and water efficiency plans, ensuring sustainable
water use. We commit to the progressive realization of access to safe and affordable drinking water and basic
sanitation for all, as necessary for poverty eradication and to protect human health, and to significantly improve
the implementation of integrated water resource management at all levels as appropriate. In this regard, we
reiterate these commitments in particular for developing countries through the mobilization of resources from all
sources, capacity building and technology transfer” (UN, 2012, Outcome 120).
Both, the survey results on IWRM implementation and the WWDRs prove that progress is made, however, most of
all by creating an enabling environment through new laws and integrated policies and assigning institutional roles at
the highest (national) level. In contrast, the process to operationalize IWRM on the ground through the employment
of integrated management tools often remains an exception. Much has been learned from successful implementations
and some recommendation can be derived. An important insight has been that much more attention needs to be paid to
specific contexts and problem-settings. To successfully implement IWRM at the local level, prevailing problems have to be
addressed first and incentives must be created for stakeholders to engage, in order to achieve coordination. Recently, calls
for a more adaptive approach towards IWRM implementation as well as combining socio-economic and ecological goals
have become louder (UN-Water, 2012a,b).
The following section reflects on the scientific discourse on the concept of IWRM. This discourse has intensified since
the end of the 1990s and paralleled the international political dialog.
2.2 Scientific discourse on IWRM - Criticism, obstacles for implementation and recommendations
The assessment effort on implementation monitoring by the international organizations in charge (GWP, UNEP, UNESCO,
UN-Water) is complemented by an extensive scientific discussion among researchers and practitioners. Many authors see
the implementation outcomes of the IWRM progress critically and draw lessons from implementation practice so far. There
seems to be a general agreement on the principles of IWRM and the normative character of IWRM, but, as in the case of
the concept of sustainability as well, there is much controversy on what IWRM implies in its practical application.
First reflections about the emerging global paradigm of IWRM came up in the scientific discourse at the end of the
1990s and the beginning of the 20th century. Grigg (1999), for instance, attempts “[...] to add clarity to the popular but
poorly-understood concept of integrated water management” by reflecting on the need for and purpose of integration and
by providing suggestions about implementing improved approaches to integration. He questions the usefulness of the
“new” concept of IWRM for a general application: “The goals of integrated water management are certainly important,
but it is not clear that the term is operable at practical levels. In any case, we need a process to determine when such
an approach is required and to get the commitments needed from the appropriate participants. Water management
organizations may need to be convinced to participate, especially when their investments go for regional benefits, not only
their own direct needs” (Grigg, 1999).
Furthermore, Grigg asks in his paper “Who should lead and who should pay?”, thus, referring to who should assume
institutional and financial responsibility for an integrated approach. He sees principal “barriers to integration” in a lack of
congruence of political and problem boundaries, disincentives to cooperation, and low perceived need for integration.
Hence, according to Grigg “this leads to the question: why is an integrated approach necessary in the first place? The case
for the integrated approach is based on perceived benefits; thus the reason to accept leadership is to make integration
work, once it has been shown to be necessary”. In 1999, shortly before the nowadays most recognized IWRM definition of
the GWP was published, Grigg questions further “whether the term integrated water management is the best one to use. Is
the term operable, or should other words, such as coordinated, regional or cooperative be used?”. Grigg believes that the
main benefit of using integrated water management as a paradigm is its focus on the blending of viewpoints, and he offers
this definition: “Integrated water resources management is a framework for planning, organizing and controlling water
systems to balance all relevant views and goals of stakeholders”. Having established a clear term the next step is to decide
whether resolving a certain management problem requires a joint rather than a separate action: “In other words, rather
than solve problems in an age of complexity, recognizing and understanding them becomes more of an issue. When it has
been shown that joint action is required, getting commitments from the players to commit to the joint endeavor is the next
step. Then, finding and validating the leadership is required, and negotiating the payment arrangements“. Hence, Grigg
argues for a more problem-oriented and context-specific rationale for integration.
Moriarty et al. (2000) address the practical implications of IWRM and acknowledge that “while at the international level
agreements are signed and consensus reached about IWRM, at the local level, and within water sub-sectors there continues
to be much confusion as to what exactly the new paradigm implies, and how it should be addressed”. Their paper outlines
a methodology based on an interpretation of the Dublin Principles that helps to initiate a process of inclusion of IWRM
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principles within drinking water and sanitation projects. The papers of Grigg and Moriarty et al. evidence that questions
about the operationalization of IWRM, especially in the context of achieving integration, have been raised early on.
In 2004, Biswas published his critical paper Integrated water resources management: a reassessment asserting many
problems, both in concept and implementation, of IWRM as defined by the GWP. He argues that there has been little
impact of IWRM in practice, which he attributes, at least in part, to the amorphous character of the concept and absence of
guidelines to achieve its vision. Moreover, he questions if “[...] it is possible for a single paradigm of integrated water
resources management to encompass all countries, or even regions, with diverse physical, economic, social, cultural, and
legal conditions?”.
Similarly, Rahaman and Varis (2005) refer to IWRM as “[...] the current buzzword of water resources development,
[and] future challenges remain in reducing the gap between theoretically agreed policies and implementation”. Rahaman
and Varis argue further that the integration of different related sectors is very challenging and “[...] overly general or
universal policies and guidelines for implementing IWRM may become counterproductive” since problems and solutions of
IWRM implementation differ. Thus, Rahaman and Varis resume that “three decades of conferences have resulted in many
commitments to IWRM that, unfortunately, were often not implemented”.
Van der Zaag (2005) offers a way out of the practical implementation dilemma by regarding IWRM more as a framework
of possible management options than as a process. He concludes that “IWRM is a relevant, yet elusive and fuzzy concept”,
nevertheless, he regards IWRM as a must and not as an option. Van der Zaag discusses three general obstacles of IWRM
implementation: the institutional dimension, decision-processes, and upstream-downstream linkages. Referring to the
institutional dimension, Van der Zaag sees the role of new water organizations as consultative bodies ensuring consistent
developments throughout the catchment without necessarily having executive functions. Moreover, in a bid to avoid
wasting valuable resources, existing institutions and management structures should be incorporated. Accordingly, decision-
making should be based on consensus. Thus, Van der Zaag again argues in favor of more pragmatic and context-related
interpretation and implementation of IWRM. Concerning the upstream-downstream linkage obstacle, he states that “IWRM
in this context means designing institutional linkages that reciprocate and mirror the water flows. This will promote equity
and co-operation and preclude conflict. Our focus should be on the equitable sharing of the benefits derived from that
resource and not necessarily on sharing the water itself” (Van der Zaag, 2005). Although not explicitly, Van der Zaag, at
this point, already cautiously indicates the importance of recognizing the linkage between institutional design and the
natural system to be managed.
But still more authors point at the implementation problems of IWRM. Watson et al. (2007), for instance, highlight
“[w]hile most water researchers and managers appear to be comfortable with the general idea that IWM [Integrated
Water Management] is concerned with balanced, equitable and sustainable management of water, land and other natural
resources, there is very little agreement regarding what this actually means in practice or how IWM initiatives should be
designed, implemented and evaluated. While previous research has shown quite clearly that IWM cannot be achieved
through traditional top-down, fragmented and technocratic organizational and administrative arrangements, a great deal
of uncertainty and disagreement still exists regarding the precise institutional processes and mechanisms that are needed”.
Merrey (2008) makes a similar point as Biswas (2004) by claiming that “[IWRM] is leading to paralysis rather than
prioritized actions as water managers struggle to implement the full normative IWRM package in all its complexity”. He
regards IWRM as a systems paradigm that is critical to understand problems and limitations of single-factor solutions.
However, especially in the context of water management problems in developing countries (Merrey refers to his experiences
from South Africa) his argument is analogous to the former cited authors that “[...] converting IWRM into a set of normative
principles that must be implemented regardless of whether they are contextually appropriate is causing serious delays in
solving real problems” (Merrey, 2008).
The far-reaching ambitions of IWRM and the respective broadness of goals are identified also by Medema (2008) as
“[...] a significant hindrance to the ability of practitioners to demonstrate utility as the yawning gap between theory and
practice is both difficult to bridge and offers an uncertain reward for those who try”. García (2008) similarly argues
“[...] the concept [of IWRM], despite the efforts of many to clarify the issue, represents many things to many people
and accepts many definitions”. Molle (2008b) calls IWRM “the main ubiquitous nirvana concept” in the field of water
which “has evolved from the correct perception that water management has been unintegrated, or fragmented: economic
sectors and ministries have managed water independently while interventions in, and development of, water resources in
upper catchments have taken place without adequate consideration of impacts on downstream areas; water quality issues
have been often either disregarded or disconnected from quantity issues; groundwater has frequently been exploited
without concern for its hydrological linkages with surface water (and vice versa), and land-water interactions have been
overlooked; and last, ecosystems have been impaired and social equity often disregarded”. Hence, Molle argues that due
to the “wooly” nature of IWRM the concept obscures the political nature of natural resources management and is easily
hijacked by groups seeking to legitimize their own agendas.
Other authors agree with Molle stating that IWRM implementation is hindered if its inherent political nature is not
seriously recognized (Allan, 2003b; Wester and Warner, 2002; Swatuk, 2005). Accordingly, Allan (2003b) emphasizes the
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importance of the the political nature of water management (“integration is political and management is political”) by
proposing to change IWRM to IWRAM with ‘A’ for Allocation. Although IWRM is derived from international consensus,
Allan argues that it is reshaped by local political imperatives (cf., Molle, 2008b). Additionally, he sees in this context
limitations of focusing on river basins as the fundamental unit given that economies and societies transcend hydrological
boundaries. Wester and Warner (2002) question the transition to sustainable water management through the policy
prescription emphasized by the dominant water discourse to manage water on the basis of river basins. They base this
questioning on a concern that the political dimension of river basin management has not received sufficient attention: “A
major problem with river basin management is that its political dimension has been neglected, through the reification
of ‘natural’ boundaries, the emphasis on ’neutral’ planning and participation and the search for optimal management
strategies (‘win-win’ solutions). From a political science perspective, it becomes apparent that, at heart, the delineation and
maintenance of boundaries, the mobilization of interests and stakeholder representation, and the creation of basin-level
decision-making arrangements are quintessentially political processes that revolve around matters of choice” (Wester and
Warner, 2002). The fundamental importance of governance is underlined by Wester and Warner in stating “that water
management institutions and policies are effects of political practices”. Recognizing this importance implies a “discourse
that describes instead of prescribes, that focuses on processes and outcomes instead of forms and functions, and that is
informed by real world struggles” in order to better understand water management practices and processes of institutional
change.
Merrey (2008) agrees on the fact that water management is a political issue when he criticizes that many technical
water professionals regard integration only with reference to hydrological and ecological dimensions while leaving out
the political dimension. In their paper of 2005, Merrey et al. claim that IWRM should be centered on human welfare
(livelihood-centered) as a multi-level approach. Local stakeholders need to take part in the decision-making process and
serve as sources of information. Jonker (2007) supports this livelihood-centered IWRM conceptualization by arguing
“IWRM is a framework within which to manage peoples’ activities in such a manner that it improves their livelihoods
without disrupting the water cycle”.
Moss (2010) summarizes the criticism on IWRM that has been expressed in the scientific community besides a broad
political consensus on the concept as follows (exemplary sources added by the author):
• Concept too vague (Biswas, 2004; Rahaman and Varis, 2005; Watson et al., 2007; Merrey, 2008; Molle, 2008b)
• Overplays win-win situations, downplays trade-offs (Allan, 2003b; Mollinga et al., 2007; Merrey, 2008)
• Based on normative claims rather than sound science (Biswas, 2004)
• Process-oriented, but lacking measurable targets for goals (White, 1998; Savenije and Van der Zaag, 2000; Thomas
and Durham, 2003; Van der Zaag, 2005)
• Designed primarily for developed country contexts (Jonker, 2007; Lankford and Hepworth, 2010; Butterworth
et al., 2010)
• Tension between integrative approach around river basins and participatory approach around local communities
(IWMI, 2007b)
• River basins not always most suitable units for water management (Biswas, 2004)
• Parallel structures of decision-making: river basin and political territories (Wester and Warner, 2002; IWMI, 2007b)
2.3 IWRM implementation in developing countries
The different international IWRM implementation surveys showed clearly that developing countries are encountering more
problems in translating legislative and institutional reforms into practice in order to achieve operational results. In 2007
the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) reviewed the IWRM implementation process in developing countries
over the past three decades, in an attempt to promote institutional reform in the water sector (IWMI, 2007b). The IWMI
report concludes that the major reason for disappointing results is that a succession of narrowly-focused blueprint solutions
has been promoted and imposed, often with strong donor support. Moreover, the report states, for instance, that contrary
to the implementation of often recommended river basin organizations “countries would do well to consider placing
more emphasis on developing, managing, and maintaining collaborative relationships for basin governance - building on
existing organizations, customary practices, and administrative structures”. Consequently, the IWMI (2007b) proposes “a
structured, context-specific approach to negotiating and crafting effective institutions and realistic policies that recognize
the inherently contentious and political nature of institutional transformation”.
The IWMI criticizes that what usually gets passed-off “in the name of IWRM at the operational [...] level has largely
tended to include a blue-print package including:
1. A national water policy;
2. A water law and regulatory framework;
3. Recognition of River Basin as the appropriate unit of water and land resources planning and management;
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4. Treating water as an economic good; and
5. Participatory water resource management”.
Thus, according to the IWMI the difficulties in these blueprint packages lie in their practical implementation: “Drafting
new water laws is easy; enforcing them is not. Renaming regional water departments as basin organizations is easy; but
managing water resources at basin level is not. Declaring water an economic good is simple; but using price mechanisms
to direct water to high-value uses is proving complex. As a consequence, the so-called IWRM initiatives in developing
country contexts have proved to be ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst” (IWMI, 2007a).
Furthermore, several researchers point at the difficulties of developing countries in achieving tangible results from
IWRM implementation. Merrey (2008), for instance, argues in a similar way as the IWMI stating that “[...] IWRM fails as
a guide to practical action, at least in developing countries”. García (2008) also makes this point: “The major hurdles
encountered in this effort relate to the emphasis that was placed on applying the IWRM concept at the constitutional and
associative levels compared to the operational level [...]. There is a tendency to be heavy on diagnostics but weak in
solutions and a gap still exists between papers and actions”.
Among other authors, Shah et al. (2006) have criticized the way IWRM has been interpreted and implemented in many
developing countries “as a relatively standard ‘package’ of reforms regardless of the context” (as cited in Butterworth et al.,
2010). According to Shah et al. this ‘package’ “[...] consists of the development of a national water policy, the creation of
a water law and corresponding regulatory framework, development of water resource and service pricing mechanisms,
creation of water rights by instituting a system of water withdrawal permits, the recognition of the river basin as the unit of
water planning and management and subsequent creation of river basin organisations and the promotion of participatory
water resources management”. This critique goes in the same directions as the one expressed by the IWMI (2007a).
Butterworth et al. (2010) summarize critiques of Mollinga (2006) and Warner et al. (2009) that IWRM implementation
in developing and transitional countries “often gives the impression of being externally imposed or adopted to please
donor”. Mollinga (2006) bases his critical point of view on experiences from South Asia when he refers to IWRM as a
“concept in search of a constituency” since the concepts implementation, in his opinion, “is clearly not locally rooted”.
More explicit is Warner et al. (2009) more explicitly criticize that the new Kazakh water law had been drafted by an
external consultancy along the lines of the European Water Framework Directive and, hence, unrelated to the realities
on the ground. For this reason its implementation is therefore largely ignored (Warner et al., 2009; Butterworth et al.,
2010). These criticisms again indicate the problems of IWRM implementation, when not adopted to the specific context of
a country and merely based on general prescriptions.
In their comparison of IWRM implementation in the EU and in developing countries, Beveridge and Monsees (2012)
point out as well that “an inherent challenge specific to developing countries is the general mismatch between IWRM
concept and practices and the needs and conditions on the ground”. Furthermore, the authors argue that key components
like the river basin focus, the establishment of modern water rights, and demand management are much more suited
to developed countries, where the IWRM concept, according to the authors, has its roots. Another developing country-
specific challenge revealed in comparison to the EU is “a marked lack of human, financial and institutional capacity, in
combination with strong pressures from normally project-oriented, short-term-oriented, external donors for quick, visible
results (leading to rushed implementation)” (Beveridge and Monsees, 2012). Moreover, according to Shah et al. (2006),
uncritical imposition of “institutional models in vastly different socio-ecological contexts can be dysfunctional and even
counter-productive”. Furthermore, Shah et al. stress the need to take a broader view of institutional change instead of
focusing only “on things that governments can do - make laws, set up regulatory organisations, turn over irrigation systems,
specify property rights” (Shah et al., 2006). Hence, the authors argue that many small steps to build the foundation for
IWRM at the local level can be taken by informal actors instead.
A further obstacle of implementation is related to the decentralization process promoted by the IWRM approach. There
are serious constraints to decentralization in developing countries because of lack of financial and personal resources (cf.
Beveridge and Monsees, 2012). Thus, Butterworth et al. (2010) emphasizes that “at the local level, catchment agencies
in many developing countries may be expected to struggle to establish legitimacy and be effective given their limited
capacities, at least in the short and medium run”. Furthermore, when catchment management agencies are in place
to realize decentralization, effective participation in form of shared decision-making is often limited to the human and
financial resources available to these agencies. Therefore, according to Butterworth et al. (2010) “such agencies often lack
the capacity to fulfill even basic functions”. As a result, IWRM is even more prone to be composed merely of top-down
approaches without complementary bottom-up measures in developing countries since actions at the national or larger
river basin scale are not reinforced and complemented at other scales. However, Lenton and Muller (2009) also highlight
that in developing countries “IWRM reforms have tended to focus on the higher levels of scale, on policy and legislation
reforms at national level and the establishment of river basin organisations”.
Butterworth et al. (2010) see accepting realities in contexts of IWRM implementation as more promising than imposing
ideals and standard policy packages. Thus, building on “effective existing local arrangements is more likely to succeed
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than starting from scratch at the catchment level. As local water users cannot wait for river basin organisations to develop
enough capacity to effectively penetrate to the local level, much day-to-day decision-making on water development and
management issues will remain in the hands of users and communities (e.g. in large parts of sub-Saharan Africa and the
Andes)” (Butterworth et al., 2010). Accordingly, Butterworth et al. (2010) sees “opportunities not just to build upon the
existing infrastructure, but even more importantly, upon existing institutions that already have the experience, knowledge
and systems needed to manage water effectively at the local level. Some of these institutions are already quite integrated
or relatively holistic while they may face challenges in adapting to be relevant at higher scales”.
A good summary of key challenges for IWRM implementation in developing countries identify from a literature review,
including several of those discussed above (exemplary sources added by the author), is provided by Beveridge and Monsees
(2012):
• General mismatch with needs and conditions in developing countries (Allan, 2003b; Saravanan et al., 2009;
Butterworth et al., 2010)
• Development politics and IWRM (Swatuk, 2005)
• Institutional fit and interplay (Moss, 2001; Saravanan et al., 2009; Horlemann and Dombrowsky, 2011)
• Lack of sensitivity to traditional, informal institutions (Swatuk, 2005; Shah et al., 2006; Van Koppen et al., 2007)
• Participation, equity and accountability (Molle, 2008b; Saravanan et al., 2009; Butterworth et al., 2010)
• Lack of resources and rushed implementation (Swatuk, 2005)
Despite this summary of Beveridge and Monsees (2012), particular insights on IWRM implementation in developing
countries provide the results of International Conference on Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) entitled:
Lessons from Implementation in Developing Countries which took place from 10 to 12 March 2008 in Cape Town, South
Africa. The conference “highlighted the need for a concerted shift away from the debates on definitions and towards
identifying implementation mechanisms and approaches” (Anderson et al., 2008). In accordance with the findings of
past global IWRM implementation status reports and WWDRs, the conference conclusions highlight “the importance of
balancing the establishment of enabling environments, which includes legislation, policies and institutional structures,
with smaller-scale projects that have more tangible, immediate benefits for the poor”. This statement indicates clearly that
the predominating top-down approaches of IWRM implementation require specific complementary bottom-up approaches.
The conference summary stresses further that “over-emphasis on the policy and legislation component leaves little benefit
to those on the ground and does little to effect real change or promote poverty reduction” (Anderson et al., 2008). But
at the same time, ignoring the enabling environment can limit the sustainability of IWRM by hampering longer-term
formalization of IWRM approaches. The conference concludes pragmatically that “perfect integration between all sectors,
across the hydrological cycle and between all users is unlikely” (Anderson et al., 2008). Hence, instead of waiting for
perfect integration from top-down it is more important to achieve tangible benefits on the ground. In order to be successful,
the conference conclusions highlight that the IWRM process on the ground must assist the achievement of benefits
including increased access to water services, socio-economic empowerment, protection of ecosystems, improvement in
water quality and overall poverty reduction (Anderson et al., 2008).
The conference paper of Leendertse et al. (2008) criticizes also that as a result of dominant top-down implementation,
with little stakeholder engagement, “institutional and legal changes will have little effect on the way water is used
and managed, with few tangible improvements in water quality and ecosystem protection” as cited by Anderson et al.
(2008). Furthermore, Leendertse et al. (2008) argue that environmental concerns are often least considered when water
management policies and plans are being developed and often even more neglected when in implementation. This is
especially noteworthy since the poor are highly dependent on the environment.
At a workshop of staff members from IWRM case-study projects in developing countries held in 1996, a self-assessment
tool was developed, based on an extended version of the Dublin principles that the staff members felt were relevant to
their projects. A number of guiding questions and indicators relevant to each principle were developed by the participants
and together formed an assessment tool. Moriarty et al. (2000) provide a summary of their assessment findings on
implementation obstacles related to each of the eight extended IWRM principles (see Table 2.2).
In 2009 the GWP responds to the critics and admits that “IWRM has gained wide acceptance in water policy circles as
the best way to tackle these challenges but 17 years after the approach was endorsed by the Rio Earth Summit, the content
and even the relevance of the concept continues to be debated” (GWP, 2009a). “Following periods of conceptualizing
and advocating an integrated water resources management (IWRM) approach and of establishing locally-owned regional
and country partnerships” the GWP seeks with the book Integrated water resources management in practice: Better water
management for development “to support countries to improve water resources management, putting IWRM into practice
to help countries towards growth and water security” (Lenton and Muller, 2009). It is a reaction to the criticisms that:
• IWRM calls for integration of all activities that use or impact water resources, and thus is unworkable in practice
(Biswas, 2008).
• IWRM is too broadly defined to have any real meaning or value except as a buzzword (Molle, 2008b).
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• IWRM presents an ideal of water management but little practical guidance on how this ideal can be achieved in the
real world (Wester and Hirsch, 2007).
Key IWRM principles Key findings on implementation problems
Water source and catchment con-
servation and protection are es-
sential
Water source and catchment conservation are increasing, but the necessary frame-
works to ensure communication and cooperation between sectors and levels are
often lacking.
Water allocation should be
agreed between stakeholders
within a national framework
While conceptually widely accepted, stakeholder, and user involvement remains
limited and conflict between competing uses and users is often glossed over. Stake-
holder involvement frequently occurs at an information rather than a decision
making level. Good, appropriately presented hydrological information is essential
to informed decision making, but is seldom available.
Management needs to be taken
care of at the lowest appropriate
level
The lack of clear legal frameworks enshrining rights and responsibilities within
the decentralization process often causes confusion. While community-based ap-
proaches are now accepted as the norm, the necessary underpinning capacity
seldom exists in support agencies.
Capacity building is the key to
sustainability
Proper monitoring of the effectiveness of capacity building programmes is essential
to their success. Capacity building programmes frequently pay insufficient attention
to the lower and intermediate levels within decentralized support agencies, thus,
they remain unable to fulfill their role in facilitating user decision making.
Involvement of all stakeholders
is required
[. . . ] communities frequently remain uninterested in becoming involved in wider
IWRM because of high transaction costs and lack of genuine decision making
powers.
Efficient water use is essential
and often an important ‘source’
in itself
Water use efficiency and demand management is gaining attention, however guid-
ance is often lacking in how to integrate it into projects.
Water should be treated as hav-
ing an economic and social value
The principle of paying for water is now widely accepted and many projects are
introducing water user charges. However, the role of water as a social good needs
to be kept in view and the rights of vulnerable groups protected.
Striking a gender balance is es-
sential
A wider understanding of gender as encompassing other important aspects of
community dynamics such as age, wealth, class, cast etc. is missing. Gender specific
approaches concentrate solely on the degree of involvement of women.
Table 2.2: Key IWRM principles and respective key findings on implementation obstacles; based on (Moriarty et al., 2000)
Consequently, the book is intended “to hopefully put to rest the concerns of some that IWRM is an unrealistic and
impractical approach“ (Lenton and Muller, 2009). It emphasizes “that pragmatic, incremental approaches, which take into
account contextual realities, seem to have had the greatest chance of working in practice” (Lenton and Muller, 2009).
Accordingly, the GWP reports on common pitfalls in putting IWRM into practice (GWP, 2009b):
• “When it has been applied as blueprint - as a checklist of actions - in a way that does not take into account specific
problems to be solved and contextual realities, IWRM has not delivered concrete benefits. Even within countries
there are often significant differences that shape water resources challenges and possible solutions.
• Trying to establish management relations between too many variables risks getting mired in complexity at the
expense of effectiveness. When putting IWRM into practice it’s important to think strategically about where and to
what degree coordination and new management instruments are necessary.
• Participation can stall processes, undermine development and impose heavy costs on participants if it is undertaken
without clear objectives and time lines, informed stakeholders, and mechanisms for negotiation and conflict
resolution”.
In order to avoid common IWRM implementation pitfalls the GWP provides five key lessons learned from past
implementation struggles:
• “IWRM is not a one-size-fits-all prescription and cannot be applied as a checklist of actions. Pragmatic, sensibly
sequenced institutional approaches that respond to contextual realities have the greatest chance of working in
practice.
• Water resource planning and management must be linked to a country’s overall sustainable development strategy
and public administration framework.
• Water management must ensure that the interests of the diverse stakeholders who use and impact water resources
are taken into account.
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• Approaches to water resources management will evolve as the pressures on the resource and social priorities change.
The challenge is to develop institutions and infrastructure that can adapt to changing circumstances.
• While the river basin is an important and useful spatial scale at which to manage water, there are often cases where
it is appropriate to work at smaller sub-basin scale or at a regional multi-basin level” (GWP, 2009b).
A principle concern of all the critics is the continuous and prevailing implementation gap. Moss (2010) identifies six
generic implementation problems from literature review:
• Gap between policy-making at national / international levels and implementation on local level
• IWRM often applied as standard ‘package’ of reforms regardless of context (lack of fit)
• Inadequate consideration given to building on existing structures
• Little consideration of informal norms and customs of local water management
• In developing countries IWRM can appear externally imposed
• Stakeholder participation in IWRM often weak in practice
Besides the scientific discourse on the limitations of a normative IWRM concept and the identified problems of
operationalization, in recent years a discourse has also developed on implementation and operationalization in practice,
especially in developing countries with limited resources. The following section analyzes the present trajectory of the
IWRM concept and the state of the art of recommendations to improve its implementation in practice.
2.4 Present IWRM trajectories - Refining an established concept to improve practical implementation
Today a large majority of the world’s countries have adopted an IWRM approach to achieve sustainable water resources
management. There is broad agreement on the multi-level approach of IWRM that begins at the national, i.e. international,
level by including water issues in a broader development agendas down to the river basin level and subsidiary decision-
making. Cross-sectoral integration, stakeholder involvement and management of water resources on the basis of river
basins (IRBM as IWRM on the level of river basins) are accepted as basic principles for IWRM implementation. This has
led to the development of new national water laws, policies and strategies at the national level based on the principles of
IWRM, forming the necessary enabling environment for IWRM implementation. Subsequently, institutional reforms have
been implemented to improve integrated policy making.
However, this development has been based basically on top-down, regulatory and command-and-control mechanisms.
While this strategy has been successful in creating enabling environments and establishing institutional roles at national,
or in the case of the EU also international, level, little progress has been made in implementing IWRM on the ground, i.e.
on the regional to local level of river basins and sub-basins. Even in the EU, where the implementation of the WFD is
demanded in a command-and-control regulatory manner from top-down, remain challenges in following the river basin
approach and in achieving public participation. In developing countries, due to apparent resource constraints, these
challenges are even greater.
These shortcomings and obstacles in IWRM implementation have been repeatedly acknowledged by the international
community as a principle result of the several surveys on the global IWRM implementation status and WWDR (see section
2.1.2). Additionally, as the discussion of the above documents illustrates, the scientific community concludes with a similar
problem diagnosis on IWRM implementation. There is general agreement that there are no blueprints or one-size-fits-all
solutions to IWRM implementation according to the GWP, WWC, UN-Water, and the WWAP (among others) representing
the main promoters of the concept. Researchers generally support this conclusion, thus, questioning the suitability of
standard packages for IWRM implementation (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3).
Besides criticisms and doubts on IWRM implementation, several researchers and practitioners have tried to adapt the
IWRM concepts in order to improve its implementation on the ground. This sections provides an overview on the main
outcomes and conceptual outputs.
As early as 2000, Moriarty et al. introduced a light IWRM approach that concentrates on the application of general
IWRM principles (an extended version of the Dublin Principles; see Table 2.2 in Section 2.2) within water sub-sectors.
The approach is based on experience from a comparative study by Visscher et al. (1999) of the degree of integration of
IWRM principles into water sector (water supply and sanitation) projects in eleven cases from seven, mostly developing,
countries: Zambia, South Africa, Ghana, Nepal, Cambodia, India, and Colombia. In general, the study revealed that
while IWRM principles are internationally accepted they are not yet truly applied to the evaluated projects. Moriarty
et al. (2000), thus, stress “while many national governments are addressing the issue of IWRM through the development
of legislative frameworks, movement towards practical application remains slow”. Hence, the authors “believe that the
implementation of light IWRM will facilitate the eventual implementation of full IWRM as and when the necessary enabling
environment comes into existence”. According to the authors, the light IWRM approach “aims to help staff of sub-sector
organizations to identify how they can best incorporate the relevant IWRM principles into their own projects and systems,
rather than worrying about more abstract policy or regulatory matters that are outside their ambit of influence” (Moriarty
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et al., 2000). Thus, the proposed light approach aims at IWRM implementation starting from sub-sectors through which
the application of the identified principles will start networking to achieve full IWRM in the long run. Thus, Moriarty et al.
propose a context-specific IWRM approach based on the specific interests and concerns of sub-sectors at the community
level. Furthermore, the direct involvement of water users in decision-making is highlighted (Moriarty et al., 2000). In
a pragmatic way, they assume that no one can be an expert in all aspects, hence, in the efforts of each sub-sector to try
to implement IWRM principles, the need to involve and include others will quickly become clear and integration will
occur step-wise as a logical result (Moriarty et al., 2000). In 2004, Moriarty et al. highlight this point again stating that
“any improvement in coordination or planning of water resource development represents a step in the process, and in
many cases local level agreement and capacity-building on better sharing and use will have greater impact than new
national laws or international level treaties” (Moriarty et al., 2004). Especially in the context of developing nations,
they point out, “IWRM must not be viewed as a body of complex legislation, or an expert control system in which, to
be effective, all aspects of water resources supply and use are integrated into a complex centralised system under the
control of one super-agency” (Moriarty et al., 2004). While regarding basin-level IWRM by representative bodies in which
all stakeholders are fully and fairly represented as the target, or endpoint, for achieving IWRM, Moriarty et al. (2004)
propose to apply light IWRM in situations where over-arching legal and institutional frameworks for river basin planning
and allocation of water resources are either missing or ineffective as a pragmatic approach tailored to meet capacities and
contexts. This is often the case in resource scarce countries.
Similarly, the World Bank (2003) pursues in its Water Resources Sector Strategy a pragmatic but principled approach that
recognizes “that water resources management is intensely political and that reform requires the articulation of prioritized,
sequenced, practical and patient interventions”. Therefore, the Bank insists to pay more explicit attention in design and
implementation with “solutions that have to be tailored to specific, widely varying circumstances and that the art of reform
is in picking the low-hanging fruit first, not in making the best the enemy of the good” (World Bank, 2003). The World
Bank clarifies that it is not abandoning the idea of integrated water resources management but it recognizes that “even the
world’s most developed countries are a long way from integrated water resources management, and progress has been
slow and incremental. The goal of this strategy is not to dismiss the goal of integrated water management, but to define
practical, implementable and therefore sequenced and prioritized actions that can lead to that end” (World Bank, 2003).
Moriarty et al. (2010) applied and further developed their light IWRM approach within the 4-year (2003-2007)
EMPOWERS project which was mainly funded through the European Union’s Regional MEDA Water Programme for Local
Water Management. EMPOWERS was implemented in Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine. The light IWRM approach was further
developed specifically for use at the intermediate and local levels (sub-national and sub-basin) focusing on a facilitated
process of stakeholder dialogue for concerted action supported by a strategic planning framework (Moriarty et al., 2010).
Thus, representing a counterpoint to the typical package of institutional, legislative and informational interventions usually
recommended and typically implemented in form of a national water sector reform (referred to as full IWRM by the
authors). Thus, according to the authors, “in contrast to the normal top-down IWRM package, light IWRM aims to be
pragmatic, problem-focused and adaptive” (Moriarty et al., 2010). Two elements are noted as particularly important
to achieve this: (1) “real decentralized decision making can only happen with decentralized financing” and (2) “local
water governance needs to be nested within higher-level water governance structures to give real effect to the principle of
subsidiarity and to allow for scale-related and cross-boundary (physical and societal) issues to be dealt with” (Moriarty
et al., 2010).
Another IWRM-project funded by the EU was LoGo Water - Towards effective involvement of local government in
Integrated Water Resources Management in river basins of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region
(2005-2008). This project promoted a bottom-up IWRM approach through the active involvement of local communities
which is very similar to the one pursued by the EMPOWERS project (Sullivan et al., 2008). The main components of these
and other projects with focus on community participation (e.g. WHIRL, WATERCOURSE) are working with community
owned knowledge and existing institutions, focusing on capacity building, active learning, identifying risk, engaging with
local stakeholders and empowering them to make decisions (Heath, 2010).
The before mentioned attempts to improve IWRM implementation in practice focused strongly on reducing the
complexity of IWRM at the local level and adapting the concept to local needs. Thereby, local priorities and decision-
making were tried to place stronger emphasis.
Consecutively, with expedient IWRM Lankford et al. (2007) introduce an adaptive framework for IWRM in developing
countries “which focuses relentlessly on problems on the ground rather than on IWRM principles to be articulated”. They
propose the problems identified in a certain catchment and the ongoing iterative relationships with stakeholders in the
catchment should be the starting point of water management actions rather than a comprehensive framework of IWRM
(Lankford et al., 2007). The comprehensive, idealized IWRM approach implies a package of tools and practices, designed
to match and accommodate the complex nature of the water management problem, providing water managers with a
long list of activities to execute, many of them simultaneously. Lankford et al. (2007), based on research in Tanzania
complemented by a literature review, conclude that the attempt to implement such a comprehensive approach diverts
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Figure 2.2: Normative IWRM and adaptive IWRM (on the left); Adaptive IWRM implementation cycle (on the right) from
Lankford et al. (2007)
attention away from the most felt problems facing people in the basin and may even lead to inappropriate interventions.
Therefore, a comprehensive approach is regarded by Lankford et al. (2007) as too complex, thus, requiring financial,
human and institutional resources far beyond most developing countries’ capacities (Lankford et al., 2007). Figure 2.2
illustrates the differences between the deployment of IWRM policy and operations of a partial comprehensive IWRM (on
the right) implementation and an expedient (on the left) implementation. Thus, expedient IWRM, according to Lankford
et al. (2007) “can be defined as ‘advisable on practical rather than principled grounds’, emphasizing a shift towards
problem identification and solution, and away from the adoption of accepted norms - including the Dublin Principles” and
has clear links to the concept of adaptive management.3
According to Lankford et al. (2007), IWRM implementation could be improved by focusing on “problems” rather
than comprehensive achievement of all possible IWRM objectives (see Figure 2.2). Thus, Lankford et al. (2007) regard
IWRM implementation as a “balancing act” between the theoretical ideal of IWRM and a strong orientation on prevailing
problems. Mitchell (1990) similarly argues in favor of a differentiated implementation: “[...] at the strategic level, a
comprehensive approach should be used to ensure that the widest possible perspective is maintained, but in contrast, a
more focused approach is needed at the operational level where attention should be directed to a smaller number of issues
that account for most of the problems” (Mitchell, 1990 as cited in Medema, 2008). While many countries have made good
progress in taking a comprehensive approach at a strategic level by establishing legal enabling environments (e.g. national
IWRM plans, new water laws) more focused approaches at the operational level are missing.
A structured, context-specific approach is also proposed by Merrey et al. (2007) in order “to negotiate and craft
effective institutions and realistic policies that recognize the inherently contentious and political nature of institutional
transformation”. Mollinga et al. (2007) further develop and operationalize a proposal of Merrey et al. (2007) and advocate
a strategic action approach to institutional reform (Merrey, 2008). In recognizing that water management is inherently
political and embedded in a larger institutional context, a concrete problem setting is chosen as starting point by mapping
what is necessary and possible and who are the actors involved. Mollinga et al. (2007) use the term problemshed to
describe this alternative perspective as opposed to a purist watershed perspective. Therefore, a problemshed perspective
implies identifying empirically the boundaries of a problem in contrast to pre-imposing a hydrological boundary. Thus,
related parties to a problem are mapped and analyzed as an issue network. Merrey (2008) argues that these issue networks
“will invariably include institutions and parties not contained within a specific basin or hydrological boundary”. Hence, the
focus is placed on “actually existing social relations in interaction and decision-making processes, and avoids the projection
3 The MEA defines adaptive management as “systematic process for continually improving management policies and practices by learning from
the outcomes of previously employed policies and practices” (MEA, 2005).
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of ideal-type, normative models or assessments of social behaviour and decision-making” (Mollinga et al., 2007). This
is the basis to create alliances around common goals and planning and negotiation of an implementation plan (Merrey,
2008).
Merrey (2008) notes that the problemshed approach of Mollinga et al. (2007) and the expedient management approach of
Lankford et al. (2007) clearly converge. Both focus on specific issues and problems, begin with their prioritization and then
identify options for solving the highest-priority problems by identifying the constellation of interested parties (actors and
institutions) to negotiate a way forward (Merrey, 2008). Therefore, IWRM no longer constitutes a blueprint or objective in
itself, it rather provides a systems context to understand the likely implications of specific solutions (cf., Merrey, 2008).
The discussion so far has revealed that attempts to foster implementation mainly from top-down by creating new
institutions, forcing collaboration and drawing new administrative boundaries along river basins do not seem to be the best
way to achieve integrated management results on the ground. An important insight from over two decades of experience
with IWRM implementation among both practitioners and researchers is that IWRM implementation at the operational
level has to occur context-related and orientated to specific prevailing problems on the ground - thus more adaptive - rather
than being overly comprehensive. Hence, researchers are increasingly proposing interpreted, expedient, light or adaptive
approaches starting from bottom-up in order to implement IWRM in a complementary manner to the prevailing top-down
approaches. These, often pragmatic, proposals are based on the recognition that IWRM deals with complex systems
involving the need to include risk and uncertainty in the management of water resources. Lankford et al. (2007); Mollinga
et al. (2007); Merrey (2008); Moriarty et al. (2010) developed approaches to overcome the IWRM implementation gap, as
a response to the strong political character of IWRM and local realities (people centered) based on empirical models. The
authors do not provide a (theoretical) generalization of the systems characteristics to be managed nor of the management
approach itself. Full IWRM implementation is regarded as a task far too complex to achieve in a normative manner in
practice. Therefore, the solution, an adaptive / expedient approach, is developed to reduce complexity by building on
prevailing problems, issues and participants. Hence, adaptation is interpreted as reducing complexity by using easier entry
points and options specific to certain problem contexts (e.g. a problemshed). Responding to IWRM criticism from Biswas
(2008); Molle (2008b); Wester and Hirsch (2007), the GWP (2009b) argued recently in a similar way that “pragmatic,
sensibly sequenced institutional approaches that respond to contextual realities have the greatest chance of working in
practice” and “there are often circumstances where it is appropriate to work at smaller sub-basin scale or at a regional
multi-basin level”.
Based on findings of Moriarty et al. (2000); Lankford et al. (2007); Moriarty et al. (2010), Butterworth et al. (2010)
focus in their papers on lighter and more locally rooted approaches to water management. These approaches embrace
“IWRM as a principle, they seek their application in an alternative manner: focusing at the more local level, as opposed
to the river basin or national level; seeking integration from within sectors, as opposed to establishing inter-sectoral
mechanisms; and building upon existing institutions and participation mechanisms, as opposed to establishing new
multi-sectoral institutions” (Butterworth et al., 2010). A summary of IWRM criticisms and solutions/alternative entry
points on how to address these with a lighter IWRM approach are presented (see Table 2.3). Butterworth et al. (2010)
argue that these lighter, more pragmatic and context-adapted approaches, strategies and entry points are useful “in
addition to the necessary but long-term policy reforms and river basin institution-building at higher levels”. These
approaches “address some of the scale problems in implementing IWRM, are attractive for their pragmatism rather than
idealism, and make it easier (or unavoidable) to engage with people and politics” (Butterworth et al., 2010).
Despite all criticism, Butterworth et al. (2010) advise against discarding the concept of IWRM for its flaws. In
summary, the authors argue to work towards the outcomes “that IWRM originally aimed to achieve though a better
mix of complementary light and full approaches at different levels of scale that build upon local and sectoral realities”
(Butterworth et al., 2010). Hence, the actual mix of light and full approaches should be determined through specific
outcomes desired in a given location. According to the authors, this mix can only be developed through an adaptive
approach which will certainly be subject to political response and local constraints (e.g. capacity and resources).
Beveridge and Monsees (2012) compare institutional challenges and politics of IWRM in developing countries and
the EU and identify “similarities in the core challenges of achieving integration (e.g. [spatial and institutional] fit and
interplay) and the requirements of ‘good governance’ (participation, etc.)”. Institutional interplay and spatial fit (or
misfit) dimensions of the integration challenge are inseparably linked to each other in terms of, “e.g. the definition of a
‘competent authority’, multi-level governance, cross-sector integration and spatial planning” (Beveridge and Monsees,
2012). Based on their literature review, Beveridge and Monsees (2012) stress “that in order to successfully implement
integration in water resource management in both EU and developing countries, policies and projects need to be more
sensitive to context-specific conditions”. Consequently, Beveridge and Monsees (2012) argue that research “should be
geared towards encouraging what Butterworth et al. (2010) have called a lighter, more practical IWRM: accepting realities
in contexts of implementation, instead of imposing ideals and standard policy packages” (Beveridge and Monsees, 2012).
The context-specificity of IWRM implementation at the operational level that is repeatedly highlighted by several
authors, is provided by two basic systems: the natural system (e.g through ecosystem properties) and the social or human
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IWRM criticisms / problems Solutions provided by light IWRM approaches
Vagueness of IWRM concept IWRM should be considered more as a philosophy than as a ‘package of reforms’
No agreement on fundamental is-
sues on what to integrate, how,
by whom, or if integration is prac-
tically possible
IWRM principles should be built into projects and programs
IWRM is not sufficiently people-
centered
Local laws and customary institutions should be an entry point for IWRM
IWRM does not incorporate adap-
tive management principles
Better linkages should be built with local government and its planning processes
Concept is unwieldy IWRM should be built from bottom up
Packages of IWRM reforms do
not include local IWRM
IWRM reforms need to build upon existing mechanisms for participation and
organization of stakeholders, even if this means building upon ‘sectorality’, rather
than a complete overhaul
River Basin Organizations may
struggle to establish legitimacy
‘Light’ approaches that aim to apply IWRM principles at all stages of the project
cycle are more likely to be good entry points
RBOs often lack the capacity to
fulfill even basic functions
Supporting the existing local arrangements should be encouraged as a form of local
IWRM in itself and is more likely to succeed than starting from scratch at the river
basin level
IWRM activities ignore politics Although local IWRM initiatives often have limited scope, they can still contribute
to the development of IWRM at basin scale and serve as important entry points for
applying the IWRM framework
Levels of participation in IWRM
are low
Forging better links between the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sub-sector
and IWRM is another way to strengthen grassroots participation in IWRM
Table 2.3: Summary of common criticisms of IWRM and possible ways out by Butterworth et al. (2010)
system (e.g. through existing institutions, perceived problems, power relations, political organization etc.). Both systems
are interdependent and place site-specific constraints on operational IWRM implementation. While Lankford et al., Merrey,
Moriarty et al., Mollinga et al., and Butterworth et al. have stressed the importance of the human system context, other
researchers call for adaptive approaches towards IWRM supporting their argumentation by referring to the theories of
Social-Ecological System (SES).4 This can be interpreted as further development of light approaches in taking into account
the intrinsic interdependency of human and natural system contexts based on Social-Ecological System theory.
Pahl-Wostl and Sendzimir (2005), for instance, describe adaptive management as “seeking to increase the adaptive
capacity of river basins based on an understanding of key factors that determine a basin’s vulnerability” (as cited in
Lenton and Muller, 2009). According to Pahl-Wostl and Sendzimir, adaptive management is a concept that has its origins
in ecosystem management (Holling, 1978) and “is based on the insight that the ability to predict future key drivers
influencing an ecosystem, as well as system behaviour and responses, is inherently limited” (Pahl-Wostl and Sendzimir,
2005). Thus, adaptive management includes the ability to manage change by continually improving management policies
and practices and by learning from the outcomes of implemented management strategies. The paper of Pahl-Wostl and
Sendzimir (2005) discusses differences between traditional and integrated, adaptive approaches. The identified differences
form the basis for subsequent analysis where Pahl-Wostl (2006) calls for a transition from current management regimes
based on prediction and control to more adaptive regimes as a learning approach. Pahl-Wostl et al. (2010) develop this
further stating more explicitly that “in terms of planning intervention therefore, the new paradigm implies a change
from command and control to a more systemic approach rooted in the co-production of knowledge and acceptance of
uncertainty“. The differences between the two approaches are summarized in Table 2.4.
In this context, the EU project HarmoniCOP (Harmonising Collaborative Planning; 2003-2005) was intended to increase
the scientific understanding of social learning and public participation processes aimed at supporting the implementation
of the WFD. To do so, the project’s conclusions propose to move towards new adaptive institutional regimes (Tàbara
et al., 2005). Based on the experiences of the HarmoniCOP project, Pahl-Wostl et al. (2007) conclude that “collaborative
governance is considered to be more appropriate for integrated and adaptive management regimes needed to cope with
the complexity of social-ecological systems”.
4 Social-ecological systems are linked systems of people and nature. The term emphasizes that humans must be seen as a part of, not apart from,
nature - that the delineation between social and ecological systems is artificial and arbitrary. Scholars have also used concepts like ‘coupled
human-environment systems’, ‘ecosocial systems’ and ‘socioecological systems’ to illustrate the interplay between social and ecological systems.
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Dimension Prediction, control paradigm Integrated, adaptive paradigm
Governance Centralized, hierarchical, narrow stakeholder
participation
Poly-centric, balance between bottom-up and top-
down processes, broad stakeholder participation
Sectoral
integration
Sectors separately analyzed, resulting in policy
conflicts and emergent chronic problems
Cross-sectoral analysis identifies emergent prob-
lems and integrates policy implementation
Scale of analysis
and operation
Transboundary problems emerge when river
sub-basins are the exclusive scale of analysis
and management
Transboundary issues addressed by multiple
scales of analysis and management
Information
management
Understanding fragmented by gaps and lack of
integration of proprietary information sources
Comprehensive understanding achieved by open,
shared information sources that fill gaps and fa-
cilitate integration
Infrastructure Massive, centralized infrastructure, single
sources of design and power delivery
Appropriate combination centralized and decen-
tralized, diverse sources of design and power
delivery
Finances and risk Financial resources concentrated in structural
protection (sunk costs)
Financial resources diversified using a broad set
of private and public financial instruments
Dealing with
uncertainties
Uncertainties perceived as undesirable sign of
incomplete knowledge
Emphasis on reducing uncertainties
Influence of different perspectives largely ig-
nored
Irreducible uncertainties accepted
Emphasis on how to deal with uncertainties and
robust strategies
Influence of different perspectives explicitly ac-
knowledged
Table 2.4: Two water management paradigms and their manifestation in characteristics of the water management regime
(Pahl-Wostl, 2006; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010)
Also Watson (2004) argues “[...] the current ‘myth’ [of inter-agency coordination] must be reformed and that a more
powerful system-response capability founded on inter-organisational collaboration should be developed”. He proposes in
his paper that “[...] researchers and practitioners should shift their attention from co-ordination strategies to the design
and implementation of more collaborative approaches for decision-making and problem solving”. ‘Wicked’ or ‘messy’
management problems characterized by complexity, change, uncertainty and conflict, thus, cannot be solved through
inter-agency cooperation alone, thus Watson (2004) calls for a reform of IWRM towards more collaborative and adaptive
management approaches, taking into account the nature of river basins and society, i.e. the natural and human system
context.
Timmerman et al. (2008) reviewed, in the context of the EU funded NeWater research project the state of the art in
European research on integrated water resources management on the topics of participation, transboundary regimes,
economics, vulnerability, climate change, advanced monitoring, spatial planning, and the social dimensions of water
management. They conclude that the concept of adaptive water management should become a preferred direction for the
future development of IWRM. Lenton and Muller (2009), on behalf of the GWP, as well regard the adaptive approach
proposed by Pahl-Wostl and Sendzimir (2005) as “a useful focus”.
Engle et al. (2011) observe the continuous merging of the concepts of IWRM and Adaptive Management. As both
concepts have unique advantages, they also vary their adaptability and their level of institutional and stakeholder
integration. Figure 2.3 illustrates the predominant characteristics of each concept and also includes the main characteristics
of traditional command and control approaches, where both concepts depart from.
Pollard and Du Toit (2008) reflect on experiences of national IWRM implementation in South Africa by addressing
the challenges of managing catchments comprised of linked social and ecological systems: “It is also widely recognised
that the management of such systems requires an iterative, learning-by-doing approach that is reflexive in nature and
builds learning into the next management cycle”. In the opinion of the authors an adaptive management approach
appears best suited to such conditions. In the context of complex systems, the role that water users play as a part of
deriving management solutions is central to an adaptive management approach. Pollard and Du Toit (2008) argue that
self-organization, identity and integration are all essential characteristics in order to build resilience in a catchment system.
Lankford and Hepworth (2010) introduce an alternative model of poly-centric water resources management (bazaar)
in contrast to predominating centralized (cathedral) models. Lee (2003) defined poly-centric adaptive governance
earlier in general terms as a “form of social coordination in which actions are coordinated voluntarily by individuals and
organizations with self-organizing and self-enforcing capabilities” (as cited in Folke et al., 2005). According to Lankford
and Hepworth (2010) “poly-centric river basin management, is institutionally, organisationally and geographically more
decentralised, emphasising local, collective ownership and reference to locally agreed standards”. The poly-centric model
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Adaptive Management (AM) 
•  Seeks to manage uncertainty 
•  Resilience of social-ecological-
systems as foundation 
•  Self-organizing and emergent 
properties at various scales 
•  Emphasis on social learning and 
process-based problem solving 
•  Fusion of experimentation and 
scientific method in management 
Adaptive and Integrated 
Water Resources 
Management 
Command-and-Control 
•  Control of processes and 
outcomes as an operational rule 
•  Use of regulation and contractual 
obligations 
•  Seeks to minimize uncertainty and 
variation in processes 
•  Centralized and hierarchical 
decision-making often distributed 
vertically  
Integrated Management (IWRM) 
•  Institutional integration of water 
resource governance 
•  Emphasis on decentralization 
•  Use of natural boundaries as lowest 
feasible scale (i.e. river basins) 
•  Pluralistic: democratic conflict 
resolution, consensus building, 
stakeholder collaboration, etc. 
•  Recognition of multiple scales of 
stakeholder interests 
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Figure 2.3: A simplified summary of major integrated water resources management (IWRM) and adaptive management
(AM) principles (Engle et al., 2011)
proposed by the authors is constructed from the creation of appropriate managerial mosaics of nested sub-units within
river basins rather than integrating it into a hierarchical whole (cf. Ostrom, 2009).
Accordingly, the “focus [is] on pursuing immediate and customised solutions to problems that subunit societies face
including the provision of scientific services to support local policy-making and the fostering of local standard-setting
and agreements on monitoring, rewards and penalties” (Lankford and Hepworth, 2010). These internally functioning
sub-units, holons, subsequently nest together to achieve the basin-wide performance (see Figure 2.4). Uphoff (1996)
claims that holons as introduced by Koestler (1967), may be considered as whole in themselves and at the same time parts
of larger wholes. Hence, certain aspects of the behavior of a holon may be confined entirely to that holon, yet systems
(i.e. holons) at any level are constrained and controlled by the levels above and below, thus, can be considered as nested
(Stephens and Hess, 1999).
Pahl-Wostl and Kranz (2010) encounter some empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that poly-centric systems
with effective stakeholder participation are more adaptive than either centralized or fragmented governance systems (Pahl-
Wostl, 2009). Moreover, to be effective in increasing governance performance, poly-centric decentralization approaches
should be combined with effective vertical integration and cross-level interactions (Pahl-Wostl and Kranz, 2010). Public
participation and the involvement of stakeholders proved to be important for achieving effective vertical integration and
cross-level interaction (Pahl-Wostl and Kranz, 2010). According to Pahl-Wostl et al. (2012), adaptive management with a
poly-centric structure “creates possibilities of responding at different spatial scales as well as dealing with heterogeneity in
impacts and capacities among different places or sub-basins”. Due to the distribution of authority in a poly-centric regime,
place-specific responses to heterogeneity and uncertainties are easier to achieve than in a centralized system. Pahl-Wostl
et al. (2012) argue that past emphasis on legal frameworks and management plans in water governance reform was quite
futile in countries with limited statehood where formal institutions are not effective. Thus, support of bottom-up informal
processes to develop civil society and local governance capacity instead of intervention at the national level may be more
promising (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012).
Another group of authors also apply the theory of Social-Ecological System to improve IWRM implementation, but draw
their attentions more towards the implications on how to deal with the natural system context. Falkenmark and Rockström,
for instance, in their paper of 2006, highlighted the urgent need for a shift in thinking in water resources governance
and management. In their view, this shift is a move from a blue runoff focus to a broadened green-blue soil moisture and
runoff focus (Falkenmark and Rockström, 2004). Its fundamental implication is to shift to seeing precipitation rather than
runoff as the primary water source. Moreover, it implies a shift from applying IWRM solely as a runoff-based management
framework to implementing it as a rain-based water management framework. Furthermore, Falkenmark and Rockström
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Figure 2.4: Schematic illustration of nested holons within a river basin (Lankford and Hepworth, 2010)
(2010) argue that in contrast to a conventional blue water management approach where the focus is placed at the river
basin level, the application of an integrated green-blue approach also implies a different scale of focus. Representing a
downward extension of the basin focus, the green-blue approach puts a “stronger emphasis on the smaller catchment in
which soil moisture operates and generates a multitude of ecosystem services for humans and nature” (Falkenmark and
Rockström, 2010). According to Falkenmark and Rockström (2010), actions at this meso-scale level (above the farmer’s
fields but below the river basin) “creates choices for partitioning rainfall and allows consumptive use of green water to be
properly brought into the water balance and to influence management interventions”. Moreover, this intermediate level
allows “a more explicit analysis of conflicts of interest and trade-offs between green and blue water use, and between
upstream and downstream users and uses“ (Falkenmark and Rockström, 2010).
This down-scaling of water management from basin to catchments and sub-catchments incorporates management
actions with regard to the partitioning points of green and blue water pathways. Furthermore, policies have to be
developed that are well adapted to the management of rain as the primary water source (see Table 2.5). Consequently,
Falkenmark and Rockström (2010) stress that two fundamental shifts are necessary for water planners: “(1) focus on
precipitation as the planning resource and (2) bottom-up application of planning, starting from the local sub-catchment,
i.e., the small, often ephemeral tributaries forming social-ecological units ranging in size from hundreds of hectares to
hundreds of square kilometers, and moving on to catchments”.
At this point there are clear parallels between the approach of Pahl-Wostl et al. and the one of Falkenmark and
Rockström in using SES as its theoretical background. While Pahl-Wostl et al. derives implications for how to address the
human system, Falkenmark and Rockström deduce implications on how to deal with natural system’s characteristics.
According to Falkenmark and Rockström (2006), both the focus of IWRM and the scale at which it is implemented have
to be redefined. A new focus has to consider the full water balance of blue and green water as manageable. In places where
rain-fed agriculture is of significant importance, as in developing countries, “the scale of focus should more prominently be
on the smaller catchment or watershed scale, which corresponds better to the scale relevant to the farmer” (Falkenmark
and Rockström, 2006). Thus, the incorporation of land use decisions as important water decisions into the concept of
IWRM is essential.
Everard and Powell (2002), in a similar manner to Falkenmark and Rockström (2006), claim that river catchments
should be regarded as living systems where water and land are interdependently connected. Thus, management of river
catchments requires a move from a reactive to a systemic approach to the water environment. For Everard and Powell
(2002) the “acknowledgment of the central importance of ecosystem functions, the protection of these functions through
management action, valuing them appropriately, and taking longer-term and wider-scale perspectives in management
decisions” are essential for a systemic approach. In order to move in thinking and action there are seven shifts that society
needs to undertake to move from a reactive to a systemic approach to the water environment:
• From anthropocentric to ecocentric - The functioning of the ecosystem, and not merely the human use of it, needs
to be central to our thinking.
• From downstream ‘fixes’ to systemic understanding of catchments. The benefits to society provided by intact
ecosystems must be quantified at the catchment scale, and properly valued by development decisions.
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New Conventional
Planning
Sources = rainfall forming green water in soil and
blue water in rivers/aquifers
Sources = water in rivers and aquifer
Planning of management options as a continuum
from rain-fed to irrigated agriculture
Planning focus on water allocations for irrigation,
industry, and domestic water supply
Cross-scale focus - down-scaling from river basin to
catchment and local level
River basin plans
Integrated land and water resource management
(ILWRM)
IWRM
Policies
New environmental policies, including green water
needs to sustain terrestrial ecosystems
Environmental impact assessment
Green-blue trade-offs between up- and downstream
(e.g. Water Act, Republic of South Africa)
Water in aquatic ecosystems, environmental wa-
ter flow
Forest plantation fees Demand management
Green water credits (GWC)1 Water laws regulating blue water distribution
1 The GWC concept builds on the growing evidence that improved land and water management upstream cannot only improve green water
benefits there (e.g., through increased farm yields) but also release more useful and better quality blue water to downstream uses, e.g. base
flow replacing storm flow, less sediment (Dent and Kauffman, 2007).
Table 2.5: Conceptual di erences between the past blue water-based management of water resources and the new
green-blue water-based management of land and water resources (Falkenmark and Rockström, 2010)
• From evaluating single-function benefits to accounting for multiple benefits. Benefits stemming from the water
environment, including amenity, water retention, storage and groundwater exchange, chemical purification, reduced
greenhouse gas emissions, better flood storage and attenuation, fish recruitment, and nature conservation need to
be factored into decision-making.
• Focus on long-term rather than short-term implications.
• From management solutions applied in isolation to ’building blocks’ contributing to catchment functioning. These
potential ‘building blocks’ include sustainable drainage systems, buffer zones, re-meandering of rivers, or full-scale
river restoration.
• From maintenance and mitigation to restoration.
• From consultation to consensus-building” (Everard and Powell, 2002).
The ecosystem-based approach proposed by Everard and Powell (2002) calls for management actions at the local level
which “also contribute to the protection or restoration of natural functions at catchment scale” (Everard and Powell, 2002).
This idea of interdependent sub-units that ought to be managed from bottom-up is similar to the proposal of Lankford and
Hepworth’ holons as nested sub-systems for management.
2.5 Summary
Since its emergence at the beginning of the 1990s, the concept of IWRM has increasingly gained acceptance as a normative
framework to guide the way how water and related land resources have to be managed. A large number of countries
has now embarked on an implementation process of IWRM through the passing of IWRM conform water legislation and
respective policies, creating an enabling environment. At national levels new institutional roles have been defined and
specific organizations have been created to improve cross-sectoral cooperation. However, as global assessments have
repeatedly confirmed, this process has taken a long time and IWRM implementation, at this stage, has largely remained
without taking the subsequent step of operationalization in the practical application of participatory, stakeholder involving
management instruments. Especially in developing countries, standard ‘packages’ of IWRM implementation do not take
the prevailing resource constraints in these countries sufficiently into account.
The struggles towards IWRM implementation have been critically observed by a broad scientific community. While the
scientific discourse, at first, focused on the complexity of the concept itself, it has subsequently addressed the problematic
implications it has in practice if the concept is ‘fully’ implemented in an all-integrating, comprehensive manner. The
recognition that specific contexts have to be considered led to more pragmatic and problem-oriented approaches towards
IWRM implementation, known as light, expedient or adaptive IWRM. In awareness of the need for a more adaptive approach,
local contexts of action are seen as fundamental to achieving effective change in water resources management. To put
IWRM into context, this means moving from global, exogenous ‘solutions’ to local, endogenous plans of action (Beveridge
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et al., 2012). Thus, the key for improving IWRM implementation is to address the institutional and political challenges
typically encountered when implementing integrated approaches: e.g. problems of institutional interplay and spatial fit,
lack of participation, equity and accountability, as well as the general mismatch with needs and conditions in specific
places (Beveridge and Monsees, 2012). Therefore, a problem- and people-orientated approach is needed that avoids the
pitfalls of the ‘one-size-fits-all’ attempts which often characterize mainstream implementation.
Both Pahl-Wostl et al. and Falkenmark et al. highlight the importance of social-ecological-system’s interactions in order
to improve IWRM implementation from bottom-up. Both scientific communities acknowledge that a context-specific and
problem-oriented approach is necessary to achieve this. Although both recognize the interconnectedness of human and
natural systems Pahl-Wostl et al. put a stronger focus on improvement in the integration within the human system while
Falkenmark et al. do this with regard to the natural system. Humans are the central drivers of ecosystem change but at the
same time firmly dependent on the goods and services that ecosystems provide. This interdependency has to be reflected
in IWRM as well. Within river basins this interdependency has to be recognized and addressed, thus, the water governance
challenge of IWRM as IRBM has to take due care when linking human society and natural ecosystems.
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3 Methodological conceptualization of Integrated Water Resources Management implementation
According to the implementation assessments and the broad scientific discourse, IWRM implementation is essentially a
question of governance and management at the right scale. Moreover, since decentralization and the river basin approach
are imperatives in IWRM implementation, it is more precise to refer to a multi-level governance1 challenge. Therefore,
Mitchell (1990), among others, argues that the IWRM concept may be applied at normative, strategic and operational
levels. According to Mitchell, there has been much progress, although sometimes mostly rhetorically, at the normative
level by defining what ought to be done to achieve IWRM. Examples are the numerous national IWRM plans, strategies
and also general laws on IWRM at the national level. The strategic level subsequently represents the principal level of
governance in practice and is concerned about what can be done to actually implement IWRM, e.g. implementation in a
normative sense as full IWRM or light IWRM as context-specific interpretation of IWRM. Finally, the operational level is
concerned with the operationalization of the targets defined at the governance, i.e. strategic, level. According to Mitchell
(1990), what actually will be done is defined at this level. The IWRM process should take place at all of these levels and it
is important to be aware that the IWRM process often moves from one level to the next. Scheuchzer et al. (2012) identify
two different levels of IWRM as important for implementation: Integrated Water Governance at the national, i.e. strategic
level, and Integrated River Basin Management, i.e. operationalization of IWRM at the river basin level.
In the context of IWRM implementation, achievements at the strategic and operational level (cf., Grambow, 2013,
also normative and operational management) - the river basin level and below - have been especially difficult. This
difficulty has its origin in the significant changes in the governance system of natural resources implied by the IWRM
process (Rogers and Hall, 2003; Dombrowsky, 2005). Changes in the governance system in turn require changes in
management instruments as well, i.e. how water governance is implemented, because management instruments are the
means to implement changes in the governance system. IWRM challenges traditional governance systems, which implies
the use of different management instruments to meet the targets of IWRM governance. These challenges, in this context,
refer to integration as cooperatively balanced interests among all relevant stakeholders (i) in a cross-sectoral manner
(comprising different water sectors, including use and conservation of the resource), (ii) in a spatial manner (within
a relevant area within a river basin across administrative boundaries), and (iii) in an institutional manner (across all
relevant governmental levels) (Huppert, 2005).
Thus, the general subject of this chapter is the methodological conceptualization of IWRM implementation problems in
practice. Based on this conceptualization of implementation gaps, the requirements for specific instruments to achieve
further implementation are assessed in order to develop a solution statement. For a better understanding of the discussion
in this chapter it is useful to define several terms with regard to governance analysis. A useful definition of the term
governance, as it is used in this dissertation, is provided by Hufty (2011):
“Governance refers to a category of social facts, namely the processes of interaction and decision-making among
the actors involved in a collective problem that lead to the creation, reinforcement, or reproduction of social
norms and institutions”.
Hence, governance is about how each society develops its own ways of making decisions and resolving or avoiding conflicts.
Elements of governance such as decision-making processes, social norms, and institutions allow members of a society to
live together and cooperate, even without an omni-present state (Hufty, 2011). Thus, contrary to the concept of political
systems and the traditional idea of politics, governance does neither presuppose vertical authority nor regulatory power.
Interpreting governance in this way, it refers equally to formal and informal, vertical and horizontal processes, without
predefined preference. According to Hufty (2011) using this governance perspective permits the inclusion of a large
variety of social processes. This interpretation is especially useful in the context of IWRM implementation in developing
countries where governments and formal rules are often weak in performance.
Consequently, water governance can be understood as a set of systems that controls decision-making with regard to
water resources development and management. Water governance, thus, is more about the way how, i.e. by whom, and
under what circumstances decisions are made than about the decisions themselves (Moench et al., 2003). According
to the OECD (2011b), water governance “covers the manner in which roles and responsibilities (design, regulation and
implementation) are exercised in the management of water and broadly encompasses the formal and informal institutions
by which authority is exercised”. Governance understood as composed of a combination of formal and informal institutions
is referred to as distributed governance (cf., Kooiman, 1993).
1 The OECD defines multi-level governance as the explicit or implicit sharing of policy-making authority, responsibility, development and
implementation at different administrative and territorial levels, i.e.: i) across different ministries and/or public agencies at central government
level (upper horizontally); ii) between different layers of government at local, regional, provincial/state, national and supranational levels
(vertically); and iii) across different actors at the sub-national level (lower horizontally) (OECD, 2011b).
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In the context of this dissertation, the term institution is defined as sets of rights, rules, and decision-making procedures
that define social practices, assign roles to the actors in these practices, and guide interactions among the occupants
of individual roles (Young, 1999, 2002b). More broadly said, an institution may be represented in any structure or
mechanism of social order and cooperation governing the behavior of a set of individuals within a given community.
Moreover, institutions are constructed with a social purpose (produced by collective human choice, though not directly by
individual intention), transcend individuals and intentions by mediating the rules that govern cooperative living behavior.
Typical examples for institutions in this sense are structures of property rights2, electoral systems, and practices relating
to resources use and conservation. Institutions form, thus, a fundamental part of environmental management (Young,
1999). Additionally, institutions are the central subject of New Institutional Economics, a branch of economic theory
that attempts to extend economics by focusing on the social and legal norms and rules, hence, institutions that underlie
economic activity. Comparative institutional (economical) analysis is applied to make recommendations about efficient
internalization of externalities and institutional design. Among other, important elements of this analysis are property
rights, transaction costs, modes of governance, social norms, ideological values, and enforcement mechanisms.
In contrast to institutions, organizations are construed as material entities with budgets, offices, employees and
usually legal personality. Thus, according to Young (2002b), organizations may represent actors that typically emerge
as stakeholders whose activities are guided by the rules of the game defined by institutions in which they participate.
Examples of organizations are the World Bank, the Global Water Partnership or even local municipalities and water user
organizations. Furthermore, Young stresses that “institutions can and do vary widely in terms of a range of dimensions,
including functional scope, spatial domain, degree of formalization, stage of development, and interactions with other
institutions”. An environmental or resource regime (not to be confused with an authoritarian government or dictatorship)
consists of a set of institutions that deal explicitly with environmental or resource issues. Amezaga (2006) stresses
that organizations can be conceptualized as institutions or as “institutionalized” organizations. In the context of water
institutions and organizations, Amezaga refers to RBOs, water companies, or ministerial departments as “institutionalized”
organizations. Moreover, the author summarizes water institutions as a combination of: policies and objectives, laws, rules,
and regulations, organizations, their bylaws and core values, operational plans and procedures, incentive mechanisms,
accountability mechanisms, and norms, traditions, practices and customs (Amezaga, 2006). With regard to the core
meaning of the term “institutions” and the emphasis in the popular usage of the term associated with “organizations”,
Bandaragoda (2000) proposes a broad interpretation of the term in the context of IRBM. In his interpretation the
institutional framework for water resources consists of established rules, norms, practices, and organizations that provide
a structure to human actions related to water management (Bandaragoda, 2000). Amezaga (2006) highlights that in this
interpretation established organizations are to be considered as a subset of institutions.
As Young (2002b) highlights, it is important to distinguish between thin perspectives and thick perspectives on
institutions. A thin perspective on institutions is limited to those institutions that are articulated in constitutive documents,
e.g. constitutions, treaties and contracts (Young, 2002b). This perspective objectively describes the features of institutions
as rules of the game in form of rules on paper (North, 1990). A thick perspective on institutions additionally includes
“common discourses in terms of which to address the issues at stake, informal understandings regarding appropriate
behavior on the part of participants, and routine activities that grow up in conjunction with efforts to implement the rules”
(Young, 2002b). This thick perspective is important to take into account since social practices “ordinarily evolve over
time in ways that are not easy to trace to their constitutive foundations” (Young, 2002b). Thus, a thick perspective is
more about rules in use which are only partly reflected in rules on paper. Especially in the context of developing countries
and in the view of the importance of informal economies and rules there, it is important to acknowledge the presence
of all rules in use. The noncompliance of regulatory laws and other command and control measures, typical problems
of governmental regulation in many developing countries, is another important argument to take a thick perspective.
An important point of difference between the thin and thick perspective is that the thick definition treats behavioral
consequences as a defining characteristic of institutions. Therefore, it omits rules on paper that do not influence social
practices and adds de facto practices that do not rest on formal constitutive agreements (Young, 2002b). Thereby, “the thin
definition directs attention to matters of compliance or conformance, whereas the thick definition focuses on a broader
range of behavioral patterns arising in conjunction with the operation of social practices” (Young, 2002b).
Since institutions pursue a social purpose, so do environmental regimes. In the context of this thesis, the social purpose
of the considered environmental regime is an integrated management of water resources as a means to ensure their
sustainable use.
Although the terms water governance and water management are sometimes used interchangeably, it is useful to
distinguish them. Water governance is concerned with the system and its components which are to be governed with
2 Property rights are a theoretical construct in economics to determine how a resource is used, and who owns that resource - government,
collective bodies, or individuals (Alchian, 2008). In the context of regulating the use of the environment implicit or explicit property rights
can be created either through prescriptive command and control approaches (e.g. limits on input/output/discharge quantities, specified
processes/equipment, audits) or by more flexible market-based instruments (e.g. taxes, transferable permits or quotas) Guerin (2003).
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a core focus on institutions as well as (institutionalized) organizational structures and their efficiency. Thus, water
governance determines what is being governed placing targets from a systems point of view. In order to express targets,
water governance requires the design of public policies and institutional frameworks that are socially accepted and able to
mobilize (social) resources in support of them (Rogers and Hall, 2003). As water governance involves the balancing of
various interests facing political realities, it is clear that there is a profoundly political element to governance (cf., Allan,
2003a).
However, the term water management refers to the operational activities for meeting specific targets of water gover-
nance. In the context of IWRM, management is here basically about operationalization of IWRM in practical terms, e.g.
through application of a river basin approach, cross-sectoral collaboration, stakeholder involvement and participation.
Hence, water management is about how, i.e. through what kind of instruments, water governance in terms of institu-
tional / organizational goals and objectives are attained in an effective and efficient manner through planning, organizing,
leading and controlling the institutional / organizational resources (cf., Malano and Van Hofwegen, 1999).
Implications for general institutional design and appropriate operationalization instruments for implementation arise
from the findings of international IWRM implementation assessments as well as from scientific discourse (see Sections 2.1
- 2.4 respectively) and can be summarized as follows:
• Success of standard packages for IWRM implementation has remained limited to the creation of national enabling
environments and formally assigned institutional roles. Several implementation gaps (see Table 3.1 for a useful
categorization of different implementation gaps provided by the OECD) persist in terms of implementation of IWRM
at the strategic and operational level.
• It has now been widely acknowledged that it will probably not be possible to successfully achieve IWRM opera-
tionalization blue-prints of full integration without relation to specific implementation contexts. Hence, top-down
approaches and command and control instruments are generally discarded in this context.
• A more adaptive approach towards IWRM is necessary in order to cope with prevailing complexity and persisting
fragmentation in water resources management. This adaptive approach requires a shift in emphasis towards “the
management of processes and people” (UN-Water, 2012a) based on continuous learning about the natural system
to be managed and the human system’s response to it in order to reduce uncertainty and risk. Furthermore, “better
use should be made of the natural environment as a component of water resources infrastructure” (UN-Water,
2012a), e.g. “the role of land cover (vegetation) and soil in reducing hydrological risk illustrates the need to rethink
water storage in ecosystem terms” (UN-Water, 2012a).
• This adaptive IWRM implies governance and management based on institutional reform, incentives and behavioral
change requiring multi-disciplinary and multi-sector collaboration.
According to these findings, the focus of further IWRM implementation efforts has to be placed on improvements in
water governance through effective (formal and informal) institutions as well as on appropriate management instruments
to operationalize them. On the one hand, institutions have to respond to specific contexts (natural and human system
properties and especially their interactions) and, on the other hand, a gradual shift towards policies based on institutional
reform, incentives and behavioral change through appropriate management instruments, sensitive to prevailing constraints,
is necessary. Hence, instruments to overcome the implementation gaps (operationalization) should be based on natural
and human system’s contexts, thus, considering people and ecosystems (participatory and ecosystem-based) - representing
the relevant governance system.
The OECD developed a multi-level approach for governance of public policies in decentralized contexts “to look at ways
to improve capacity and co-ordination among public stakeholders at different levels of government to increase efficiency,
equity and sustainability of public spending” (Charbit, 2011). This methodology has been tested in the context of water
policy implementation of OECD and non-OECD countries in order to diagnose multi-level governance challenges and
examples of tools used by countries to bridge co-ordination and capacity gaps (OECD, 2011b; Akhmouch, 2012). Table 3.1
illustrates the identified IWRM implementation gaps and respective implications to overcome them. Although described in
more general terms, these gaps reflect the principal IWRM implementation obstacles identified in Sections 2.1 and 2.2.
This chapter addresses the IWRM implementation gaps identified in Section 2.4 with respect to challenges to the
water governance system on the one hand and concerning requirements for management instruments to operationalize
IWRM on the other hand. The IWRM governance challenge will be analyzed based on an analytical framework for
environmental governance presented by Young (1999). In an additional step, and as a response to the governance
challenges, requirements for management instruments based on an actor’s perspective and incentives for behavioral
change of involved actors are discussed.
The concept of Young is used because, contrary to other analytical frameworks for environmental institutions, the
characteristics of the environmental resource, i.e. the ecosystem, to be managed are an intrinsic design principles of
Young’s concept. Other analytical frameworks for institutions of environmental management generally focus more on
socio-political factors and treat the characteristics of the environmental resource as contextual factors and thus are not
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Governance gap Description Implications
Administrative gap Geographical “mismatch” between hydrological
and administrative boundaries
Need for instruments to reach effective size
and appropriate scale
Information gap Asymmetries of information (quantity, quality,
type) between different stakeholders involved
in water policy, either voluntary or not
Need for instruments for revealing and sharing
information. Sectoral fragmentation of water-
related tasks across public authorities
Policy gap Sectoral fragmentation of water-related tasks
across ministries and agencies
Need for mechanisms to create multidimen-
sional/systemic approaches, and to exercise
political leadership and commitment
Capacity gap Insufficient scientific, technical, infrastructural
capacity of local actors to design and implement
water policies and relevant strategies
Need for instruments to build local capacity
Funding gap Unstable or insufficient revenues undermining
effective implementation of water responsibili-
ties at sub-national level, cross-sectoral policies,
and investments requested
Need for shared financing mechanisms
Objective gap Different rationales creating obstacles for adopt-
ing convergent targets, especially in case of mo-
tivational gap (lack of political will to engage)
Need for instruments to align objectives
Accountability gap Difficulty ensuring the transparency of practices
across the different constituencies, mainly due
to insufficient users’ commitment, lack of con-
cern, awareness and participation
Need for institutional quality instruments, in-
struments to strengthen the integrity frame-
work at the local level and instruments to
enhance citizen involvement
Table 3.1: Key implementation gaps in water policy; based on Charbit (2011) and further elaboration by OECD (2011b)
reflected explicitly in design principles (cf., Edwards and Steins, 1999). This structural assessment is carried out in order
to conceptualize the requirements for necessary institutions (i.e. management instruments) to overcome the IWRM
implementation gaps. It abstractly describes the general problem setting, why IWRM implementation at the river basin
level and lower is challenging and why implementation problems occur, with the aim to shed more light on implementation
gaps at the governance level in a structured manner. The aim is to deploy a general analytical framework, based on prior
findings of Young and others to describe the problems of integration, cooperation / collaboration and finding the right scale
of both in a context-specific manner. In doing so, the requirements to cope with generic IWRM implementation problems
are provided without addressing particular contexts nor specific problem-settings. This is supposed to provide guidance to
identify appropriate management instruments addressing these generic problems by being flexible in addressing different
contexts and problem-settings.
Following the IWRM trajectories discussed in Section 2.4, it is assumed that IWRM implementation is a matter of
governance and management of complex Social-Ecological System. Both, the adaptive management approaches with a
stronger focus on social and institutional issues (Timmerman et al., 2008; Pollard and Du Toit, 2008; Pahl-Wostl, 2009;
Lankford and Hepworth, 2010; Pahl-Wostl and Kranz, 2010; Engle et al., 2011; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2012) and those with a
stronger focus on ecological issues (Everard and Powell, 2002; Pinkham, 2002; Falkenmark and Rockström, 2004, 2006;
Smith and Barchiesi, 2008; Falkenmark and Rockström, 2010) refer to SES and highlight the importance of context-specific
approaches, thus representing expedient, light, adaptive approaches of IWRM, based on specific characteristics of the
natural and human system as well as, more importantly, their interactions, to achieve better IWRM implementation.
The analytical framework of fit and interplay by Young (1999) is consistent with the SES theory, since both integrate
a systems approach and adaptive management, emphasis on linkages and feedback (Holling, 1978), and improvement
of performance of natural resource systems based on an institutional and property rights approach, a people-orientated
approach which focuses on the resource user rather than on the resource itself (Berkes et al., 2000). Table 3.2 describes
Young’s framework of institutional fit and interplay in general as well as in the context of IWRM implementation and
relates it to the OECD implementation gaps (see Table 3.1).
Accordingly, the approach in this context integrates two streams of resource management thought (Berkes et al., 2000).
One is the use of a systems approach and adaptive management with emphasis on linkages and feedback controls (Holling,
1978). The system approach recognizes that natural resources cannot be treated as discrete entities in isolation from the
rest of the ecosystem nor the social system. Thus, social and ecological systems are understood as truly interdependent and
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Conceptualization
by Young
Description IWRM context OECD multi-level
governance gaps
Problem of fit The effectiveness of social institu-
tions is a function of the match be-
tween the characteristics of the in-
stitutions themselves and the char-
acteristics of the biogeophysical sys-
tems with which they interact
Problems of incompatibility between
institutional arrangements (e.g. mu-
nicipal land use planning, use of wa-
ter resources, up- and downstream
communities) and biogeophysical
systems
Administrative gap
Problem of
interplay
The effectiveness of specific insti-
tutions often depends not only on
their own features but also on their
interactions with other institutions
either at the same level (horizontal
interplay) or across levels of social
organization (vertical interplay)
Problems of interaction of differ-
ent institutions (e.g. different rules
for water users: agriculture, wa-
ter supply, power generation, sanita-
tion), cooperation and collaboration
among stakeholders
Policy gap,
Objective gap,
Accountability gap
Table 3.2: The framework proposed by Young (1999) to analyze institutional challenges of environmental governance and
related OECD governance gaps
constantly co-evolving. Several scientific disciplines, i.e. human or social ecology and ecological economics, are centered
on this approach.
The other stream of thought deals with improving the performance of natural resource systems. It places emphasis on
institutions and property rights representing a people-oriented approach which focuses on the resource user rather than
on the resource itself - resource management is people management (cf., Berkes et al., 2000). Concepts incorporated in this
approach relate to institutions and collective action, community-based resource management and institutional learning
and resource management (Berkes et al., 2000).
This analytical framework refers to the identified administrative gaps in water policy as problems of fit (Section 3.1)
and to policy, objective and accountability gaps as problems of interplay (Section 3.2). Although information, capacity
and funding gaps are also addressed in the context of problems of fit and interplay, these gaps will be assessed further in
terms of principal problems of operationalization in the context of IWRM implementation in developing countries (Section
3.3). This is done to highlight the special circumstances in these countries (e.g. of weak state, problems of corruption and
public finance) that present additional obstacles towards IWRM implementation.
This framework is suitable to analyze the implementation obstacles that arise while implementing IWRM at the river
basin level and below, because it directly addresses the interdependence of the natural and the human systems as social-
ecological-systems. Accordingly, problems of fit address the principal challenge of institutions to match the ecosystems and
their properties which they manage. This can be interpreted as an integration challenge within the natural system (cf.,
GWP, 2000) focused on by Falkenmark et al. The institutional challenges that result from improving fit are addressed as
problems of interplay between different institutions. This can, in turn, be interpreted as integration challenge within the
human system (cf., GWP, 2000), the focus of Pahl-Wostl et al., Lankford et al. and others. The concept of institutional fit
and interplay, thus, is applied as an analytical framework in response to the need for adaptive, context- and site-specific
solutions that are required to overcome IWRM implementation gaps.
The problems of fit and interplay are interdependent, as will be explained in the following sections, thus, allowing to
identify instrument requirements that explicitly address the challenge of interdependence of natural and human systems.
Hence, this will be the first, context-specific step of identification of institutional design requirements based on an SES-view
which will be followed by an operationalization analysis based on respective actor / stakeholder views. This second
analytical step focuses on incentive measures to change actor’s behavior. An actor orientation to institutional design is
essential since participation and stakeholder involvement can only be achieved if actors can be actively engaged.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the methodological conceptualization of the IWRM implementation (illustrated in the upper
governance sphere of the Figure) and operationalization (illustrated in the lower management sphere of the Figure) based
on the problem analysis of Chapter 2. Hence, this chapter conceptualizes the analyzed governance and management
challenges along IWRM implementation. The principal objective is to:
• Address the governance challenges conceptualized as interdependent problems of institutional fit and interplay by
finding appropriate governance scales; and to
• Address the operationalization challenges conceptualized as operational constraints and appropriate incentives by
finding appropriate management instruments
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Figure 3.1: Overview of IWRM implementation assessment (Source: Author’s work)
3.1 Problems of institutional fit
The notion that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ when it comes to designing environmental regimes to solve a variety of
environmental problems has been expressed prominently by Young (2002b). Hence, the problem of fit is generic, it occurs
whenever and wherever humans interact with bio-geophysical systems, regardless of the scale (e.g. large river basin or
small tributary watershed or even smaller). Young (2002b) stresses the importance of fit of environmental regimes to
ecosystem dynamics and properties for their sustainable management. It is important to look beyond the immediate and
stationary problems of overuse or point-source pollution and instead take a systems approach in responding to wider
causal effects and identifying linkages between these and characteristics of human systems (Moss, 2006). Such a system’s
approach considers also linkages within the natural and human systems, e.g. diffuse pollution, groundwater recharge, flow
regimes etc. To illustrate this, Young (2002b) gives an example of the calculation of sustainable yields from stocks of fish.
These calculations have to consider the interactions (e.g. predator-prey-relationships) with other ecosystem components
(other species or physical; e.g. temperature; and biological conditions; e.g. reproduction rates) to be sustainable. This
is an argument in favor of holistic ecosystem management. If regimes do not consider the interactions and the chaotic
behavior of the ecosystems they govern, Young (2002b) argues that “the predictable result is a problem of fit that leads
to unintended consequences that threaten or even preclude sustainability” (Wilson et al., 1994). Thus, problems of fit
“concern the failure of an institution or a set of institutions to take adequately into account the nature, functionality, and
dynamics of the specific ecosystem it influences” (Ekstrom and Young, 2009). Accordingly, Young (2008) stresses that “the
effectiveness of social institutions is a function of the match between the characteristics of the institutions themselves and
the characteristics of the bio-geophysical systems with which they interact”.
Solutions to the problem of fit strongly influence the performance of institutions that govern human and environment
relations (Young, 1999, 2008). Moreover, Brown (2003) argues that the problem of fit is of particular importance in the
context of reconciling environmental conservation and development goals. The basic assumption is that the effectiveness
of an institution is diminished where its characteristics do not match the characteristics of the biophysical systems it
addresses, e.g. the degree to which an institution’s area of operation covers the same geographical area as the natural
resource it is designed to influence (Moss, 2001). The challenge of environmental governance in particular, is that the
spatial context of natural resources cannot easily be altered. Therefore, institutional arrangements need to adapt to the
properties of the specific resource to be managed (Moss, 2006). This kind of boundary problems between natural and
human systems, described here as a problem of fit, has received much attention in the literature on the management
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of common pool resources (Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 1994). Thus, attempts to redesign institutions to follow the
characteristics of specific ecosystems are not just an obstacle to effective governance but the heart of the problem (Moss,
2006; OECD, 2011b).
According to Young (2002b) an assessment of the principal properties of the relevant ecosystems should be the starting
point to solve problems of fit. Hence, Young (2002b) identifies a number of important ecosystem properties and groups a
range of relevant ecosystem properties for problems of fit under three broad headings: ecosystem structures, processes,
and linkages (Table 3.3).
Property category Ecosystem property Description
Structures
Properties of elements of
ecosystems and their
relationships
Complexity Elements playing functionally distinct roles that are essential to
their maintenance and resilience
Homogeneity Degree of similarity among individual elements
Interdependence Tightness of links or couplings among elements or subsystems
Processes
Ecosystem dynamics that
develop, maintain, or
transform individual
systems through time
Productivity Metabolic processes with varying length, magnitude, and regularity
Growth Developmental process
Stabilization Capacity of an ecosystem to recover from disturbances or to return
to some earlier state
Change Change may be cyclical, episodic, or chaotic. Both, the nature
of triggers and the extent to which resultant processes are path
dependent or constrained by events occurring within a system
during previous times vary greatly
Linkages
Connections between
ecosystems
Boundary conditions Permeability of boundaries
Transboundary
interactions
Interaction with neighboring and other ecosystems
Exogenous impacts
Table 3.3: Ecosystem properties relevant to the problem of fit (Young, 2002b)
This starting point highlights the importance of measuring and monitoring ecosystems the properties of ecosystems or
to gain knowledge about them from other sources that may be based on experiences of local experts in order to solve
problems of fit. It has, thus, much in common with the social learning concept of adaptive management discussed in
Section 2.4.
In a next step, institutional arrangements that fit the contours and inherent properties of bio-geophysical problems
should be designed and built. Young (2002b) highlights that “this is easier said than done”. For ecosystems, understood
as complex systems where everything is related to everything else, “a specification of boundaries separating distinct
ecosystems is ultimately somewhat arbitrary and may emerge as a barrier to addressing important issues” (Young, 2002b).
Furthermore, Young (2002b) stresses to be “wary of an argument that treats the properties of ecosystems as objective
realities or facts of life that are immune from the effects of social construction”. Accordingly, he argues that “it seems
clear that regimes governing human harvesting of renewable resources that do not take into account variations among
ecosystems in these terms are asking for trouble by ignoring the problem of fit; that is, by failing to devise institutional
arrangements that are constructed in such a way that they are compatible with key properties of relevant ecosystems”.
Galaz et al. (2008) develop these ecosystem properties in the context of problems of fit further and derives different
types of misfits. These different types of institutional misfits, concerning spatial and temporal fit, threshold behavior and
cascading effects of ecosystems, are described in Table 3.4 (categories threshold behavior an cascading effects in grey color
are not further considered in the context of this dissertation).
According to this categorization, the problem of fit articulates how well environmental institutions match spatial or
temporal scales of ecosystems and account for functional ecosystem processes (Galaz et al., 2008). Misfits of environmental
regimes and ecosystem properties have contributed substantially to the deterioration of ecosystem services (Young, 2002b,a;
Ekstrom and Young, 2009). According to Galaz et al. (2008) the problem of fit concerns the failure of an institution
or a set of institutions (regime) to take adequately into account the nature, functionality, and dynamics of the specific
ecosystem it influences. Governance gaps, i.e. more precisely administrative gaps (see Table 3.2) in the context of
problems of fit, prevail where institutional mechanisms that account for links within and among resource use sectors and
significant properties of the ecosystem are lacking (Galaz et al., 2008; Ekstrom and Young, 2009). Misfits are present
where institutions leave these gaps, for instance, by not completely covering the ecosystem that comprehends the resource
or the resource use they are designed to manage by institutions (Hoel et al., 2005; Ekstrom and Young, 2009). Besides the
institutional matching of the ecosystems properties, thus, it is also important to take the resource use and the alternation
of ecosystem properties through human action into account.
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Type of misfit Definition and mechanism of misfit
Spatial extension
Institutional jurisdiction too small or too large to cover or affect the areal extent of the ecosystem(s)
subject to the institution
Institutional jurisdiction unable to cope with actors or drivers external or internal and important
for maintaining the ecosystems or processes affected by the institution; e.g. “one size fits all”
institutions are designed inappropriately to local social or ecological contexts (cf., Ostrom, 1999)
Temporal dynamics
Institution formed too early or too late to cause desired ecosystem effects
Institution produces decisions that assume a shorter or longer time span than those embedded in
the biophysical systems affected; and/or social response is too fast, too slow, too short, or too long
compared to the time taken for biophysical processes involved
Threshold behavior
Institution does not recognize, leads to, or is unable to avoid abrupt shift(s) in biophysical systems
Institution provides for inadequate response to contingencies (e.g. lack of rules for action in
extreme conditions) or reduces variation in biophysical systems (e.g. by removing whole functional
groups of species and/or by adding anthropogenic stress such as pollution). Institutions fail to
respond adequately or at all to disturbances that could have been buffered. Leads to practically
irreversible biophysical shifts (Folke et al., 2005)
Cascading effects
Institution is unable to buffer, or trigger further effects between or among biophysical and/or
social and economic systems
Institutional response is misdirected, nonexistent, inadequate, or wrongly timed to propagate or
allow the propagation of biophysical changes that entail further causative changes along temporal
and/or spatial scales
Table 3.4: Types of misfits between ecosystem dynamics and governance systems; based on Galaz et al. (2008)
In his analysis Young (2002b) finds evidence that suggests a number of distinct mechanisms that result in institutional
mismatches with ecosystem properties. Often two or more of these mismatches occur at the same time, thus, the sources
of mismatches are not mutually exclusive (Young, 2002b). The sources of mismatches are grouped by Young (2002b) into
three main categories: imperfect knowledge, institutional constraints, and rent-seeking behavior (see Table 3.5).
Category of mismatch Sources of mismatch
Imperfect knowledge
Ignorance because of absence of usable knowledge, underestimation of exploitation impacts
or lack of awareness regarding the ecosystems in questions
Faulty models or misleading discourses
Disregard of endogenic role of human actions in coupled human-natural systems
Institutional constraints
Embeddedness of regimes in larger or overarching social institutions (institutional linkage)
Jurisdictional boundaries
Implementation of lead agencies for purposes of administering a regime in practice
Path dependence - diverging change velocities of environmental or technological change and
institutional change
Rent-seeking behavior
Actors try to improve their individual payoffs at the expense of social welfare
In the absence of rules designed to protect the public interest, private actors often exploit
natural resources ruthlessly for their own benefit (rape, ruin, and run)
Political rent-seeking on the part of leaders able and willing to pursue their own objectives
regardless of longer-term consequences for sustainability of human-environment relations
Table 3.5: Sources of mismatches between regimes and ecosystems; based on Young (2002b)
The governance challenge increases with the number and types of misfits (e.g., from local spatial misfits to cross-national
cascade effect misfits) as a result of the enlargement in the number of actors, spatial scales, and interactions across systems
introduced by environmental and resource regimes operating at different governance levels (Young et al., 2008).
Although there are “no simple antidotes to these forces leading to the persistence of mismatches between ecosystem
properties and institutional attributes”, Young (2002b) presents three possible approaches to confront them. One
practical approach is to establish a monitoring system of both the status of key ecosystems and the performance of major
environmental regimes. This way evidence of mismatches can be revealed through continuous, detailed, and credible
feedback regarding the course of relevant human-environment relations. This approach is related to the social learning in
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adaptive management approaches. Building substantial flexibility into provisions of environmental regimes is another
approach. This approach is also incorporated in adaptive management. Finally, Young (2002b) proposes a precautionary
approach “to respond to problems arising from imperfect information and institutional constraints by erring on the side of
safety; that is, by building in margins of safety to ensure that exploited components of ecosystems are not pushed beyond
the limits of sustainability”.
In the context of water governance an administrative gap (see Table 3.1) described as a problem of fit, thus, corresponds
to a geographical mismatch between hydrological and administrative boundaries (OECD, 2011b). In the governance of
natural resources, in this case water resources, the administrative gap represents a fundamental problem of fit since the
logic of service provision by a governing institution is constrained by nature. This, however, is not the case for many other
governance fields, e.g. health or education. Governance fields that are independent from the natural systems can therefore
be much easier administrated in line with administrative boundaries of municipalities, regions and states. Moreover, poor
fit of institutions in environmental governance is not a phenomenon limited to the international level, it is also true at
the national and even the local level where for historical and economic reasons jurisdictions of virtually all governments
match poorly to natural system’s properties (Lipschutz, 1999).
Administrative gaps in national water governance3 principally imply mismatches at sub-national level that often
obstruct water policies and complicate the relationships between elected representatives, local authorities, water agencies,
resource managers and end users (Moss, 2006; OECD, 2011b). Problems of mismatches such as lack of co-operation,
participation and transparency in water management are often rooted in the historical organization of water bodies along
administrative boundaries, although river basins rarely obey administrative logic (Molle et al., 2007; OECD, 2011b).
Hence, the enforcement of water quality regulations and water abstraction rules, for instance, is difficult where two or
more institutions regulate different sections of one river, i.e. of a river basin. Furthermore, management of water resources
, in the past, has often focused on either point-source or scattered and uncoordinated solutions for water pollution (e.g.
end-of-pipe solutions to waste water problems), resource use or flood protection according to local administrative priorities
lacking an integrated basin perspective.
Accordingly, Voigt (1997) argues that effective water resources management, in terms of both quality and quantity
related aspects, depends on a governance, i.e. management concept, which reflects the complexity of water-based
ecosystems, the multiple anthropogenic uses of water and the interaction between biophysical and human systems. Thus,
policies which cover only a part of the water system (i.e. the river basin), a point source of pollution for instance, “[...]
without considering the broader context run the serious risk of ignoring, or even creating, negative external effects” (Moss,
2006). The management of water resources on the basis of the whole river basin (longitudinally from the source to the
estuary of a river and laterally from the river stream to the drainage-divide) aims at addressing the interdependence
between, in particular, upstream and downstream effects, water quality and water quantity aspects, and water and adjacent
land-use (OECD, 1989). In the context of IWRM, problems of fit are most prominently addressed with regard to spatial fit.
The principal policy strategy to overcome the common problem of spatial misfit of administrative boundaries and river
basin delineations is found in Integrated River Basin Management (see Figure 3.2). It is assumed that at the river basin
level, apart from spatial misfits, misfits stemming from temporal dynamics, threshold behavior and possible cascading
effects (cf., Table 3.4) are captured as well.
A 
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River basin 
Figure 3.2: Illustration of the problem of spatial fit between a river basin and administrative boundaries of A, B and C
(Source: Author’s work)
3 Problems in the context of international river basins are not addressed in this dissertation.
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Rogers (1997) argues further economically that for the internalization of externalities “[t]he river basin itself is an ideal
unit of analysis to achieve this goal: it can reasonably be assumed that most externalities are captured by analysing the
river basin as a single unit”. Hence, the central argument for the need to solve problems of spatial fit “[...] is that lack
of fit causes spatial externalities, benefiting free riders and harming others beyond the spatial reach of the responsible
institution” (Moss, 2001). The concept of fiscal equivalence (Olson, 1969) addresses the problem of fit in economic terms
as well, stating that those who receive a benefit from a collective good (e.g. rival but open-access water resources) need to
be matched with those who pay for and decide on it. A link between the spatial extent of a problem and the spatial remit
of political decision-making bodies and jurisdictions is similarly asked for in the related theory of fiscal federalism (Oates,
1999). However, the question of finance of water governance raised here has to be seen in the context of decentralization
and will be addressed in section 3.3.
3.1.1 Integrated River Basin Management to solve problems of spatial fit
As highlighted in Section 2.1 and stressed in the introduction of this chapter, IWRM is a multi-level process that ranges
from an international, transboundary level over national and regional levels to the local level (Lenton, 2011). While at the
national level progress is made with the development of new water laws, national water policies and new institutional roles,
the progress at the regional and local level is slow (see Section 2.1.2). The actual operationalization of IWRM with tangible
outcomes takes place at these levels. This regional or local IWRM incorporates Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM)
as a subset of the IWRM process. Hooper (2005) defines IRBM “as an integrated and coordinated approach to the planning
and management of natural resources of a river basin, one that encourages stakeholders to consider a wide array of social
and environmental interconnections, in a catchment / watershed context”. The management of water resources according
to river basins, thus, is a prominent approach to solve problems of institutional misfit. Hence, Hooper (2005) highlights
the characteristics of integrated, adaptive river basin management, derived from IRBM definitions of Mitchell and Hollick
(1993) and Naiman (1992):
• Coordinated activities rather than amalgamated programs of action;
• Top-down management meeting bottom-up management;
• Strategic planning rather than all-embracing efforts: being targeted and selective about actions and prioritizing
work programs;
• Integrating goals rather than planning resource use and conservation by either single or multi-purpose reasons;
• Proactive rather than reactive resource use planning: looking to identify problems before they occur and being
cautious in resource use;
• Using cost-effective rather than prescriptive financial management mechanisms;
• Using partnerships and cost-sharing programs wherever possible;
• Working with partners in a co-operative work environment, rather than using confrontational and directive
management;
• Encouraging commitment in staff rather than using command-and-control management styles;
• Empowering local and regional decision-making rather than centralizing decisions and directing staff;
• Management based on problem-solving rather than functionality
• Having flexible organizations rather than rigid inflexible structures;
• Providing appropriate, relevant, affordable information that is relevant to IRBM;
• Using equitable management methods which are sensitive to and respect cultural needs and gender issues, and do
not discriminate against catchment managers because of their distant location from the decision-making processes
of other water professionals.
Hooper (2005) sees river basin decision-making as a set of principles and characteristics (see above) which need to be
applied to any river basin management setting. In order to be effective the planning process, requires the following: (1) the
planner has jurisdictional authority over the system being planned and (2) the planner can predict the consequences of his
or her plans. Moreover, Mitchell (1990) argues that an integrated approach considering land and water resources “offers
the possibility of addressing the dynamics of an ecological system, thereby ensuring that critical relationships are identified
and managed”. Jaspers (2003), highlights that water management not coinciding with the boundaries of the river basin is
very cumbersome when conducting its principle tasks. Accordingly, it will induce authorities to monopolize the water
supply sources within their area and to transfer the problem of flooding downstream. Therefore, water management
on hydrological boundaries is needed because of the growing competition for water or the need to co-operate in an
upstream-downstream relation for flood control or both.
However, the suitability of an entire river basin as best spatial fit is not always given. Lenton (2011) argues, for
instance, that “some aspects of integration within the natural system (e.g., green and blue water, surface and groundwater
management) are more relevant at the watershed and basin levels, whereas some aspects of human-system integration
(such as considering water-resource policy within national economic and sectoral policies) are more relevant at the
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national level”. Furthermore, Moss (2012) argues that on the one hand spatial misfit of institutions is often responsible
for negative externalities, benefiting free riders and harming others beyond the reach of the institution responsible. On
the other hand, responding to this misfit by increasing the geographical scale of institutional arrangements until all
externalities are covered “often brings with it serious drawbacks in the form of unwieldy and bureaucratic structures with
very little sensitivity to local or regional contexts” (Moss, 2012). Lenton (2011) too, stresses that “some problems are best
addressed at the sub-basin or local level. Accordingly, the OECD emphasizes the need for instruments to reach effective
size and appropriate scale as key to overcome this administrative gap (OECD, 2011b).
Consequently, although the river basin with its clearly delineated boundary for surface water appears to promise the
solution to spatial misfits in water management, experiences of institutionalizing river basin management are falling short
of expectations. Moss (2012) highlights three principal criticisms from literature on IRBM since the 1980s challenging the
notion of creating perfect spatial fit:
• IRBM does not solve all hydrological boundary problems. The flows of surface water, not groundwater, delineate
river basin boundaries. River basin boundaries are overridden where water supply networks (inter-basin transfers)
or artificial waterways connect two or more river basins.
• River basin organizations lack the legitimacy and authority of democratically elected bodies of local, regional, or
central government as they cover a different territory than political jurisdictions. They can experience difficulties in
collaborating with policy fields/water users which are not organized around river basins, e.g. urban development,
agriculture, forestry, transportation, and energy (Moss, 2004b; Mostert, 2003; Mostert et al., 2007; Pahl-Wostl,
2007).
• Water management along an ecosystem boundary has often resulted in a focus on biophysical, rather than
socioeconomic, problems of water management (Mostert, 1999). A recent criticism that river basin management
in practice is often neglecting participation and transparency reflects this point (Molle, 2008a; Mollinga, 2008;
Saravanan et al., 2009).
Moreover, a perfect spatial fit may not be achieved since “the replacement of existing institutional arrangements by
institutions oriented around biophysical systems will inevitably create new boundary problems and fresh mismatches”
(Moss, 2012). Accordingly, Moss (2012) argues that “a purist pursuit of river basin management will tend to exclude from
consideration factors that are not central to resolving problems of spatial fit”. Again, as discussed in Section 2.4, instead of
striving to achieve the ideal spatial fit across the entire river basin it is argued to consider the territorial unit of the river
basin in a broader context-specific way of overlapping social, economic, political and physical spaces (Lipschutz, 1999;
Moss, 2012). Accordingly, based on a comparative study of about 100 cases of river basin management worldwide the
OECD highlighted that the key to solve problems of fit is to determine the rationale for the choice of spatial management
unit, and to consider carefully the relative merits of adopting the river basin area as the management unit (OECD, 1989,
as cited in Moss (2006)).
Nevertheless, discarding the concept of spatial fit is not an issue in the literature, instead a more pragmatic approach is
prevailing. Moss (2012) states that “this [more pragmatic approach] entails accepting the existence of multiple geographies
of water, with overlapping social, economic, political, cultural, and physical spaces, and the importance of collaborative
and flexible ways of working across the boundaries they entail”. Furthermore, Moss argues that “spatial fit, like river basin
management in general, should be seen not as a panacea to environmental problems (Ostrom, 2007), but as a practice of
adaptive (co-)management involving a wide range of relevant stakeholders operating in different spatial contexts and on
different scales”. Referring to the statements of the chapter on freshwater in Agenda 21 that states that “Integrated water
resources management, including the integration of land- and water-related aspects, should be carried out at the level of
the catchment basin or sub-basin” (ICWE, 1992) and the Article 26 of the Johannesburg Plan for Implementation that
“the river (or water) basin should be used as the basic unit for integrating management”, Lenton (2011) acknowledges
that water management at the basin level has become the central focus of much of the advances in thinking about IWRM.
Notwithstanding, Lenton (2011) highlights, in a similar manner as Moss (2012), also the limitations of water management
at the river basin level: “while basin boundaries provide a useful way of delimiting the supply side of the equation, they
are not necessarily the best means to integrate the demand side, especially since basin boundaries usually do not coincide
with political or administrative boundaries. Integrating natural and human systems therefore generally requires work at
other levels beyond the basin” (Lenton, 2011). Furthermore, terrestrial ecosystems that define the partitioning of rainfall
within the hydrological boundaries certainly extend across these boundaries. A forest fire in a neighboring river basin,
for example, will not respect hydrological boundaries, thus, impact across these poses limitations on the hydrological
cycle. Nevertheless, river basins are considered as the most suitable general “management” unit because they do match
significant process of surface water flows better than other management units, e.g. administrative units.
When considering sub-basins or tributary river systems, it is important to take, at least, the obvious connections within
the larger river basin into account. The notion of sub-basins as nested sub-systems forming together a river basin, as
proposed by Lankford and Hepworth (2010), is a useful analytical conceptualization in this context (see also Section 2.4).
Uphoff (1996) claims that these holons - nested sub-systems - as introduced by Koestler (1967) may be considered as
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whole in themselves, and at the same time parts of larger wholes. Hence, certain aspects of the behavior of a holon may be
confined entirely to that holon, yet systems (i.e. holons) at any level are constrained and controlled by the levels above
and below, thus, can be considered as nested (Stephens and Hess, 1999). Considering holons as social-ecological systems,
they represent a spatial extent of ecosystem-human system interaction. An example of a holon as a nested sub-system
can be individual farmers who determine what will happen within their own farming system but must work within the
social, political, technical, economic and environmental constraints imposed by a larger (e.g. village or catchment) system.
Using ecosystem properties and human system interaction (use of the natural system) seems to be an interesting way to
determine the appropriate management unit for the strategic and operational level. Knowledge about the natural and
human system interaction is very important for this determination, thus, an adaptive and integrated approach based on
social learning appears to be most adequate. Moreover, according to Cleveland et al. (1996), it is reasonable to assume for
practical purpose that ecosystems function to some extend as divisible systems functioning as connected subsystems, or
holons (cf., O’Neill et al., 1986). This way scientific and practical understanding of the system can be divided into tractable
smaller problems. Hence, good fit between governance and biophysical systems may be based on a government structure
nested across levels of administration with an adaptive capacity as suggested in research on multi-level environmental
governance (Young et al., 2008). This challenge of scoping the analysis broadly enough spatially to consider all important
consequences of all interactions, but narrowly enough to be efficient in making decisions about planning, operations,
regulations, and other considerations represents a basic analytical challenge for IWRM. Hence, Cardwell et al. (2009) sees
in the realm of water resources management the problem that plan formulation is often scoped in hydrological boundary
context, “but plan evaluation of the economic and environmental consequences considers a spatial context defined by
business-system interactions that may not align with the hydrology”.
Since water is the management, i.e. governance subject, river basins as drainage area of rivers provide a quite a suitable
spatial fit to the governance challenge. However, it is important to highlight that the river network alone only represents
the blue water component for spatial fit, adjacent terrestrial ecosystems that determine the rainfall partitioning as green
water flows complement the spatial fit required for good governance. Although an entire river basin may not represent the
best spatial fit for all institutional challenges, the linkages of terrestrial ecosystems and river networks need to be taken
into account in any case in order to achieve adequate spatial fit (cf., Falkenmark and Rockström, 2010). This is an essential
requirement for institutions (i.e. management instruments) to cope with the implementation of IWRM. Since humans are
an important driving force (see Vitousek et al., 1997) for terrestrial ecosystem change (green water flows) and water use
(blue water flows), both natural ecosystem properties (as described in Table 3.3) and human use and alternation of them
interactively define the best spatial fit. Thus, achieving good spatial fit is highly site-specific and context (i.e. use)-specific.
This implication is stressed in the adaptive IWRM approaches with social and ecological focus.
Vatn and Vedeld (2012) make this point of context-specificity also in their review of Young’s concept of fit and interplay
when they state that “the challenge from a governance perspective is, however, not only about how to construct regimes
that fit the dynamics and complexities of the resources or ecosystems. No governance structure can be evaluated without
reference to an aim. Ecosystems are not fixed entities. They convey many properties and these can, at least to some extent,
be re-arranged or modified to change the ‘delivery’ of the system. Hence, the goals we try to attain will influence what
we emphasize and see as problems”. Consequently, Vatn and Vedeld (2012) conclude that since “regime formulations
are dominantly related to human use in some sense [...] the concept of fit needs to include references to what aspects
and capacities of the biophysical system humans emphasize”. In other words, the definition of spatial fit, hence the
corresponding socially constructed government regime, is not only about “the pure biophysical system” but also about the
human use of it (Vatn and Vedeld, 2012).
Vatn and Vedeld (2012) elaborate this point further and conclude that “fit is not only about fitting ecosystem dynamics,
our [society’s] priorities concerning these, and what rules fit these issues. It is also about motivations and human
interaction. Therefore a theory about fit demands a theory about human motivation and choice”. According to Vatn and
Vedeld (2012), a possible way forward lies in the observation that human motivation is itself dependent upon institutions
(Vatn, 2005, 2009). Hence, institutional structures or regimes can be designed, for instance, to facilitate or expect
cooperative will and social engagement, rather than fostering people to act on their own interests (Vatn and Vedeld,
2012). This is a question of provision of incentives by institutional structures that will be discussed again in the context of
interplay (see Section 3.2) and later on in the context of specific policy instruments in Section 3.4 as well.
To enhance the fit between biophysical systems and governance, coordination of institutions is a minimum requirement.
Mechanisms to facilitate linkages among institutions with often autonomous but interdependent actors or actor groups
are crucial to avoid fragmented and sectoral approaches (Young et al., 2008). For this purpose intermediaries, e.g.
boundary organizations and bridging organizations, that establish the institutional interplay typically necessary to achieve
successful fit are important (Brown, 1991; Young et al., 2008). In the context of adaptive co-management bridging
organizations may provide arenas for trust building, social learning, sense making, identification of common interests,
vertical and / or horizontal collaboration, and conflict resolution (Folke et al., 2005). According to Young et al. (2008),
bridging organizations are “crucial for maintaining new collaboration among different stakeholder groups in order to foster
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innovation, generate new knowledge, and identify new opportunities for problem solving”. Therefore, intermediaries such
as bridging organizations can substantially avoid misfits and play a key role in social learning processes. Holzinger (2001)
concludes similarly stating that “[...] disparities between functional space and political territory can only be removed by
the reorganisation of political territories or by functional cooperation between the responsible jurisdictions”.
Thus, advocates of adaptive IWRM are in favor of informal collaboration among multiple institutions within a river
basin instead of creating a formalized, unitary river basin organization as generally favored in the past (Huitema et al.,
2009; Borowski et al., 2008; Butterworth et al., 2010). This implies paying far more attention to the interactions among
the multiple organizations affecting water use within a basin and less attention to the structure of an authority responsible
for managing a river basin (Moss, 2012). Hence, Moss (2012) concludes, based on his investigations in the Wupper river
basin in Germany, that problems of fit and interplay in reality are often interlinked and it may be opportune to distinguish
them for analytical purposes only. Therefore, fit and interplay need to be conceived as complementary dimensions of
collaborative water management.
The concept of institutional fit highlights the importance of finding the right size of a management unit based on the
specific characteristics of the ecosystem to be managed. However, a prescribed size of the management unit, e.g. first
order river basin, is not the best solution for implementation of IWRM in practice. Specific requirements for institutions
to improve fit with river basins include the provision of mechanisms to measure and monitor the river ecosystem, make
this information accessible and base decision on it. Thereby, the spatial extent of institutional mechanisms has to reflect
the ecosystem properties, e.g. land use management at the level where its impact and temporal dynamics are perceived,
as well as the interrelationships within the river basin, e.g. upstream-downstream dependence or by the integration of
spatial planning / land use and water management. Furthermore, the institutional design to address problems of fit is
also related to the resource use. Thus, institutional fit has to consider ecosystem properties but also interactions with the
human system, defined by the user and uses of the natural system. A context-specific and problem-oriented selection of a
management unit requires information on both, systems and their institutions. Matching the ecosystem properties and
interactions with resource use requires a reorganization of institutions resulting in problems of interplay. Hence, solutions
to the problem of fit through the establishment of new institutions (now based on ecosystem properties, e.g. river basins)
imply problems of institutional interplay between existing and new institutions and both problems have to be solved
interactively. While solving problems of fit improves integration within the natural system, the integration of land and
water being the most important, solutions to problems of interplay are needed with respect to interactions with the human
system, facilitating collaboration among stakeholders, participation and subsidiarity of decision-making. The problem of
institutional interplay is discussed in the following section.
3.2 Problems of institutional interplay
As mentioned above, a principal concern of solving problems of fit is that the replacement of existing institutions by
institutions appropriate to biophysical systems will create new institutional boundary problems and potentially new
mismatches (Moss, 2004b). This problem is referred to as institutional interplay implying that “the effectiveness of
specific institutions often depends not only on their own features but also on their interactions with other institutions”
(Young, 1999). Therefore, the objective of addressing institutional interplay is to highlight “[...] the importance of looking
beyond the design of individual institutions to the ways in which institutions interact and how this interaction can shape
policy delivery” (Young, 1999). Generally, a distinction can be made between the horizontal and vertical dimensions of
institutional interplay.
The problems of horizontal interplay arises because institutions operate within functionally split jurisdictions although
these functions are physically linked on the ground. Thus, horizontal interplay describes linkages among institutions
operating at the same level of social organization. These linkages are ubiquitous in environmental governance and with
an increasing number of institutions in a given social space, interactions between and among individual institutions
increase exponentially (King, 1997; Young, 2002b). Often horizontal linkages, just as vertical linkages, represent side
effects or unintended byproducts of institutions designed to achieve other ends. This sort of linkages is often referred
to as institutional overlaps (Young, 2002b). However, sometimes these institutional overlaps are intentional in order to
solve problems or enhance cooperative outcomes and thereby make distinct institutional arrangements fit together into
structures that promote a common goal. In other cases, horizontal interplay may also seek competition among institutional
arrangements to advance their individual institutional agendas (Young, 2002b). Hence, institutional interplay can promote
both cooperative and competitive ends in conscious efforts as politics of institutional linkages.
For this reason it is important to stress that institutional interplay, both horizontal and vertical, ordinarily generates
incentives to manage interactions in order to achieve joint gains or to avoid joint losses. Attaining these positive outcomes
is not an easy task since interplay often implies mixed-motive situations where actor’s behavior may complicate the pursuit
of a common goal. Furthermore, the achieved institutional interactions may lead to opportunities for strategic behavior for
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those who have little or no interest in promoting the common goal (Young, 2002b). Considering the potential positive
synergies of institutional interplay in maximizing social welfare, the possible downsides have to be kept in mind.
According to King (1997), institutions can “respond to institutional interplay or overlap through adaptation of one
institution to another (unilateral adjustments) or mutual adjustment in which two or more institutions are designed to
work together in order to optimize joint effectiveness, muster political support, or achieve some other purpose that neither
can accomplish on its own”. While unilateral adjustment often occurs because of vertical institutional interplay when local
regimes are superimposed by national regimes or forced to adjust to them (e.g. through the creation of RBOs having the
same or similar functions as local governments), mutual adjustment more often occurs horizontally, rather than vertically,
since it requires the existence of a decision-making arena that can deal with both (all) institutions involved (King, 1997;
Young and Underdal, 1997).
In contrast to horizontal interplay, vertical interplay in its most common form represents linkages between institutions
dealing with related issues but located at adjoining levels of social organization. Interactions between federal and state or
provincial institutions dealing with the management of land and natural resources, and between state or provincial and
local institutional arrangements addressing matters of environmental quality or public health are prominent cases for
vertical institutional interplay in the context of water resources governance (Young, 2002b).
The directions and reasons of institutional interplay can differ substantially. While the direction of institutional interplay
is either vertical (e.g. from the national to the local level and vice versa) or horizontal (e.g. among different institutions
of different sectors within a river basin), the reasons for institutional interplay may also differ. According to Young
(1999) and earlier work of King (1997), institutional interplay can originate from a functional linkage as an unavoidable
interdependency between different institutions, e.g. those for agriculture and environmental protection, or from a political,
i.e. tactical, linkage where institutions seek integration for a common political purpose (e.g. public health and water
supply institutions to improve life expectancy). A membership linkage is introduced by King (1997) as a third type of
institutional interplay referring to components of institutions, which overlap or have an integrative function. River basin
organizations are a typical example of interplay between different participating institutions linked by membership. Table
3.6 illustrates the different types of origin in institutional interplay.
Type of institutional linkage Description
Functional Linkage Functional linkages typically reflect (inter-)dependence relationships existing in the
biophysical contexts or social settings
Political Linkage Politically constructed linkages exist whenever actors decide to consider two or more
institutions as part of a larger complex or package
Membership Linkage Refers to components of institutions, which overlap or have an integrative function
(e.g. River Basin Organization)
Table 3.6: Di erent types of institutional linkages (cf., King, 1997)
Vertical interplay primarily, although not exclusively, arises from functional interdependence, in contrast to the deliberate
or intentional links associated with the politics of design and management which often become prominent in connection
with efforts to solve problems arising from the effects of functional interdependence related to horizontal interplay.
Young (2002b) argues that nationally organized regimes facilitate and sometimes promote rather large-scale, consump-
tive, market-driven, and often unsustainable uses of targeted resources (e.g., forests, fish) in form of commodification.
This is caused by the provision of “arenas in which the interests of powerful, nonresident players generally dominate the
interests of small-scale, local users” (Young, 2002b). By contrast, local regimes are in favor of small-scale uses of resources
that evolve over time from the experiences of resident resource users. Furthermore, local regimes are less market-driven
and give higher priority to sustainability of local ecosystems (cf., Ostrom, 1990). As local and other institutional levels
coexist, environmental resources may be affected substantially by cross-scale interactions (vertical interplay) between
these systems.
A common problem of vertical interplay if induced from top-down, according to Young (2002b), is the proliferation
of formal rights and rules that are poorly suited to local circumstances. Additionally, local exceptions and informal
interpretations can contribute to practical ineffectiveness. This is also true regarding the rights and interests of various
groups of stakeholders. Considering the subsidiarity principle, design and operation of institutional arrangements need to
take local knowledge into account and protect the rights and interests of local stakeholders, even when they introduce
mechanisms at higher levels of social organization, required to fit the dynamics of ecosystems that are regional or even
international in scope (Young, 2002b). The proper level of social organization to assign management authority, thus,
is very context-specific. A promising approach here can provide forms of co-management where working partnerships
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between local users of natural resources and (sub)national agencies with the formal authority to make decisions about
human activities impacting ecosystems as well as the resources to administer management systems are established (Berkes
et al., 2000). However, layered institutional structures that imply vertical interplay are needed because of the nested
characteristic of ecosystems together with the structure of nation states. Cause-effect relationships of local actions may
reach the regional level but can easily reach the global level, thus, spreading beyond administrative boarders (Vatn and
Vedeld, 2012).
In the context of water governance, horizontal and vertical directions of interplay, such as functional, political and
membership linkages, are common for different reasons. Table 3.7 illustrates these different kinds of institutional interplay
and linkage with regard to the IWRM process. New formal institutions situated at the river basin level have been introduced
in most countries of the world to reduce problems of fit between administrative and biophysical boundaries (Pahl-Wostl,
2009). Thereby, problems of fit have often been solved at the expense of problems of interplay (cf., Moss, 2006). As a
result newly established institutions at basin scale and those organized at traditional administrative boundaries, e.g. for
land use planning or agriculture, now experience problems of vertical and horizontal interplay between them that prove to
be a barrier for implementing integrated management approaches and may lead to overly complex structures (Borowski
et al., 2008; Pahl-Wostl, 2009).
Functional Linkage Political Linkage Membership Linkage
Vertical
interaction
Transposition of na-
tional water laws into
municipal legislation
Cooperation between national and
municipal authorities in imple-
menting multi-level water laws
Municipal authorities fulfill-
ing dual functions (state
and self-government tasks)
Horizontal
interaction
Functional Land use, water pollu-
tion and water protec-
tion
Cooperation between water users
and farmers in achieving water
quality goals
Management committee
serving agricultural and
water management interests
Spatial Dependency of down-
stream on upstream
users
Coordinating agricultural support
schemes between neighboring
states
Trans-boundary coordina-
tion of water management
in river basins
Table 3.7: Examples of di erent kinds of institutional interaction and linkages in the context of a national IWRM process;
based on Moss (2004b)
With regard to vertical interplay, the IWRM implementation process is, in general, induced from top-down, based on
legal and institutional reforms at the national level as well as coordination and alignment of general development goals
of water resources management, with implications for all policy levels. The decentralization process pursued in IWRM
implementation is based on the subsidiarity principles and is intended to assign important decision-making competencies
to the sub-national level. Furthermore, it is necessary to integrate all (relevant) stakeholders in the planning and decision
making processes. Thus, the IWRM process implies significant vertical interplay between different policy levels, i.e. levels
of social organization. In the context of IWRM, institutional interplay additionally refers to cross-sectoral cooperation
and coordination of different water use sectors and others, including land uses that affect the hydrological cycle or are
dependent on it (see Figure 3.3) in terms of horizontal interplay. Vertical and horizontal interplay together represent the
integration within the human system.
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of the problem of horizontal institutional interplay within a river basin (Source: Author’s work)
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With regard to vertical interplay, the decentralization process of IWRM is of special importance. Decentralization
offers opportunities to manage water in a context-specific integrated way and options for practical participation of
local communities and other local players. Moreover, it offers more scope for timely and effective enforcement of rules
(Adeyemo, 2003). But there are also significant constraints to decentralization because of a lack of funding and capacity,
e.g. at the local level of municipalities. Furthermore, there is a need to develop local expertise and the introduction of
integrated water management planning at district and municipality level. In case of provision of sufficient sovereignty to
autonomous municipalities through an effective national enabling environment, they may be able to raise their own funds
and attract domestic and even international investment for water resources management (Adeyemo, 2003). Since the
present link between water management at different levels is often disjointed, conflicting or top-down it is very important
to link local water management with water resource planning at river basin or national level in a bottom-up manner
of vertical interplay. There is much evidence that local communities and water users can govern common resources in
equitable and efficient ways (Bromley, 1992; Ostrom, 1990) while “many of the current problems of water governance
derive from hierarchical and centralized control by the state and its inability to provide sufficient water-related services
or to enforce regulations” (UNESCO-WWAP, 2003). Accordingly, (Adeyemo, 2003) argues that an effective governance
of water resources requires the combined commitment of government and various groups in civil society particularly at
local / community levels as well as the private sector. This distributed governance of water by directing more responsibility
to the local and regional level is an institutional response to the IWRM principle of subsidiarity. To achieve this “confusion
over the demarcation of responsibilities between and among actors, inadequate co-ordination mechanisms, jurisdictional
gaps or overlaps, and the failure to match needs, responsibilities, authorities and capacities for action” has to be overcome
(Adeyemo, 2003). In order to consider all interests involved, IWRM should enable full stakeholder participation at the
appropriate level. Therefore, river basin plans, as the principle instrument of vertical interplay in IWRM, according to
Jaspers (2003), need to be composed of lower level sub-basin, catchment or watershed plans if the scale of the river basin
or specific use contexts makes them necessary. Lenton (2011) too, highlights the need to understand integration in vertical
terms where “actions at one level should seek to reinforce and complement actions at other levels, within the generally
agreed principle that decision making on water resources should be taken at the lowest appropriate level”.
According to Moss (2004b), improvements in horizontal institutional interplay “[...] may be achieved through new
‘comprehensive’ institutions (involving additional transaction costs and political will and mandate) or through loosely
organized cooperation agreements between existing (sectoral) institutions in form of minimal institutional change”.
Experience of IWRM implementation from countries with principally regulatory policies with few negotiative and
participatory governance elements, e.g. Germany and Spain, suggests that the necessary institutional interplay in river
basin management has posed severe problems of institutional adaptation (Moss, 2004b). Moreover, when it comes
to river basin management plans legitimacy and ownership are frequent problems of institutional interplay impeding
operationalization. Mitchell (2005) concludes in this context: “The result is that the IWRM recommendations often have
low priority because they are perceived to be someone else’s problem or responsibility. Alternatively, if implemented,
they are scheduled to fit into the activities and priorities of each agency, rather than with regard to how they should be
sequenced as part of an overall, integrated initiative”.
It is assumed that these challenges of coordination are even greater in developing and transition countries, because
these countries typically lack essential financial, institutional and human resources (Horlemann and Dombrowsky, 2011).
Nielsen et al. (2013) argue that different institutional set-ups may promote or hinder synergies among institutions
regulating water and related policy fields, particularly land use, as required for an IWRM. Mitchell (1990) stresses further
that solving the problem of spatial fit in river basin management depends on the success in parallel improvements of
institutional interplay: “[T]here is never a perfect ‘fit’ among legitimization instruments, functions and structures. As a
result, use is made of various processes and mechanisms to overcome the problems, which occur because of imperfect
matches. It is often these processes and mechanisms, informal and formal, which facilitate co-ordination and integration”.
Furthermore, Moss (2004b) argues that “[...] in the absence of an [appropriate] organisational blueprint for river basin
management, the process of institutionalising river basin management, rather than the end-result, acquires particular
significance”. Moreover, he adds “[...] the task of winning broad support for a more integrated, holistic approach to
water management demands extensive interaction between a wide range of parties. It requires complex negotiation and
bargaining processes with other parties relevant to water resource management and the creation of new partnerships to
solve basin-specific problems (from Newson, 1997)”.
Moss (2006) points out that the literature on the organizational aspects of IWRM on the river basin level identifies
differences in the spatial remit of institutions as a significant hindrance to cross-sectoral cooperation over water-related
issues. Furthermore in this context of horizontal interplay Newson (1997), for instance, sees policy gaps (cf., OECD, 2011b)
between land use planning and water management planning resulting from different spatial scopes of the two planning
regimes, as one of the principal problems of river basin management. Hence, he concludes that IWRM cannot be achieved
by institutions of water management alone because water resources are affected in quantity and quality by a wide range
of human activities, e.g. agriculture, urban development, power generation etc. Hence, good institutional interplay is
essential to achieve effective IWRM implementation.
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Thus, there is a need to align objectives of sectoral institutions. This objective gap (cf., OECD, 2011b) underlines the
governance challenges in fostering strategic and territorial planning of water policy. How different rationales create
obstacles for adopting convergent targets can be observed at sub-national level where urban flood controls and ecological
preservation or restoration of urban waters often conflict. For instance, exclusive emphasis on structural methods of flood
control has led to destruction of habitat as well as deterioration of water quality in the past (OECD, 2011b). A promising
way in reducing the objective gap has been found when rationales of flood control, ecological preservation and spatial
planning converge (often referred to as ‘issue linkage’). In doing so it is also possible to minimize the impact on other
policy areas (OECD, 2011b). Cleveland et al. (1996), based on findings from a review of ecological and the social science
literature, stress in this context that cooperation, e.g. in form of issue linkage, seems to be more likely where the number
of actors is smaller rather than larger, where interactions are repeated, and where actors are able to detect cheating and
punish offenders.
Similarly, Horlemann and Dombrowsky (2011) note that cooperation and coordination of numerous water-related
organizations, if not effective, leads to inconsistent water governance in terms of problems of horizontal interplay. These
problems of horizontal interplay between different water using sectors are extremely pertinent in water management
because of the multi-functional character of water (Horlemann and Dombrowsky, 2011). Each sector is framed by its
own institutional arrangements (cf., Moss, 2004b), thus, demands of all water users and their water-relevant institutional
environment have to be balanced to resolve coordination problems and to achieve cooperation or at best collaboration.
This requires coordination of possible conflicting sector institutions, e.g. economic and environmental institutions, and
requires cooperation among their respective administrative bodies (Horlemann and Dombrowsky, 2011).
The concept of benefit-sharing addresses coordination and collaboration problems of horizontal interplay in moving
from the sharing of water quantities to the sharing of the benefits the users receive from its use (Dombrowsky, 2010a).
One reason to focus on benefits from water rather than of water quantities, i.e. allocation of water use rights, is the
promise to leave the zero-sum game of water-sharing and replace it by a positive sum game of benefit-sharing (e.g. Biswas,
1999). This way potentially difficult negotiations may be avoided. Sadoff and Grey (2002) argue, for instance, that
“[f]ocusing on the benefits derived from the use of water in a river basin, rather than the physical water itself, is another
way to broaden the perspective of basin planners”.
Type of problem Examples Incentives for cooperation
Provision of
commonly
used water
infrastructure
Flood protection along shared rivers, shipping or con-
struction of water infrastructure that benefits all parties.
Cooperation includes a “production problem” in finding
the most efficient project realization and a “distribu-
tion problem” concerning the distribution of cost and
benefits from the project.
All parties’ interests are equal in direc-
tion and cooperation is of benefit to
all. Although the distribution of cost
and benefits may be politically challeng-
ing, the chances for agreement are high
because of the symmetric character of
incentives and homogenous interests.
Cooperation in
management of
shared water
bodies
(i.e. existing wa-
ter infrastructure)
Contrary to the provisioning problem of shared wa-
ter infrastructure, the use or appropriation of existing
water resources often has the structure of a coopera-
tion problem (Dombrowsky, 2005) - often referred to
as prisoner’s dilemma. Individually rational decisions
on resource use result in collectively irrational conse-
quences, e.g. exploitation of a common groundwater
aquifer by different parties at the same time beyond its
regeneration capacity.
There is a strategic incentive problem be-
cause non-cooperation may be advanta-
geous for some resources users if others
cooperate (free rider problem). Com-
pared to the coordination problem of
commonly used infrastructures the prob-
ability for cooperation is reduced if col-
laboration cannot be supported through
positive or negative incentives.
Unidirectional
externalities
(upstream-
downstream)
Classical problem constellations within river basins
where upstream activities lead to positive or negative
externalities downstream. Possibilities for collabora-
tion are limited because individual actors are not in-
terested in cooperative solutions because incentives
are missing. E.g. pollution control or flood protection
measures where only downstream populations benefit.
Incentives for cooperation are lowest be-
cause of asymmetrical interests. Cooper-
ation can only be expected if compensa-
tions for opportunity costs are paid.
Table 3.8: Typology of coordination and collaboration problems in IWRM; based on Klaphake (2005); Dombrowsky (2005)
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The need for benefit-sharing arises because not all actors influencing the availability and quality of water resources
agree on a common water, i.e. land use for optimal water management (cf., Rogers, 1997; Marty, 2001; Dombrowsky,
2005). This coordination problem can be further differentiated in three types of coordination, i.e. collaboration problems
(see Table 3.8):
1. Provision of common infrastructure
2. Cooperation in (transboundary) management of commonly used water bodies
3. Unidirectional externalities (upstream-downstream)
According to Dombrowsky (2005), a distinction can be made between coordination and cooperation problems in water
resources management depending on the respective problem structure. A typical cooperation problem between different
parties (in water resources management the provision of commonly used water infrastructure has usually the structure of
a coordination problem) contains a production problem and a distribution problem. On the one hand, the production
problem consists of determining which measure results in the highest welfare improvement. On the other hand, the
distribution problem consists of finding an agreement on the distribution of (Pareto-optimum) net benefits among all
parties. The production problem is purely a coordination problem whereas the distribution problem represents a zero sum
game where gains of one party imply losses of another party. If an agreement on the production function is achieved,
all parties have an interest in realizing the agreement. This solution to a coordination problem is therefore called a
self-enforcing agreement (Barrett, 2003).
Contrary to the above mentioned provisioning problem of shared water infrastructure, the use or appropriation of
existing water resources often has the structure of a cooperation problem (Dombrowsky, 2005), often referred to as
prisoner’s dilemma. In this kind of problem, individually rational decisions on resource use result in collectively irrational
consequences. One example is the exploitation of a common groundwater aquifer by different parties at the same time
beyond its regeneration capacity.
Both, the provision of common infrastructure and the cooperation in the management of commonly used water bodies,
are also referred to as reciprocal externality problems (cf., Dombrowsky, 2007a). In most cases, however, externalities
are unidirectional, due to the flow direction of water, leading to typical upstream-downstream problem constellation. A
unidirectional externality rules out reciprocal effects in the same use. According to Dombrowsky (2007a), unidirectional
externalities, whether positive or negative, rule out reciprocal effects in the same use. Figure 3.4 illustrates different types
of unidirectional externality problems in water management and provides typical examples for each type.
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Figure 1. A typology of unidirectional externality problems in transboundary water management.
Source: Own presentation.
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Figure 3.4: A typology of unidirectional externality problems in transboundary water management (Dombrowsky, 2010b)
The unidirectional character of problem constellations is further typical with regard to the impact of land use on water
resources. In this regard, upstream-downstream relationships are a prominent example of functional linkage requiring
an integration of land and water institutions to be addressed properly. IWRM usually attempts a political linkage of the
sectors, however, a political linkage on its own has proven to be widely ineffective. Watson (2004) refers to coordination as
an arrangement of two or more institutions that create and / or use existing decision rules in order to align their separate
policies, programs or practices (cf., Mulford and Rogers, 1982). A formal, rigid and rule-based relationship is implied
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which enables assisting each other in working towards their separate objectives. Watson (2004) stresses that coordination
is necessary to overcome problems of administrative fragmentation, overlap and duplication in river basin management,
but on its own does not provide adequate institutional capacity to deal with land and water management problems that
are often characterized by complexity, change, uncertainty and conflict. Hence, “co-ordination alone does not represent an
adequate institutional strategy for IRBM” (Watson, 2004). He criticizes that inter-organizational coordination in IRBM is a
‘myth’ that needs to be reformed. In order to be successful, collaborative approaches to IRBM are necessary that ultimately
depend on the design of institutional arrangements and the ability of participants to reach consensus through effective
negotiation (Watson, 2004). Intractable problems, Watson (2004) notes diffuse pollution from agriculture and the loss
of wetlands and biodiversity among others, usually “transcend the interests and jurisdictions [...] operating in different
policy arenas, at different scales and with different understandings, values, attitudes and beliefs regarding the use and
management of land and water” (Watson, 2004). Since effective solutions are beyond the reach of any single institution or
actor, in such circumstances “producing agreement over causes, consequences and management responses for the problem
is extremely difficult” (Watson, 2004).
Consequently, based on experiences and insights regarding the key institutional conditions and arrangements in the
Fraser Basin, Canada, Watson (2004) elaborates key features or design principles that are required for a collaborative
approach to IRBM to be successful. This approach is described by the acronym CARIBOO (see Table 3.9).
Key feature Description
Common Vision of the desired future conditions in the river basin and the principles that will guide actions towards
realising those conditions
Adaptive Capacity to enable policies and practices to be adjusted as new knowledge emerges and as conditions
change
Resources to enable the collaborative arrangement to function effectively and to progress from problem
setting to direction setting through to implementation and monitoring
Independence from government control, but with continued government involvement in decision-making.
Though, replacement or duplication of the functions of existing government organizations involved
in land and water management is not attempted
Balance to enable diverse groups with varied economic, social and environmental interests to be fairly
represented
Outputs to ensure the arrangement is action-oriented and not just a forum for debate
Outcomes to demonstrate that collaborative efforts have a positive impact on the sustainability of the river
basin systems
Table 3.9: The CARIBOO model for collaborative IWRM at the river basin level; from Watson (2004)
Watson (2004) argues that a collaborative governance model offers a number of potential benefits for IRBM, which
cannot be provided by conventional top-down or even highly coordinated institutional arrangements. Especially in the
context of “edge and boundary problems” of overlapping powers, duties, jurisdictions and interests of several institutions,
resulting from solving the problem of fit, a collaborative approach can provide a mechanism to deal with them in a joined
policy process (Mitchell, 1990; Watson, 2004). Nevertheless, for Watson (2004) collaboration in IRBM is unlikely to
be a smooth or conflict-free process. Thus, sustained negotiation and facilitation will be needed in order to engage the
interested parties.
Hence, a special concern of horizontal institutional interplay is related to functional, i.e. physical, linkages between
different water and land users. These functional linkages are difficult to resolve. Dixon (1997) stresses that in many
countries, in the context of water resources management, there is a marked difference in the location of political as well
as financial power and the relative flows of benefits between groups inhabiting the upper watershed and those who live
further downstream. Based on a case study from Asia, Dani (1986) explored these interactions and identified typical
upland-lowland patterns of decision-making, resource inputs, and flows of benefits. Figure 3.5 illustrates these patterns of
political and social interactions between the lowland and upland inhabitants in a watershed that often benefit the lowland
communities more. Upper watersheds, according to Magrath and Doolette (1990), apart from being physically remote, are
often politically remote from decision-making as well. This uneven distribution of financial and political power, as shown
in Figure 3.5, results in an uneven division of the benefits from improved watershed management. This is because the
resources required to implement the policies are disproportionately paid by the upland group while a disproportionate
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Figure 3.5: Highland-lowland relationships in watershed management; based on Dani (1986) as published in Dixon (1997)
share of the benefits goes to the lowland group. According to Dixon (1997), “this separation of benefits and costs [is] not
surprising given that the main opportunities to conserve soil are in the upper watershed while a larger share of population
and infrastructure are located in the lower part of the watershed“. Dixon regards the underdevelopment of the upland
group as one result of this process which is frequently accompanied by political and social tensions, and an ‘us-them’
attitude.
According to Dixon (1997), the interactions among up- and downstream stakeholders as well as the distribution of
cost and benefits identified by Dani (1986) may explain the rather unsuccessful record of many watershed-management
projects in developing countries. Those who are asked to implement conservation practices, e.g. different cultivation or
land-management practices, often do not see themselves as the beneficiaries of these changes (Dixon, 1997). In contrast,
downstream decision-makers, which are negatively affected by existing upstream cultivation or land-management patterns,
“see upland residents as a difficult, somewhat foreign group that needs to be managed” (Dixon, 1997). Effective resource
management and cooperation / communication among stakeholders, thus, are obviously negatively affected by these
tensions. Mostert (1999) agrees that such asymmetric power-relations caused by hydrological factors are a principal
characteristic of IRBM. Regardless of political power distribution, upstream users depend less on the downstream users
than vice versa. On its own, this unidirectional dependence results in fewer incentives to co-operate for upstream users
than for downstream users (cf., LeMarquand, 1977; Marty, 1997). For some uses, e.g. shipping, the dependence may
also be of reverse direction and, more importantly, relations resulting from hydrological factors are only one aspect of the
relationship between the upstream and downstream users (Mostert, 1999).
This complex stakeholder interaction illustrates that the reduction of misfit by the introduction of hydrological
boundaries defining the area of management can lead to greater challenges with regard to collaboration and participation
of stakeholders. These problems have also been documented in the context of implementation of the WFD in the EU
(Moss, 2004b; Mostert et al., 2007; Timmerman et al., 2008). Mostert et al. (2007), based on the examination of WFD
implementation experiences in 10 European river basins, conclude that stakeholder participation is often only consultative
without decision-making features. He describes the situation in the 10 European river basins as follows: “Quite often, the
existing governance style was not participatory, and it took a lot of convincing to move toward multiparty collaboration. In
many cases, the authorities lacked experience with multiparty approaches, relied heavily on technical expertise, feared
to lose control, or feared that too broad participation could threaten the confidentiality of the proceedings. As a result,
participation often remained limited.” The OECD (2011b) refers to accountability gap when insufficient users’ commitment
as well as lack of concern, awareness and participation are present (see Table 3.1 in the introduction of this chapter). A
shortening of the decision-making process, in particular when local governments do not have the capacity to monitor and
civil society is not totally engaged, introduces risks of transparency, integrity, capture and corruption (OECD, 2011b).
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Figure 3.6: Interaction of issues of institutional interplay and fit in a national IWRM implementation context (Author’s
work)
The main findings of this policy analysis concerning spatial fit and institutional interplay in the context of IWRM
are the interdependence between creating an appropriate managing unit that reflects the characteristics of the natural
resource to be managed (problem of fit) and a successful cooperation as well as coordination between different institutions
(problem of interplay). This interdependence is very site-specific, thus, creating new spatial areas of governance and new
institutions from top-down remains a challenge (Moss, 2004a). This circumstance may explain why prescribed solutions
from top-down for problems of spatial fit and institutional interplay do not work well, especially in an environment where
existing institutions are weak and lack resources as for instance in many developing countries. While using traditional
‘command and control’ policies, usually bound to respective administrative limits, there is no incentive, neither for
coordinated action to improve spatial fit, nor for cooperation in terms of improved institutional interplay (Serageldin,
1995). However, an OECD survey on water governance revealed that “more than two-thirds of OECD countries surveyed
explain the remaining policy gap by the lack of institutional incentives for encouraging inter-institutional co-operation at
horizontal level” (OECD, 2011b). Mitchell (2005) describes this separation of responsibilities among resource-management
institutions and their inability or unwillingness to consider their mandate relative to those of other organizations as “silo
effect” (cf., Serageldin, 1995).
Figure 3.6 illustrates the interdependence of different forms of institutional interplay and the problem of fit in the
context of a typical national IWRM implementation process. The problems of institutional fit and interplay have to be
solved interdependently in order to find the right scale for management corresponding to prevailing natural and human
system’s characteristics. These principal challenges of operationalization of IWRM are illustrated in the figure with a grey
shaded box.
3.3 Principal problems of operationalization in the context of IWRM implementation in developing countries
The implementation of IWRM is characterized by specific information, capacity and funding gaps which generally have
their origin in a typical resource scarce environment of these countries (OECD, 2011b; Akhmouch, 2012). Besides
the problems of fit and interplay as discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, these implementation gaps represent significant
additional obstacles which have to be considered when choosing instruments for the operationalization of IWRM.
One of the principal problems of IWRM operationalization concerns available information on the human and natural
system to be managed. On the one hand information is not shared because of sectoral fragmentation of water-related
tasks across levels of government and local actors involved in water policy, and on the other hand information often does
not exist at all. This lack of information is a primary concern regarding guidance for decision makers. Although in practice
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sub-national, i.e. local governments will tend to have more information about local needs and preferences, and also about
the implementation and costs of local policies, this information is often not considered in higher-level decision-making
(OECD, 2011b; Akhmouch, 2012).
While one aspect of the information gap is that only limited information is available on the human and natural system.
Another aspect relates to the way how the rationale for an integrated management of water resources is communicated
among different stakeholders. In case of a widely-held perception of the depletion or degradation of water and natural
resources, the implementation of IWRM is more likely to occur. Thus, the information gap is also about problem awareness
and willingness to act on the part of government authorities and water users to invest financial resources and labor in water
management, rather than in another area of public concern. Lee (2000) stresses that, as far as cities in developing countries
(especially in Latin America) as the largest single water consumers and polluters are concerned, there has been little
history of cooperation among public authorities, city residents, and the private sector concerning river basin management
and stewardship for this task has been neglected. Although land use regulations and environmental protection laws
designed to prevent water resource deterioration often exist on paper, these are not applied due to a lack of will and / or
the necessary resources for monitoring and enforcement (Lee, 2000). This holds also true for the implementation of
water management plans which many of the least-developed countries are unable to achieve because of lacking financial,
managerial, and political capacity (Lee, 2000).
Besides an informational gap there is evidently also often a capacity gap when local authority’s organizational,
technical, procedural, networking and infrastructure capacity is not able to assume additional water responsibilities from
implementation of national water policies (OECD, 2011b). Hence, the fundamental problem of the decentralization
process in IWRM is at which sub-national level responsibilities should be assumed and decentralized tasks be executed.
There is no general answer to this question. The OECD (2011b) argues in its assessment on IWRM implementation
gaps that, on the one hand, there is often more capacity with regard to strategic or normative decision-making and
accessibility to funding and, on the other hand, more specific knowledge at the local level, e.g. in estimation of opportunity
or transaction costs for local actions. Therefore, according to the OECD (2011b) there is a need for instruments to build
local capacity and for blending of knowledge of multi-level governance.
Another important operationalization obstacle refers to insufficient or unstable revenues to implement water policies
across levels of government creating a funding gap. The decentralization process often results in delegation of respon-
sibilities to lower administrative levels but without assignment of additional funds to fulfill these tasks (OECD, 2011b;
Akhmouch, 2012). However, decentralization is necessary in order to bring decision making closer to those affected by
governance, thereby promoting higher participation and accountability; and, it can help decision makers take advantage
of more precise time- and place-specific knowledge about natural resources (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). The lack of
capacity and information is somehow an expression of a lack of adequate funding. Moreover, the financing of IRBM tasks
is broadly neglected and there are no revenues available to cover the costs. As a result, private partners, investment banks
and innovative arrangements at local level have been explored as complements to public action in water financing (OECD,
2011b; Akhmouch, 2012). The funding gap often causes a dependence of sub-national authorities on higher levels of
government for funding water policies, while central government depends on the sub-national authorities to deliver them
and meet both national and sub-national policy priorities (Akhmouch, 2012). Given these funding constraints, the OECD
(2011b) stresses the need for shared financing mechanisms between the principal actors involved, e.g. the national and
sub-national authorities as well as the private sector.
The funding gap is closely related to the administrative gap. In river basins shared by different jurisdictions (e.g.
municipalities) insufficient coordination and collaboration of public authorities often results in a lack of an integrated
approach and territorial customized water policy that compromises the efficiency of budget execution (OECD, 2011b).
In developing countries, the main constraints to IWRM or policy implementation in general are strongly related to a weak
performance of government at all levels. However, this is due to limited resources in terms of capital, personnel capacity
and information on environmental resources in order to enforce strong interventionist policies. Moreover, corruption and
political arbitrariness have led to very low confidence in the government as a constructive actor to solve environmental
problems. This explains the tendency, in many developing countries, of informal rules to override formal rules, making the
enforcement of formal rules even more difficult and thereby affecting performance (Bandaragoda, 2000). These informal
rules-in-use become dysfunctional when they contradict formal rules or replace formal rules that become ineffective due to
a lack of proper enforcement. Another important aspect that affects the success of regulatory government interventions is
the dependence of smallholders on (marginal) environmental resources for subsistence and their limited capacity, e.g.
because of lack of knowledge or opportunities, to tap alternative sources of income.
Horlemann and Dombrowsky (2011) studied the national IWRM implementation of Mongolia. One of their major
findings was that, “as elsewhere, the decentralisation process contributed to problems of fit in the sense that strengthened
jurisdictions at lower levels now face the challenge to coordinate at river basin level. In addition, it amplified problems
of vertical institutional interplay, in particular due to its incompleteness and an unclear allocation of decision-making
and fiscal competences” (Horlemann and Dombrowsky, 2011). Nevertheless, Horlemann and Dombrowsky (2011) stress
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that in the Mongolian case steps had also been taken which potentially address these problems of fit and interplay. The
most important step is identified with the establishment of River Basin Councils (RBC) which are supposed to balance
local water user interests by coordinating different sectoral interests and different administrative levels at the basin
scale, thereby, addressing problems of fit, horizontal and vertical interplay simultaneously. According to Horlemann
and Dombrowsky (2011), the lack of implementation capacity and financial resources remains a huge constraint for the
Mongolian River Basin Council (RBC)s and can only be solved through associated River Basin Authorities (RBA) or the
establishment of water administrations at provincial and district levels. Additionally, the political decentralization has
to follow a fiscal decentralization in order to generate the necessary resources for IWRM implementation (Horlemann
and Dombrowsky, 2011). Hence, specific organizations are established to solve prevailing problems of interplay (e.g. the
Mongolian National Water authority to tackle vertical interplay at different administrative levels and the National Water
Committee to foster cooperation of the water-related ministries addressing horizontal interplay), but “vested interests by
line ministries, long-established institutions and strong sectoral segregation resist efforts to better institutional interplay”.
The success of such newly established institutions is further diminished by endowment of few resources for enforcement
for their tasks. Thus, Horlemann and Dombrowsky (2011) consider the allocation of decision-making and financing
competences, not only for Mongolia but in general as a challenge in water resource management.
Horlemann and Dombrowsky (2011) regard the analytical framework of fit and interplay introduced by Young “as
valuable tools to structure the analysis of institutional arrangements conducive and obstructive to an IWRM”. But similar
to (Moss, 2004b) they also highlight the difficulty of regarding the institutionalization of IWRM exclusively as a problem of
fit or vertical or horizontal interplay. Issues of fit and interplay, thus, are viewed as interdependent. Moreover, Horlemann
and Dombrowsky (2011) argue that the success or failure of IWRM implementation cannot be reasoned sufficiently by
issues of fit and interplay alone. Because of the political dimension of IWRM (cf., Allan, 2003b; Mollinga, 2008; Biswas,
2008) they recommend adding actor-centered explanatory approaches to the fit-interplay concept (Saravanan et al., 2009;
Moss and Newig, 2010). Cardwell et al. (2009) sees the actor-perspective also as crucial when he argues that the scope
and degree of which organizations to involve and how to involve them depends on specific actions which may significantly
affect them or from which they are affected. In either case activities should be integrated or at least coordinated.
The need to solve problems of fit and interplay as well as the operationalization constraints specific to developing
countries have several implications with regard to the suitability of policy instruments. It seems necessary to find
appropriate instruments, complementary to existing ones, which include some kind of priority setting in order to improve
IWRM implementation. Agyenim and Gupta (2012), therefore, argue that countries with limited resources should aim to
define what needs to be done first and what can be postponed. This way it can be identified how existing resources can be
focused and concentrated to address the priority goals first, rather than debating on how to get the institutions and policy
planning process right first. Moreover, instruments that provide incentives for active stakeholder involvement, cooperation
and public participation may possibly reduce the costs for specific actions to achieve this.
The following section analyzes the suitability of different policy instruments in addressing the problems of institutional
fit and interplay in the presence of operational constraints. A focus is laid on the incentives provided by the instruments.
3.4 Instruments for IWRM implementation and operationalization
The problems of fit and interplay, as described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, arise as additional governance challenges from the
implementation of IWRM. In order to solve these problems, complementary policy instruments are required that consider
the ecosystem characteristics of river basins and the interaction of relevant stakeholders across sectors and administrative
boundaries. Both of these problems have to be addressed in a context-specific manner, this means that the physical
characteristics of ecosystems and the actors involved in their use have to be addressed. The aim is to reach the appropriate
scale for management, i.e. operationalization of IWRM.
Addressing the problems of fit and interplay has not been a specific subject of sectoral policy instruments in the past.
Fit was predefined through administrative units, thus, no specific instruments were necessary to achieve appropriate fit.
Institutional interplay has been avoided through sectoral policies covering main political sectors according to jurisdictional
responsibilities. Hence, policy instruments where the legislative authority is the main actor in implementation are bound
to administrative boundaries and often also to specific policy sectors. Vatn (2010) stresses this point by arguing that
traditional environmental regimes have not been focused on managing interdependence, instead they have been divided
according to individual resources (e.g. forests, natural or agricultural areas) or uses (e.g. forestry, agriculture, nature
conservation). Accordingly, this construction of separated management units has led to great institutional challenges (Vatn,
2010). On the one hand interactions across different management units have created coordination problems, and on the
other hand, there are significant externalities across the boundaries of administrative management units (Vatn, 2010).
This has changed in the context of IWRM with the insight that water resources ought to be managed according to natural
boundaries of river basins and in an integrated, cross-sectoral manner. The dominant instruments of IWRM implementation
today are: Integrated River Basin Management, River Basin Organizations (RBO) and River Basin Management Plans.
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Integrated River Basin Management and RBOs are the prevailing attempts to address the governance challenges of
institutional fit and interplay by defining the scale for management and the actors involved. The elaboration of River Basin
Management Plans is the most common form of operationalization of IWRM.
Integrated River Basin Management defines the river basin as the principal unit for management. Besides first order
river basins, river sub-basins are often also recommended as management units. This solution to the problem of fit is
commonly applied from top-down by a national water authority, ministry or specific water laws. According to Dombrowsky
(2007b) an organizational solution and a cooperative solution are possible to solve problems of fit between hydrological
and administrative boundaries (Oates, 1999; LAWA, 2003; Dombrowsky, 2005). In case of an organizational solution a
specific River Basin Organization is created and responsibilities are transferred from the existing political-administrative
units, e.g. states or municipalities, to the river basin organization. This kind of newly established organization requires its
own budget and also the power to set norms.
In contrast, a cooperative solution, e.g. a cooperative structure like a working group at the river basin level, represents
an organizational arrangement of existing relevant jurisdictions to facilitate cooperation and to reach agreements. In this
case, however, the budgetary and norm-setting competences remain with the respective jurisdictions. Thus, establishing
the river basin as a management unit implies creating new structures, changing roles and responsibilities to meet the goals
of IWRM. This is a complex task and there is evidence that the introduction of new organizational structures such as river
basin organizations has been disappointing in many countries (Cap-Net, 2008). Moreover, there is often uncertainty about
the role and functions of river basin organizations in the context of IWRM implementation.
The shift from traditional water resource management based on administrative boundaries to a cooperative solution
is smaller than a shift to a true organizational solution. The coordinated solution can be regarded as in between the
organizational and the traditional administrative solution. The coordinating arrangements in cooperative solutions have,
in principal, a coordinating task, as extensive river basin planning, under most organizational solutions, often does not
exist (Cap-Net, 2008). However, in most developing countries organizational solutions through the establishment of
RBOs are encountered, often at the strategic level of first order river basins without operational solutions at lower levels.
Moreover, these prevailing approaches to solve the problem of fit rely on mandating the management of water resources
according to river basins from top-down in a regulatory manner. The creation of organizational or cooperative institutions
is an attempt to create membership, i.e. political linkages among involved sectors and administrations (see Section 3.2).
The expectation is to achieve management on the basis of river basins (cross-jurisdictional cooperation) and cross-sectoral
collaboration, but direct incentives towards relevant actors to do so are actually missing. The experience so far has shown
that mandatory and comprehensive integration from top-down has not led to the expected results. Instruments are needed
to facilitate context-specific integration based on solving the problems of fit and interplay interactively. According to Moss
(2006), empirical studies of experiences with river basin management indicate that a flexible and contextually sensitive
approach can help to solve problems of fit and interplay more interactively.
Based on the definition of river basins as management units, the resulting problem of interplay is addressed through the
creation of organizational or cooperative entities composed of predefined sector representatives as cross-sectoral structures.
However, these approaches to address the problems of fit and interplay are realized in a consecutive manner based on
the natural and human system’s knowledge at the national, i.e. normative or strategic level of IWRM implementation
(cf., Mitchell, 1990). The interdependence of institutional fit and interplay, as discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2, is not
specifically considered in this standard process. As a result, the determined governance scale is not based on context-
specific human and natural system characteristics. Instead it is determined on the basis of apparently obvious hydrological
characteristics, e.g. the size and order of a river basin. The additional inclusion of smaller governance scales, e.g. river
sub-basins, follows the same logic. Moreover, in developing countries, e.g. as documented by Horlemann and Dombrowsky
(2011) for the case of Mongolia, lower level instances are often lacking because of insufficient resources.
Cap-Net (2008) studied the performance of four RBOs in developing countries (Sri Lanka, Kenya, Mexico and Malaysia)
with regard to the legal framework under which the respective RBO operates, its level of autonomy and effectiveness
(comparing objectives / performance targets with the actual workings), the involvement of stakeholders and financing
of RBO activities. The study revealed, in three of the cases, that the existing legal framework was not limiting the
performance of the RBO, only in one case the legal framework provided limited opportunities to involve stakeholders in
the decision-making process. The level of autonomy of all RBOs was limited by the state government because approval
for some decisions needs to be obtained from national agencies and much of the RBOs funding goes through a national
agency. For all cases this political influence at some point was regarded as being detrimental to the functioning of the
respective RBO. The objectives of all organizations are directed towards a holistic approach to water management but the
RBOs examined are actually unable to achieve these ambitious objectives. The actual activities of the RBOs differ from
these objectives due to limited human, financial and institutional capacity of the organizations. Since the organizations do
not have the required resources to address all the water management tasks at their disposal they must select priorities
on which to focus. Therefore, the study documents that the RBOs eventually decide to focus on the problems that are
most acute or are given the highest priority. This priority setting depends strongly on problem perception at the level
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of the RBOs decision-making (Cap-Net, 2008). In all RBOs examined, mechanisms for stakeholder participation could
be established, but this does not guarantee actual participation which in practice was very limited. Financing of RBO
activities is limited to scarce financial resources and there is a strong dependence on transfers from central governments
and the donor community. In cases where RBOs are able to raise funds this income is transferred to general government
budgets rather than being available to the RBO for financing its activities. Moreover, the lack of financial resources has
hampered the design of effective mechanisms, especially for environmental protection, in the Lerma-Chapala-Santiago
basin, Mexico, (Cap-Net, 2008).
Thus, this approach to solve the problems of fit and interplay may not achieve the most appropriate scale to effectively
address specific human-natural system interactions. For the human system context, this can result in involving stakeholders
that do not share common problems or benefits at the determined governance scale and consequently do not have
incentives for cooperation or collaboration. In the context of the natural system, this can mean that important ecosystem
properties are not captured. Another problem of this approach of defining the governance scale stems from its dominant
top-down orientation without a complementary bottom-up counterpart accounting for appropriate stakeholder involvement
and public participation. The actors to be involved in IRBM and RBOs depend on the determined governance scale without
consideration of specific contexts. Although public participation and stakeholder involvement is often encouraged in
this form of IWRM implementation, the applied mechanisms often have a public hearing character without consideration
of possible functional connections between the actors involved. Thus, it can be concluded that there is still room for
improvement in finding the right governance scale.
A hierarchical structure of RBOs and RBCs is reasonable in order to address strategic and operational issues at different
governance levels (cf., Mitchell, 1990). However, success in establishing lower level instances at the operational level has
proven difficult and has generally been based on top-down decisions. Hence, instruments promoting a context-specific
identification of the right operational scale for management from bottom-up are missing. This is illustrated schematically
in the upper part of Figure 3.7. The left hand side of the figure describes the methodological conceptualization of the
core problems of IWRM implementation and operationalization, the right hand side illustrates the dominant conceptual
application in practice. The dashed arrows and question marks indicate critical issues of dominant IWRM implementation
practice.
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Figure 3.7: Conceptual methodological application and implementation in practice (Author’s work)
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Figure 3.8: Simplified model of human and organizational action; based on Kaufmann-Hayoz and Gutscher (2001)
Besides finding the right governance scale, there is also the need to find appropriate management instruments that
provide incentives to put the IWRM principles into practice despite the presence of operational constraints. This implies
land use planning and related policies at the determined scale of governance, involving all relevant stakeholders in
achieving cross-sectoral coordination and cooperation in order to manage water resources in a sustainable way. An
actor-oriented consideration of stakeholder interaction, especially in integrating land and water management issues, is
important.
Environmental management instruments are often rated according to their ecological effectiveness and economic
efficiency. Ecological effectiveness includes an instruments accuracy in meeting an ecological goal and also the duration
until a desired impact is achieved. Cost-effectiveness, promotion of innovations and impact on existing structures
are elements of economic efficiency (Michaelis, 1996). Cost-effectiveness considers opportunity costs of other policy
instruments to achieve the same goal as well as transaction and implementation costs of the policy instrument itself.
Concerns about equity issues of policy instruments in terms of their impact on burdens and gains of different actors affected
have also been considered as evaluation criteria. Furthermore, institutional preconditions for instrument implementation
and related practicability of instruments have also been a reason for consideration of policy instruments (Grunewald
and Bastian, 2012). In the context of this dissertation, the aim is to identify complementary instruments that are able
to address the specific problems of IWRM implementation, i.e. operationalization of fit and interplay. The ecological
effectiveness and economic efficiency of possible instruments is not directly a subject of this dissertation, although they
will be addressed in the following chapters from time to time. The conclusion of IWRM implementation assessments so far
is that important incentives to operationalize IWRM are not provided by the most common instruments in use, therefore,
these instruments fail in achieving IWRM implementation at the operational level in a context specific manner (Bellamy
et al., 2002). Thus, the following discussion of management instruments focuses on the capacity of certain instruments to
address potential stakeholders directly, encouraging participation from bottom-up, raise additional funds and address
context-specific problems of local importance.
A suitable way to look at different policy instruments to achieve these requirements, is from an incentive perspective of
behavioral change of the actors involved (cf., Kaufmann-Hayoz and Gutscher, 2001; Börner and Vosti, 2013). Following the
definition of Kaufmann-Hayoz and Gutscher (2001) instruments are meant as a goal-directed influence of an actor upon
the conditions that determine a target group’s action. Kaufmann-Hayoz and Gutscher (2001) present a simplified model to
explain human as well as organizational action composed of an interdependent internal and external structure (see Figure
3.8). The internal structure includes goals and knowledge which result in intentions. However, goals and knowledge as
well as derived intentions are influenced by the reality perceived. These factors together result in a certain action that
addresses the external structure composed of the natural system (ecosystem properties and man-made interventions) and
the human system (institutions, value-systems, power relations, knowledge generation, actor’s social relations). These
two systems define objective options and constraints which in turn are perceived by the actor’s internal structure. Policy
instruments address external and internal structures in different ways, thus, incentivizing actor’s behavior in different
ways as well.
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A concrete realization of an instrument is described with the term measure. Different instrument types are characterized
with respect to their rationale (mechanism), actors to whom the instruments are available, their target group(s) (whose
behavior is intended to be influenced) and implementation and enforcement requirements. In this context a special focus
is laid on how the different instruments address specific contexts with regard to institutional fit and interplay, respond
to operationalization constraints and embed in existing institutional frameworks. Furthermore, an additional concern is
how the instruments influence actor’s behavior and how actor’s decisions are influenced. In other words do they provide
incentives to improve fit and interplay given certain constraints?
The incentive perspective, as proposed by Kaufmann-Hayoz and Gutscher (2001), has the advantage of taking the
rationale (i.e. functioning mechanism), the actors involved in implementation, the target groups and the implementation
and enforcement requirements of policy instruments into account. In an ideal case, from a policy implementation point of
view, the behavior of targeted groups or individual actors is adjusted in such a way that natural resources and the ecosystem
services they provide are used, i.e. conserved, in socially optimal ways (Baumol and Oates, 1988). In practice, the
optimal level is generally not known. However, stakeholders do have preferences regarding environmental management
and ecosystem service provision which are usually not attained through markets alone. Since IWRM implementation is
essentially based on existing environmental policies it has been proven useful to build on these as much as possible and to
fill the gaps through complementary tools forming part of a general policy mix (cf., Ring and Schlaack, 2011; Grunewald
and Bastian, 2012). This is especially important in the context of IWRM implementation as it involves adjustment of
different existing policy instruments in many different policy sectors. Thus, different existing policies have to be taken
into account in order to achieve the objectives of IWRM. Besides creating a new spatial planning unit, the river basin,
IWRM implementation requires new forms of cross-sectoral cooperation and cross-jurisdictional collaboration. At best, all
relevant stakeholders are involved in this process and participation is encouraged.
Policy instruments can be classified according to their major characteristics. Different authors and disciplines have
suggested different categorizations, but the following three are widely used in the literature (Michaelis, 1996; Gunningham
and Young, 1997; Sterner, 2003):
• Regulatory, command-and-control instruments, including permits, standard-setting and land use zoning or planning,
directly control or restrict environmentally damaging activities.
• Economic instruments, such as environmental taxes, charges and fees, put a price on environmentally damaging
behavior, thus internalizing negative externalities, whereas payments for environmental services and ecological
fiscal transfers reward conservation enhancing behavior, thereby addressing positive externalities.
• Communication (information) and diffusion instruments aim to shift individual or community preference functions
towards more conservation and inform or educate people about relationships between their activities and the
environment (Ring and Schlaack, 2011).
Table 3.10 provides an overview of these policy instrument categories, including the instrument of collaborative
agreements, with regard to their rationale, actors involved, target groups and implementation requirements.
In practice, these instruments are often used in combination. In some cases, instruments have been intentionally
introduced to enhance the outcome of others.
While in the past traditional water management was principally based on sectoral command-and-control regulations and
land use planning according to administrative boundaries, the IWRM approach requires additional measures to solve the
resulting problems of fit and interplay when a new basis for land use planning is introduced with the river basin approach.
Gunningham et al. (1998) consider most existing approaches to regulation as seriously sub-optimal, meaning ”[...] that
they are not effective in delivering their purported policy goals, or efficient, in doing so at least cost, nor do they perform
well in terms of other criteria such as equity or political acceptability“. The suitability of policy instruments is likely to
be context-specific, depending highly on the characteristics of the environmental issue under consideration (Opschoor
and Turner, 1994; Gunningham et al., 1998). Thus, effective policy instruments addressing point-source pollution from
industries are likely to be very different from those to avoid land degradation. Besides different environmental problem
characteristics, institutional actors, the political and economic contexts in which policy mixes must be designed differ as
well. Hence, there is no single optimal policy instrument applicable to all circumstances.
Zysset and Kempter (2013) studied IWRM implementation in Switzerland on the regional and local level. The authors
confirm that the objectives of IWRM require the application of many different policy instruments. While each policy
instrument has specific advantages and disadvantages, synergies and incompatibilities, Zysset and Kempter (2013) could
not identify a specific instrument category that is especially suited for IWRM implementation. Communication instruments
such as participatory processes and influencing of values, norms, knowledge and ability, for instance, can help transferring
the rationale for an integrated approach, however, they do not bring about the balancing between the often conflicting
water uses (Zysset and Kempter, 2013). They should rather be combined with command and control instruments or
collaborative agreements to contain the system drivers and to give some latitude to its most dependent participants. Hence,
reliance on a variety of different policy instrument types is useful since there is no single best instrument category to foster
integration and adaptive capacity.
3.4 Instruments for IWRM implementation and operationalization 59
Instrument type
Rationale
Implementing
actor(s)
Target group(s) Implementation and
enforcement
Command and control instruments
Legal prescriptions having a direct
impact on the range of options open
to specified actors, constraining cer-
tain ways of acting or excluding
some forms of conduct.
Only legislative pub-
lic authorities (fed-
eral, state or munici-
pal for instance) are
legitimized.
Apply to all actors
as defined in the
legal norm in the
same way.
Enforcement mechanisms neces-
sary and heavily demanding on
technical, financial and person-
nel resources; granting of excep-
tions in practice recurrently com-
promises efficiency; prescriptions
towards barely accessible actors
are difficult to enforce and control.
Economic instruments
Internalization of externalities of eco-
nomic activities through price sig-
nals: raising the cost of polluting
behavior, reducing the cost of or re-
warding for environmentally sound
behavior and establishing markets
for polluting rights or positive exter-
nalities
Directly through
public authorities
if legal basis is
required or on a vol-
untary basis through
any stakeholder
(public authorities
indirectly involved).
Direct target
groups are public
and private con-
sumers, indirectly
all stakeholders.
Legal basis usually required. Sim-
ple and flexible rules facilitate im-
plementation and reduce room for
dispute or manipulation. Monitor-
ing and enforcement is needed.
Collaborative agreements
Legally binding or non-binding
agreements of private stakehold-
ers towards other stakeholders, esp.
public authorities, based on negotia-
tions to enhance policy goals.
Actors involved in
the agreement mutu-
ally develop and im-
plement the instru-
ment.
Target group
(agreement
partners) is
involved in de-
velopment and
implementation.
Although intended to be voluntary,
participation is often enforced un-
der slight pressure from public au-
thorities.
Communication and diffusion instruments
Aim at influencing actors’ goals (pref-
erences), knowledge and behavior
by modifying motivational, cognitive,
and social preconditions of action
through stimulating the thinking of
individuals and shaping societal dis-
courses on goals / options for action.
Available to and im-
plementable by all
actors.
General public or
specific groups of
any kind.
Suitable for use in preparation of
other interventions or as a comple-
ment. Instrument often a precondi-
tion for proper functioning of other
instruments.
Table 3.10: Instrument typology with regard to actors involved, target groups and implementation requirements; based on
Kaufmann-Hayoz and Gutscher (2001)
Typically, regulatory, planning, policy-making and enforcement powers are divided between water authorities represent-
ing federal, state or municipal governments. Their responsibilities are often strongly segregated between different sectors
of public policy to be controlled into separable individual elements. Moreover, environmental management has relied
heavily on regulatory instruments in the past, often without any participatory, cooperative forms of governance beyond
formal consultation exercises (Moss, 2004b). Thus, control is exerted centrally, adhering to rigid and detailed plans for
the fulfillment of established goals. This predominance of ‘command-and-control’ instruments and technocratic forms of
policy-making has been widely attributed as cause for the low level of environmental policy implementation in the past.
Besides the different ways how policy instruments influence actor’s behavior, they also have specific advantages and
disadvantages as summarized in Table 3.11. For instance, to address point-source problems of resource use (water
resources used as a pollution sink or as a source) command and control measures and also economic instruments have
been successful. These problems are not (primarily) political boundaries crossing problems and can be addressed according
to existing jurisdictions. To control diffuse problems other instruments have been used with more success.
Command and control instruments are regulatory instruments that are direct and mandatory, representing legal
prescriptions with a direct impact on the options open to specified social actors. Hence, command and control instruments
constrain certain ways of acting or exclude some forms of conduct. Mandatory orders are used to prescribe or prohibit
specific actions and/or specific outcomes of actions stating clearly what is legal and what is illegal. The rationale of
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Advantages Disadvantages
Command and control instruments (such as emission limitation, planning regulations, spatial zoning)
• Verifiable, reliable and predictable in their main
impact if they are enforced
• Require precise knowledge of activities, dependen-
cies / options of those involved; complex to develop
• Allow positive economies of scale when widely-used • Inflexible, possibly inefficient or involving side effects
• Can be complicated to verify
• Can be resisted / disregarded if benefit is unclear
• Do not motivate to exceed the minimum standards
Economic and financial instruments (such as subsidies, polluter taxes, auctioning)
• Can promote an economic approach if associated with
privatization of public goods
• Impact is hard to predict as action is transferred to
market players
• Can create incentives to exceed minimum standards • Taxes and grants can stifle innovation
• Can reduce enforcement costs for the authorities • Can generate high subsidy costs in some circumstances
• Allow cost-efficient solutions in market situations • Can lead to unfairness towards non-beneficiaries
Collaborative agreements (such as public private partnerships, certification and labels)
• Can be very efficient and effective if the interests of
the participants are at least partially parallel
• Can lead to unclear roles of public and private
participants
• Allow mutual motivation / control among participants • Complicated to enforce
• Flexible and practical • Can stifle competition and exclude third parties
• Sanction options are often limited
Communication instruments (such as influencing of values, norms, knowledge and ability, participative processes)
• Can extend the number of participants • Their impact is uncertain and hard to control
• Rapidly implemented, can be motivational • Can be complex, slow and short-lived
• Can supplement other policy instruments well • Not appropriate for strongly conflicting interests
Table 3.11: Categorization of policy instruments and their advantages and disadvantages; based on Gunningham et al.
(1998); Kaufmann-Hayoz and Gutscher (2001); Australian Government (2009) from Zysset and Kempter (2013)
command and control instruments is based exclusively on command, control, and sanction, thus, it is assumed that in
order to avoid sanctions actors behave according to the prescription or norm (Kaufmann-Hayoz and Gutscher, 2001).
Penalties and other enforcement mechanisms are essential for the implementation and effectiveness of command and
control instruments. Measures of enforcement can be based on a variety of (conditional or secondary) instruments, ranging
from withdrawal of use permits to criminal prosecution, and often include an economic component in addition to the pure
regulatory aspect (e.g. fines if emission levels are exceeded).
In most democracies, only the legislative authorities have the legitimization to use command and control instruments.
Usually, this legitimization is shared by different administrative levels (e.g. federal, state and municipal governments)
depending on the relevant policy domain. The principal application and eventual enforcement measures of command and
control instruments is in the hands of the public authorities. Thus, policy design and application is, in practice, generally
limited to public actors.
Since command and control instruments apply to any actor or group of actors specified in the legal norm in the same
way, the instrument can be used to influence the behavior of any target group, from individuals to corporate actors or
private companies.
Implementation and enforcement of command and control instruments often places heavy demands on technical
competence as well as on the amount of available human and financial resources (Mayntz, 1980) and can be troublesome
in many respects (Kaufmann-Hayoz and Gutscher, 2001). In practice, a common phenomenon is that granting of
exceptions (legally or illegally) often compromises the implementation of efficient command and control instruments.
These exceptions are rarely appealed against by other public authorities. Although in principal any target group can be
addressed, command and control instruments directed to barely accessible target groups are often very difficult to enforce
and hardly controlled. In this case the fear of sanctions for illegal behavior may disappear.
Direct regulation or command and control regulations have been used in water management in areas where there is a
high risk which could result in a substantial impact on the economy, environment, groups or individuals. The protection
of water source and nature conservation areas or standards for fertilizer and pesticide uses in agriculture are typical
examples. In case where there have been problems with systematic noncompliance with self-regulation or when the risks
3.4 Instruments for IWRM implementation and operationalization 61
of non-compliance are high to society, these instruments should be considered. Command and control instruments work
best when actors are easily identifiable and accessible.
Traditional command and control instruments use a compulsory application approach where it is decided directly
(sometimes unilaterally) what situation is desired, e.g. for the water body, while using the power of the state to achieve it.
Therefore, Porto and Lobato (2004) argue that from the perspective of an omnipresent state, this appears to be enough
to achieve the intended objectives, but “effective implementation presents deficiencies that result from the fact that the
quality of the environment in general and of the water resources in particular, is the result of the action of multiple social
agents. This makes it rather complex to “command” all the factors involved to achieve the desired objectives, including
those to impose law-enforcement mechanisms which require structures to inspect and apply fines and penalties, with
increasing difficulties because of the magnitude of the problem”.
A general disadvantage of command and control instruments is their rigidity, because some generalizations have to
be made to set regulatory rules and these rules apply to the entire target group equally, which may hinder the efficiency
and effectiveness of environmental policies (Kaufmann-Hayoz and Gutscher, 2001). These may not take into account
the differences in control costs among the polluting agents or those who exploit the natural resources. Since rules of
command and control instruments, e.g. land use standards, are generically imposed, they do not provide to those holding
advantages in reducing their externalities to levels lower than the others (cf., Porto and Lobato, 2004). This can result in
discarding of more efficient alternatives to achieve environmental policy goals.
In the 1960s public authorities in developed countries started applying command and control institutions, often
as a combination of ambient environmental quality standards, technology requirements, emissions criteria, and other
restrictions to control use of natural resources (John, 1994). According to Lubell et al. (2002), most commentators agree
that these instruments have successfully reduced pollution from well-defined point sources like factories and sewage
treatment plants. The use of these instruments for regulating geographically diffuse non-point sources of pollution emitted
by or resulting from individual actions of numerous and heterogeneous resource users who jointly affect the environmental
quality of a watershed, has been much less successful (John, 1994; Lubell et al., 2002). Moreover, command and control
instruments have difficulty in addressing environmental issues that involve different media (e.g. air, water and soil) and
span political and administrative boundaries (John, 1994; Marsh and Lallas., 1995; Lubell et al., 2002). Moreover, in
applying command and control regulations it is supposed that actors have not violated commanded rules until a violation
of rules is proven or demonstrable violations can be confirmed. Thus, especially in case of diffuse, continuous and poorly
understood effects of human action the use of these instruments presents several intrinsic weaknesses.
Besides the disadvantage of command and control instruments being less suited for environmental problems of diffuse
character, they rely on a strong role of the state in designing, implementing and enforcing the instrument. The experience
with command and control instruments in developing countries has been disappointing so far. Specific problems of
application of these instruments in developing countries: definition of standards (e.g. for land uses that conflict with poor
smallholder farmers), control and enforcement is often difficult or impossible because of a lack of resources, penalties
on poor farmers prove ineffective, presence of corruption and weak governmental and legal systems. In the context of a
weak state, as is often the case in developing countries, it is reasonable for the state to concentrate on core activities and
to look for opportunities of cooperation to achieve other environmental goals. If command and control instruments are
complemented by policy instruments that reduce the role of government while integrating other actors in policy design
and implementation, the use of incentives to attract additional actors to participate becomes apparent. Hence, other
instruments such as economic instruments, communication and information tools and collaborative agreements present
opportunities for others to become part of the policy process.
However, in order to achieve more context-specifity it is necessary to add complementary policy instruments to
regulatory command and control instruments. Other instruments, especially economic instruments, are more flexible in
achieving different degrees of environmental targets (beyond compliance), involving additional actors for instrument
design (information gap) and implementation, addressing specific local contexts (administrative gap) and in tapping
additional resources (funding gap, information gap).
The principle rationale for the use of classical economic instruments is the assumption that environmental degradation
and resource depletion occur because a substantial part of the costs or benefits of economic activities, so-called externalities,
is not being paid by the actors responsible but by the general public, e.g. in the form of environmental damage, security
and health risks, or long-term climatic risks (Kaufmann-Hayoz and Gutscher, 2001). There are three principal forms of
intervention conceivable:
• Raising the costs of polluting behavior based on the principle of true costs. This approach imposes taxes or charges
for environmentally harmful behavior to cover the costs of the damage it causes. This way the actor’s range of
options is not influenced directly insofar as they are not constrained by regulations. However, the imposition
of economic costs for environmentally harmful behavior is an attempt to steer actor’s behavior toward more
environmentally sound actions, because these are more cost-efficient. In a functioning market mechanism, the least
expensive actions are supposedly to be realized first.
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• Reducing the costs of environmentally sound behavior is an attempt, contrary to charging environmentally harmful
behavior, to reward environmentally sound behavior, often by the means of subsidies or lower prices for environ-
mentally responsible behavior. These positive incentives aim at making environmentally sound behavior more
attractive, thus, more likely.
• Establishing markets for polluting rights for the trading of resource use permits, e.g. to pollute the air. The use of
environmental resources as pollution sink requires a permit which has to be bought and can be traded.
These classical forms of economic instruments are usually implemented by public authorities on a legal basis at different
political levels (municipal, state, international etc.), depending on the authority responsible for the traded good and the
nature of the good. However, economic instruments can also be implemented by other actors than public ones as long as
this is permitted by the existing legal basis. The target groups of economic instruments implemented by public authorities
are generally private actors and households as well as companies. Although being targeted directly to specific actors
and actor groups, economic instruments usually indirectly affect all actors through price effects (Kaufmann-Hayoz and
Gutscher, 2001). Economic instruments affect incomes of different actors through the modification of prices as well as
through the way how tax revenues are used, i.e. subsidies financed.
The implementation of economic instruments requires a legal basis. Moreover, it has to be clear to whom, for what
purpose and how the economic instrument is to be applied. The latter requires a definition of how the charge, reward
or specific action has to be calculated, i.e. economically valued and how revenues are to be spent. This is done on the
basis of the law or specific contractual agreements. Simple and flexible regulations based on uniform calculations with
little room for administrative interpretation are particularly important for successful implementation and less vulnerable
to manipulation and dispute (Kaufmann-Hayoz and Gutscher, 2001). Just as for any command and control instrument,
enforcement and monitoring is needed. The effort involved in enforcement and monitoring can vary widely. For political
acceptance of the instruments it is crucial how the revenue is spent or how subsidies are financed. The use of revenues
to support targeted environmental goals or redistribution to the public will often increase acceptance (OECD, 1997).
Economic instruments in water management are often used to distribute benefits and costs resulting from land use impacts
on water resources, including direct or indirect subsidies, taxes, and transferable property or use rights for land, water,
and emissions (Amezaga, 2006).
Command and control as well as traditional economic instruments are principally aimed at modifying different aspects
of the external structure of actor’s behavior: the political, legal, and administrative, the socio-economic, and the physical
environment (see Figure 3.9). Most command and control instruments directly restrict actors’ options, while economic
instruments attempt to make environmentally desirable actions more attractive or rewarding and undesirable actions
less attractive by providing appropriate incentives. However, actor’s internal structures are generally influenced more
by communication and diffusion instruments. These instruments address the knowledge and goals of individuals and
organizations and attempt to influence their respective ways of achieving them as well as affecting their perceptions and
appraisals of the social and physical reality (Kaufmann-Hayoz and Gutscher, 2001).
Simpliﬁed2model2of2human2ac=on;22based2on2\cite{KaufmannAHayoz2001}2
Natural system  
(ecosystem properties and 
man-made interventions) 
Human system  
(institutions, value-systems, 
power relations, knowledge 
generation, actor’s social 
relations) 
Objective options and constraints 
External'structure'
Internal'structure'
Goals and knowledge 
Intentions Perceived reality 
Ac.on' Percep.on'Collaborative 
agreements Command and 
control 
Economic 
instruments 
Communication 
+ diffusion  
Figure 3.9: Primary target of di erent types of instruments; based on Kaufmann-Hayoz and Gutscher (2001)
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Policy challenge Description
Heterogeneity and
multiple objectives
IWRM requires cross-sectoral integration considering all water and land uses affecting the
resource
Irreversibility Beyond certain thresholds or tipping points, impacts may be irreversible and cause ecosystem
collapse; appropriate policies adhere to the precautionary principle
Information gaps The inherent complexity of ecosystems to be managed requires policy decisions under
uncertainty; adaptive management approaches
Mix of values River basins provide a variety of use values and non-use values, some of which are tangible
and marketable, whereas others are of a public or common good nature
Multiple market
failures
Both negative and positive externalities need to be addressed through economic instruments
and regulations
Mix of pressures Different pressures on river basins arise from various economic sectors, calling for different
responses
Impact accumulation Small impacts over a long time may create large losses with irreversible outcomes in the
long-run, while the costs of prevention have to be incurred in the present
Spatial externalities Benefits and cost are often incurred at different places. Costs are also unequally distributed
between economic sectors, and unevenly spread across administrative units
Multi-level governance IWRM policies require appropriate instruments at local, regional, national and international
level
Multi-actor governance Due to the multi-faceted nature of IWRM, both public and private actors need to be involved,
next to the increasing relevance of hybrid organizations crossing the public-private divide
Table 3.12: Policy challenges of IWRM implementation calling for a policy mix; based on (Ring and Schlaack, 2011)
Collaborative agreements between individual actors and organizations often target problems beyond the scope of
existing regulations. These instruments aim at the internal structure of actor’s, through increasing their knowledge and
motivation for potential gains from collaboration, as we as at their external structure in making agreed actions more
attractive. The enlargement of the set of relevant actors within the river basin boundary involved in the policy-making
process can lead to new forms of collaboration. Lubell et al. (2002) stresses that so-called watershed partnerships can
build on local knowledge and craft specialized policies congruent with local watershed problems. Moreover, the authors
stress that voluntary participation by local actors allows for the development of self-monitored norms of cooperation
that circumvent costly legal and administrative compliance mechanisms as they would be required for command and
control instruments. These watershed partnerships emerge because they produce mutually beneficial solutions to resource
conflicts in the watershed that are (Pareto) superior to command-and-control institutions (Lubell et al., 2002). However,
actors often need to perceive an incentive for collaboration in order to invest in social efforts. Lubell et al. (2002) argues
additionally, that the greater the transaction costs of developing and maintaining partnerships, the less likely partnerships
will emerge.
Operational constraints caused by resource scarcity require instruments that incorporate additional resources apart
from governmental ones. Thus, instruments seem promising that are flexible in addressing different contexts, involve
non-governmental stakeholders in resource demanding tasks (e.g. participation in land use planning, decision making
processes) and possibly tap additional funds. Positive experience has been made with voluntarism in Australia with its
Landcare movement, which aims at improving natural resource management by landholders and community groups
(Australian Government, 2009). Voluntarism is often initiated by a governmental, or in developing countries often
a non-governmental, intermediary playing the role of coordinator or facilitator, providing administrative support and
targeted funding. However, participation is completely voluntary. This approach has proven most successful where
individuals or businesses perceive their self-interest to be consistent with the broader public interest or at least other
involved parties’ interest. Although it is often impossible to involve all stakeholders, a voluntary approach “can be a
very useful first step where achieving a threshold of cultural change is required before other policy instruments can be
contemplated, and/or where active participation by a large number of individuals is required to solve a problem (such
as reducing water usage or the adoption of better natural resource management techniques)” (Australian Government,
2009). An important advantage of voluntarism is its non-interventionist character implying low (governmental) resource
requirements and high political acceptability by involved stakeholders because of low degrees of prescription and coercion
by the instrument (cf. Gunningham et al., 1998). At best, voluntarism results in stakeholders internalizing the motivation
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for the desired behavior and achieving sustainable, long-lasting behavioral change. However, there are significant possible
disadvantages as well. Once again, effectiveness depends strongly on the motivation to participate and it may be difficult
to target and monitor outcomes without incurring high administration costs (Australian Government, 2009).
Given the diversity of policy instruments, it is important to note that combinations of different policy instruments
work best since each instrument category has something valuable to offer while at the same time having substantial
limitations as a stand-alone strategy for government intervention. The advantages of dependability and predictability of
properly monitored and enforced command and control regulation, for example, are contrasted with its properties of being
inflexible, time consuming to make and amend, costly to enforce and inefficient when not enforced properly. Economic
instruments, instead, are often efficient but their actual impact can be uncertain. Communication and collaboration
instruments are less coercive and intrusive than command and control regulation and generally cost-effective, but they
tend to be unreliable when used in isolation (Australian Government, 2009). Hence, a combination of instruments instead
of relying on a single type can be the best way of overcoming the deficiencies of individual instruments, while taking
advantage of their strengths. Table 3.12 summarizes major policy challenges of IWRM implementation which, according
to Ring and Schlaack (2011), need to be addressed by a policy mix rather than individual policy instruments alone.
In general, a top-down approach encounters difficulty in being sufficiently context-specific with regard to specific
natural or human system contexts. This has resulted in problems of ‘full’ integration only for the sake of integration. To
encounter the right context, thus, requires a certain degree of flexibility in management design that cannot be provided
equally by all management instruments. Moreover, when it comes to cross-sectoral and cross-administrative cooperation
and collaboration this can hardly be achieved by mandate but rather through specific incentives and active involvement of
stakeholders in the IWRM implementation process. Management instruments have to provide appropriate incentives for
cooperation and collaboration, i.e. interaction among relevant stakeholders for a given management context. Furthermore,
problems of top-down approaches relate to the capacity to implement, monitor and enforce management instruments
and specific measures. Local stakeholder or target groups are often much more capable out of executing these necessary
tasks than higher order administrative bodies. The requirements of complementary management instruments can be
summarized as follows:
• Flexible enough to match human and natural system context - address ecosystem characteristics and interactions of
humans with the natural system at the right scale.
• Provide incentives for cooperation and collaboration across sectors and administrative boundaries at the identified
scale.
• Encourage social learning, self-regulation and participation.
• Management instruments have to be embedded in a diverse institutional and social system (compatibility with
existing regulations)
This variety of requirements calls for properties of different instruments to be applied in a policy mix. More flexible
solutions to meet specific context can be achieved through economic instruments as well as through collaborative
agreements, both bear the potential to reduce expenses of public authorities and to involve additional stakeholders in
the instrument design and implementation process. Communication and diffusion may also play an important role in
pronouncing new ways of policy and decision making in the context of IWRM. By applying additional policy instruments to
traditional command and control instruments the decision making level may possibly be closer to the actors involved. The
actors in turn may have more incentives for cooperation and coordination. This desired effect is illustrated in Figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.10: Interaction between regulator and actors. On the left based on top-down command and control regulation;
on the right additional policy instruments move decision-making level closer to addressed actors and provide
incentives for cooperation (Author’s work)
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Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) represent a promising instrument that combines several of the desired instrument
properties. Over the last two decades, PES has become a popular instrument to complement protected areas and other
regulatory approaches in ecosystem conservation policy. According to Ferraro (2011), the popularity of PES schemes
in developing countries resulted from frustration and ethical issues associated with regulatory approaches and from
dissatisfaction and criticism of indirect approaches. Since the introduction of PES schemes is accompanied by the hope to
raise additional funding, concerns over inadequate conservation budgets have also played an important role. Moreover,
Maro (2010) argues that “unlike conventional approaches to conservation which are regulatory and top-down, PES is
incentive-oriented and provides for free interaction among the different parties“.
With the introduction of Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services (PHES), the instrument is also applied specifically
to environmental challenges of water resources management. PHES combine governance and management, recognizing
their interdependence. The ecosystem service concept as governance system forms the basis to enable PHES as a practical
management instrument.
Although principally an economic instrument, PHES contain several characteristics of collaborative agreements as well
as communication and diffusion instruments. The voluntary nature of the instruments is a common feature of collaborative
agreements and the ecosystem service approach as the conceptual basis of PHES is a strong communication instrument.
The potential role of PHES in IWRM implementation will be assessed in the following chapters.
3.5 Summary
In order to improve the operationalization of IWRM the principal problems of fit and interplay have to be addressed. In
general, attempts of IWRM implementation apply command and control approaches to achieve institutional fit at the river
basin level. The resulting problems of institutional interplay are addressed through political or membership linkages on
the basis of the institutional solution of fit. The interdependence of fit and interplay is not recognized and the problems
are solved in sequence, in practice solutions to interplay follow solutions to fit, rather than in interaction. This may result
in sub-optimal scales for management, low cross-sectoral stakeholder involvement and cross-jurisdictional collaboration.
Although the majority of operationalization approaches considers a policy mix, e.g. command and control instruments
complemented by communication instruments, the problem of finding the right management scale with context-specific
solutions to fit and interplay is not explicitly addressed. The ‘standard packages’ of IWRM implementation in developing
countries are principally based on the role of the state as designer and implementer as well as enforcement actor. Given
the prevailing resource constraints in developing countries, this does not seem to be the best solution. Policy instruments
that are less interventionist, i.e. concentrating state resources for core tasks, and building on the involvement of additional
actors for the design, implementation and enforcement of policy actions are a promising complement to existing policies.
Economic instruments or incentive-based instruments are supposed to be more flexible and efficient in achieving
environmental policy goals. Toward the end of the 1990s, economic instruments where introduced in developing countries,
especially in Latin America, for the conservation of protected areas and to combat deforestation in general. The instrument
of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) has gained broad popularity among the variety of economic instruments and
is now applied more or less in all Latin American countries and several other developing countries in Africa and Asia.
In addition, conservation efforts for protected areas are now widely applied, where the protection of water resources
taking the form of Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services (PHES) is concerned. These instruments are praised
by practitioners and scientist as promising and innovative tools to address problems of environmental degradation.
Their application in the context of IWRM has received little attention so far. However, their popularity and widespread
application in developing countries as well as their proximity to the goals of IWRM gives reason to analyze their suitability
as a possible alternative or complement to existing approaches to IWRM operationalization. PHES are based on the concept
of Ecosystem Services (ES) for environmental governance. The ES concept departs from quite a different point than the
traditional government perspective of environmental regulation. Instead of political and membership linkages it focuses
on functional linkages between the natural and the human system. Thus, it provides a different way of addressing fit and
interplay. The following chapter introduces the ES concept and analyzes, based on the findings of Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of
this chapter, its suitability to address the problems of institutional fit and interplay in order to improve operationalization
of IWRM through instruments based on its principals such as PHES.
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4 The concept of Ecosystem Services and their valuation
The present and the following chapter provide a general theoretical analysis of the potential of Payments for Hydrological
Ecosystem Services (PHES) to contribute to improvements in IWRM implementation and operationalization as a possible
solution statement (see Figure 4.1). The Ecosystem Services (ES) concept, as the basis of PHES, is addressed in this
chapter. The principal aim is to analyze whether the concept provides a means to address the governance challenges of
fit and interplay in the context of IWRM implementation. Moreover, it will be analyzed if the concept of hydrological
ecosystem services can contribute to identifying the appropriate scale for management, hence, guiding operationalization
of IWRM for specific contexts.
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of the methodological conceptualization of core IWRM implementation problems and the PHES
solution statement based on the ecosystem service concept (Author’s work)
4.1 Introduction to the ecosystem service concept
Basic ecological concepts represent the main point of departure for the concept of Ecosystem Services (ES). Ecosystems
are understood as dynamic complexes of living biotic communities of plants, animals and microorganisms which together
with their non-living inorganic environment form a functional unit with the capacity of self-regulation to a certain degree
(cf. Tansley, 1935; UN, 1992; MEA, 2005). For practical reasons it is often necessary to define the spatial extension of an
ecosystem of concern, e.g. a lake or a river basin, although this is merely conceptual and not based on any distinct spatial
configuration of interactions (Tansley, 1935; Odum, 1969). However, ecosystems may also nest into each other. Apart from
a specific species composition, an ecosystem also comprises interactions and processes within a certain habitat including
all interdependencies within all of its components. This encompasses further all ecological functions, e.g. regulation of
nutrients and climate, resulting from the respective energy and material flows between different compartments. Ecosystem
functions are a subset of the interactions between the structure and processes of an ecosystem that underpin the capacity
of an ecosystem to provide goods and services (TEEB, 2010a). The structure of an ecosystem refers to its biophysical
architecture made up of a varying composition of species. Ecosystem processes, however, describe any change or reaction
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(physical, chemical or biological) occurring in an ecosystem including decomposition, production and fluxes of energy
and nutrients. Table 4.1 illustrates examples of ecosystem processes that comprise ecosystem functions important for the
provision of ecosystem services.
Ecosystem function Exemplary ecosystem processes
Primary production  ! Photosynthesis, plant nutrient uptake
Decomposition  ! Microbial respiration, soil and sediment food web dynamics
Nitrogen cycling  ! Nitrification, denitrification, nitrogen fixation
Hydrological cycle  ! Plant transpiration, root activity
Soil formation  ! Mineral weathering, soil bioturbation, vegetation succession
Biological control  ! Predator-prey interactions
Table 4.1: Examples of ecosystem processes that comprise ecosystem functions important for the provision of ecosystem
services; based on (Virginia and Wall, 2000) as cited in (TEEB, 2010a)
An important term with regard to ecosystems and the provision of services is the term biodiversity or biological diversity.
Biodiversity describes the variability among living organisms from all sources (terrestrial, marine, aquatic ecosystems
etc.) and the ecological complexes of which they form part of. This includes diversity within species, between species
and between ecosystems (MEA, 2005). Moreover, the term biodiversity reflects the hierarchy and complexity at the level
of genes, individuals, populations, species, communities, ecosystems and biomes (TEEB, 2010a). Changes in ecosystem
functioning can be a result of alternations in biodiversity. Hence, biodiversity at all levels contributes to the maintenance
of ecosystem functions and services (Hanna et al., 1996). Several linkages between changes in biodiversity and the way
ecosystems function have been identified in theoretical and empirical studies (Schulze and Mooney, 1993; Loreau et al.,
2002).
Generally, ecosystem functions are referred to as Ecosystem Services if an anthropogenic benefit can be derived from
ecosystem functioning (Loft and Lux, 2010). Barbier et al. (1994) defines ecosystem services more precisely as those
ecosystem functions that are currently perceived to support or protect human activities or affect human well-being (cf.
Hanna et al., 1996). Natural resources, i.e. ecosystem goods, as well as ecosystem services are generated and sustained by
ecosystems. Moreover, they also maintain nature in a condition attractive to humans (Hanna et al., 1996). One of the first
mentions of Ecosystem Services was by Ehrlich and Ehrlich (1981) and (Ehrlich and Mooney, 1983). De Groot (1992) and
Daily (1997) produced a further development of the ES concept. Since then there have been many attempts to define the
term Ecosystem Services, whereas the following definitions remain very influential and popular:
• “The conditions and processes through which natural ecosystems, and the species that make them up, sustain and
fulfill human life” (Daily, 1997)
• “The benefits human populations derive, directly or indirectly, from ecosystem functions” (Costanza et al., 1997)
• “The benefits people obtain from ecosystems” (MEA, 2003)
The definition of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA), listed last in the above, has its origin in the former two
definitions, following Costanza et al. (1997) in including both natural and human-modified ecosystems as sources of
ecosystem services, while adapting the definition of Daily (1997) in using the term “services” to encompass both the
tangible and the intangible benefits humans obtain from ecosystems, which are sometimes separated into “goods” and
“services” respectively.
While many authors (Daily, 1997; Costanza et al., 1997; MEA, 2005; de Groot et al., 2010) do not distinguish ecosystem
services from ecosystem goods, several other authors do this explicitly (Boyd and Banzhaf, 2007; Wallace, 2008; Fisher and
Turner, 2008; Balmford et al., 2008; Bateman et al., 2011). Assessments of connections between people and nature are
complex and different disciplines look at them in different ways which makes it very challenging to find common categories
and classification systems. Additionally, the objectives for such assessments differ, e.g. the need to describe ecosystem
services in order to map or value them economically or to estimate the human impact on ecosystems and how this impact
changes their capacity to deliver services with the aim to develop appropriate policies (Haines-Young and Potschin, 2013).
Hence, the need for a common accounting system for natural capital has led to the Common International Standard for
Ecosystem Services (CICES) as a contribution of the European Environment Agency (EEA) to the United Nations Statistical
Division (UNSD) as part of the revision of the System of Environmental-Economic Accounting (SEEA). CICES intends “to
help negotiate the different perspectives that have evolved around the ecosystem service concept and assist in the exchange
of information about them” (Haines-Young and Potschin, 2013). The widely employed and acknowledged classification
of ecosystem services used in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005) incorporated four ecosystem service
categories: provisioning, regulating, cultural and underlying supporting services (see Figure 4.2).
While the MEA had its main focus on the assessment of state of the earth’s ecosystems, communicating the intrinsic
dependence of human well-being on intact ecosystems and at the same time the destruction of those by human activity, an
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Figure 4.2: Overview of ecosystem service categories and exemplary ecosystem services (MEA, 2005)
international study The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) launched in 2007, aims to draw attention to
the global economic benefits of biodiversity and ecosystem services. The TEEB study, in its ecosystem service typology,
basically follows the categorization of the MEA by using the familiar provisioning, regulating and cultural (and amenity)
categories, but omits the category of supporting services and introduces habitat services as a new one. The omission of
the supporting services category is justified with a clearer conceptual distinction of ecosystem services and underlying
ecosystem functions and processes which, it is argued, many of the supporting services (e.g. nutrient cycling or food chain
dynamics) represent (TEEB, 2010a). The habitat service type is introduced to put explicit emphasis on the importance of
ecosystems to provide habitat for migratory species and gene pool protectors in the context of biodiversity. Several other
typologies have also been debated among the scientific community (Wallace, 2008; Fisher and Turner, 2008; Costanza,
2008) demonstrating a lively debate on how to tackle human and nature relationships. This underlines the rationale for
the CICES initiative.
CICES Theme CICES Class Corresponding TEEB Categories
Provisioning
Nutrition Food Water
Materials Raw Materials Genetic resources Medicinal
resources
Ornamental
resources
Energy
Regulating
Regulation of wastes Air purification Waste treatment
Flow regulation Disturbance, preven-
tion or moderation
Regulation of water
flows
Erosion
prevention
Regulation of physical
environment
Climate regulation Maintaining soil
fertility
Regulation of biotic
environment
Gene pool protection Life cycle
maintenance
Pollination Biological
control
Cultural
Symbolic Information for cog-
nitive development
Intellectual and
Experiential
Aesthetic
information
Inspiration for cul-
ture, art and design
Spiritual
experience
Recreation
& tourism
Table 4.2: CICES classification of ecosystem services and respective TEEB categories (Haines-Young and Potschin, 2013)
In a very first step, ecosystem services are defined for CICES as the contributions that ecosystems make to human
well-being, arising from the interaction of biotic and abiotic processes, and refer specifically to the final outputs or products
from ecological systems (Haines-Young and Potschin, 2013). Thus, ecosystem services are understood as things directly
consumed or used by people. The TEEB typology, the classification which is currently elaborated for CICES, recognizes
4.1 Introduction to the ecosystem service concept 69
provisioning, regulating and cultural services as final ecosystem outputs but it does not cover supporting services as
originally defined in the MEA.
Table 4.2 illustrates how the CICES classification of ecosystem services relates to the categories used in the TEEB study.
Accordingly, since supporting services are only indirectly consumed or used they are considered as part of the underlying
structures, processes and functions that characterize ecosystems (Haines-Young and Potschin, 2013). Additionally,
supporting services often simultaneously facilitate the output of many final outputs.
The TEEB service type, habitat services, is proposed by the EEA for CICES as part of a broader regulating and
maintenance section. It is argued that habitat services capture aspects of natural capital that are important for the
maintenance of physical, chemical, biological conditions in ecosystems (e.g. pest and disease control, pollination, gene
pool protection) and are equivalent to other biophysical factors that regulate the ambient conditions such as climate
regulation (Haines-Young and Potschin, 2013). The broad consultation process with the scientific community and
practitioners for CICES, according to Haines-Young and Potschin (2013), confirmed the importance of making a clear
distinction between final ecosystem services, ecosystem goods or products and ecosystem benefit. Therefore, the definitions
listed in Table 4.3 have been recommended as the basis for CICES.
Term Definition
Final ecosystem
services
are the contributions that ecosystems make to human well-being. These services are final in
that they are the outputs of ecosystems (whether natural, semi-natural or highly modified) that
most directly affect the well-being of people. A fundamental characteristic is that they retain a
connection to the underlying ecosystem functions, processes and structures that generate them.
Ecosystem goods
and benefits
are things that people create or derive from final ecosystem services. These final outputs from
ecosystems have been turned into products or experiences that are not functionally connected to
the systems from which they were derived. Goods and benefits can be referred to collectively as
products.
Human
well-being
is that which arises from adequate access to the basic materials for a good life needed to sustain
freedom of choice and action, health, good social relations and security. The state of well-being is
dependent on the aggregated output of ecosystem goods and benefits, the provision of which can
change the status of well-being.
Table 4.3: Definition of the terms final ecosystem services, ecosystem goods and benefits, and human well-being proposed
for CICES (Haines-Young and Potschin, 2013)
The EEA’s recommendation for CICES distinguishes ecosystem services, which are connected to underlying ecological
structures and processes, from ecosystem products and benefits which are not connected to these structures and processes.
A key early decision in designing CICES was to exclude the so-called supporting services from the classification and focus
only on the provisioning, regulating and cultural components. According to Haines-Young and Potschin (2013), the reason
for the omission of supporting services was the need to identify and describe the final outputs from ecosystems that people
use and value in order to link ecosystem and economic accounts in a corresponding manner. In doing so, the problem
of double counting of ecosystem services (e.g. as supporting and regulating services) is supposedly avoided because the
value of the ecological structures and processes that contribute to final outcomes is already wrapped up in their estimation
(cf. Boyd and Banzhaf, 2007; Wallace, 2008; Fisher and Turner, 2008; Balmford et al., 2008). This implies that for the
economic valuation of ecosystem services the contributions of these final services essentially matter for achieving benefits,
while adding up the value of direct and indirect contributions to the same benefits made by the underpinning ecological
functions can be avoided. This, however, does not subordinate supporting services (often also referred to as intermediate
services). Supporting services may certainly be accounted for as underlying ecological structures, processes and functions
which a number of different final services depend on, but in order to define an appropriate interface between ecosystems
and society the exclusive use of final services has been proposed for CICES (Haines-Young and Potschin, 2013).
The notion of ecosystem services as final outputs has important implications for the valuation of ecosystems (see
Section 4.3). Ecosystem functions based on ecosystem structures and processes provide ecosystem services but are only
implicitly valued through the valuation of end products (Kroeger and Casey, 2007). This distinction is necessary for the
assessment of ecosystem service alternation in provision and the rationale for the valuation of ecosystem services, for
instance, through avoiding cost methods or substitution cost. It is also important to value the cost of service provision.
Here, it is the improvement of ecosystem functions and processes that is important for final service provision.
The following example is useful to under the terminology introduced in the above. Ecological structures and processes
of ecosystems determine the functions, i.e. the functioning itself, of ecosystems. Ecosystem functions, thus, describe the
potential ecosystems have to provide ecosystem services. Nutrient cycling and soil permeability are an ecosystem function
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Figure 4.3: Illustration of the pathway from ecosystem structures and processes to human well-being; based on Haines-
Young and Potschin (2010) and Maltby (2009) as presented in TEEB (2010a)
and an ecosystem process that is needed (possibly among other functions and processes) to purify water, i.e. an ecosystem
function, to provide clean water as a provisioning ecosystem service. From this final ecosystem output, clean water, many
different contributions to benefits can be derived, including the use of it for nutrition, pleasure or even for cultural identity.
Finally, these benefits may also be valued economically, e.g. through estimations of Willingness To Pay (WTP) for a specific
service or a bundle of them (see Section 4.3.1). This pathway from a natural system context of ecosystem structures,
processes and functions over ecosystem services to a human system context of benefits and (economic) values is illustrated
in Figure 4.3. Here, ecosystem services represent the interface between the natural and the human system.
It is important to note that just as the same ecosystem structures and process facilitate different ecosystem functions, so
do ecosystem functions bear the potential to deliver different ecosystem services. These ecosystem services in turn may
contribute to several benefits. The direct and indirect final outcomes (ecosystem services) are what people deem useful,
thus, representing social preferences that may change over time and from place to place, regardless of ecosystem change.
The complexity of ecosystem processes, structure and resulting functions as well as the role of biodiversity to provide
redundancy for ecosystem resilience is still far from being clearly understood. Falkenmark and Rockström (2004), for
instance, describe the role of biodiversity and resilience as follows: “While resilience is a buffer to disturbance, biological
diversity plays an essential role in this buffer capacity - it acts as insurance by providing overlapping functions for restoring
ecosystem capacity to generate essential ecological services”.
When considering the impact of ecosystem change in order to improve the provision of desired services on other
ecosystem service provision, it is important to realize that ecosystem services are often interdependent (Heal et al., 2001;
MEA, 2005), and that the relationships between them may be highly non-linear (Farber et al., 2002; van Jaarsveld et al.,
2005). Single ecosystem services, thus, represent different elements of an interrelated bundle (cf. Cumming et al., 2006).
Therefore, optimization of a single service is often traded-off by reductions or losses of other services (Holling and Meffe,
1996). Figure 4.4 schematically illustrates the transition from ecosystem service provision of an ecosystem in a natural
state (1) toward extensive (2) and intensive (3) agricultural use. In this context, for instance, it has been reported
that regulating and cultural services are often higher in natural and semi-natural ecosystems than in heavier modified
ecosystems (Pearce and Turner, 1990; de Groot, 1992; Costanza et al., 1997).
According to Rodríguez et al. (2006), trade-offs between the provision of different ecosystem services are very common
and amply reported. Jackson et al. (2005), for instance, revealed trade-offs in the case of carbon sequestration and
water provision services, while Kanowski and Catterall (2010) document trade-offs between carbon sequestration and
biodiversity in Australian ecosystems. Hence, Muradian and Rival (2012) argue that a focus on single services has to be
considered critically because of the complex and not yet well-understood structure of ecosystems.
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Figure 4.4: Transition of distribution of ecosystem service provision from an ecosystem in a natural state (1) toward an
extensively (2) and intensively agriculturally used (3) one (Braat and ten Brink, 2008)
Without a doubt, the main driver of ecosystem change is human economic activity, most importantly, through agriculture
and related land use changes (Vitousek et al., 1997). The management of natural resources generally aims at changing the
composition and structure of ecosystems in forms more favorable for the provision of ecosystem goods for human well-
being (Wallace, 2007). Human activities traditionally focus on an enhancement of on-site ecosystem service production
(Foley et al., 2005), mainly in terms of increased agricultural output, thereby, intentionally or unintentionally, affecting
the provision of other ecosystem services such as water regulation (MEA, 2003). However, the fact that landscapes
simultaneously produce multiple ecosystem services that interrelate in complex dynamic ways has been largely overlooked
(Chan et al., 2006; Rodríguez et al., 2006; Brauman et al., 2007). Unexpected or undesirable declines in other ecosystem
services have resulted as unintended consequence of human domestication of ecosystems (Kremen and Ostfeld, 2005).
On a global scale the MEA highlighted that the increase in a few services, such as food and timber, resulted in a decline
in most other services such as flood control, genetic resources, or pollination (MEA, 2005). This has been one major
reason for approaches of natural resource management focusing on the integration different environmental media and
considering ecosystems as a whole, such as IWRM.
Although human-managed ecosystems, e.g. for agriculture, are driven by human management (e.g. soil tillage,
irrigation, nutrient additions), they are still influenced by the same ecological processes that shape and drive natural
ecosystems, particularly by those processes that support biomass production and others such as nitrogen uptake from
the atmosphere and pollination of crops (Falkenmark and Finlayson, 2007). Ecosystems modified as agricultural systems
are often referred to as agroecosystems (Falkenmark and Finlayson, 2007). Today the difference between a natural
ecosystem and an agroecosystem is related to the extent of human intervention or management and considered to be
largely conceptual.
Rather recently these external effects, i.e. externalities gained more importance, for instance, in the context of global
climate change or biodiversity loss. The ecosystem service concept has served as an eye-opener (cf. Costanza et al., 1997;
Gordon and Folke, 2000) for traditionally undervalued ecosystem services and connects ecosystems with on-site - and
more importantly - off-site beneficiaries. As humans are altering the potential of the ecosystem to provide services though
different land uses, the ecosystem service concept connects land users with beneficiaries. Therefore, land users may be
regarded as providers of ecosystem services and disservices. The interrelationships between different ecosystem services,
thus, are an important issue. A management focus on individual ecosystem services, as standalone services, may lead to
trade-offs among services resulting in unwanted declines in some ecosystem services (MEA, 2005) or even regime shifts
with unexpected consequences (Gordon et al., 2008). However, these trade-offs may possibly be altered by focusing on
managing the ecosystem processes that link services (Pretty et al., 2006). However, despite the growing awareness of
the socio-economic relevance of ecosystem services, actual mainstreaming and implementation of ecosystem services in
practical planning and decision-making can be considered as still in its infancy (Naidoo et al., 2006; Daily et al., 2009).
The ecosystem service concept has been addressed by different economic schools of thought of environmental and
ecological economists including some rejecting it entirely. Therefore, Farley and Costanza (2010) present a particular
definition of ecosystem services and ecosystem goods as an attempt to reconcile the contrasting conceptualization
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of environmental economic, for instance as introduced by Engel et al. (2008) and ecological economic approaches,
discussed by Muradian et al. (2010), as well as those rejecting the concept of ecosystem services because of the threat of
commodification of ES, as expressed for instance by McCauley (2006); Robertson (2006); Kosoy and Corbera (2010).
While the environmental economics approach prioritizes economic efficiency by integrating ecosystem services into the
classical market model, the ecological economics approach focuses more broadly on the multiple goals of ecological
sustainability, just distribution and economic efficiency favoring a variety of valuation mechanisms to achieve these goals,
both market and non-market based. Accordingly, in the ecological economics approach appropriate institutions and
mechanisms are determined by and adapted to the relevant characteristics of the ecosystems and services in question.
In presenting a distinct definition for ecosystem services and goods, Farley and Costanza (2010) aim to unify all three
perspectives in order to identify appropriate institutions for their governance based on the physical characteristics of the
services in question. Moreover, the definition presented is based on the reasoning that ecosystem services are essential,
non-substitutable and poorly understood, while there are real costs to their provision and protection. Since someone has
to pay those costs, this reasoning justifies ecosystem service valuation without requiring commodification of ecosystem
services. Thus, Farley and Costanza (2010) pick up a unifying feature of most ecosystem service definitions that define
services as processes or functions of value to humans and elaborate a definition more suitable for the analysis of policy
instruments such as Payments for Ecosystem Services (introduced in Chapter 5). However, Farley and Costanza (2010)
argue that payment mechanisms based on pure market logic will only rarely be appropriate.
In their definition, Farley and Costanza (2010) propose to differentiate between ecosystem goods as stock-flow resources
and ecosystem services as fund-services (as introduced by Georgescu-Roegen in 1971) provided by nature, thus connecting
the economic subsystem to the ecosystem. Ecosystem goods, i.e. stock-flow resources, represent the physical flow or
throughput of raw materials and stored energy from nature transformed into economic products and later returned to
nature as disordered waste. These goods, equally considered as ecosystem structures (Daly and Farley, 2010), may be
used at the rate society chooses transforming them physically in the act of production, e.g. forests into houses. Hence,
according to Farley and Costanza (2010) they can be quantitatively used up, but also be stockpiled when inflows exceed
outflows.
In contrast, ecosystem services are described as fund-services having fundamentally different physical characteristics.
Fund-services are functionally connected to stock-flow resources since they are generated by a particular configuration of
stock-flow resources (Farley and Costanza, 2010). As opposed to ecosystem goods, the use rate of ecosystem services cannot
be accelerated because ecosystem services are available at a given rate over time. The generation of ecosystem services
does not transform the provisioning ecosystem; instead of being used up quantitatively quantitatively the ecosystem is
changed qualitatively. A further difference to ecosystem goods is that ecosystem services cannot be stockpiled.
Farley and Costanza (2010) present five conceptual advantages of their definition:
• Defining ecosystem services as fund-services reflects the valuation of land uses associated with generating the
service, i.e. the link between land use and service provision, more explicitly.
• The definition encompasses existing definitions, e.g. the one by Fisher and Turner (2008) emphasizing the fund side
and the MEA’s definition focusing on the service side, stressing that these two actually work together. The definition
describes provisioning service as the capacity of ecosystem structure to reproduce itself, rather than the food, fiber,
fuel and water provided representing ecosystem goods.
• Ecosystem services are described as the physical characteristics of fund services rather than their explicit value to
humans. This takes into account the limited knowledge and understanding of ecosystem functioning which might
be of value for humans. Hence, defining ecosystem services by their physical characteristics stresses that they do
not blend readily with market institutions, and other economic institutions may be required to protect and provide
them.
• Defining ecosystem services as generated by a particular configuration of stock-flow resources emphasizes their role
as an emergent property of complex systems.
• In distinguishing between stock-flow and fund-services, the dual nature of natural resources is highlighted. This may
help to analyze why market economies systematically favor the conversion of ecosystem structure into stock-flow
inputs and into economic production over its conservation in ecosystem funds in order to provide ecosystem services
(Farley, 2010). Moreover, as stock-flow and fund-service resources are typically complements it stresses the limits of
their substitution.
With their definition of ecosystem goods and services, Farley and Costanza (2010) stress the need to conserve the dual
functions of ecosystems, as stock-flows that could provide raw materials for economic production and as fund-fluxes that
provide critical ecosystem services. By using up ecosystem goods in form of stock-flows, the structure of ecosystems may
be converted to economic output, and ecosystem functions are sufficiently compromised. This is a trade-off that has to be
considered.
When considering the ecosystem service concept in the context of IWRM the focus has to be laid on so-called hydrological
ecosystem services. This type of services will be introduced in the following section.
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4.2 Hydrological Ecosystem Functions and Services
The provision of hydrological or water-related ecosystem services is one element of a bundle of other essential services
- such as air quality, carbon dioxide sequestration, and soil generation - provided by ecosystems which are interrelated
in dynamic and complex ways. Some authors refer to these services by using the term watershed services (Smith et al.,
2006), thus, highlighting the use of the concept in the context of water management. A reasonable distinction of different
water-related services is provided by Brauman (2009) in dealing with aquatic services representing direct services from
freshwater ecosystems themselves, e.g. in-stream nutrient removal, and hydrological services describing the terrestrial
effects on hydrological flows separately. Hence, the quality, quantity and timing of water draining into and flowing
along rivers is modified by topography, geology, soil type, vegetation cover, land use and other human activities within a
river basin. Primarily, water is partly returned to the atmosphere via evaporation from lakes, wetlands, the soil surface
and wet vegetation, and through transpiration by plants and trees but another part of water moves down slopes and
stream channels, as well as underground, carrying sediment, nutrients and other chemicals or contaminants. Thus, the
quality, quantity and timing of water available to downstream users in a river basin depends on the particular types and
distribution of vegetation, the underlying geology, the soil types present and the way that land is used and managed.
Therefore, watershed services, i.e. hydrological ecosystem services - as they are referred to - in this dissertation, are
final outputs of ecosystem functions or processes that provide different kinds of direct and indirect streams of benefits to
humans in the following main categories (cf. Tognetti et al., 2006):
• Provision of freshwater for:
– Consumptive uses (drinking, domestic, agricultural, and industrial)
– Non-consumptive uses (hydropower generation, cooling water, and navigation)
• Flow regulation and filtration, key aspects of which are the control of mean surface runoff, peak or flood flows, base
or dry season flow, and erosion and sediment load, as well as recharge of groundwater and soil moisture (FAO,
2002). Benefits of these may include the following:
– Water storage in soils, wetlands, and floodplains, which can buffer flood flows and drought
– Control of erosion and sedimentation which, in excess, can have adverse effects on aquatic life, irrigation
canals, dams, and navigation. Below normal flows of sediment downstream from dams can have adverse
effects on coastal areas where it provides protection from erosion and nourishes the development of mangroves,
both of which can reduce storm damage
– Maintenance of river channels, wetlands, riparian habitats, fisheries, and other wildlife habitat that may be
important for hunting, migratory birds, rice cultivation, and fertilization of floodplains
– Maintenance of mangroves, estuaries, and coastal zone processes, which often rely on seasonal pulses of
freshwater inputs, and are critical habitats for fisheries as well as for other marine life
– Control of the level of groundwater tables that may have adverse effects on agriculture by bringing salinity to
the surface.
– Maintenance of water quality, which may be impacted by inputs of nutrients and organic matter, pathogens,
pesticides, and other persistent organic pollutants, salinity, heavy metals, and changes in the thermal regime
Apart from these provisioning and regulating services there are also important hydrological supporting services,
including the maintenance of natural flow and disturbance regimes as drivers of ecosystem processes which support
aquatic ecosystem resilience, often referred to as environmental flows, as well as services that support cultural values, e.g.
aesthetic qualities that support tourism and recreational uses (Tognetti et al., 2006). The interdependence of all of these
services often implies trade-offs between the provision of freshwater for direct uses and the regulatory and supporting
services that insure its continued provision.
Brauman et al. (2007) define hydrological services more narrowly as those ecosystem services which “encompass the
benefits to people produced by terrestrial ecosystem effects on freshwater”. This definition focuses explicitly on the off-site
final services. Brauman et al. (2007) organize these services into five broad categories:
• Improvement of extractive water supply
• Improvement of in-stream water supply
• Water damage mitigation
• Provision of water-related cultural services, and
• Water-associated supporting services.
Brauman et al. (2007) provide three aspects related to hydrological ecosystem services to describe the pathway from
service provision to the final outputs that beneficiaries value (see Figure 4.5): ecohydrologic processes, hydrologic
attributes and hydrological services themselves. In a management and policy context it is useful to consider these three
aspects since they convey specific information to facilitate institutional fit and interplay. The first aspect, ecohydrological
processes (and structures) describes the provisioning function of ecosystems and therefore corresponds to the providers of
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(what the ecosystem does)
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(direct effect of the ecosystem)
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(what the beneficiary receives)
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flow) 
Environmental filtration 
Soil stabilization 
Chemical and biological 
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Quality 
(pathogens, 
nutrients, salinity, 
sediment) 
Soil development 
Ground surface modification 
Surface flow path alteration 
River bank development 
Location 
(ground/surface, 
up/downstream, 
in/out of channel) 
Control of flow speed 
Short- and long-term water 
storage 
Seasonality of water use 
Timing 
(peak flows, base 
flows, velocity) 
Diverted water supply:   
Water for municipal, 
agricultural, commercial, 
industrial, thermoelectric 
power generation uses 
In situ water supply:
Water for hydropower, 
recreation, transportation, 
supply of fish and other 
freshwater products 
Water damage 
mitigation:
Reduction of flood damage, 
dryland salinization,  
saltwater intrusion, 
sedimentation 
Spiritual and aesthetic:
Provision of religious, 
educational, tourism values 
Supporting:
Water and nutrients to 
support vital estuaries and 
other habitats, preservation 
of options
Figure 3
Relationship of hydrologic ecosystem processes to hydrologic services. Each service has attributes of
quantity, quality, location, and timing of flow. Municipal water supply, for example, requires not just an
adequate quantity of water, but also that it be of acceptable quality and in the right place at the right time.
A number of ecosystem processes affect each attribute.
Because ecosystem effects on macrocli-
mate often occur at spatial and temporal scales
inconsistent with the scale of landscape hy-
drologic response to a given climate regime,
we do not include the effects of vegetation on
macroclimate in our discussion of hydrologic
services (18). For information on this topic,
see References 19–23.
Which ecosystems provide hydrologic ser-
vices, and at what scale? Any ecosystem in
a watershed will affect the attributes of the
water that passes through it. Thus, all ecosys-
tems provide hydrologic services, although to
differing degrees (24). Vegetation is often the
driving force in ecosystem effects on water,
but all elements of an ecosystem, from mi-
crobes to megafauna, can and do affect hy-
drologic service provision.
Hydrologic services are regional services;
downstream users experience the effects of
ecosystems throughout their watershed. Be-
cause the effects are spread over space, the
impact of land cover may be diffused in larger
watersheds. In Texas, shrub removal provided
dramatic water savings in riparian regions
when measured at the stand scale, but wa-
ter savings at the landscape scale were muted
or nonexistent (25). In many cases, ecosystem
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Figure 4.5: Relationship between hydrological ecosystem processes and services (Brauman et al., 2007)
on-site and off-site ecosystem services. Different ecosystems may have similar functions (e.g. water retention of woodlands
and wetlands) to similar but also to different degrees.
The second aspect, hydrological attributes, describes qualitative and quantitative as well as temporal and spatial
characteristics affected by ch ng s in ecohydrological functioning. Each and every hydrological ecosystem service
is determined by certain hydrological attributes. The requi ements on hydrological attributes can vary for different
hydrological ecosystem services, thus, trade-offs are common here as well. Moreover, each hydrological attribute is
directly impacted, improved or degraded, by ecosystem processes and structures as water moves through a landscape.
While flowing through an ecosystem, different ecosystem processes may have competing effects on the same attribute or
simultaneously have positive and negative effects on different attributes of a particular service. Thus, infiltration may be
increased in a forest ecosystem, for instance, while total liquid water volume leaving the ecosystem may be decreased
through transpiration (Brauman et al., 2007). The hydrological attributes of a provisioning hydrological ecosystem service
as a potential benefit for off-stream use, e.g. municipal water supply, are defined by a specified volume of water of an
expected quali y in a certain form and at certain time. Other beneficiaries, thos of flood damage mitigation, are likely
to have less formal but similarly important requirements. Figure 4.6 illustrates how diff rent processes and structures of
ecosystems relate to hydrological attributes.
The latter aspect of the conceptualization of hydrological ecosystem services by Brauman et al. (2007) refers to the
final benefits and beneficiaries of services (although the authors call them hydrologic services, according to the definitions
presented in Section 4.1 these are actually benefits). These benefits and beneficiaries represent (potential) direct and
indirect water users. Together with the providers of ecosystem services they represent the stakeholders across all sectors
that IWRM intends to integrate. However, they are not considered by sector, instead the ecosystem (in the IWRM context
it is commonly the water resource itself represented as a “comb” that connects the different sectors and stakeholders) as
the basis for all (economic) activity serves as the principal integrator of the natural and human system.
Since any ecosystem within a river basin affects the attributes of the water that passes through it, all ecosystems
provide hydrological services, although to differing degrees (Allan, 2004). All elements of an ecosystem, from microbes to
megafauna, affect hydrological service provision, but vegetation, i.e. land use and land cover, is often the driving force in
ecosystem effects on water, especially when considering short and medium term disturbances. Contrary to other ecosystem
services, e.g. carbon sequestration, hydrological ecosystem services are generally local and regional services are defined
by the biogeophysical properties of a river basin and its sub-basins. Hence, downstream users experience the effects of
ecosystem change throughout their river basin. At different spatial and temporal scales different (internal and external)
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Figure 4.6:Water cycle-ecosystem interactions. Arrows indicate fluxes of water (Brauman et al., 2007).
drivers of change gain and loose importance. For instance, the impact of land cover change (internal driver) may be
diffused in larger river basins while a large-scale meteorological event can cover larger parts (Birkinshaw and Bathurst,
2006). According to Brauman et al. (2007), for instance, the ecosystem effects on sediment yield and flooding are only
measurable in small river basins and for small rainfall events. Depending on the dimension and location of different
ecosystems within the basin and on the frequency, duration, and intensity of climatic events hydrological ecosystem service
effects may either decrease or increase with basin size, extrapolations of local and short-term effects of hydrological
services to larger scales may therefore be flawed (Brauman et al., 2007).
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) investigated the impacts of land use on hydrological
and landscape processes on the basis of a large number of hydrological studies and came to similar results (FAO, 2002).
According to the FAO, the results, summarized in Table 4.4, provide some “general rules“ indicating that impacts can only
be verified within small basins, and most of the hydrological studies in fact pertain to small-scale river basins. Since at
larger scales, natural processes (e.g. meteorological phenomena) are dominant, it is difficult to detect any change as a
result of conservation practices, particularly on a short time scale. In contrast, impacts of land use on water quality can be
observed at much larger scales. In some cases, water quality impacts have been well documented and quantified even in
larger basins (FAO, 2002). In case of various sources of pollutants, however, a direct linkage of causes and effects may
remain elusive.
For the identification of hydrological service provision and related benefits, information on the scale at which land
use practices have a verifiable impact on hydrological attributes (water resources availability in volume and timing as
well as quality) is crucial. This information defines the spatial fit and institutional interplay of provider and beneficiary
constellations and determines the feasibility of policy intervention toward a more equitable sharing of costs and benefits.
The latter is only the case when impacts of land use can actually be linked with downstream effects to a reasonable degree
of uncertainty.
Recognizing that the dynamics of hydrological ecosystem service interactions are crucially influenced by the scale at
which the phenomena are studied as well as by the physiological characteristics of vegetation, the pedology of the soil, and
the type of climate, a new field of studies emerged with ecohydrology in the late 1990s. Rodriguez-Iturbe (2000) defines
ecohydrology as “the science which seeks to describe the hydrologic mechanisms that underlie ecologic patterns and
processes”. Moreover, ecohydrology quantifies and explains the relationships between hydrological processes and biotic
dynamics at a catchment scale (Zalewski and Wagner-Lotkowska, 2004). Hence, ecohydrology incorporates the ecosystem
service approach but carries it further in the context of ecological engineering. Thus, it considers how ecological processes
and structures can be used and enhance through “hydro-technical infrastructure“ (cf. Zalewski et al., 1997) in order to
improve hydrological ecosystem service provision. A central principle of ecohydology is to use ecosystem properties as
management tools at the river basin scale Zalewski (2000). The climate-soil-vegetation dynamics (and their alternation by
management practices) are considered as the core of hydrology with the soil moisture balance, in absence of pronounced
topographical effects, as the principle determinant for infiltration, evaporation and leakage quantities (Sandström, 1998;
Rodriguez-Iturbe, 2000; Brauman et al., 2007).
The ecohydrological perspective on land use changes in a river basin focuses on their effects on water flows. The link
between land use and the provision of hydrological ecosystem services is found in the partitioning points of the water cycle.
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Impact Type1
Approximate basin size [km2]
Source
0,1 1 10 102 103 104 105
Average flow X X X X – – – (Bosch and Hewlett, 1982; Chapman and Falkenmark,
1989; Bruijnzeel, 1990)
Peak flow X X X X – – – (Bruijnzeel, 1990; Brooks et al., 1991; La Marche and
Lettenmaier, 2001)
Base, dry season flow X X X X – – – (Brooks et al., 1991; Calder, 1998; Chomitz et al., 1999)
Groundwater recharge X X X X – – – (Tejwani, 1993; Calder, 1998; Chomitz et al., 1999)
Sediment load X X X X – – – (Chapman and Falkenmark, 1989; Bruijnzeel, 1990;
Brooks et al., 1991)
Nutrients X X X X X – – (Chapman and Falkenmark, 1989; Brooks et al., 1991)
Organic matter X X X X – – – (BGS, 1996; Ongley, 1996)
Pathogens X X X – – – – (Dougherty and Hall, 1995)
Salinity X X X X X X X (BGS, 1996; FAO, 1997)
Pesticides X X X X X X X (Ongley, 1996)
Heavy metals X X X X X X X (Ongley, 1996)
Thermal regime X X – – – – – (Westcot, 1997)
Table 4.4:Measurability of land use e ects by basin size; based on FAO (2002)
1 Legend: X = Measurable impact; – = No measurable impact
Any kind of land use and its interaction between soil, water, plant and atmosphere will generate a specific partitioning of
rainfall. Falkenmark and Rockström (2004) conceptualize the climate-soil-vegetation dynamics with their green and blue
water approach, while focusing on two principal partitioning points of precipitation. The main biophysical and human
determinants for this partitioning are summarized in Table 4.5.
Flow component Biophysical determinant Human determinant
1st Partitioning point
Surface runoff Vegetation / Biomes Land use
Soil surface conditions Tillage practices
Rainfall intensity –
Soil wetness Soil management
Soil moisture Water holding capacity in soil Soil management
2nd Partitioning point
Evaporation Atmospheric demand (potential evaporation) Canopy cover
Micro-meteorology Mulching
Wetness of soil Timing of planting
Transpiration Photosynthetic pathway Crop management
Plant available soil moisture Forest management
Atmospheric demand –
Groundwater recharge Soil hydraulic conditions Compaction
Geological conditions
Table 4.5: Biophysical and human factors that determine the partitioning of water flows in the hydrological cycle (Falken-
mark and Rockström, 2004)
Additionally to the biophysical determinants of rainfall partitioning, land management has a primary influence as the
most important human determinant. Falkenmark and Rockström (2004) point out that rainfall partitioning significantly
determines water flow paths at various scales. Land use and natural conditions, therefore, influence flow partitioning on
all scales, from the individual plant to the river basin with considerable impacts on on-site and off-site water availability.
This is a strong argument to shift the conventional water resource management focus on blue water alone, which is directly
associated with stable blue water flow in rivers and aquifers downstream in river basins, toward more consideration of
green water flows that influence the rainfall partitioning upstream which in turn determines blue water flows downstream.
Hence, “rainfall, not stable blue water flow, is the fundamental water resource” in the concept of ecohydrology (Falkenmark
and Rockström, 2004).
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The ecohydrology concept is particularly useful to understand the provisioning side of hydrological ecosystem services by
providing a land use - water flow path consideration. Moreover, it illustrates the natural determinants of the hydrological
cycle and the possible human influence on those. Hence, land users can be considered as contributors to the provision
of ecosystem services, i.e. disservices. Thus, the concept facilitates comparisons of land use impacts and natural factors
on service provision, at least at the primary partitioning points of rainfall. While crossing the river basin either on the
surface or the subsurface, the hydrological attributes are further determined by additional processes. For superficial, i.e.
overland, water flows the presence of buffer strips or re-infiltration areas are important for flow retention, erosion control
and sediment reduction before water reaches a stream or river reach. The interaction of subsurface flows and rivers can
be of effluent or influent character, determining the flow in different ways. As pointed out before, in-stream processes
subsequently alter hydrological attributes. Each of these processes within river basins may vary significantly from one
climatic zone to another.
In the context of human determinants of service provision, Falkenmark and Rockström (2004) highlight overgrazing,
deforestation and land mismanagement in agriculture as three major causes of human-induced land degradation. They all
cause a shift toward increased erosive surface runoff, reduced productive green water flow (biomass production) and
lowered ground water recharge as a result of their effect on rainfall partitioning. Deforestation, for instance, may cause
more storm water surface flow and less groundwater recharge, and may turn a relatively water-rich region into a region
experiencing seasonal water scarcity (Agarwal, 2000; Falkenmark and Rockström, 2004). Although many aspects of
hydrological response are often determined by extreme but infrequent meteorological events (cf. Brauman et al., 2007),
the ability of ecosystems to mediate these is unclear. This mediation of extreme events is, thus, of considerable importance
and presumably not linearly related to the delivery of water services in average years. Most of the knowledge about
ecosystem effects on hydrological ecosystem service provision, e.g. water supply and water hazard mitigation, stems from
research activities conducted in temperate ecosystems (Brauman et al., 2007). Hydrological responses for a different
climate, geography, or ecosystem type have been studied to a lesser degree.
Meybeck (2003) realized a global analysis of human impacts on river basins and demonstrated that the modification
of aquatic systems by human pressures (e.g., flood regulation, fragmentation, sedimentation imbalance, salinization,
contamination, eutrophication, etc.) has increased to a level that can no longer be considered as being controlled by natural
processes (climate, relief, vegetation, limnology) only. Based on these conclusions, Zalewski and Wagner-Lotkowska
(2004) regard technical solutions alone as insufficient to reduce or eliminate the discharge of pollutant, instead tools are
necessary to manage the degradation of ecological processes in landscapes based on an understanding of the temporal and
spatial patterns of catchment scale water dynamics.
In the context of the role that different ecosystems play for the provision of hydrological ecosystem services there has
been a big discussion, especially on the role of forest ecosystems. This issue has been addressed repeatedly by Salati
and Vose (1984); Calder (1998); Sandström (1998); Calder (2002); Aylward (2004); Bonell and Bruijnzeel (2004b);
Kaimowitz (2004); Bonell and Bruijnzeel (2004a); Andréassian (2004) and several other authors.
The principal experimental method to investigate the impact of land use changes on hydrological flows is paired
catchment studies (cf., Bosch and Hewlett, 1982; Brown et al., 2005). These studies generally consider four broad
categories: afforestation experiments, deforestation experiments, regrowth experiments and forest conversion experiments.
The principal advantage of paired catchment studies is that macro-scale and meso-scale climate variability is removed
through the comparison of two catchments subject to similar climatic conditions under different land uses Brown et al.
(2005).
The subsequent land use and the respective degradation of hydrological functions is important for the resulting altered
hydrological response. Overall annual water yield often has limited explanatory power since the total water yield may
increase because of high amounts of surface runoff during the wet season, while dry season flow may decrease because of
lower infiltration during the wet season (Bruijnzeel, 1988). Roa-García et al. (2011) provide evidence for this infiltration
trade-off hypothesis (cf. Bruijnzeel, 1988, 2004) for tropical environments (the Andes), which assumes that after forest
removal, soil infiltration rates are smaller and the water losses through quick flow are larger than the gains by reduced
evapotranspiration. This hypothesis has been reaffirmed recently by Bonell et al. (2010), Krishnaswamy et al. (2012)
and Krishnaswamy et al. (2013) for several Indian river basins. Brown et al. (2005) conclude similarly with regard to
their comparison of paired catchment studies that “the difference in hydrological responses observed in tropical summer
dominant rainfall catchments, undergoing similar changes in vegetation highlights the difficulties associated with making
generalisations about the seasonal impacts on water yield. At the seasonal time scale other catchment characteristics such
as soil depth and type play a much larger role in the response than on the mean annual basis“.
The role of forested areas in the tropics for the maintenance of dry season flows was studied by Roa-García et al. (2011).
The authors revealed, in a paired catchment experiment that the basin with the highest forest cover (68%) showed the
smallest reduction in flow during the dry season and the highest low flows were maintained there, even when compared to
grassland dominated basins. Moreover, it could be proven that natural forests have a larger capacity to store and release
soil moisture than grassland (Roa-García et al., 2011; Krishnaswamy et al., 2013).
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However, in order to record changes in total annual water yield around 20% of the catchment area had to be altered in
most paired catchment studies, but there are cases where only 15% (Rocky Mountains) or up to 50% (Great Plains) had to
be changed to cause any response (Brown et al., 2005).
The limitations of paired catchment studies have been addressed by Bruijnzeel (2006) who refers to them as a time-
consuming method (typically more than 5 years) and thus an expensive affair. Moreover, he regards the method as being
essentially a “black-box” requiring additional process research to reveal the relative importance of different causative
factors to explain the changes observed in streamflow. Both aspects have led, according to Bruijnzeel (2006), “to a
general decline in the number of such studies in the last few decades and a gradually increasing emphasis on computer
simulations”. Nevertheless, some lessons learned from the limitations of paired catchment experiments can still be derived
for general consideration with regard to hydrological responses due to land use changes:
• The results of permanent vegetation change experiments indicate that, depending on the changes in soil storage
and the transpiration-vegetation age characteristics of the new vegetation type, it takes longer than 5 years for a
new hydrologic equilibrium to be established.
• Changes in vegetation type will affect not only mean annual flow, but also the variability of annual flow.
• Flow duration curves provide a useful means of displaying the complete range of daily flows and allow the impacts
on low and high flows to be assessed at different temporal scales (annual or seasonal). Seasonal flow duration
curves can be used to assess the seasonal impacts on daily flow (Brown et al., 2005).
In general, it seems inappropriate to make generalizations on the effects of land use changes on hydrological responses
only on the basis of land uses in the sense of land cover, e.g. forest changed into pasture. Most important is how the
different rainfall partitioning points are quantitatively and qualitatively changed through the change in vegetation and soil
properties which together influence the critical processes of evapotranspiration, infiltration and soil moisture retention.
These processes in turn determine whether Hortonian, infiltration-excess because of soil saturation or sealing, overland
flow (cf. Horton, 1945) occurs which causes faster runoff responses and increased erosion. Figure 4.7 provides a schematic
representation of the occurrence of various streamflow generating processes in relation to their major controls.4 RAINFALL-RUNOFF PROCESSES
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Figure 2 Schematic representation of the occurrence of various streamflow generating processes in relation to their
major controls (Reproduced from Dunne, 1978, by permission of John Wiley & Sons Ltd). Note: ‘‘direct precipitation and
return flow’’ are equivalent to saturation overland flow, SOF
exposure to radiation and air streams) and ungauged subter-
ranean transfers of water from one catchment to another, a
“direct” comparison of streamflows from catchments with
contrasting covers can be problematic. The same applies
to a comparison of flows from a single catchment before
and after a change in cover. The classic response to such
problems has been the “paired catchment experiment” in
which the streamflow from two (preferably adjacent) catch-
ments of comparable geology, topography, exposure, and
vegetation are expressed in terms of each other (using
regression analysis) during a “calibration phase”. Once a
robust baseline calibration relationship has been obtained,
one of the catchments is subjected to manipulation of its
cover (e.g. strip cutting or clear-felling) while the other
catchment remains undisturbed as the “control” (Figure 3).
Throughout this “treatment” phase, streamflow from both
catchments continues to be monitored. Any effects of the
treatment are evaluated by comparing the actually mea-
sured flow totals from the manipulated catchment with
the flows that would have occurred if the catchment had
remained undisturbed. This is usually achieved by insert-
ing streamflow totals determined for the control catch-
ment into the calibration relationship (Figure 3; Hewlett
and Fortson, 1983). Although a more rigorous compari-
son between catchments is obtained in this way than in the
case of a “direct” comparison of flows, the tacit under-
lying assumption is that differences in leakage between
the two catchments remain unchanged with time, regard-
less of catchment cover status. Also, to avoid unjustified
extrapolation of the calibration relationship to accommodate
extremes in streamflow during the treatment phase (e.g.
because of excessive rainfall or drought), it is imperative
for the calibration period to include both wet and dry years.
This makes the paired catchment method a time-consuming
(typically >5 years) and thus an expensive affair. Moreover,
the method is essentially a “black-box” requiring additional
process research to reveal the relative importance of differ-
ent causative factors to explain the observed changes in
streamflow. All this, plus the limited resolution afforded
by the paired catchment approach (usually more than 20%
cover change is required for effects on streamflow to be
detectable for small headwater catchments), has led to a
general decline in the number of such studies in the last
few decades and a gradually increasing emphasis on com-
puter simulations (seeChapter 132, Rainfall-runoff Mod-
eling for Assessing Impacts of Climate and Land Use
Change, Volume 3 and Chapter 121, Intersite Compar-
isons of Rainfall-runoff Processes, Volume 3).
Forest Harvesting Techniques
Harvesting of forest products may range from the manual
collection of a particular component of the forest (such as
fruits, fuelwood, or rattan), usually by forest dwellers or
farmers living near the forest, through the removal of lit-
ter and topsoil for use as fertilizer or animal bedding, to
the mechanized extraction of timber whose impacts are the
main focus of this article. The hydrologic effects of the
Figure 4.7: Schematic representation of the occurrence of various streamflow generating processes in relation to their
major controls; from Bruijnzeel (2006) as reproduced from Dunne (1978).
Note: “direct precipitation and return flow” are equivalent to saturation overland flow
An important cause for infiltration excess occurrence is the r duction of hydraulic conductivity, principle soil property
(cf. Bouwer, 1966), as a result of degradation, e.g through top soil erosion or oil compaction (Kris nasw my et al., 2013).
Thus, it is more appropriate to consider the degradation degree ompared to a former state in order to project possible
hydrolo ical r sponses. Furthermore, hydrological res on es, especially those with longer time lags like seasonal and base
flows, can also be significantly controlled by th geological properties of underlying bedrock. The annu l precipitation
istribution d the corr sponding soil moi ture conditions may also influence the v riability of annual runoff (Peel et al.,
2001).
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Hydrological ecosystem service Principal beneficiaries
Provision of freshwater in-stream Hydro power generation, transportation, water recreation,
freshwater fish and other food production
off-stream (extractive) Municipal water supply, irrigation agriculture, commercial and
industrial water user, thermoelectric power use
Regulating services Water supply, flood-prone inhabitants and industries, agriculture,
hydro power generation, transportation, water recreation,
freshwater fish and other food production
Cultural services Spiritual uses, aesthetic appreciation, tourism
Table 4.6: Hydrological ecosystem services and related beneficiaries; based on Brauman et al. (2007)
These insights call for being cautious with oversimplifying hydrological responses based on land use changes alone,
instead a focus on alternation of hydrological process is more reasonable. This provides opportunities for considering
different management practices, in addition to different land uses, in order to improve hydrological ecosystems service
provision.
However, the spatial and temporal distribution of subsurface hydrological processes still represents a significant
knowledge gap (Bogaart et al., 2011). These processes are characterized by large variability and heterogeneity (preferential
flows, transient water tables etc.), but good observation methods are missing or in their infancy.
Besides stressing the supply side of hydrological ecosystem services and the role of changes to ecosystems by humans,
the ecosystem service concept establishes a link to potential beneficiaries. Table 4.6 summarizes hydrological ecosystem
service and related beneficiaries, i.e. water users.
Just as the supply side of hydrological ecosystem services provision comprises different sectors such as agriculture,
forestry, nature conservation, so does the beneficiary side as well. The broad variety of different beneficiaries encompasses
all water using sectors.
4.3 Economic valuation of Ecosystem Services
All Ecosystem Service definitions have a common anthropocentric perspective since their individual assessment is only
made possible by a socio-economical valuation of ecological structures and processes (de Groot et al., 2002; Fisher et al.,
2009; Haines-Young and Potschin, 2010). Therefore, ecosystem services can only be assessed in a defined societal context
and may be valued (monetarily or non-monetarily) very differently from time to time and from place to place (Boyd
and Banzhaf, 2007; Wallace, 2007). Thus, social preferences of ecosystem processes and functions are as important as
their ecological interaction (Haines-Young and Potschin, 2010). Although grounded in a shared scientific methodology,
the process of valuation and assigned economic values themselves are culturally and socially constructed, just as are the
concepts of ecosystems, ecosystems services and biodiversity. Therefore, economic values reflect socially and culturally
constructed mindsets, worldviews and realities of particular sectors of a society, hence, economic values do not represent
universal truths or static objective facts (Wilk and Cliggett, 2006). Moreover, they are not exogenous to the valuing
society, but instead reflect the everyday social interactions as well as political and power relationships within a system of
interdependence of local, regional and global extent (Hornborg et al., 2007).
With the rise of the new environmentalism in the 1960s a shift in environmental concerns from the protection of empty
spaces and particular species toward concerns with the human environment came about. The most prevailing outcome of
this process has been the global establishment of protected areas (Zimmerer, 2006). Even today, this environmental policy
results in more emphasis being placed on protecting and isolating ecosystems from economic development or commodity
markets, than on redefining and regulating the relationship between the economy and the natural environment (TEEB,
2010a). A more direct effort to integrate the environment into the economy was identified in the Brundtland Report
(WCED, 1987) by opening space for new conceptions based on the principle of inter-generational responsibility. The
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), a key outcome of the Earth Summit of 1992, reflected the shift from species-
based conservation to the conservation of ecosystems and biomes, while also highlighting the role of local populations
as stewards for nature and a source of knowledge relevant to conservation and sustainable development (UN, 1992).
Furthermore, the convention has put significant emphasis on the value, including economic value, of biodiversity and
ecosystem services as well as local knowledge, e.g. through bioprospecting.
Further important contributions to integrate the environment into policy and economic thinking are represented in the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) of 2005. While proposing a utilitarian and anthropocentric approach, with the
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Figure 4.8: Ecosystem value composed of insurance and output value; based on TEEB (2010a)
ecosystem service concept as its core concept, it also emphasizes the dependency of humans not only on resources but on
ecosystem functioning itself. Through the MEA’s framework of human well-being depending on ecosystem services, a
major contribution was made to the visibility of a broad array of ecological and biophysical functions usually taken for
granted by society (MEA, 2005). This has also led to a much broader understanding of the global scale of human impact
on the environment and the resulting economic and social consequences.
Meanwhile, the challenges of valuing biodiversity and ecosystem services have been widely recognized and the multi-
dimensional, strongly context-dependent nature of valuation has been addressed by several authors (Turner et al., 2003;
Shmelev, 2008; EPA, 2009). With the TEEB initiative, the economic valuation of biodiversity and ecosystem services was
addressed even more explicitly.
However, despite these advances important limitations in economic valuation remain with respect to the inclusion of
cultural and social values that need to be recognized (Shmelev, 2008). This has some implications for valuation, especially
with regard to ethical concerns about what should and what should not be valued (cf., Turner et al., 2003; TEEB, 2010a).
Moreover, economic valuation of the environment has an important consequence in the way it contributes to change the
notion of property and ownership described by Polyani (1944) as commodity fiction; see also the previously mentioned
criticism by McCauley (2006); Robertson (2006); Kosoy and Corbera (2010). Thus, it is argued that through economic
valuation, Ecosystem Services may be perceived as environmental commodities which “can be owned and traded in
the market system for dollar” (Vatn and Bromley, 1994) while neglecting their intrinsic values. However, the lack of
previously defined monetary values for non-marketed goods as most ecosystem services can lead to valuation processes
that trigger negotiations between and within exogenous and endogenous systems of value (Cummings et al., 1986; Sagoff,
1988; Hanemann, 1994). Hence, besides the risk of a commodity fiction, economic valuation induces previously ignored
monetary appreciations and new utilitarian frames of appreciation (TEEB, 2010a). How individuals assign economic
values is yet far from being understood completely. Findings in behavioral economics suggest that utility and emotions are
interdependent: “utility arises from emotions and emotions arise from changes, and people’s judgment and choices have
more intuitive than rational or logical origins” (Kahneman, 2003).
The economic value of ecosystems has two distinct aspects. One can be described as the sum of the ecosystem service
benefits provided, referred to as final services (see Section 4) or output value. Another aspect considers the ecosystem’s
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Figure 4.9: Illustration of the concept of Total Economic Value (TEV); based on TEEB (2010a)
capacity to maintain a sustained flow of these final services. This insurance value (Turner et al., 2003; Balmford et al.,
2008) depends on the ecosystem’s functioning based on ecosystem processes and structures (see Figure 4.8). The resilience
(capacity to absorb disturbances) and the self-organizing capacity (to maintain essential functions) of an ecosystem is an
important part of its insurance value (Holling, 1973; Walker et al., 2004). Biodiversity is strongly related to the insurance
value of an ecosystem.
The (total) output value can be described using the Total Economic Value (TEV). The concept of TEV is the most
prevalent assessment method for the economic value of ecosystem services (Pearce and Turner, 1990). It encompasses all
values of service flows that natural capital generates at present as well as in the future by taking appropriate discounting
rates into account. Ecosystem services, in theory, are valued for marginal changes in their provision. Hence, from an
economic point of view ecosystems and their biodiversity can be considered as natural capital with ecosystem services
as the interest that society receives from it (Costanza and Daly, 2006). The natural capital asset is scarce if the use, i.e.
obtaining an additional unit of the service, of it implies opportunity costs, i.e. something else has to be given up. The
basic assumption behind ecosystem service valuation is that society can somehow assign values to ecosystem services
to the extent to which these fulfill human needs or result in direct or indirect satisfaction. While there are reasonable
values for many provisioning services (e.g. wood or agricultural production) as there are often markets for these goods,
the value of cultural or regulating services representing non-marketed goods is not clear. This and the public or common
pool character of these services makes them a particular subject to overuse (Carpenter et al., 2006; Barbier, 2008). The
TEV is used to express the sum of all components of utility (and disutility) that can be derived from ecosystem services
expressed by using a common metric: money or any other (traded) exchange value that allows comparison. It is composed
of use-values, direct, indirect and option value, and non-use values, bequest and existence value. Figure 4.9 illustrates the
composition of the TEV and provides examples for different value types.
The principal logic behind valuation of ecosystem services is to illustrate the complexities of socio-ecological relationships,
to make explicit how human actions affect ecosystem service values, and to express these values in units (e.g. monetary)
that allow their incorporation in public decision-making processes (Mooney et al., 2005). Hence, quantifying the benefits
from ecosystems through economic valuation of ecosystem services provides a means to assess the impacts and trade-offs
of ecosystem change, especially when gains and losses are accrued by different beneficiaries at disparate spatial and
temporal scales.
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Valuation approach Method Value type
Market valuation Price-based Market prices Direct and indirect use
Cost-based Avoided cost Direct and indirect use
Replacement cost Direct and indirect use
Mitigation, restoration cost Direct and indirect use
Production-based Production function approach Indirect use
Factor income Indirect use
Revealed preferences Travel cost method Direct (indirect) use
Hedonic pricing Direct and indirect use
Stated preferences Contingent valuation Use and non-use
Choice modeling, conjoint analysis Use and non-use
Contingent ranking Use and non-use
Deliberative group valuation Use and non-use
Table 4.7: Relationship between valuation methods and value types (TEEB, 2010a)
4.3.1 Economic valuation methods
Although a multitude of valuation approaches exist, two general valuation paradigms can be distinguished. One paradigm
represent biophysical methods which derive values from measurements of the physical costs of producing a certain service
based on a cost of production perspective (TEEB, 2010a). Thus, these methods consider the physical costs of labor, energy
or material inputs, etc. of maintaining a desired ecological status in valuing ecosystem services. Another valuation
paradigm are preference-based methods which, in contrast to biophysical methods, rely on models of human behavior
assuming that values can be derived from the subjective preferences of individuals or groups.
There is an ongoing debate about the use of valuation methods, see Gomez-Baggethun and de Groot (2010). This
dissertation deals primarily with cost-based and preference-based methods.
Values for ecosystem services in the context of TEV are derived from information of individual behavior which may
be provided by market transactions directly related to the service in question. This valuation approach is referred to as
direct market valuation. If price information of direct market transactions is absent, alternative price information can
be derived from parallel market transactions, indirectly associated with the service to be valued. This second approach
is termed revealed preferences approach. A third category of valuation techniques is represented by stated preferences
approaches which in absence of direct and indirect price information on ecosystem services use hypothetical markets in
order to elicit values (Chee, 2004). Table 4.7 illustrates the three principal valuation approaches, commonly used methods
and the respective value they are used to assess.
Three main methods are used for direct market valuation: market price based methods, cost-based methods and
methods based on production functions. Since all these methods use information from actual markets, they have the
advantage of reflecting actual preferences or costs to individuals in a given market context. Additionally, prices, costs and
quantities in existing markets are relatively easy to obtain, thus, may serve as a reference.
For the estimation of values for provisioning services market price-based methods are most often used. The goods
produced on the basis of provisioning services are often sold on markets (e.g. crops on local food markets) and market
prices, in well-functioning markets, reflect preferences and marginal cost of production. In this case these prices can be
taken as accurate information on the value of these goods. In this case these prices can be taken as accurate information
on the value of these goods. The product of the price of a good produced by the service and the marginal product of the
ecosystem service can be used as an indicator for a provisioning ecosystem service value.
If ecosystem services benefits had to be created through artificial means the costs for doing so can be estimated using
cost-based methods (Garrod and Willis, 1999). At least three techniques exist for cost-based methods: the costs that would
incur in absence of an ecosystem service are expressed using the avoided cost method, the cost of replacing ecosystem
services with artificial means is expressed using the replacement cost method and the cost of mitigating the effects of the
loss of ecosystem services or restoring them is expressed using the mitigation or restoration cost method.
The contribution of an ecosystem service, e.g. a regulating service, to the delivery of another ecosystem service traded
on a market is estimated using production function-based approaches. Thus, this approach considers the enhancement of
income or productivity by a related ecosystem service. For the production function-based approach, in general, scientific
knowledge on cause-effect relationships between the ecosystem service that is valued and the level of productivity or
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income increasing output is used. Thus, the physical effects of changes in an ecosystem service on an economic activity
have to be determined first. Then, the impact of these changes is valued through corresponding changes in marketed
outputs (Barbier et al., 1994).
Direct market valuation approaches have important limitations when applied to ecosystem services mainly due to the
absence of or distorted markets for ecosystem services. If there are no markets for ecosystem service (or for goods or
services indirectly related to them), then the information needed to carry out these approaches is also lacking. In case of
existing markets these can be significantly distorted, for instance, by subsidies or limited competition. In this case prices
will not adequately reflect neither preferences nor marginal costs which consequently leads to biased and unreliable values
for ecosystem services. Specific problems are reported in using the replacement cost method under uncertainty (Barbier,
2007), with limited knowledge and information to define production functions to quantify cause-effect relationships (Daily
et al., 2000; Spash, 2000), and with respect to the interconnectivity and interdependency of ecosystem services which may
lead to double counting (Barbier et al., 1994; Daily, 1997).
In the absence of price information for ecosystem services their value may be derived indirectly from associated parallel
market transactions using revealed preference approaches. Hence, these approaches are based on observed individual
choices in existing markets that are related to the ecosystem service to be valued and which are supposed to reveal
individual preferences indirectly. The most common methods for this approach are the Travel Cost Method (TCM) and
Hedonic Pricing (HP). The TCM is mainly used to estimate recreational values related to ecosystem services and biodiversity.
The rational for this method is that recreational experiences are associated with direct expenses and opportunity cost of
time which relate to the quality and quantity of recreational sites. For the HP method information on an implicit demand
for ecosystem services is utilized to value ecosystem services indirectly. It is often used to estimate economic benefits or
costs associated with environmental quality, e.g. air or water pollution, or with environmental amenities, e.g. aesthetic
views. Hence, the HP assumes that the price of a marketed good or service is related to its characteristics, or the services it
provides. Revealed preference approaches, like direct market valuations, can be influenced by market imperfections which
results in distorted values for ecosystem services, Moreover, these approaches often require large data sets and complex
statistical analysis which makes them expensive and time consuming in operation. Their main drawbacks are the inability
to estimate non-use values and the dependence on assumptions about the relationship of ecosystem service values and
surrogate markets examined (TEEB, 2010a).
To simulate demand for use and non-use ecosystem services, stated preferences approaches are applied by using
surveys on hypothetical (policy-induced) changes in the provision of ecosystem services. These approaches can be used
independently of the existence of surrogate markets from which values of ecosystem services can be deduced. Three
groups of techniques can be distinguished: Contingent Valuation (CV), Choice Modeling (CM) and group valuation.
The CV method uses questionnaires to find out about people’s Willingness To Pay (WTP) for an increase or enhancement
of ecosystem service provision, alternatively it can survey the Willingness To Accept (WTA) ecosystem service loss or
degradation. CM is a method that attempts to model the decision making process of individuals in a given context by
offering different alternatives (i.e. choices) with shared attributes to be valued, but on different levels (Hanley et al.,
1998). The main difference between CV and CM is that CV methods usually present only one option to respondents.
Respondents in a CM method are asked to consider all the options by trading off their different attributes. While CV is
easier to design and implement, CM may provide estimates which are of more value for changes in the characteristics of
ecosystems (TEEB, 2010a).
Another stated preferences approach is group valuation which combines stated preferences methods with techniques
of deliberative processes from political sciences (Spash, 2008). These methods are used increasingly in order to take
issues like value pluralism (e.g. public nature of ecosystem services and the measurement of their economic value through
individual expression), incommensurability, non-human values and social justice into account (cf., Wilson and Howarth,
2002).
The limitations of stated preferences methods relate to a large extent to the issue of objective choice. Although they
are often the only option to estimate non-use values, whether respondents’ hypothetical answers correspond to their
actual behavior in a real life situation remains doubtful. The literature on stated preference methods also reveals a
general divergence between the results of WTP and WTA studies (Hanemann, 1991). Furthermore, depending on the
ecosystem service to be valued there can be significant cognitive and knowledge constraints among respondents. Therefore,
stated preference methods sometimes incorporate basic information upfront in questionnaires. According to Christie et al.
(2012), valuation workshops that provide respondents with opportunities to discuss and reflect their preferences can
help to overcome some of these constraints. In addition, deliberative methods were developed to integrated deliberative
processes in environmental valuation as a response to criticism of contingent valuation (Sagoff, 1998). It is often the
institutional setting that influences individual preferences in a valuation situation by activating particular motivations and
rationalities (Vatn, 2005). According to Gowdy (2005), in cooperative consensus building and collective decision making,
common preferences can result in shared values, i.e. institutions on perceived values. Deliberative valuation methods,
e.g. facilitated as Participatory Rural Appraisals or Round tables, do not assume pre-existing values and emerge from a
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communicative social process (TEEB, 2010a). Understanding ecosystem valuation as a value-articulating institution (cf.
Jacobs, 1997) in this way allows for expressing values, influences how values are formed and what kind of conclusions are
to be drawn based on them.
Table 4.8 summarizes the different valuation methods and gives some examples of their application from literature
(TEEB, 2010a).
Valuation method Comment / Example Reference
Market valuation
Market prices Mainly applicable to goods, only some cultural (e.g. recreation) and
regulating services (e.g. pollination)
Brown et al. (1990);
Kanazawa (1993)
Avoided cost Derivation of flood control service from estimated flood damage Gunawardena and Rowan
(2005)
Replacement cost Valuation of groundwater recharge based on the cost of an alterna-
tive source; cost of waste water treatment if wetlands are lost
Ammour et al. (2000)
Mitigation /
restoration cost
Cost of preventive costs in absence of wetland serving as flood
barriers
Breaux et al. (1995)
Production func-
tion/factor income
Improved soil fertility’s impact on income of farmers, water quality
improvements and increase of fish catch
Pattanayak and Kramer
(2001)
Revealed preferences
Travel Cost Recreational value of ecosystems estimated through time and money
people spend in traveling to the site
Martín-López et al.
(2009)
Hedonic Pricing Presence of water related to real estate prices Garrod (1996)
Stated preferences
Contingent
Valuation
Estimation of non-use values, often based on survey questionnaire
to identify peoples WTP (e.g. improved water quality)
Wilson and Carpenter
(1999)
Choice modeling Values are inferred from hypothetical choices or trade-offs that peo-
ple make (e.g. finding of a landfill site)
Hanley et al. (1998)
Group valuation Addresses shortcomings of revealed preferences methods (e.g. pref-
erence construction, lack of knowledge)
Spash (2008)
Table 4.8:Monetary valuation methods and examples of application from the literature
Provisioning services have been valued mainly through production function and direct market valuation approaches,
while for regulating service values avoided cost, replacement and restoration costs, or contingent valuation have been
used mostly (Martín-López et al., 2009). Hedonic pricing for aesthetic information, contingent valuation for existence
values and travel cost methods for valuation related to recreation and tourism have instead been used mainly for cultural
services. Often there are specific valuation methods used according to certain ecosystems (TEEB, 2010a).
Since the 1980s several authors have developed ecosystem service valuation methodologies, among others, Dixon and
Hufschmidt (1986); Pearce and Turner (1990); Freeman (1993); Hanley and Spash (1993). Authors such as Kramer
et al. (1995) and van Beukering et al. (2003) carried out valuations for particular ecosystems like forests or coral reefs.
Furthermore, several frameworks for the valuation of ecosystem services have resulted from broad and far reaching studies
(Costanza et al., 1997; Turner et al., 2000; de Groot et al., 2002; MEA, 2003). Especially the publications of Costanza et al.
(1997); MEA (2005); Stern (2006); TEEB (2009) brought the importance of valuing ecosystem services to the attention of
policy makers.
Figure 4.10 illustrates the relationship between elements of an ecosystem (structure, process, functions and the provision
of goods and services), on the one hand, and the aggregation of (ecological, socio-cultural as well as economic) values
to a total value as basis for a decision-making process to determine policy options and management measures, on the
other hand. These outcomes of the decision-making process will in turn have an impact on ecosystem structures and
processes. The grey shaded elements in Figure 4.10 are determined by the human system, while the white elements
form the natural system. Ecosystem goods and services represent the interface of the natural and human system for
ecological, socio-cultural and economic valuation. However, ecosystems themselves, i.e. their structures and processes,
are of ecological value as well since they are essential for the functioning of ecosystems, independent of the provision of
ecosystem goods and services.
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Figure 4.10: Process of ecosystem valuation; based on de Groot et al. (2002)
According to Hein et al. (2006), the valuation process of ecosystem services in a policy context consists of five principal
steps:
1. Specification of the boundaries of the ecosystem to be valued
2. Assessment of the ecosystem services supplied by the system
3. Valuation of the ecosystem services
4. Aggregation or comparison of the values of the services
5. Analysis of scales and stakeholders
Especially the last step of the valuation process stresses the need to explicitly consider the scales at which ecosystem
services accrue to the different stakeholders. Since ecosystem services are often generated and provided at particular scales,
valuation requires assessing at which scale, and to whom the benefits of the system’s services accrue. The assessment of
generating and provisioning scales as well as of the stakeholders involved is critical to find an appropriate management
scale defined by fit and interplay. The identification of scales and stakeholders, according to Hein et al. (2006), “allows the
analysis of potential conflicts in environmental management, in particular between local stakeholders and stakeholders
at larger scales“. The maintenance of hydrological services provided by a forest in an upper watershed, for instance,
implies restrictions on the use of the forest by local stakeholders. Thus, a basis to determine the size of potential
compensation payments to local users may be provided through the analysis of different (opportunity) costs and benefits
of ecosystem management for stakeholders at different scales (Hein et al., 2006). The definition of the spatial, temporal
and socio-economic scale is a critical step in an economic valuation as benefits can be perceived far away in time and space
from the ecosystem that provides them. The spatial scale establishes service specific provider-beneficiary relationships,
while the temporal scale influences when benefits are actually perceived and may require discounting (cf., Korsgaard and
Schou, 2010).
Economic valuation of ecosystem services may also bear significant downsides. The assumptions underlying conventional
economic valuation are marginality and substitutability. According to Korsgaard and Schou (2010), both assumptions
are critical for valuing ecosystem services, especially in developing countries. Marginality means that for conceptual and
practical reasons the change to be valued must be marginal. In practice, for instance, there is not always a straightforward
relationship between impact and resulting change, making it difficult to judge the marginality of a change (Limburg et al.,
2002). The assumption of substitutability in utilitarian valuation approaches may also be critical since it implies that all
types of values and capital are substitutable or replaceable. In cases where ecosystem services are used for subsistence, for
example rural people in developing countries who depend directly on them, this assumption may not be valid (Korsgaard
and Schou, 2010). But this does not only apply to subsistence use of ecosystem services, there is general recognition that
substitution of natural capital and ecosystem services has limits and a critical amount of natural capital has to be preserved
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(Barbier et al., 1994; Daly and Townsend, 1996; Prugh et al., 1999; Daly and Farley, 2004). Moreover, substitution of
ecosystem services is often only partial for some desired ecosystem services. For example, water treatment plants can
substitute for ecosystems in providing clean drinking water but this will not overcome the impacts of water pollution on
other components of the ecosystem and the services they provide. And if these substitutions benefit other beneficiaries
than the previous beneficiaries of these ecosystem services, the substitution has additional distributional effects. Hence,
in order to take the non-marketed value of ecosystem services into account, economic valuation, as one way of value
expression, should be embedded into a superior value setting of ethical as well as moral values of nature to society (Sagoff,
1988). However, the intrinsic value of nature for instance cannot be reflected by prices and economic valuation. Valuing of
existing ecosystems, landscapes, certain species or other elements of biodiversity is recognized by all human societies and
a feature of all cultures and sometimes cultural or spiritual values alone are already sufficient to ensure sustainable use
and conservation of ecosystems (TEEB, 2010b). In this context the irreversibility of ecosystem or biodiversity loss is also a
critical issue. It is not possible to value an irreversible loss. The formulation of safe minimum standards is an approach to
deal with problems of uncertainty and irreversibility (Costanza et al., 2001).
Since ecosystems as well as all the functions and services they provide are not entirely substitutable, prices for ecosystem
services can only express what actually is substitutable, e.g. the way a service is provided as the value of actions taken
in order to assure a continuous provision or improvements in Ecosystem Services supply. Therefore, valuation can be a
way of organizing information to help guide decisions but is not a solution or end in itself (Daily et al., 2000). In this
regard, Farley (2010) stresses that there is also much to be gained from examining the problem through an economics
lens. The author points out that through the recognition of economic values of ecosystems and the services they provide,
environmental protection which is also driven by economic factors may be easier to understand and ecosystems may be
conserved better by reducing degradation. Moreover, economics can offer a when-to-stop, i.e. when-to-conserve rule is
another point which Farley (2010) stresses. Thus, if economic systems grow by displacing and degrading ecosystems, then
marginal benefits of economic growth are diminishing while the marginal costs of ecological degradation are increasing.
Hence, the point to stop economic growth and to focus stronger on ecological conservation is reached when the two are
equal. Finally, economics may help to understand how to efficiently and justly allocate resources toward conservation
(Farley, 2010).
4.3.2 Economic valuation of hydrological ecosystem services
Economic valuation of hydrological ecosystem services has been made since at least the 1970s (Wilson and Carpenter,
1999; Echavarría, 2000). The economic quantification of environmental amenities such as water quality has been the
principle objective of these early valuation studies (Leggett and Bockstael, 2000; Carson et al., 2003). However, as
Brauman et al. (2007) point out, the value of actual ecosystems to the production of these valued amenities is less clear.
Often a proxy related to the production of an attribute such as water quality is used in valuation studies of wetlands and
riparian buffers, which then value the incremental impact of changes in that attribute (Pattanayak, 2004). This way, the
gains in improved water quality and reduction in soil loss from vegetated buffer strips were proven to outweighed the
costs of land taken out of production in a study of Californian farmers (Rein, 1999). Different values were estimated for
wetlands in a study of flood damages related to wetland development in Florida (Highfield and Brody, 2006). Wetlands
within floodplains received higher values than those outside of flood-prone areas. Furthermore, different approaches have
been undertaken in order to estimate the value of different hydrological services produced by river basins (Brauman et al.,
2007). Kaiser and Roumasset (2002) have modeled the role of conserved forests in Hawaii in the context of groundwater
recharge. The authors’ results indicate that in some places the value of increased groundwater recharge under conserved
forest is substantial; the calculation for one forested river basin is substantial, the calculated of one forested river basin
was estimated to be between US-$ 1.5 and US-$ 2.5 billion (Kaiser and Roumasset, 2002). With regard to the effect on the
timing of water for in-situ and diverted supply, the value of forests may also be high. A study of Guo et al. (2000) in China
indicates that forested river basins may improve the productivity of dams on the Yangtze river and increase revenues
by up to US-$ 600,000 per year. The economic value of native forest in a river basin in Chile was estimated to be over
US-$200 per hectare and year because of its positive effects on drinking water supply (Núñez et al., 2006). However, the
functionality and resulting values of ecosystems providing hydrological services is very site-specific and likely to be highly
variable, despite the striking results of valuation studies (Woodward and Wui, 2001).
In a practical management and policy context, the value of hydrological ecosystem services has often to be assessed in
terms of comparisons of service production from an alternative land use. Chomitz et al. (1999), for instance, highlight
that tropical forest conservation may provide net hydrological benefits compared to an alternative land use of annual
cropping or grazing, but not when compared agroforestry. Besides the choice of a comparative land use, value is also
dependent on the scale at which services are assessed. A study of drinking water treatment costs in relation to the relative
share of forested area within the river basin in the US revealed the importance of the spatial extension of forests for the
provision of hydrological services (see Table 4.9).
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Share of watershed
forested
Treatment costs per
3,785 m3
Average annual
treatment costs
Cost increase over 60 %
forest cover
60% US-$ 37 US-$ 297,110 -
50% US-$ 46 US-$ 369,380 24 %
40% US-$ 58 US-$ 465,740 57 %
30% US-$ 73 US-$ 586,190 97 %
20% US-$ 93 US-$ 746,790 151 %
10% US-$ 115 US-$ 923,450 211 %
Table 4.9: Forest cover and related water treatment costs based on 27 US water supply systems1; from Postel and Thompson
(2005) based on Ernst (2004)
1 Based on treatment of 22 million gallons (83,270 m3) per day, the average daily production of the water suppliers surveyed.
Investments in watershed protection for the improvement of metropolitan water supplies and the reduction of water
treatment costs are particularly popular in the US. Postel and Thompson (2005), in their review, document avoided costs
of several major US cities which have invested in watershed protection instead of constructing (additional) drinking water
filtration plants (see Table 4.10). The case of New York City is one of the most cited examples of cost-effective investment
in the provision of hydrological ecosystem services compared to built-infrastructure and has served as a prototype for
many replications (NRC, 2000; Appleton, 2002; Pires, 2004).
Metropolitan
area
Population
(thousands)
Avoided costs through watershed protection [US-$] Source
New York
City1
9,000 1.5 billion spent on watershed protection over 10 years to avoid 6
billion in capital and 300 million in annual operating costs.
NRC (2000)
Boston,
Massachusetts
2,300 180 million (gross) avoided cost. Stearns (2000)
Seattle,
Washington2
1,300 150-200 million (gross) avoided cost. Flagor (2003)
Portland,
Oregon
825 920,000 spent annually to protect watershed is avoiding a 200
million capital cost.
Reid (2001)
Portland,
Maine
160 729,000 spent annually to protect watershed has avoided 25 million
in capital costs and 725,000 in operating costs.
ECONorthwest
(2004)
Syracuse,
New York
150 10 million watershed plan is avoiding 45-60 million in capital costs. ECONorthwest
(2004)
Auburn,
Maine
23 570,000 spent to acquire watershed land is avoiding 30 million
capital cost and 750,000 in annual operating costs.
Ernst (2004)
Table 4.10: US cities avoiding construction of filtration plants through watershed protection (Postel and Thompson, 2005)
1 The City is being required to construct a $687 million filtration plant for the more-developed Croton watershed, which supplies about 10% of
the city’s water. The filtration waiver applies to the Catskills-Delaware watershed, which supplies about 90% of the city’s water.
2 Supply from Seattle’s Cedar River watershed is unfiltered, but that from the Tolt watershed is now filtered.
Besides cost-based economic valuations, preference-based valuations have also been carried out. According to Wilson
and Carpenter (1999) the three most prevalent methods to value non-marketed hydrological ecosystem services applied in
the US are the Travel Cost Method (TCM), Hedonic Pricing (HP), Contingent Valuation (CV), or combinations of them.
There are also valuation studies of hydrological ecosystem services for developing countries. Korsgaard and Schou
(2010) reviewed several recent studies and compared the valued hydrological services, the valuation method as well as the
estimated values (see Table 4.11). The valuation methods most frequently applied are based on replacement, mitigation,
or avoided cost estimates, or a combination of them. Price-based market valuation was applied for direct water use only.
In order to estimate recreational values or landscape beauty travel cost based and contingent valuation methods were
used. The review illustrates the large variety of economic values assigned to different hydrological services. The range is
especially wide in the case of water purification and flood mitigation, but also for the other services there is a considerable
difference in values. These differences are inherently method and context specific. Woodward and Wui (2001), for
instance, based on a comprehensive meta-analysis of 39 studies of economic values of wetland services conclude that value
estimations are very site specific and point out that the use of benefits transfer to estimate wetland values faces substantial
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challenges. Thus, the need for site-specific studies remains. Most studies reported their results in the unit of net value per
hectare and year. This unit is suitable if the value of an ecosystem service is correlated to the size of its provisioning area.
However, for some services such as recreational ones this unit is less useful (cf. Korsgaard and Schou, 2010). Moreover,
apart from being possibly related to the size of the provisioning, the value of hydrological services is determined by the
characteristics of the beneficiaries. The value of flood mitigation, for instance, is highly dependent on a given context, e.g.
the size of the affected population and potential damages. As the majority of studies reviewed by Korsgaard and Schou
(2010) provide information on the affected population, the authors converted the values of the per hectare values into per
capita values (see Table 4.11). According to the authors, this unit results in more consistent values for most services with
total values within the range from 10 to 230 US-$ / capita / year. This demonstrates that valuation can reflect both the
value of the provisioning ecosystem and the value perceived by beneficiaries. Therefore, Korsgaard and Schou (2010)
argue “that the potential value of an ecosystem service is a function of ecosystem (or biophysical) characteristics (e.g. size)
while the actual value (the extent to which the potential value is utilized) is a function of population (or socioeconomic)
characteristics”.
Hydrological service Valuation method Net economic value
[US-$ / ha / year] [US-$ / per cap / yr]
Direct water use Direct price-based market valuation 50, 150, 4001 1, 10, 212
Water purification Replacement or mitigation cost 20, 40, 140, 620, 14003 2, 8, 20, 504
Flood mitigation Replacement, mitigation or avoided cost 2, 30, 90, 340, 1400, 17005 2, 2, 20, 75, 3706
Groundwater recharge Replacement, mitigation or avoided cost 10, 70, 907 25, 308
Erosion control Replacement, mitigation or avoided cost 20, 1209 710
Recreation, tourism Travel cost, contingent valuation 20, 30, 26011 20, 110012
Table 4.11: Economic values from studies in developing countries for di erent hydrological ecosystem services; based on
(Korsgaard and Schou, 2010)
1 Acharya (2000); Emerton (1994); Seidl and Moraes (2000)
2 Emerton and Kekulandala (2002); Emerton (1994); Acharya (2000)
3 Turpie et al. (1999); Gerrard (2004); Seidl and Moraes (2000); Emerton and Kekulandala (2002); Emerton et al. (1999)
4 Gerrard (2004); Emerton et al. (1999); Emerton and Kekulandala (2002); Turpie et al. (1999)
5 Turpie et al. (1999); Emerton et al. (2002); Rosales et al. (2003); Seidl and Moraes (2000); Gerrard (2004); Emerton and Kekulandala (2002)
6 Turpie et al. (1999); Emerton et al. (2002); Emerton and Kekulandala (2002); Gerrard (2004); Rosales et al. (2003)
7 Turpie et al. (1999); Seidl and Moraes (2000); Acharya (2000)
8 Acharya (2000); Turpie et al. (1999)
9 Seidl and Moraes (2000); Emerton et al. (2002)
10 Emerton et al. (2002)
11 Emerton and Kekulandala (2002); Busk (2002); Seidl and Moraes (2000)
12 Emerton and Kekulandala (2002); Busk (2002)
When looking at the value of hydrological ecosystem services to different beneficiaries it becomes clear that it depends
strongly on the purpose of the water use. For instance, hydrological services in form of provisioning services for irrigated
agriculture are usually valued the lowest, although this depends on the value of the crop. Provisioning services used for
high-value crops can be much higher in value, sometimes even in the order of magnitude to the value of water in domestic
and industrial uses. However, if hydrological services are used to supply domestic water its value is generally highest,
whereas the values for environmental purposes, e.g. environmental flows, maintenance of wetlands, wildlife habitat, vary
widely, but typically fall in between the agricultural and domestic values (Brouwer, 2010).
Prices for the use of hydrological ecosystem services exist, in most cases, for marketed provisioning services only.
However, river basins provide several other non-marketed hydrological services such as the storm protection functions
provided by mangroves or the water filtration functions provided by wetlands (Gleick, 1993; Naiman et al., 1995; Daily,
1997). Goldberg (2007), for instance, argues that although various studies recognize that degradation of hydrological
ecosystem services “[...] represents a loss of capital assets, significant gaps remain at the policy and methodological levels
in terms of economically quantifying both the costs of water related investments as well as the direct and indirect costs
of watershed degradation, and the multiple benefits of supporting integrated water resource management“. Moreover,
Krchnak (2007) concludes in her review of current river basin management practices employed across the Western
Hemisphere that a vast majority of them does not fully capture the non-marketed economic values of river basins.
Goldberg (2007) stresses that accounting for non-market values of river basins and integrating upstream variables into
current management practices, “[...] provides leverage for an alternative management option in which policymakers can
manage water resources more holistically and in which the livelihoods of upstream communities may be simultaneously
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improved (e.g., farmer’s enhanced long-term return via soil conservation). Thus, internalizing the non-market values
(externalities) tied to watersheds will result in more socially and economically optimal use of water systems”. This approach,
contrary to traditional downstream oriented approaches, can stimulate due consideration toward the inextricable link
between beneficiaries and hydrological functions of river basins.
Without efforts to quantify the non-market benefits associated with goods and services generated by watersheds, policy
and managerial decisions hold the potential to be skewed in favor of environmentally degrading practices by neglecting the
diffuse interests that benefit from many of the non-market oriented characteristics of such systems (Wilson and Carpenter,
1999). To curtail the impact of such negative externalities and correct the total economic value of environmental assets,
economists and other policy-oriented social scientists have developed a diverse array of techniques to measure the value of
non-market environmental goods and services.
4.4 Addressing the governance challenge of fit and interplay in the context of IWRM implementation
In the freshwater chapter of Agenda 21, issued in 1992 at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED),
the governments defined IWRM as a process based on water being “an integral part of the ecosystem, a natural resource
and a social and economic good, whose quantity and quality determine the nature of its utilization”. This more than
20-year-old agreement on a definition for IWRM highlights the importance of ecosystems and water being an integral part
of them.
In the IWRM process of the last two decades, ecological approaches prevailed more and more. The control of reservoir
discharge according to environmental flows or the recovery of natural floodplains as retention storage in case of floods are
vital examples. Both examples illustrate that natural flow regimes are gaining importance in the context of IWRM although
society has to accept (substantial) trade-offs, e.g. the loss of construction land on floodplains. Another example is the use
of (constructed) wetlands for waste water treatment. With the establishment of the European Water Framework Directive
in 2000 and the aim to achieve a good ecological status of water bodies, the ecosystem approach to water resources
management was further strengthened, at least in Europe.
In the IWRM context, an ecosystem approach to water management is achieved through the management of water and
land resources in an integrated manner on the basis of river basins as Integrated River Basin Management (see Section
3.1.1). According to Reynolds (1993), who summarizes the conceptual basis for ecosystemic water management based on
contributions to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) seminar on Ecosystems Approach to Water
Management held in 1991, “the ecosystemic [or ecosystem] approach is proactive in seeking to defend ecological integrity
per se and to devise action appropriate to improving ecosystem condition. In essence, it becomes paramount to determine
the current state of the ecosystem in question, and the processes currently dominating its behaviour, and to implement
action to enhance its future functioning“. Thus, essential importance is placed on the ecosystem as integrator for water
management. This implies the recognition of ecosystems as equivalent water users or co-users (cf., Reynolds, 1993) as
well as the integration of water and land as management subjects. The benefits of the ecosystem approach to human
well-being is also made explicit: “Benefits accrue from new uses of revitalized ecosystems, supporting new livelihoods
from harmonious subsistence or the commercial use of restored catchment areas, more enjoyable leisure and recreation,
and more natural flood control and nutrient removal by vegetation” (Reynolds, 1993).
However, in the context of IWRM, the ecosystem approach has been interpreted mainly in form of environmental
flow requirements, i.e. water for ecosystems (cf. Forslund et al., 2009), rather than ecosystems as service providers
like in the ecosystem services concept. Thus, so far in IWRM an ecosystem approach has been applied principally in
an ecological sense alone. Some authors consider the management of water resources on the basis of river basins as
management unit already an ecosystem approach, others refer to an ecosystem approach in the context of environmental
flows and incorporation of the natural ecosystem as equivalent water “user” (e.g. UNCEC, 1993; Jewitt, 2002; Hooper,
2003; Leendertse et al., 2008). The use of an ecosystem service approach that connects water users and the natural
ecosystem directly has not found equal recognition.
In contrast, the ecosystem service approach, although being essentially based on the ecosystem approach, goes further
in making the link between ecosystems as service providers and society as ecosystem service beneficiary explicit. The
ecosystem service concept, first and foremost, serves as a communication tool which increases the visibility and recognition
of the importance of ecosystems for human well-being beyond their role as a resource stock (cf., Daily, 1997). A valuation
in economic terms, then, is making ecosystem services visible on the balance sheet. Thus, the ecosystem service concept
provides incentives, e.g. persuasive or economic, to change human behavior toward sustainable water management.
Furthermore, recognizing ecosystems as service providers can facilitate green infrastructure solutions, e.g. flood
retention by natural floodplains or water purification in wetlands which may at least complement traditional built
infrastructure. Moreover, the ecosystem service approach may not be limited to hydrological ecosystem services alone.
When considering synergies among different ecosystem services there is also the potential to address other services, for
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Figure 4.11: Possible spatial relationships be-
tween ecosystem service produc-
tion (P) and benefit areas (B)
(Fisher et al., 2009)
mon practice to distinguish a range of spatially de-
fined ecological scales (Holling, 1992; Levin, 1992).
They vary from the level of the individual plant, via
ecosystems and landscapes, to the global system—see
Fig. 2. In such a classification of ecological scales, it
is common to include the ecosystem itself as a par-
ticular scale, for example in terms of a dforest
ecosystemT.
The functioning of ecosystems depends upon
earth system processes that take place over a range
of spatial (and temporal) scales. This ranges from
competition between individual plants at the plot
level, via meso-scale processes such as fire and
insect outbreaks, to climatic and geomorphologic
processes at the largest spatial and temporal scales
(Clark et al., 1979; Holling et al., 2002). In general,
large-scale, long-period phenomena set physical con-
straints on smaller scale, shorter period ones (Lim-
burg et al., 2002). However, large-scale processes
may be driven by the joint impact of small-scale
processes (Levin, 1992). For example, microbes op-
erate on the scale of micrometers and minutes, but
their cumulative activity determines a larger scale
process such as the nutrient cycle, e.g., through
demineralization of organic material and nitrogen
fixation.
Ecosystem services are generated at all ecological
scales. For instance, fish may be supplied by a small
pond, or may be harvested in the Pacific Ocean.
Biological nitrogen fixation enhances soil fertility at
the ecological scale of the plant, whereas carbon
sequestration influences the climate at the global
scale.
3.2. Scales of socio-economic systems
In the socio-economic system, a hierarchy of insti-
tutions can be distinguished (Becker and Ostrom,
1995; O’Riordan et al., 1998). They reflect the differ-
ent levels at which decisions on the utilization of
capital, labor and natural resources are taken (North,
1990). At the lowest institutional level, this includes
individuals and households. At higher institutional
scales can be distinguished: the communal or munic-
ipal, state or provincial, national, and international
level (see Fig. 2). Many economic processes, such
as income creation, trade, and changes in market
conditions can be more readily observed at one or
more of these institutional scales (Limburg et al.,
2002).
The supply of ecosystem services affects stake-
holders at all institutional levels (Berkes and Folke,
1998; Peterson, 2000). Households, as well as local
or internationally operating firms, may directly de-
pend upon ecosystem services for their income
(e.g., fishermen, ecotourism operators). Government
agencies at different levels are involved in manag-
ing ecosystems, and in regulating the access to
ecosystem services. They may also receive income
from specific ecosystem services (park entrance
fees, hunting licenses). Ultimately, all individuals
depend upon the essential regulation (life-support)
services of ecosystems. Ecological and institutional
boundaries seldom coincide, and stakeholders in
ecosystem services often cut across a range of
institutional zones and scales (Cash and Moser,
1998).
Ecological scales Institutional scales
global international
biome national
landscape state/provincial
ecosystem municipal
plot family
plant individual
Human-ecosystem
interactions
Fig. 2. Selected ecological and institutional scales (adapted from Leemans, 2000).
L. Hein et al. / Ecological Economics 57 (2006) 209–228 215
Figure 4.12: Selected ecological and institutional scales of human-
ecosystem interaction; adapted from Leemans (2000) as
presented in Hein et al. (2006)
instance pollination or carbon sequestration, important to specific stakeholders enabling broader cross-sectoral cooperation.
Hence, a “step outside of the water box“ seems to become easier. As well as the ecosystem approach, the ecosystem service
approach is based on understanding and learning about the properties of ecosystems but additionally focuses on the
impact of human actions on the provision of services and humans as their potential beneficiaries.
Besides a better communication of the value of ecosystems and the broadening of the solution space by adding green
infrastructure solutions, the ecosystem service approach establishes new cross-sectoral relationships between providers and
off-site beneficiaries. This has important implications since providers and beneficiaries may now be identified in a spatially
(and possibly as well temporally) manner, thereby creating explicit spatial scales for management. The cause-effect
analysis at the core of the ecosystem service concept acknowledges the substantial importance of intact ecosystems for
the provision of services that affect human well-being. However, it is a certain ecosystem state that provides the desired
services, and humans (i.e. in this case land users) may facilitate the service provision through certain land use practices or
conservation efforts. In the context of water resources management this represents the desired link between water and
related land resources within a river basin through a direct involvement of respective stakeholders. This way, solutions
to the problem of fit are not limited to ecosystem properties alone but include provisioning and use characteristics of
ecosystems and their services as well. Hence, addressing institutional fit and interplay is inherent to the ecosystem service
concept. Therefore, the identification of appropriate management units based on an ecosystem service approach can lead
to much more context-specific bottom-up results than approaches that are based on natural (hydrological) boundaries
versus political boundaries and basically top-down alone.
The relationship between the provision of ecosystem services and the benefits derived from them represents the core
of the context-specific solutions of fit and interplay provided by the ecosystem service approach. In order to allow a
more comprehensive understanding of the value and perceptions of relevant stakeholders, an assessment of ecosystem
services has to take place both at ecologically understandable and policy-relevant scales (Hein et al., 2006; Fisher et al.,
2008; Granek et al., 2010). Spatial explicitness in the context of ecosystem services is important as the provision and
use or benefits of services vary spatially. The benefits from ecosystem services can range from being on-site at the point
of provision to off-site locations at a local, regional or even global scale. Fisher et al. (2009) describe possible spatial
relationships between service production areas (P) and service benefit areas (B); see Figure 4.11. The authors identify four
possible spatial relationships: area of service provision and area of benefits are the same; e.g. soil formation, provision of
raw materials, illustrated in (1) in Figure 4.11. An omni-directional provision with benefits at the surrounding landscape,
e.g. pollination, carbon sequestration, as illustrated in (2). Some services have specific directional benefits (3 and 4),
e.g. an uphill-downhill relationship (3), for instance, in water regulation services provided by forested slopes. And as
illustrated in (4) service provision units could be coastal wetlands providing storm and flood protection to a coastline
(Fisher et al., 2009). Scale and directional characteristics of ecosystem service provision should be considered together,
e.g. local omni-directional service provision of pollination or regional directional service provision of flood protection.
Thus, understanding the distribution of services and benefits across a landscape is important to effectively match providers
and beneficiaries (Naidoo et al., 2006; Chan et al., 2006).
According to Fisher et al. (2009), applying this consideration allows a benefits-directed recognition of the spatial-
temporal dynamics of ecosystems, public-private good aspects, and benefit dependence of services. Hence, an internaliza-
tion of external effects and the development of additional cooperative structures is facilitated.
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Analyzing scales of ecosystem service production and, even more importantly, the scales at which ecosystem services
potentially contribute to benefits, is important in order to reveal interactions of different stakeholders and institutional
interplay. This analysis allows connecting ecosystem service providers and beneficiaries in a spatially explicit manner and
may provide further insight for the development of appropriate institutional scales for decision making in environmental
management (Hein et al., 2006). The temporal and spatial scales at which ecosystem services are provided to the human,
i.e. economic system varies greatly from short-term, on-site level (e.g., amenity services) to a long-term, off-site global
level (e.g., carbon sequestration) (Turner et al., 2000; Limburg et al., 2002). The spatial scale at which ecosystem services
are provided determines the stakeholders that may benefit from them, thus, provisioning scales and stakeholders correlate
(Vermeulen and Koziell, 2002). The ecosystem processes and structural characteristics that influence ecosystem functioning
are found over different spatial (and temporal) scales, ranging from plot-level plant-soil interactions, pests or fires at
the meso-scale to geological and macro-climate process at the global level sometimes occurring at temporal scales of
millenniums. According to Limburg et al. (2002), the aforementioned large-scale and long-period phenomena general
set the physical constraints on the processes at smaller scales and shorter periods. These exogenous drivers of ecosystem
service provision are hardly manageable, although, management of ecosystems can focus on increasing systems resilience
and, hence, reduce the risk of undesired impacts. The joint impact of small-scale processes, however, can also drive
large-scale processes, as the ecologist Levin (1992) found out. The cumulative activity of microbes operating on the scale
of micrometers, for instance, steers the large scale process of nutrient cycling by nitrogen fixation and demineralization
of organic material (Hein et al., 2006). Related ecosystem services may be perceived in turn at very different scales,
e.g. enhancement of soil fertility through nitrogen fixation at the plot scale or carbon sequestration for global climate
regulation. Variations in ecosystem service provision at different temporal scales are discussed by Howarth and Norgaard
(1993) (discount rates and inter-generational equity) and Hanley and Spash (1993).
Just as different institutional scales for decisions on the utilization of natural resources in socio-economic systems can
be distinguished (North, 1990; Becker and Ostrom, 1995), a distinction is equally possible for the ecological scale at
which ecosystem services are provided (see Figure 4.12). Ecosystem services contribute to benefits at all institutional
scales (Limburg et al., 2002), thus, reaching different stakeholders at these levels, ranging from individual households to
local and internationally operating firms (Berkes and Folke, 1998; Peters and Meybeck, 2000). Therefore, the problem of
fit (see Section 3.1) where ecological and institutional boundaries do not coincide is directly addressed in the concept
of ecosystem services whose stakeholders (ecosystem service providers and beneficiaries) often cut across a range of
institutional scales, e.g. administrative boundaries, and sectors (Cash and Moser, 2000; Hein et al., 2006). This way the
ecosystem service concept inherently addresses the problem of fit.
The spatial scales at which ecosystem services are received differ between ecosystem service categories. While
provisioning services often coincide with their production areas and sometimes off-site, the benefits from regulating
services are generally perceived off-site from the production area. The benefits from provisioning services are defined
on-site by the producing ecosystem, e.g. a lake for fish or a forest for wood. However, for regulation services which are
typically generated at a specific ecological scale, the benefits may accrue to stakeholders at a range of institutional scales
(see Table 4.12).
Ecological
scale
Dimensions
(km2)
Regulation services
Global > 1.000.000
Carbon sequestration
Climate regulation through regulation of albedo, temperature and rainfall patterns
Biome - landscape
10.000 -
Regulation of the timing and volume of river and ground water flows
Protection against floods by coastal or riparian ecosystems
1.000.000 Regulation of erosion and sedimentation
Regulation of species reproduction (nursery service)
Ecosystem 1 - 10.000
Breakdown of excess nutrients and pollution
Pollination (for most plants)
Regulation of pests and pathogens
Protection against storms
Plot - plant < 1
Protection against noise and dust
Control of run-off
Biological nitrogen fixation
Table 4.12: Ecological scales most relevant for the regulation of ecosystem services (some services may be relevant at more
than one scale); from Hein et al. (2006) based on Hufschmidt et al. (1983); de Groot (1992); Kramer et al.
(1995); van Beukering et al. (2003)
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Moreover, besides a specific ecological scale, the position in the landscape also plays a role for the provider-beneficiary
constellation. Hein et al. (2006), for instance, stress that the impact of the water buffering capacity of forests will be
noticed only downstream in the same river basin (Bosch and Hewlett, 1982). Hence, affected stakeholders of regulating
services are all residing in or depending upon the area affected by the service.
Table 4.13 groups the ecosystem services listed in Costanza et al. (1997) into five categories according to their spatial
characteristics. Services like carbon sequestration are classified as global and non-proximal since the spatial location
of carbon sequestration does not matter to global beneficiaries. Local proximal services, in turn, are characterized by
their spatial proximity of the provisioning ecosystem to the beneficiaries. Costanza (2008) provides the example of storm
protection which requires that the ecosystem providing the protection is proximal to the infrastructures being protected.
The hydrological services of water supply and water regulation represent directional flow related services being dependent
on the flow from upstream to downstream (Costanza, 2008). In the context of IWRM, spatial relationship of provision and
benefit of local-proximal, directional flow-related and in-situ are of specific importance for the identification of appropriate
units for management.
Spatial relationship of provision and benefit Ecosystem Services
Global - non-proximal Climate regulation
(Independent on proximity) Carbon sequestration and storage
Cultural / existence value
Local - proximal Disturbance regulation / storm protection
(Depending on proximity) Waste treatment
Pollination, biological control, habitat / refugio
Directional flow-related Water regulation / flood protection, water supply
(Flow from point of production to point of use) Sediment regulation / erosion control
Nutrient regulation
In situ Soil formation
(Point of use) Food production / non-timber forest products
Raw materials
User movement related Genetic resources
(Flow of people to unique natural features) Recreation potential, cultural / aesthetic
Table 4.13: Ecosystem services classified according to their spatial characteristics (Costanza, 2008)
The heterogeneity and dynamics of ecosystem service provision and ecosystem service benefits describe potential
cross-sectoral (e.g. agriculture and energy production or forestry and water supply or flood protection) as well as
cross-scale ecosystem service provider and beneficiary constellations. The notion that ecosystems provide bundles of
ecosystems implies that enhancement or management of one ecosystem service may have an impact on the provision of
others. These ecosystem services interrelationships have to be considered in order to achieve the desired management
goals. Bennett et al. (2009) analyzed the different ecosystem service relationships and propose a classification based on
two principal mechanisms causing them: (1) effects of drivers on multiple ecosystem services (i.e. common drivers) and
(2) interactions among ecosystem services (see x- and y-axis in Figure 4.13). Drivers of changes in ecosystem services, for
instance fertilizer use or land use changes, can affect just a certain ecosystem service, thus, representing an independent
driver, or they can influence several ecosystems at a time in form of a shared driver (shown along the x-axis of Figure
4.13 respectively). Despite the mechanism of sharing a common driver for ecosystem service change, direct interaction
among ecosystem services is also common (shown along the y-axis of Figure 4.13). These mechanisms can be of a weak or
rather a strong nature. Moreover, these mechanisms can have a positive or a negative effect on ecosystem services (see
Figure 4.13; black arrows indicate a positive effect and gray arrows a negative effect). For instance, using fertilizer can
improve crop production (see black arrow in sector 2 of Figure 4.13) while having the unintended effect of diminishing
the provision of clean water (gray arrow). The provision of individual ecosystem services can be altered through the
interaction between ecosystem services even if an ecosystem service is independent of a certain driver. Sector 3 of Figure
4.13, for example, illustrates how conservation tillage may have a positive (i.e. reducing) effect on soil erosion as it
enhances the service of crop production which in turn reduces soil erosion. Hence, enhancement of one service by a driver
can lead to synergies if multiple services respond positively to the enhanced service (Hey, 2002; Zedler, 2003).
Knowledge of the mechanisms of independent or shared drivers of ecosystem change and ecosystem service interactions
can improve the management of trade-offs and synergies between services. In cases where ecosystem services have weak
direct interaction it may be useful to address a shared driver if it has the same directional (positive or negative) effect
on the considered ecosystem services. In contrast, addressing a shared driver may be unlikely to change trade-off in the
long-term on ecosystem services if the services themselves have an enhancing interaction (Bennett et al., 2009). Therefore,
Bennett et al. (2009) make the following three propositions for the management of ecosystem service relationships:
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fish help maintain coral reef and help them recover from
disturbance such as bleaching events or storms (Hughes
et al. 2005). Intact coral reef in turn provide more habitat
for fish populations, enhancing the grazing functioning, as
well as improving reef quality for tourism (Bellwood et al.
2004). Several recent studies have examined the synergy
between preserving forested or other natural land in agro-
ecological landscapes and agricultural production, suggest-
ing a mechanism involving a bidirectional interaction among
ecosystem services without a shared driver (Sector 3). For
example, preserving uncultivated land increases agricultural
yields per hectare by increasing pollinator habitat (and thus
pollination) in Canadian canola fields (Morandin & Winston
2006). At the same time, preserving uncultivated land
reduces the amount of land in production and might
decrease agricultural production across the landscape.
Similarly, Olschewski et al. (2006) found that preserving
forest patches near coffee plantations could increase coffee
production. Priess et al. (2007) suggest as a possible
mechanism that forests close to plantations increases
pollinator populations and thus increase potential pollina-
tion and fruit set of coffee.
Implications of the typology for ecosystem management
Knowing where in this typology an ecosystem service
relationship fits helps distinguish among the mechanisms
behind apparent relationships between ecosystem services,
which can improve our ability to manage trade-offs and
synergies between services. For example, if we know that a
trade-off among two services is caused by a shared driver
and that there is no true interaction among the services
involved, then management must address the driver and its
effects on one or both services. If, on the other hand, the
trade-off is initiated by the effect of a shared driver, but
enhanced by a true interaction among the services, then
simply managing the driver is unlikely to truly minimize the
trade-off in the long-term. Unfortunately, most ecosystem
service science does not examine mechanisms behind
ecosystem service relationships in depth and cannot
distinguish among the causes of typical relationships. In
Fig. 2, the effect of drivers and interactions in Sectors 2, 3,
and 4 might all lead to a relationship among services that
appears similar (e.g. a trade-off), but would require very
different management strategies to effectively address the
Figure 2 The supply of ecosystems services can be related either due to interactions between ecosystem services, or due to responding to the
same driver of change. Black arrows indicate a positive effect and grey a negative effect.In the lower left-hand sector (Sector 1), a driver (trail-
building) affects cultural tourism (Service A), which has no interaction with maple syrup production (Service B). In the Sector 2, the driver
affects both services, but these services have no interaction with one another. In the example presented here, fertilizer use has a positive effect
on crop yield and a negative effect on water quality. However, the driver also might affect both positively or both negatively. Moving up along
the y-axis, Sectors 3 and 4 show examples in which the services have a unidirectional interaction. That is, the level of provision of service A
affects the level of provision of service B, but not vice versa. Sectors 5 and 6 show a bidirectional interaction among services in which the
level of provision of service A affects the provision of service B and the level of provision of service B affects the provision of service A. In
all cases, this interaction can be positive or negative.
4 E. M. Bennett, G. D. Peterson and L. J. Gordon Review and Synthesis
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Figure 4.13: Supply of ecosystems services related either due to interactions between ecosystem services or due to respond-
ing to the same driver of change (Bennett et al., 2009)
• Identification and assessment of relationships among multiple ecosystems services by integrated social-ecological
approaches.
• Identification of leverage points of small management investments that yield substantial benefits through under-
standing the mechanisms behind simultaneous response of multiple services to a driver and behind interactions
among ecosystem services.
• Strengthening of ecosystem resilience, enhancement of the provision of multiple services, and avoiding catastrophic
shifts in ecosystem service provision by managing relationships among ecosystem services.
These propositions aim to build a deeper understanding of how differe t services are bundled together by key
interactions in order to take advantage of synergies among services and avoid unnecessary ecological trade-offs (Bennett
et al., 2009). Hence, small changes in the relationships among services can cr ate mportant o portunities for the
management of multiple services. The role of regulating ecosystem services for stability and resilience of the flow of other
ecosystem services deserves speci l attention. Regulating services and ecosystem service interactions involving those have
generally been poorly appreciated. Despite the apparent importance of regulating services, environmental management
and monitoring have focused on provisioning or cultural services (Carpenter et al., 2006). However, increasing soil
biodiversity to increase nutrient availability (Altieri, 1999), con ervation tillage improving erosion control (Pimentel
et al., 1995), and forest patches enhancing pollination and pest control (Ricketts et al., 2008) are examples where
e hancement of regulating services has resulted in improvements in provisioning services. In contrast, enhancement of
provisioning services seldom automatically increase regulating services, but instead leads to declines in many cases, e.g.
many agricultural techniques for improving agricultural yield have led to eclines in other, oft regulating, ecosystem
services (MEA, 2005).
When natural ecosystems are modified by human activities the focus is primarily on the enhancement of on-site
provisioning services in form of agroecosystems. This often comes at the cost of losing regulating services including
recycli g of nutrie ts, local micro-climate control, regulation of local hydrological processes, regulation of the abundance
of undesirable organisms, and detoxification of noxious chemicals. Biological simplification in agroecosystems can imply
quite significant economic and environmental costs, e.g. the need to supply crops with costly external inputs (fertilizer,
pesticides etc.) for basic regulating functional components of soil fertility and pest regulation (Altieri, 1999).
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In some cases of ecosystem service trade-offs or synergies, management action is not only limited to merely responding to
them, but their extend and existence can be actively managed and addressed. Through the establishment of riparian buffers,
for instance, the trade-off between agricultural production and water quality by limiting the effect of the driver (fertilizer
use) on water quality can be altered without affecting the impact of the driver on agricultural yields (Bennett et al., 2009).
The basis for mitigating trade-offs and enhancing synergies among ecosystem services is a sound understanding of the
ecological processes that structure the connections between ecosystem services. The potential to create synergies or avoid
trade-offs by managing ecosystem service drivers and their interrelationship was revealed by an analysis of Bennett et al.
(2009) and is illustrated in Table 4.14. One of their main findings was that agricultural landscapes, in particular, provide
many examples of management actions that can either enhance or degrade multiple ecosystem services. Therefore, an
integrated view on on-site and off-site ecosystem services in environmental management is promising. However, even in
well-studied agroecosystems, knowledge to generalize on when to expect synergies among ecosystem services, how to
create them, and how to take advantage of them is lacking (Bennett et al., 2009).
Driver Service A Service B Shared
driver
Response
type
Interaction
type
Synergy or
trade-off
Reference
Fertilizer use Crop
production
Water
quality
Yes Opposite None Trade-off Carpenter
et al. (1998)
Restoring
riparian
vegetation
Flood
control
Crop
production
No - Unidirectional,
positive
Synergy Kramer et al.
(1997)
Wetland
restoration
Flood
control
Water
quality
Yes Similar Unidirectional,
positive
Synergy Zedler (2003)
Afforestation Carbon
sequestration
Water
quantity
Yes Opposite Unidirectional,
negative
Trade-off Engel et al.
(2005)
Dry spells C sequestr.,
soil organic
matter
Crop yield No - Bidirectional,
positive
Bidirectional,
positive
Enfors and
Gordon
(2008)
Cloud forest
land clearing
Moisture
retention
Carbon
sequestr. &
tree growth
Yes Similar Bidirectional,
positive
Bidirectional,
positive
Del-Val et al.
(2006)
Table 4.14: Examples of ecosystem service relationships and the influence of di erent drivers; based on Bennett et al.
(2009)
Recognizing the different spatial and temporal scales of ecosystem services as well as interrelationships between them
and their drivers offers many additional management options and provides incentives for cross-sectoral multi-stakeholder
cooperation. Contrary to dealing with on-site and off-site ecosystem services separately, the ecosystem service concept
focuses directly on the linkage of both, based on functioning ecosystems. For instance, traditional approaches of on-site
regulations of input use (e.g. fertilizers or pesticides) and management practices in agricultural land use are often applied
without relation to off-site actions for water treatment. Even when instruments are applied with respect to this functional
connection of agricultural effects on water resources, these are often implemented separately for each sector, missing the
opportunity to engage stakeholder in cooperation and context-specific solutions.
4.5 Summary
The concept of ecosystem services represents a useful approach for environmental governance by explicitly linking
ecosystems’ contributions to a variety of human well-being aspects. By focusing on ecosystems as the ultimate source of
benefits to all human activities, the concept is inherently cross-sectoral in integrating the human system into the natural
system. On the one hand, this facilitates ecosystem-based solutions to environmental management problems in the first
place, while, on the other hand, human activities can be assessed according to their impact on the provision of ecosystem
services. Therefore, the concept makes a strong case at least for ecological sustainability arguing for more investment in
natural capital and specifically the restoration of degraded ecosystems. Understanding ecosystems as the original provider
of hydrological ecosystem services can make it attractive to consider them as green infrastructures more systematically
(which may be quantified and valued) as an alternative to man-made grey infrastructures. Especially when multiple goals
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have to be mutually achieved, e.g. flood protection, biodiversity protection and water filtration, these green solutions may
reveal advantages.
Moreover, as the ongoing classification of ecosystem services and the understanding of underlying processes highlights,
the ecosystem service approach needs sound knowledge of ecosystems, their functioning and the way they provide
essential services to any group of society. An important contribution of the ecosystem approach can be seen in its ability to
communicate human-natural system linkages, often referred to as an eye-opener (Gordon and Folke, 2000). The MEA, for
instance, in principal, had a strong impact on the perception of the interaction between humans and nature. Furthermore,
it provides an important link between the challenges in meeting the Millennium Development Goals and the imperative
of maintaining biodiversity. Hence, a major objective of the ecosystem approach is to change the way how biodiversity,
ecosystems and their services are viewed and valued by society (TEEB, 2010a). Since ecosystem services often represent
unaccounted externalities, incentives to maintain ecosystems for continued service provision are low. Additionally, the
public or open-access good character of ecosystem services makes it difficult to regulate use levels.
The inherent logic of service flows between provisioning areas and beneficiaries introduces new spatial and temporal
interrelationships based on ecosystem properties and human use. Here hydrological ecosystem services provide a plausible
and appealing basis to consider hydrological boundaries as basis for the integrated management of water resources.
Moreover, hydrological ecosystem services connect different actors within a river basin across sectors and administrative
boundaries, based on the idea of provision and benefits of ecosystem services. The role of humans in altering the provision
of hydrological services becomes readily apparent and may be considered as a facilitating or disturbing one. Thus, there is
the possibility for humans to contribute to positive externalities as well. In the context of IWRM, the provider-beneficiary
perspective holds another advantage because it considers the cross-sectoral relationship between land and water uses
directly. This has been one of the most difficult but also most essential integration tasks of the IWRM process which has
proven especially hard to achieve. Moreover, this perspective allows finding an appropriate management scale based on
context-specific characteristics of the natural and human use system by making explicit the linkages between different
stakeholders, in particular the users of the resource base (on which the provision of ecosystem services depends) and the
beneficiaries of the ecosystem services.
Finally, the ecosystem service concept can illustrate trade-offs and social preferences from many different perspectives
such as from on-site and off-site perspectives. Social preferences revealed by valuation processes can be important for the
definition and acceptance of environmental goals and an instrument to gain broader societal support for actions implying
trade-offs. The communication of non-use values may foster intrinsic motivations for environmental friendly resource use.
Figure 4.14 illustrates how institutional fit and interplay are addressed in an ecosystem service provider and beneficiary
context and where trade-offs, i.e. a distribution of benefits takes place.
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Figure 4.14: Fit and interplay in an ecosystem service provider and beneficiary context (Author’s work)
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Muradian and Rival (2012) argue, from a policy perspective, that the two critical goals that constitute the core of the
governance agenda associated with the ecosystem services approach are (1) to help solve the tension between economic
development and environmental conservation and (2) to influence the decisions made by the users of a resource base, so
that they align their practices with the interests of the beneficiaries of ecosystem services. These two goals correspond to
two areas of action, one of “creating linkages between different [institutional] layers and stakeholders in order to deal
with complex economic, social and ecological inter-dependencies, and [two] of inducing changes in the use or the property
rights of the resource base that provides the concerned services, so as to align the interests of different social agents”
(Muradian and Rival, 2012). Meanwhile the ecosystem service concept is increasingly applied as a policy instrument for
the governance of environmental, especially water, resources in developed and developing countries.
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) of the Executive Office of the President of the United States of America,
for instance, acknowledges in its recently published Principles and Requirements for Federal Investments in Water Resources
the importance of ecosystem functions and resulting services. Their economic importance is highlighted with the following
statement: “Healthy and resilient ecosystems not only enhance the essential services and processes performed by the
natural environment, but also contribute to the economic vitality of the Nation“ (CEQ, 2013). Besides stressing the
economic importance of healthy ecosystems for the public, the CEQ emphasizes the utility of ecosystem functions as
green infrastructures; especially the role of floodplains is highlighted. Green infrastructure solutions are assigned priority
over man-made infrastructures in achieving the objectives of water resources management. Moreover, the Principles and
Requirements for Federal Investments in Water Resources stresses that the scope and scale of water resources management
should reflect the nature of cause and effect relationships between effects on ecosystems and resulting public benefits
(CEQ, 2013). Thus, the identification of an appropriate unit for the management of water resources is proposed to
be based on hydrological ecosystem services. This policy change towards a stronger focus on ecosystem functions and
services is accompanied by a call for more adaptive management. This is not surprising as the ecosystem service concept
incorporates socio-ecological learning as advocated by adaptive management.
The application of the ecosystem service concept in water resources management is also on the rise in the EU where it
has been identified as one of the pillars of the assessment of impacts in the preparation of the 2012 Commission’s Blueprint
to safeguard the future of European Waters by 2015 (Maes et al., 2012). The EU recognizes as well the importance of
investing in nature as a source of economic development in its regional and cohesion policy (EC, 2011b). Furthermore, a
new proposal for the EU’s Common Agriculture Policy identifies restoring and preserving ecosystem services as one of six
priorities (EC, 2011a).
In the context of developing countries, the International Union for Conservation of Nature “Water and Nature Vision”
identified an ecosystem approach as a key element and new paradigm when implementing IWRM within river basins (Smith
and Cartin, 2011). This ecosystem approach is defined as a strategy for integrated management of land, water and living
resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an equitable way. While meeting people’s needs as a central
element of the ecosystem approach it aims to:
• Maintain ecosystem functions and services
• Enhance equitable sharing of benefits
• Promote adaptive management strategies
• Implement management actions through decentralization
• Foster intersectoral/interdisciplinary cooperation (Smith and Cartin, 2011)
The ecosystem service concept is increasingly promoted through the policy instrument of Payments for Ecosystem
Services (PES), i.e. Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services (PHES). In the following chapter, this policy instrument
is presented and its role as a complementary policy instrument to improve spatial fit and institutional interplay in the
context of IWRM operationalization is analyzed.
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5 The concept of Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services
After the rise of the ecosystem service concept in the 1970s and 1980s (Schumacher, 1973; Westman, 1977; Ehrlich
and Ehrlich, 1981) and its mainstreaming in both science and policy discourse in the 1990s through several influencing
publications (Daily, 1997; Costanza et al., 1997), the concept found its way in the late 1990s and 2000s into a broader
policy arena and first practical application. Prevailing examples of the increasing policy relevance of the ecosystem service
concept are the adoption of the Ecosystem Approach in the Convention on Biological Diversity (UNEP, 2000), the MEA
(2005), the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern, 2006), and the Economics of Ecosystems and
Biodiversity initiative (EC, 2008). With increasing research and public communication on economic values of ecosystems
and their services to society, interest has grown in the design of Market Based Instruments (MBI) to create economic
incentives for conservation and improve natural resource management based on the ecosystem service concept (Daily
and Matson, 2008; Jack et al., 2008). Markets for Ecosystem Services (MES) (Bayon, 2004) and Payment for Ecosystem
Services (PES) schemes (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Wunder and Albán, 2008) have been developed as specific tools
to provide these incentives. Examples for Markets for Ecosystem Services are emission trading schemes of greenhouse
gases in the EU, United Kingdom, and the Chicago Climate Exchange in the USA, as well as trading schemes for sulfur
dioxide emissions through the Clean Air Act and Wetland mitigation banking in the USA (Stavins, 2000; Robertson, 2004;
Bayon, 2004). MES are often considered as a special type of PES characterized by their free-wheeling transactions within
an established marketplace of potential ecosystem service sellers and potential buyers (cf., Gutman, 2003).
According to Pesche et al. (2013), the concept of Payments for Ecosystem Services1 originally arose from changes in
perceptions of the efficacy of traditional nature conservation policies in developing countries with high levels of biodiversity.
Two aspects had special influence on the speed of PES evolution. On the one hand, the environmental policies applied
during the late 1980s and 1990s, based on the rationale of conservation through development (mostly pursued through
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects; ICDP), were questioned in their efficacy and at the end of the 1990s
better targeting and direct payments, i.e. direct investments, for achieving the desired policy outcomes were proposed
instead (Simpson and Sedjo, 1996; Ferraro and Kiss, 2002; Simpson, 2004). Rice et al. (2001), for instance, argue
that direct payments are more effective than, for instance, trying to promote sustainable, selective logging, which has
been a feature of many integrated conservation and development projects. Moreover, the absence of clear links between
performance and benefits has been identified as a specific weakness of ICDP (Wunder, 2005). On the other hand, the lack
of sustainable funding and the need for additional sources of funding led to the search for innovative funding mechanisms
(Pesche et al., 2013). Finally, a first systematic connection between ecosystem services and markets for their provision was
made by Landell-Mills and Porras (2002).
Hence, since the end of the 1990s Payments for Ecosystem Service schemes have been established for various hydrological
services related to the quality, quantity, or timing of freshwater flows from upstream areas to downstream users and carbon
sequestration mainly in Central and South America, for habitat conservation for wildlife in Africa and South America, for
bio-prospecting in Costa Rica, and for the provision of incentives for agro-environmental measures especially in the EU
and the USA (Bond and Frost, 2006; Corbera et al., 2007; Wunder and Albán, 2008; Asquith et al., 2008; Pagiola, 2008;
Dobbs and Pretty, 2008). The country-wide program Pago por Servicios Ambientales, initiated in 1997 in Costa Rica, was
the first application of a formal PES mechanism in a developing country (Pagiola, 2008). The principal aim of the program
is to reverse severe deforestation rates which have been experienced in the past. In the early 2000s, a growing number of
PES followed throughout Meso-American and South American countries (Corbera et al., 2007; Kosoy et al., 2007; Asquith
et al., 2008; Pagiola, 2008; Wunder and Albán, 2008). Rather recently, cap and trade programs such as Reduced Emission
from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) are being discussed as possible international PES schemes for the post Kyoto
protocol (Gómez-Baggethun et al., 2010). However, many early PES schemes focused on the role of forest ecosystems for
the provision of several services, most of all carbon sequestration and hydrological services. Thus, these PES schemes
often had primarily conservation objectives, i.e. the objective to find additional funding sources for forest protection (cf.,
Johnson et al., 2001). Especially in Latin America, detaining deforestation was a major concern and a motive for looking
for alternative policy instruments since traditional policies based on command and control mechanisms did not succeed
(Pagiola et al., 2002).
Contrary to command and control instruments, PES are intended as direct and flexible incentive-based mechanisms
where a user (i.e. beneficiary) of an ecosystem service makes a direct payment in cash or in kind to an individual or
community whose decisions on the use of natural resources have an impact on the ecosystem service provision (OECD,
2010; Carius, 2012). Through the incentive, it is intended to achieve a behavioral change on decisions of land and
resource uses in order to reduce ecosystem service loss or enhance their provision. Thereby, PES schemes aim to address
1 Payments for Environmental Services or the terms rewards, compensations, stewardship or reciprocal agreements instead of the term payments
are also commonly used. Hereafter the terms payment and compensations will be used as synonyms.
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market failures by translating external non-market benefits (external effects or externalities)2 of ecosystems into tangible
incentives for their provision (OECD, 2010). Thus, besides individual on-site benefits of resource and land use, off-site
benefits to a potentially larger group of beneficiaries may as well be more explicitly considered in decision-making through
an internalization of externalities. Moreover, the conditions in terms of payment amount and restrictions of utilization of
land providing the ecosystem service can, in theory, be adjusted individually between service provider (seller) and service
user (buyer) providing a more flexible and efficient approach to achieve environmental management goals.
The principal logic of PES is illustrated in Figure 5.1, based on an example of different use options of agricultural
land and respective benefits to the land user and external costs to off-site water users. When compared to conservation
agriculture, the land user receives greater (net) private benefits through conventional agriculture. This conventional
agricultural land use, however, incurs costs to downstream water users or beneficiaries in the form of reduced watershed
services.
Figure 5.1: Logic of Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services schemes; from Hack (2010) based on Pagiola and Platais
(2002)
From a straight economical point of view, the minimum payment that the land user will be willing to accept as
compensation to change his land use focusing more on conservative aspects favoring downstream service provision is the
foregone opportunity cost of the alternative land use. At the same time, the maximum payment that an ecosystem service
beneficiary is willing to pay for conservation is the total cost of damage incurred when the land is used in the conventional
manner. Hence, the maximum payment principally considers restoration costs, but may as well consider replacement
or avoided costs, e.g. the cost of improving water quality through engineering structures. If, as in the case illustrated
schematically in Figure 5.1, the potential benefits of conservation are larger than the minimum payment, a PES mechanism
can potential be mutually beneficial. Since participation in PES is voluntary for the land user, the economic theory suggests
that rational land users will enter into an agreement as long as the payments cover at least their opportunity costs of
changing their land use practices (Kosoy et al., 2007). Accordingly, any payment level between the minimum and the
maximum is supposed to provide enough incentive to induce a change in land use towards greater ecosystem service
provision. Ideally, through such an agreement both the individual land holder (in a micro-economic sense) and the broader
society derive (macro-economic) benefit from the provision of ecosystem services from the contracted lands. This would
represent a pareto-optimal solution. Thus, the fundamental problem of conservation that the costs of abstaining from
degrading types of utilization, i.e. non utilization, are incurred by the user of the land, while others would benefit from
conserving the resource is attempted to be solved through an equivalent compensation. The costs of abstaining from
destructive forms of utilization include the costs of safeguarding non-degrading utilization, and the opportunity costs,
for instance foregone income from intensive agricultural utilization. As the conservation associated with the provision
2 Such market failures caused by externalities are largely acknowledged as an explanation for the decline of important ecosystem services as a
result of human pressures (cf. Westman, 1977; Hanley and Spash, 1993; Loomis et al., 2000; MEA, 2005; TEEB, 2010a).
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of ecosystem services of his land implies a trade-off in terms of reduced individual gains, the land user has less interest
in conserving the land than the beneficiaries of the ecosystem service provided. Hence, the incentive is provided by the
beneficiaries (or an intermediary) to motivate and compensate the right holder to provide the service. In an ideal case,
the level of compensation corresponds to both the benefit that those beneficiaries making the compensation derive from
the non-occurrence of resource degradation and at the same time to the net costs of non-utilization incurred by the right
holder of the land (monitoring and opportunity costs of abstaining from degrading local utilization minus the own benefit
of the right holder from resource conservation).
Thus, taking a market perspective assumes that a payment between the minimum and maximum payment has
distributional and cost-effective implications, but will bring about the same environmental change (OECD, 2010). Figure
5.2 illustrates this by looking at marginal costs and benefits. The theoretical optimal provision of ecosystem services is
given at Q⇤ in the figure, where the marginal costs of service provision and the marginal social benefits are equal. The
costs to provide the service encompass the opportunity costs of the alternative land use incurred by the land user and the
transaction costs associated with the implementation of the PES mechanism. For this optimal case, the area defined by
points yxb in the figure illustrates the beneficiary’s surplus (i.e. consumer surplus in market economics) and the area ybk
represents the provider’s surplus (i.e. producer surplus). However, the actual level of ecosystem service provision without
payment is illustrated with point Q1 as a consequence of the presence of market failures and the resulting divergence
between private and social marginal benefits. Hence, a payment P⇤ is required to internalize the beneficiaries costs, i.e.
to correct for the market failure, and achieve a more socially optimal level of ecosystem service provision. According
to Engel et al. (2008), in practice the sum of offered payments may be insufficient to attain Q⇤ either because of the
presence of incentives for beneficiaries to free-ride (obtaining the benefits without paying for them), or because financial
resources (e.g. from government) available for ecosystem service conservation and sustainable resource use are limited.
In this context PES aim at an improvement above the status quo of socially sub-optimal service provision. In order to
achieve a level of service provision where the marginal social benefits are greater than the marginal costs of provision
(illustrated with point Q2), the payment (i.e. price) can be set between the minimum payment (at PMC) and the maximum
payment (at PMB) as discussed above and illustrated in Figure 5.1. Point PMC indicates a payment amount according to the
marginal cost of provision and allocates the greatest welfare surplus to the beneficiaries (area defined by points wmxz),
while area wzk represents the private land user’s surplus. In contrast, a payment at point PMB, equal to the marginal social
benefits, represents an allocation of greater welfare surplus (area wmnk) to the land user and less surplus to the buyer
(area mxn). When aiming to maximize the cost-effective achievement of social benefits, the minimum payment is equal to
the land user’s marginal costs of service provision. Assuming that Q1 is provided by existing incentives for the land user
(representing the baseline level of service provision), a payment is only required to purchase additional ecosystem service
benefits (moving from Q1 to Q2). The most cost-effective payment at PMC requires finance for the difference from areas
vwzt and rdot. In turn, payments have to sum up to areas vwzt and wmnz minus rdot in the case of a payment equal to
the marginal social benefits, PMB, the maximum payment. Therefore, when favoring social benefits, cost-effectiveness
increases as the price moves towards point PMC. Depending on the magnitude of the ecosystem service benefits provided
and the different (opportunity and transaction) costs incurred in their provision, the levels of PMC and PMB are likely to
vary from one site to another as a result of spatial heterogeneity (OECD, 2010).
Theoretically, the conditions to join a PES are met if the payment is marginally lower than the level of the benefits
derived by the potential payers through conservation of the resource or marginally lower than the level of damage which
the potential payers would suffer as a result of degradation of the resource.
PES schemes, as opposed to the broadly accepted polluter pays principle, follow a provider gets or beneficiary pays
logic. Although being different in their underlying logic, both principles can be applied together without contradiction. By
defining a reference level of an environmental standard, for instance, the polluter pays principle can be applied in case
the environmental performance is below this level and for any measure of improvement above the required reference
level the provider gets principle may be applied. This, for example, is done in the European agricultural policy. Although
the intention of the polluter pays principle is to charge polluters for the costs of pollution abatement, in practice this is
often not implemented properly. The fees for waste water discharges based on the polluter pays principle, for instance,
generally do not relate to waste water and drinking water treatment costs, which are often subsidized (Stallworth, 2003).
In developing countries, however, the polluter pays principle is often difficult to apply because the polluter may be poor
and therefore unable to pay. In case of agricultural activities, often practiced for subsistence, the pollution from these
activities is, on the one hand, very difficult to assess because of their diffuse nature and, on the other hand, subsistence
farmers do not have an alternative.
Moreover, there is an important implication on the designation of roles, when applying the polluter pays or provider
gets principle. Although a direct relationship between the polluter and the polluted can be established in both situations,
i.e. between the provider and the beneficiary, in practice, however, a polluter does not pay the cost of pollution to the
polluted but to the government according to regulatory sanctions. Cordato (2001) argues therefore that “in such cases,
the polluter pays principle is used to promote an environmental agenda rather than to insure that real polluters pay
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Participation in PES programmes is voluntary; rational landholders will 
enter into PES agreements as long as the payments cover at least their 
opportunity costs of changing their land use practices. Thus any payment 
level between the minimum and the maximum should be sufficient to induce 
a change in land use towards greater ecosystem service provision. Selecting 
the payment between these two levels has distributional and 
cost-effectiveness implications, but will bring about the same environmental 
change. This can be illustrated by looking at marginal costs and benefits.  
Figure 1.2.  Optimal provision of biodiversity, and the distributional 
and cost-effectiveness implications given a budget constraint 
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In Figure 1.2 the optimal provision of ecosystem services is given by 
Q*, where the marginal costs of service provision are equal to the marginal 
social benefits. The costs of service provision include the opportunity costs 
of the alternative land use incurred by the landholder, and the transaction 
costs associated with the programme. The consumer surplus is given by area 
yxb and the producer surplus by area ybk. Due to the presence of market 
failures and the resulting divergence between private and social marginal 
benefits however, the prevailing provision of ecosystem services is Q1
(i.e. in the absence of payment). To correct for market failure and achieve 
the socially optimal level of ecosystem service provision, a payment of P* is 
necessary. In practice however, total offered payments may be insufficient 
to attain Q* either because there are incentives for beneficiaries to free-ride, 
or because finance available (e.g. from government) for biodiversity and 
Figure 5.2: Optimal provision of ecosystem services, and the distributional and cost-e ectiveness implications (OECD, 2010)
compensation to real victims of their activities”. In contrast, the payments of beneficiaries to providers are often, although
not always, made in a more direct manner. This difference is due to the voluntary nature of the provider gets principle as
opposed to the mandatory polluter pays principle. The provider gets principle has a further advantage in its psychological
function of encouraging doi g what is expected to be environmentally sound and therefore morally accepted by society
(cf., Fehr and Falk, 2002). This is especially important when communicating the importance of non-use values or use
values of others, directly impacted by externalities. An example for an economic instrument following the polluter pays
principle are environmental taxes, e.g. charges on environmentally-damaging activities. Thus, while the polluter pays
principle provides disincentives, often in form of command and control regulation, which mandates actors to undertake
specific actions and applies sanctions if they do not comply, the provider gets principle provides incentives in order to
stimulate environment-friendly behavior based on voluntary agreements. However, the use of positive incentives does
not imply the complete absence of negative inc ntives within a PES inter entio . Sommerville et al. (2009) argue if
payments are used to influence attitudes and participation in a regulatory environment, the repercussions associated
with regulation can act as a negative incentive. Moreover, PES schemes may also imply negative incentives through
coercion to participate based on social pressure from other community members, or even through regulatory fines and
punishments (Sommerville et al., 2009). Notwithstanding, for those participating in a PES schemes positive incentives
have to outweigh the negatives. Participation and engagement of ecosystem service providers is based on the transfer of
positive incentives to these individuals. However, positive incentives go beyond monetary payments and payments in-kind
as social cooperation, local norms, or religious beliefs can also influence behavior positively (cf., Deci and Ryan, 1985;
Henrich et al., 2001). Hence, Sommerville et al. (2009) point out that, in addition to monetary transfers, incentives may
as well come from social impacts such as tenure legitimacy and pride. In PES schemes where individuals choose to provide
services at payments lower than their opportunity costs (Wunder, 2005; Kosoy et al., 2007), the interaction of different
incentive forms becomes apparent. In a silvopastoral PES scheme in Nicaragua, Van Hecken et al. (2012) observed that
while farmers welcomed the payments, they attributed more importance to technical assistance and a growing market
demand for their products as the basis for their decision to alter their land use. Garbach et al. (2012) too, highlight the
importance of technical assistance to improve agricultural practices as having a positive influence on participation in other
PES schemes. Accordingly, Van Hecken et al. (2012) argue that identifying a socially and culturally acceptable type of
payment (monetary or in-kind) that is considered to be fair by the local community should be an essential part of any PES
negotiation process. Studies of Sommerville et al. (2010) and Gross-Camp et al. (2012) suggest that a perceived fairness
of the distribution of the costs and benefits among participants is a key determinant of local acceptability of PES schemes
(cf., Adhikari and Boag, 2013).
However, in some situations there may be no other option than the provision of positive incentives. This is the case, for
instance, when land users possess legal control over service provision, e.g. they have the right to carry out certain land-use
changes that would change service provision. Here incentives may influence the decision to produce the service, while
disincentives through restrictions are not an option because there is no legal justification. A typical situation would be
when land users are paid to implement certain farming practices, e.g. to develop or maintain hedgerows (Dobbs and Pretty,
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2008). Most user-financed Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services (PHES) schemes aiming to safeguard water
quality through particular land-management practices were developed because positive incentives were the only feasible
option to influence service provision (Sommerville et al., 2009). It is also argued that positive incentives, as provided
through PHES schemes, are used to influence attitudes toward a regulation or a change in legal enforcement. According to
Pagiola (2008), a principal motivation for the establishment of Costa Rica’s PES program was to gain acceptance for a
legislative ban on deforestation on private lands from landowners and to attract their cooperation. When using positive
incentives, however, the scale and the actors addressed matter. In order to influence the decisions individuals make on
how they use resources, these individuals need to be addressed directly by the incentives rather than making payments to
a regional government. This aspect, among others, will be further discussed in the following section in the context of
directness.
5.1 Economic conceptualizations of Payments for Ecosystem Services
The following discussion about the economic conceptualization of PES is quite important as it defines the aim and scope of
the instrument as well as the distribution of roles between different actors, i.e. the degree of involvement of public and
non-public actors within a policy mix.
Most of the literature referring to PES as a market based or market-like mechanism follows Wunder (2005) in defining
PES as
(a) “a voluntary transaction where
(b) a well-defined environmental service (or a land use likely to secure that service)
(c) is being bought by a (minimum one) service buyer
(d) from a (minimum one) service provider
(e) if and only if the service provider secures service provision (conditionality)“.
The theoretical background of this popular PES definition is an attempt to put the Coase Theorem3 into practice by
integrating ecosystem services into markets, dealing with ecosystem services as with any other market transaction (cf.,
Engel et al., 2008). The rationale behind the Coase Theorem is that if private property rights are clearly defined by
enforceable contracts, then the generator and recipient of an externality can, through voluntary exchange, potentially
reach an agreement that maximizes social welfare. Hence, besides the enforcement of property rights, government
intervention is not required to achieve optimum social welfare. Thus, effective environmental governance is achieved by
creating markets for trading ecosystem services that lead to getting the price right that formerly caused market failures and
under-supply of ecosystem services. However, in order to achieve this, wealth effects and transaction costs need to be
absent or insignificant (cf., Coase, 1960).
Accordingly, proponents of this Coasean approach to PES generally stress the definition of property rights, creating
enforceable contracts, and reducing transactions costs, though many still see the requirement for some degree of
government intervention (Farley and Costanza, 2010). According to Engel et al. (2008), Coasean PES approaches
are “likely to be efficient, as the actors with the most information about the value of the service are directly involved,
have a clear incentive to ensure that the mechanism is functioning well, can observe directly whether the service is
being delivered, and have the ability to re-negotiate (or terminate) the agreement if needed“. Thus, proponents of
economic conceptualizations of PES in this sense highlight the generally more positive effects on economic efficiency
and environmental effectiveness as compared to Pigouvian4 approaches such as environmental taxes to economically
internalize externalities. Since fiscal efficiency is a main focus of this approach, many proponents frequently claim private
sector PES schemes to be more promising than public ones (Wunder, 2008).
However, in practice, PES usually include a mix of market elements, e.g. voluntary participation, individual cost-benefit
considerations, and hierarchical elements, such as legal property rights, institutional rules and contracts. The diversity
of PES schemes in terms of different scales (e.g. local/regional, national or global), funding sources (e.g. private or
governmental payments) or other characteristics has been stressed by several authors of global PES reviews (Johnson
et al., 2001; Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Gutman, 2003).
The divergence from the theoretical foundations of the Coasean Theorem in the practical establishment of PES has
been addressed, among others, by Jack et al. (2008); Muradian et al. (2010); Vatn (2010); Muradian and Rival (2012);
Schomers and Matzdorf (2013). According to their findings, there are hardly any PES schemes that represent a purely
voluntary market transaction without governmental involvement. Vatn (2010) describes several aspects of PES schemes
which imply either a more Coasean or a Pigouvian-like concept. One distinguishing aspect is rights and rules to land
3 Ronald Coase, a British economist, introduced the concept of transaction costs to explain the nature and limits of firms (Coase, 1937) and
suggests with the Coase Theorem that with well-defined property rights the problems of externalities could be overcome (Coase, 1960).
4 The economist Arthur Pigou argued that a tax should be applied to market activities that are generating negative externalities in order to
correct an inefficient market outcome (cf. Pigou, 1920).
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property and use. In order to make a payment the provider has to be known and holding the rights to change the use of
the land. These rights can actually be formal or informal, although the latter will increase the risk of actual provision for
the buyer. From the current use of the land and the desired change in land uses the question arises whether its actual use
conflicts with existing rules (e.g. formal regulations or informal use rules) and whether the polluter-pays-principles (in
case of illegal land use) or the provider-gets-principles (in case of additional services provided) should be applied. Vatn
(2010) argues that various mixed responsibilities are possible between these extremes. A specific practice or environmental
quality as the reference point, sound forest practices for instance, could be agreed on while delivering a higher level
of services would result in being paid and delivering less would imply having to pay oneself (Vatn, 2010); similar to
the duty of care concept of positive and negative price signals described by Young (2000). Vatn (2010) reasons further
that “according to the literature describing various MES / PES systems, providers of environmental services seem to be
implicitly and exclusively granted the right to the status quo uses, i.e. a form of provider gets with rarely no discussion
about whether these uses are legitimate.”
Schomers and Matzdorf (2013), like Vatn (2010), highlight differences in the economic conceptualization of PES
and distinguish between Coasean and Pigouvian PES schemes as well as financial incentives beyond Coase and Pigou.
Although pure Coasean PES examples are hardly found in the literature, Schomers and Matzdorf (2013) refer to them
as “cases where benefits from ecosystem management are provided at local scales“. Typical examples of Coasean PES
are mechanisms where “downstream water users pay upstream land stewards for land use changes that are assumed
to increase both, water quality and quantity” (Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). However, since local municipalities are
often involved to varying degrees from setting up to running the scheme as intermediaries, service buyers or as well
service providers, not all of them fully comply with the Coasean conceptualization. Moreover, repeatedly payments from
beneficiaries are not realized on a voluntary basis, e.g. in the case of water fees, and in some cases contracts are not
negotiated privately among relevant stakeholders. These issues conflict with the Coase Theorem and the PES definition by
Wunder (2005). Table 5.1 summarizes Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services (PHES) schemes categorized by
Schomers and Matzdorf (2013) as either more Coasean or more Pigouvian.
On the other hand, several authors have referred to PES schemes led by (national) governments as a Pigouvian economic
conceptualization (Vatn, 2010; Pattanayak et al., 2010; Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010). Although Schomers and
Matzdorf (2013) argue that governmental payment approaches rather follow the environmental pricing and standards
procedure (cf., Baumol and Oates, 1971), they use the Pigouvian economic conceptualization as a category to distinguish
them from more Coasean conceptualizations. Van Hecken and Bastiaensen (2010) describe the Pigouvian conceptualization
as “taxing negative or subsidizing positive externalities within existing product markets“.
Just as the Coase Theorem, the Pigouvian concept attempts to correct an apparent market failure by the internalization
of externalities. Hence, in case of negative externalities of a market activity a specific tax is applied equal to the negative
externality in order to cover the social costs caused by the market activity. Often environmental pollution is addressed
with Pigouvian taxes. In the context of PES, the focus is on positive externalities provided through a certain land use
following a provider gets logic. Given this proposition, a Pigouvian subsidy is provided by the state to pay the providers of
the positive externality. While the Pigouvian subsidy requires that the payment equals the marginal net benefit that it is
supposed to generate, the environmental pricing and standards procedure, in contrast, “begins with a predetermined set
of standards for environmental quality and then imposes unit taxes (or subsidies) sufficient to achieve these standards”
(Baumol and Oates, 1971). Therefore, a defined payment is established reflecting the price for the provision of public
goods. As payments in governmental PES are not necessarily linked to a (already marketed) commodity which is assumed
to provide the beneficial externality, Van Hecken and Bastiaensen (2010) recognize that these schemes differ in this
sense from Pigouvian subsidies. Instead, the externality (i.e. ecosystem service) itself is traded as a commodity (cf.
Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010) with the state as “third party acting on behalf of service
buyers“ (Engel et al., 2008). This illustrates the principal difference between Coasean and Pigouvian conceptualizations as
being the directness of transaction (Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013). According to this differentiation, only the Coasean
conceptualization establishes a direct interaction between the buyer and the service provider through the agreement on a
transaction related to a behavioral change. Vatn (2010) ascribes this differentiation of the two types of conceptualization
to different exclusion cost structures, i.e. the public good characteristics of the service. The beneficiaries of Coasean PES
are mainly located at a local or regional proximity to the provisioning area and can therefore be easier and more directly
identified, for instance in an upstream-downstream relationship. In the case of Pigouvian PES this is often different and
the state pays for the provision of services to the general public. Table 5.1 provides examples of Pigouvian PES discussed
by Schomers and Matzdorf (2013).
In the context of the discussion on Coasean and Pigouvian PES it is important to consider the underlying discourse on
governmental versus market-like institutions. In reality, as has been recurrently stated, purely market-based solutions of
PES are absent. Instead it has to be recognized that “PES are commonly imbedded in a broad institutional setting with an
actor constellation that does not resemble simple market-based buyer and seller relations” (Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013).
Thus, considering either Coasean or Pigouvian does not reflect the broad diversity of institutional settings of existing
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Coasean conceptualization
Examples Description References
Paso de Caballos River
Basin, Nicaragua
Upstream landowners are paid by downstream households for reforesta-
tion and conservation efforts. Households created a Water Committee
and negotiate contracts with upstream land users
Corbera et al.
(2007)
Escobas River Basin,
Guatemala
Upstream forest conservation is financed by a local hydroelectricity and
water company that benefits from continuous water flows and reduced
sediment loads. Payments are financed by an increased water tariff
Corbera et al.
(2007)
Cidanau River Basin,
Indonesia
State-owned water company signed contracts for watershed conserva-
tion with upstream farmers
Leimona et al.
(2010)
Palaurco River Basin,
Ecuador
Local municipality charges obligatory water fee to downstream water-
using households. The fee is paid via a water fund to upstream landown-
ers, who are contractually committed to halting deforestation and natu-
rally regenerate degraded agricultural lands
Quintero et al.
(2009); Wun-
der and Albán
(2008)
Los Negros River Basin,
Bolivia
Compensation by local municipality targets on curbing upland defor-
estation to overcome the growing problem of water scarcity
Asquith et al.
(2008)
Pigouvian conceptualization
Examples Description References
National PES Program,
Costa Rica
Private forest landowners are paid for forest conservation or reforesta-
tion by the state. Financing comes mainly from a mandatory tax on
fossil fuels, donor and domestic water suppliers contribute as well
Pagiola (2008)
Payments for Hydrological
Ecosystem Services
Programme, Mexico
Federal government uses an obligatory water fee to finance the conser-
vation of existing forests using a uniform payment scheme
Southgate
and Wunder
(2007)
Conservation Reserve
Program, USA
Federal government purchases environmental services from agriculture
halt conversion of wetland and highly erodible land to cropland
Dobbs (2006)
Sloping Land Conversion
Program, China
Federal government pays for conversion of sloped cropland to grasslands
or forests to reduce erosion and alleviate poverty
Gauvin et al.
(2010)
Working for Water
Program, South Africa
Federal government pays unemployed to clear invasive plants and to
restore natural fire regimes in mountain catchments and riparian zones
Swallow et al.
(2010)
Table 5.1: Economic conceptualizations of Payment for Hydrological Ecosystem Service schemes; based on Schomers and
Matzdorf (2013)
PES schemes. Accordingly, Van Hecken and Bastiaensen (2010) stress that “PES is mistakenly understood as a simple
matter of financial incentives“ and should “be understood as part of a broader process of local institutional transformation
rather than as a market-based alternative for allegedly ineffective government and / or community governance”. Hence,
authors increasingly highlight that PES should be regarded as a complement rather than a substitution to regulatory
instruments (Sommerville et al., 2009; Vatn, 2010; Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010; Muradian et al., 2010), considering
the interplay of the whole institutional setting crucial for their success (cf. Greiber, 2009; Corbera et al., 2009; Muradian
and Rival, 2012; Schomers and Matzdorf, 2013).
The debate on granting different property rights in form of different use rights and whether to apply the polluter pays
or the provider gets principle, for instance, is a typical question of institutional interplay in PES implementation in practice.
This debate can be very fruitful, when carried out deliberately, in order to clarify present formal and informal rules and
how to deal with them. Here it becomes clear that PES are actually applied within a policy mix and that different policy
instruments are needed for different problems. This way institutional interplay is promoted through the communication of
existing formal institutions as well as by stakeholder involvement and public participation in clarifying the “rules of the
game“, i.e. mutually agree on which land and water uses are socially acceptable and which are not. This can build the
basis for agreements on what actions deserve to be rewarded through compensations (e.g. payments) and what actions
need to be regulated by command and control through bans and sanctions. Likewise, Vatn (2010) addresses the fact
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that PES schemes are not created in an “institutional vacuum”. Because of all the uncertainties and control problems
involved in the case of ecosystem services, well-functioning PES schemes demand cooperative parties, hence, taking
the wider institutional context seriously is important for success. In this context, social perceptions and values play a
fundamental role. Hence, in order to agree on values and payments for certain actions, trust building and participation are
vital elements of PES implementation (Corbera et al., 2007).
Carius (2012) comes to a similar conclusion with regard to the substantial diversity of PES differing in their scale,
organizational form, service specification, payment and monitoring models as well as participants. Therefore, he stresses
that the form of the PES mechanism “depends on regulations and norms as well as relevant political, social, economic and
ecological conditions in a specific location“. On the one hand, this highlights the dependence of PES on specific prevailing
conditions but, on the other hand, also the flexibility of PES mechanisms in adapting to context-specific constellations of
human and natural system interactions and specific institutional settings.
Muradian et al. (2010) discuss the Coasean conceptualization of PES in the context of practical implementation
constraints and discrepancies from the Coasean theory. They refer in their discussion to “the complex contexts in which
most PES schemes operate - particularly in developing countries - in order to draw insights for the elaboration of an
alternative conceptual framework” (Muradian et al., 2010). The situations that PES application faces are generally
unfavorable for a strictly market-based Coasean approach. The criticism of Muradian et al. (2010) on such an approach
stresses that in order to be effective a Coasean approach requires absent or at least very low transaction costs, clearly
assigned property rights, sufficient information for market-functioning as well as absence of the state. However, in
general, there is high uncertainty in PHES schemes due to scarce information and knowledge on cause-effect relationships
between land use and hydrological ecosystem service provision (see Section 4.2). This often results in practitioners and
policy-makers not having full access to vital information (Muradian et al., 2010). This information gap (see Section 3.3) is
an intrinsic problem of IWRM operationalization and instruments addressing this problem explicitly are needed. According
to Muradian et al. (2010), in order to facilitate a realistic connection between payments, services and economic benefits,
a genuine PES requires developing sound, context-specific, socio-ecological research prior to its implementation. This
research is carried out to different degrees in practical implementation, thus, implying different transaction costs which
may conflict with the Coasean theory. However, for many local PHES schemes this socio-ecological research is realized
while building the basis for a later PHES scheme to develop.
Furthermore, the monitoring of actual ecosystem service provision or the accomplishment of other agreed ecological
goals is often not well developed and rather builds on the faith of the participants (Muradian et al., 2010). An important
aspect in the context of IWRM is that both PHES and IWRM, i.e. water resources management in general, require
socio-ecological information in order to increase their ecological and economical effectiveness. PHES schemes, partly
because of their inherent ecosystem approach logic, though, provide the incentives to increase this knowledge and find
ecosystem-based solutions for economic trade-offs. Moreover, in local PHES schemes information, i.e. what sometimes
is considered faith, involves local knowledge on ecosystem functioning. This can be very valuable, for instance, in the
context of adaptive management (see Section 2.4). Institutional interplay is often promoted in local PHES schemes with
the establishment of technical and managing committees. Through the participation of different sector organizations (e.g.
for forest management or improved agricultural practices) in technical committees horizontal institutional interplay is
facilitated.
Muradian et al. (2010) argue that the trade-off between the need to estimate efficiency gains resulting from the
intervention and the need to keep transaction costs low enough to make PHES schemes feasible challenges the Coasean
conceptualization and instead highlights the need to make decisions in a context of incomplete information. However,
implementing PHES with a broader objective than efficiency alone can still make them feasible.
Another point refers to the social embeddedness and stakeholder perceptions in PES schemes. Clements et al. (2010),
based on a comparison of three PES schemes for wildlife protection and ecotourism in Cambodia, recognize the importance
of intrinsic motivation to determine behavior and endogenous rules developed through the PES implementation are far
more likely to be respected and understood by local people (cf., Berkes, 2004; Ostrom, 1990) than externally-imposed
rules (Cárdenas et al., 2000). This has been revealed in previous psychological studies (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Fehr and
Falk, 2002; Decaro and Stokes, 2008). Likewise, Gong et al. (2010) stress the importance of trust among stakeholders in
PES schemes which may outweigh the influence of economic incentives to achieve sufficient participation. Vatn (2010)
builds further on these arguments and sees PES schemes contributing to the re-connection of decisions about land use
management across different actors through cooperation. PES schemes achieve this in “a process mediated by existing
institutions, which include property rights, legal frameworks, social perceptions and values“ (Muradian et al., 2010).
Consequently, Muradian et al. (2010) criticize that the “Coasean approach towards PES does not pay enough attention to
the role of institutions and shared beliefs in shaping PES design and outcomes, even if these are critical under non-perfect
market situations”. Especially in the case of PHES, social perceptions about the relationship between land use and the
provision of hydrological ecosystem services, although often not supported by hydrological evidence (Kosoy et al., 2007),
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play an important role. However, this can be a precautionary strategy to deal with uncertainty and incomplete information
and does not necessarily represent a design drawback (Muradian et al., 2010).
In taking into account broader objectives beyond environmental conservation policy efficiency, the role of intermediaries
may have to be reassessed. From a Coasean perspective intermediaries should be obsolete because market participants
agree on their transactions on their own and additional players only raise transaction costs. However, when taking a
broader perspective, intermediaries are often the key to effective performance of PES in practice. Kosoy and Corbera
(2010) and also Vatn (2010) argue that intermediaries often take an active role in defining the services to be traded,
setting the conditions among buyers and sellers, and largely influencing the price of the exchange.
Consequently, Muradian et al. (2010) argue that PES schemes, especially in developing countries, should not primarily
be considered as “an economic tool only used to guarantee environmental protection in the most efficient way“ but instead
should be seen explicitly in a broader context of development and equity goals with paying special attention to social
embeddedness. Based on their arguments and in the context of uncertainty in the socio-ecological context of PES schemes
and the required social embeddedness Muradian et al. (2010) propose an alternative definition of PES:
“as a transfer of resources between social actors, which aims to create incentives to align individual and / or
collective land use decisions with the social interest in the management of natural resources.”
This definition stresses the aim of ecological sustainability and the alignment with social goals which in the context of
IWRM are as important as efficiency. Moreover, the definition leaves it open whether the transfer takes place in a kind of
market context or through other mechanisms like incentives or public subsidies. According to Muradian et al. (2010),
their definition encompasses the large diversity of existing PES which may be clustered according to three criteria: the
importance of the economic incentive, the directness of the transfer and the degree of commodification of environmental
services (see Table 5.2).
Criteria Explanation Criteria rationale
Importance of
the economic
incentive
Relative role of the payment in steering the
desired land use of providers of ecosystem
services
Multiple drivers may influence behavioral
patterns
Directness of the
transfer
Extent to which individual providers receive
direct payments from the ultimate beneficiaries
of the environmental service
Intermediaries play a critical role due to large
coordination efforts between several suppliers
and buyers
Degree of
commodification
Extent and clarity with which compensation
received by the ecosystem service providers has
been defined as a tradable commodity
Characterization of the commodity is often
fuzzy, based on assumptions about the relation-
ship between land use and service provision
Table 5.2: Criteria for an alternative conceptualization of Payments for Ecosystem Services; based on Muradian et al. (2010)
The proposed clustering of PES schemes by Muradian et al. (2010) provides for different combinations of criteria while
highlighting that scheme characteristics, in practice, go beyond the dichotomy between state-driven (i.e. rather Pigouvian)
and private-driven (i.e. more Coasean). While more market-oriented schemes payments aim at increasing performance
efficiency, they may also play an important role in facilitating the coordination between participants in schemes with a
broader focus of objectives. Moreover, Muradian et al. (2010) identify two particularities of PES: the use of economic
incentives and the high leverage of the intermediary in setting the rules. The setup of PES schemes generally implies more
than defining the traded ecosystem service, reducing transaction costs and the allocation of property rights. A substantial
degree of coordination between stakeholders, strategic decisions on trade-offs and dealing with information gaps is usually
also part of it. Hence, in considering PES schemes as part of a policy mix, the PES scheme itself does not actually need to
cover all costs if it provides synergies with other policy objectives. The coverage of at least the complete opportunity costs
of alternative uses, for instance, may not be provided through a PES scheme, but still land users may be convinced through
negotiation to accept less to bring themselves into compliance with commonly agreed rules for land use. Especially in
developing country contexts where property rights are often unclear, land users may like to legitimize their land and
compliance with an environmental regulation in the context of a PES scheme can present an opportunity to achieve this
(Muradian et al., 2010).
Turning away from a strict Coasean approach has further implications. Muradian et al. (2010) stress that under
Coasean efficiency considerations, the most appropriate PES strategy seems to be one which reduces the number and
increases the scale of providers, simplifies practices, focuses on narrowly defined services, holds down transaction costs and
complexity, while maximizing payment to reflect at least the opportunity costs of alternative land uses. Considering the
broader potential of PES schemes Muradian et al. argue instead to apply PES “to develop local and regional institutional
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frameworks that can cope with complexity and diversity, and that can integrate PES within existing regimes of rural
development and other policy instruments for environmental protection” (Muradian et al., 2010).
Tacconi (2012) proposes a further revised definition that builds on the definition by Muradian et al. (2010) but is more
specific on three important characteristics of PES, namely transparency, additionality and conditionality:
“a PES scheme is a transparent system for the additional provision of environmental services through conditional
payments to voluntary providers.“
Transparency in PES schemes, defined as the timely and reliable provision of information to all relevant stakeholders
(cf., Kolstad and Wiig, 2009), is important for the negotiation of contracts as well as for related provision and benefit
valuation rules. Transparent ecosystem service valuation, negotiations and monitoring of compliance and service provision
increases trust among potential stakeholders (Tacconi, 2012) and may avoid (perceptions of) corruption (Ferraro, 2008;
Muradian et al., 2010). Furthermore, according to Mulgan (2000), in order to make accountable those who manage
a system, i.e. here the PES scheme, transparency is needed. In contexts where parties who are in a weaker position in
negotiating agreements are present, transparency is also important to provide much-needed information to these parties
(Tacconi, 2012).
Additionality is another important characteristic and an equally difficult one to determine. PES schemes should of
course lead to additional improvements in or at least maintenance of a desired status of ecosystem service provision
compared to a hypothetical situation without a PES scheme. However, this hypothetical reference is generally difficult
not to say impossible to define (Sommerville et al., 2009). Likewise it is often very hard to attribute ecosystem service
provision to individual service providers and not to others. Thus, Tacconi (2012) argues that “additionality should be
considered at the aggregate level for the whole PES scheme rather than for the individual ES providers“. However, in order
to minimize the likelihood of wasting scarce resources additionality should be considered in the design of PES schemes
(Tacconi, 2012).
The third characteristic of PES schemes is conditionality of payments (cf., Kroeger, 2012) which requires that service
providers (sellers) only receive payment if they continuously comply with the contractually agreed-upon provision or
flow of outputs (flow or output conditionality; (cf., Wunder, 2007; Engel et al., 2008)) or of inputs assumed to produce
those outputs (proxy conditionality (cf., Quintero et al., 2009)). Input based payments, i.e. proxy conditionality are often
related to specific agreements on land uses or land use practices which are put in relation to service provision. According
to Kroeger (2012), different design options for PES schemes ranging from different forms of output (flow) to input (proxy)
conditionality as well as different levels of strictness leave wide room for operationalizing conditionality in practice.
Input conditionality, for instance, can incorporate reasonably fine-tuned payment levels for varying levels of the proxies
(Murgueitio et al., 2004). However, if PES schemes employ conditionality, it is usually proxy conditionality (Wunder,
2007; Dillaha et al., 2007; Engel et al., 2008). Kroeger (2012) points out that examples of output conditionality are less
common, primarily due to the difficulty and the cost of measuring actual outputs. Examples of output conditionality are
documented by Wunder and Albán (2008); Honey-Rosés et al. (2009); Wendland et al. (2010).
These characteristics together define PES as a policy instrument that substantially differs from other, more conventional,
instruments. The structuring in ecosystem service providers (or sellers) and buyers establishes new relationships based on
the hydrological context and aims at defined environmental outcomes from which all stakeholders should benefit. The
conditionality of PES in this context separates them from many other incentive-based resource management approaches.
Conditionality is based on an agreement between the service buyer and the provider on a specified land use. Payments
are only made if the agreed land use is complied with, thus, they are in some way subject to delivery of a quantifiable
service, with specific terms and conditions often set out in a written agreement with the service provider (Engel et al.,
2008; Porras et al., 2008). Flexibility can be introduced through agreements on different payments for different land uses,
thus the payment may be scaled to expected performance. Finally, the voluntary nature of PES clearly distinguishes them
from conventional command and control approaches. Thus, PES represent an alternative instrument to command and
control approaches and other economic instruments (e.g. environmental taxes) in order to internalize environmental
externalities. Moreover, because of their conditionality they are considered an advancement compared to ICDPs in the
context of developing countries (Engel et al., 2008; Bond and Mayers, 2010).
The definition of PES proposed by Tacconi (2012) including the characteristics of transparency, additionality and
conditionality applies to a variety of PES schemes at different geographical levels, from the international to the local level,
including Coasean schemes involving individuals and businesses. However, the differences between types of PES schemes
can be large and not all types are equally suitable to improve IWRM operationalization. The following section analyzes
different Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services (PHES) characteristics in order to identify the most suitable type
to promote fit and interplay as well as addressing operational constraints in the context of the IWRM implementation
process.
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5.2 Application of PHES instruments in practice
The complexity of the conceptualization of PHES as more Coasean, Pigouvian or anything else demonstrates the existence
of a broad variety of different PHES schemes in practice. Besides their economic conceptualization, PHES have been
categorized with regard to their specific provider-buyer relationships, i.e. the characteristics of the service buyer specifically.
In order to consider PHES as a complementary instrument to improve the operationalization of IWRM, specific PHES
categories, i.e. types are more suitable than others. Thus, PHES types that borrow from the Coasean concept the directness
of stakeholder, i.e. buyer and provider, interaction, and the ability to find context-specific solutions besides governmental
regulation are more suitable for this purpose since participation and stakeholder involvement is not only desired but a
prerequisite for effective outcomes of these schemes. Furthermore, scheme characteristics that are more associated with
the Pigouvian conceptualization are also relevant for considering PHES schemes as an instrument in the context of IWRM.
These characteristics include the involvement of the governmental actors as participants for the stewardship of social
interests, provision of additional funding and connection to other policy levels in the sense of multi-level governance. Local
municipalities, for instance, can facilitate the establishment of institutional settings and cross-jurisdictional cooperation in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. Especially in the context of developing countries, strengthening of existing
(formal) institutions is a legitimate objective for PHES. While governments may not be directly involved as a regulator in
PHES schemes, they may still play an important role to facilitate institutional development based on existing institutions
and implementation of the basin concept, e.g. land use / spatial planning based on of river basins.
The FAO acknowledges this variety of PHES schemes in a broad and general definition
“PES transactions refer to voluntary transactions where a service provider is paid by, or on behalf of, service
beneficiaries for agricultural land, forest, coastal or marine management practices that are expected to result
in continued or improved service provision beyond what would have been provided without the payment. The
payment may be monetary or in some other form. PES transactions can involve a wide range of parties - including
farmers, communities, taxpayers, consumers, corporations and governments - across a wide range of transaction
types - from direct payments between downstream beneficiaries and upstream providers to consumers paying for
a cup of “shade-grown” coffee beans produced on the other side of the world.”
Sommerville et al. (2009), for instance, argue that there are a wide variety of situations where ecosystem service
suppliers and buyers can operate. These situations may be characterized through a continuum of dichotomies of the
service providers, the buyers and the relationship between these two as summarized in Table 5.3.
Characteristics Institutional context Options1
Service provider
governance type democratic $ authoritarian
type of provider individual $ community
property tenure private property $ no tenure
legality of behaviors legal $ illegal
opportunity costs homogenous $ variable
Service buyer
buyer’s funding secure $ insecure
buyer goals to trade-off economic efficiency $ equitable distribution
additional buyer goals to trade-off social $ ecological
Relationship
threats to system internal $ external
distance between buyer and provider local $ international intermediaries
buyer-provider relationship one-on-one $ one-off negotiation
negotiations market-based $ regulated
participation constraints voluntary $ service
Table 5.3: Possible institutional contexts of PHES implementation depending on characteristics of service providers, buyers
and their relationship; based on Sommerville et al. (2009)
1 Options on the left often represent easier contexts for the implementation of PHES. There is often a continuum of options from left to right.
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Four principal types of PHES schemes may be distinguished based on the provider and buyer constellation (from local
to national and direct to indirect), i.e. buyer characteristics:
(1) User-financed (Asquith and Wunder, 2008), sometimes also referred to as self-organized (private) deals (Johnson
et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2006; Greiber and Schiele, 2011), bilateral agreements and beneficiary pays funds
(Bennett et al., 2013) or Voluntary Contractual Agreements (Tognetti et al., 2006). These schemes are of local or
regional character and “typically involve the negotiation and agreement of a contract in which resource users, who
benefit from watershed services, compensate upstream landowners for the costs of adopting management actions
needed to insure provision. Intermediary organizations, such as landowner associations, are often necessary as
a way to reduce transaction costs associated with the need for agreement and collaboration among; numerous
downstream beneficiaries and landowners dispersed over large upper watershed areas” (Tognetti et al., 2006).
(2) Government-financed (Asquith and Wunder, 2008) or public-payment-schemes (Johnson et al., 2001; Smith et al.,
2006; Greiber and Schiele, 2011). These are often national programs where the federal government pays on behalf
of the society as the beneficiary.
(3) Trading schemes (Johnson et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2006; Greiber and Schiele, 2011), where a market for
pollution rights is established.
(4) Certification and labeling for products that through their production promote the provision of ecosystem services
(Tognetti et al., 2006).
PHES designed as user-financed, self-organized deals or voluntary contractual agreements are specifically interesting
in the context of the operationalization of IWRM since they imply direct interactions of hydrological ecosystem service
providers and buyers taking into account the specific context of natural and human system interaction. Moreover, they
are often realized either as small scale local initiatives but may also take the form of larger water funds with significant
budgets for investments, e.g. the Quito Water Fund. Goldman-Benner et al. (2012) define a water fund “as a PES approach
that for financial management uses a trust fund managed by an external entity. In addition, water funds share the
following criteria: (1) multiple water service users or user groups, (2) payments that support implementation of watershed
best-management practices and conservation, and (3) a board of directors with stakeholder representation that decides
how to spend the revenue”. According to Goldman-Benner et al. (2012), the funds are governed by a multi-institutional
body, i.e. a public-private partnership that includes service buyers, and in some cases sellers, which makes decisions about
how to spend water-fund revenue. Thus, water funds can be understood as an organizationally and financially more
advanced form of local PHES schemes. Water funds have been introduced mainly in Ecuador, Colombia and Peru.
Considering the growing popularity of PES in general and PHES specifically, several global and regional reviews (see
Table 5.4) have been realized over the past decade in order to take stock of their distribution and number among different
countries as well as their relevance and trends in implementation.
Besides providing general information on the development of the instrument, these reviews reflect also the general
trend to shift from a strict Coasean market perspective on PHES towards a broader interpretation. The first reviews of
Perrot-Maître and Davis (2001); Johnson et al. (2001) and Landell-Mills and Porras (2002), for instance, still referred to
Markets for Ecosystem Services, thus, stressing a Coasean conceptualization. In contrast, the following reviews more or
less discarded this term and used Payments for Ecosystem Services instead. Porras et al. (2008), who also authored the
review of 2002 (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002), made this explicit based on the prevailing evidence of the actual nature
of PES implementation in practice. The shift from focusing mainly on forest ecosystems in the first reviews (Johnson
et al., 2001; Perrot-Maître and Davis, 2001; Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Dudley and Stolton, 2003) as provisioning
ecosystems of hydrological ecosystem services to a broader consideration of other ecosystems, including agro-ecosystems,
is also a trend that can be observed as a result of PHES evolution over time. This documents an increasing broadness in
the application of the instrument in different environmental policy contexts. However, several reviews on the importance
of protected forests for the provision of drinking water have made a special business case for PHES (Dudley and Stolton,
2003; Ernst, 2004; Postel and Thompson, 2005; Stanton et al., 2010; Buric et al., 2011; Bennett et al., 2013). Hence, for
many single and large service buyers, e.g. water companies of large cities or drinking water bottlers, PHES has already
become a cost-effective instrument. For instance, the City of New York started a PHES scheme in the 1980s to solve
water quality problems in the Catskill and Delaware river basins. This case provided a high profile and very tangible
example of their business case potential (NRC, 2000; Appleton, 2002; Pires, 2004). Another example is a PHES scheme by
Nestlé Waters to secure the quality of its Perrier Mineral Water. This case served to confirmed that PHES could be both
successfully implemented and highly cost effective for the buyer (cf., Perrot-Maître, 2006; Bond and Mayers, 2010). In the
United States of America (US), many medium- and large-sized cities followed the example of New York and almost all
water quality trading schemes are located in the US as well (Ernst, 2004; Bennett et al., 2013). In developing countries,
there are also a number of PHES schemes where a single beneficiary, usually a company which uses water as direct input
to their production process, is directly contracting land users for the provision of hydrological ecosystem services. A
typical case of this kind of PHES is the La Esperanza hydro power PHES in Costa Rica (Rojas and Aylward, 2002; Porras
et al., 2010). These schemes are characterized by a rather marginal role or even absent intermediaries and represent
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Year Scope and subject of the case study review Source
Global reviews
2001 9 examples from developing and developed countries focusing on different characteris-
tics depending on the financial mechanism.
Johnson et al. (2001);
Perrot-Maître and
Davis (2001)
2002 287 cases of MES (61 for Watershed Protection) from developed and developing
countries. Focus on different market forms for different ecosystem services.
Landell-Mills and Por-
ras (2002)
2003 105 of the largest cities in developing and developed countries. Focus on the impor-
tance of protected forests for the provision of drinking water.
Dudley and Stolton
(2003)
2004 25 PES (21 local ones and 15 for watershed protection) cases from 15 countries in
the Western Hemisphere. Focus on main differences and similarities between different
PES, as well as their strengths and limitations.
Mayrand and Paquin
(2004)
2008 81 case profiles of PHES from developing countries. Focus on national and local
schemes addressing an externality, voluntariness on the provider’s side and condition-
ality on the agreed land use.
Porras et al. (2008)
2008 Comparative case study comparison of 14 PES schemes from developing and de-
veloped countries. Focus on PES schemes closer to complying with the Coasean
conceptualization.
Wunder et al. (2008)
2010 Multi-country analysis of 10 PHES schemes over three years of implementation in devel-
oping countries. Additional review of 50 PHES cases from developing countries. Focus
on scheme characteristics and impact on livelihoods and environmental outcomes.
Bond and Mayers
(2010)
2010 127 PHES and water quality trading schemes from developing and developed countries.
Focus on the full account of payments directed to protect or restore hydrological
ecosystem services.
Stanton et al. (2010)
2011 36 PHES schemes for cities from developing and developed countries. Focus on
establishing a global inventory of cases and their characteristics.
Buric et al. (2011)
2011 Meta-analysis of institutional-economic factors of 47 PHES schemes from developing
countries explaining their environmental performance.
Brouwer et al. (2011)
2012 163 PHES schemes from 34 developing countries. Focus on basic features and gover-
nance processes.
Lin and Nakamura
(2012)
2013 205 PHES and water quality trading schemes from developing and developed countries.
Focus on profiling the scale, size, shape, and direction of investments.
Bennett et al. (2013)
Latin American reviews
2007 90 case studies with PHES characteristics. Review on characteristics of initiatives. Southgate and Wunder
(2007, 2009)
2012 38 PHES schemes. Systematical analysis to understand key features and to identify
information needs for evidence-based policy design and implementation.
Martin-Ortega et al.
(2012)
Central American reviews
2002 31 PES schemes (11 PHES). Focus on implementation process with respect to legal,
financial, organizational and institutional aspects of different countries.
Mejías Esquivel and Se-
gura Bonilla (2002)
2007 Comparative analysis of 3 local PHES case studies. Focus on socioeconomic background,
opportunity costs and stakeholders’ perceptions of the conditions of water resources.
Kosoy et al. (2007)
2007 4 local PES schemes (2 PHES). Focus on equity consideration of scheme participants in
protected areas compared to rural communities.
Corbera et al. (2007)
2008 27 PHES schemes mostly of local scale in response to problematic water supply. FAO-FACILITY (2008)
2008 3 local PHES schemes. Focus on functioning, actors involved, achievements + limita-
tions.
Martínez Tuna (2008)
Table 5.4: Overview of reviews on PHES schemes at di erent geographic scales used to derive typical features of the
instrument and its implementation
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a compelling business case where a buyer of a service looks for a cost-efficient solution to a given externality problem.
Besides these purely private PHES schemes, the large majority of local PHES involve local governments and / or other
public authorities, often in form of public municipal water suppliers as beneficiaries as well as important intermediaries
for the implementation and execution of schemes.
Porras et al. (2008) describe the evolution of first generation followed by second generation schemes as a notable
development of the instrument over the last decade. While the first generation were characterized as relatively isolated
pilot schemes in form of learning by doing approaches - many of them are documented by Landell-Mills and Porras (2002),
the second generation schemes are often already taking into account existing experiences and lessons learned from the
former projects. Consequently, these schemes place stronger emphasis on the design of baseline studies, monitoring and
information sharing which have been identified as particular problems of first generation schemes (Porras et al., 2008).
Hence, hydrological measurements and valuation studies are more often part of the instrument design of second generation
schemes. Additionally, earlier (first generation) schemes have been modified in order to promote the participation of
small farmers and respond more to stakeholder concerns, e.g. the national program in Costa Rica, or in order to improve
the analysis of hydrological linkages as in the case of Los Negros, Bolivia (Porras et al., 2008). Besides an increasing
recognition of the need for site-level measurement due to the complexities of the land use and water linkages, Porras
et al. (2008) stress that schemes are diversifying potential areas of service provision. Thus, the contribution of other
types of land-use such as agroforestry and organic agriculture is becoming more recognized. This results in additional
stakeholders entering on the supply side, e.g. farmers complementary to owners of forest, and in broadening the range
of potential intermediaries and facilitating organizations, e.g. forest and conservation organizations have been joined
by organizations promoting sustainable agriculture, agroforestry and community development. Many of these second
generation schemes are initiated as part of larger regional projects such as Cuencas Andinas of the German Agency for
International Cooperation (GIZ), the Silvopastoral Project of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) or
the Water Funds of The Nature Conservancy (TNC). Increasingly national programs are developed, often triggered by
good experiences with local pilot schemes. There are also more and more PHES schemes that are financed additionally
through national programs or funds complementary to service buyer investments. Bond and Mayers (2010) point out
in their global review and multi-country analysis of PHES that payments “should contribute to the costs of watershed
management and, if upstream communities are also characterised by poverty, these payments should contribute to local
development and poverty reduction as well“. This again marks a development from considering PHES as only buyer, i.e.
service provision oriented towards contributing to the financing of a more general objective of water management at the
river basin level.
In 2008, Porras et al. presented a follow up report of the review of Landell-Mills and Porras (2002), now with a focus
on hydrological, i.e. watershed services. The number of PHES schemes increased from 41 in 2002 to 102 ongoing cases
in 2008. In the end, sufficient information was gathered on 81 cases to be further assessed in the study of Porras et al.
(2008)5. Besides stressing that most PHES are located in Latin America (primarily in Ecuador, Colombia, Bolivia, and
almost all the countries in Central America except Belize), they also highlight a remarkable growth in the number of
schemes and proposals particularly in Latin America followed by Asia. This is confirmed by the reviews of Southgate and
Wunder (2007, 2009) from USAID and Virginia Tech based on Dillaha et al. (2007). They identified 90 PHES case studies
at different stages of implementation, about half of them in South America and the other half in Central America and the
Caribbean. Most of these cases are “PHES-like”, meaning, that they are of local character but without a strong market
mechanism. Similarly, Porras et al. (2008) identified that most schemes are local in nature, operating at the level of small
river basins. The share of local initiatives at the level of river basins as opposed to national programs has increased from
68 % in 2002 to 82 % in 2008 (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002; Porras et al., 2008). Brouwer et al. (2011) carried out a
meta-analysis of 47 PHES schemes for which sufficient information was available. The authors determine the average
age of the schemes by the year 2010 to be 11 years, almost 70 % of the schemes are located in Latin America, with two
thirds of them located in Central America. Another recent global review of Lin and Nakamura (2012) identified 163 PHES
schemes in developing countries at different states of implementation (9 schemes have been abandoned). Again, the large
majority of PHES schemes (82) are located in Latin America, 42 in Asia and 39 in Africa. 136 of the PHES schemes are
local ones, 27 represent national programs. Hence, it can be concluded that the largest number of PHES, especially local
ones, and the longest experience with the application of the instrument exists in Latin America (Landell-Mills and Porras,
2002; Dillaha et al., 2007; Porras et al., 2008; Lin and Nakamura, 2012).
Although the number of PHES schemes characterized as local is growing, they are often not completely independent
from national schemes or national government’s assistance. A relationship between national and local PHES schemes was
identified by Porras et al. (2008) in half of the cases they examined (41 out of 81). This relationship is mostly in form of
financial and/or technical assistance from the national level to the local initiatives in establishing negotiations among
stakeholders, preparation of baseline studies, design of mechanisms for collecting and allocating payments and general
management of the scheme. In some cases additional contributions from national funds complement those collected at the
5 Updated case study profiles are available at: www.watershedmarkets.org
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local level (Porras et al., 2008). However, according to Porras et al. (2008) different types of links between the national
and local level exist:
• National programs support pre-existing local schemes. For example in Valle de Bravo in Mexico, funding from the
national Payments for Hydrological Environmental Services program was used to supplement the existing voluntary
contributions to an environmental fund.
• National programs lead to the creation of local schemes. For example in Costa Rica, the existence of the national-
level PES program has provided the framework and institutional capacity to spur local-level agreements with several
hydroelectric companies.
• Local schemes lead to the creation of national programs. For example the small local schemes coordinated by the
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) / Program for Sustainable Agriculture on the Hillsides of
Central America (PASOLAC) in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Honduras are helping to create the momentum for the
creation of national-level programs.
• Local schemes set up as a pilot for national programs as in the case of Coatepeque and Jaltepeque-Jiquilisco in El
Salvador, where the planned national program Ecoservicios is being piloted.
The other half of the local schemes examined by Porras et al. (2008) emerged independently of a regional or national
program.
An interesting property of PHES schemes in the context of IWRM implementation are the multi-level governance links.
Apparently, local schemes can create a somehow upward connectivity to higher governmental levels enabling institutional
interplay for financial and / or technical assistance in establishing negotiations among stakeholders, preparation of baseline
studies, design of mechanisms for collecting and allocating payments and general management of the scheme. These
relationships may work both ways, local initiatives resort to expertise of higher level public authorities and these may
learn from local contexts and knowledge. The co-financing and -management can represent a benefit to the different levels
as well. The financing of start-up costs of local initiatives is often covered by international donors, directly or through a
national NGO, reoccurring costs and then mostly covered through payments by water users (Porras et al., 2008). Moreover,
local or national governments often contribute to additional ongoing financing. For example, local schemes in Costa Rica
involving hydroelectric companies or user fees from domestic water users, as in the case San Pedro del Norte in Nicaragua,
combine funding from local government budgets with private-sector or individual user investment (Porras et al., 2008).
Furthermore, national and local PHES schemes can be complementary in their target areas. Porras et al. (2008) found out,
for instance, that while local schemes often focus on improved land use practices at agricultural sites (e.g. agroforestry, soil
conservation), national schemes tend to focus stronger on the conservation of existing forests or reforestation. However,
local schemes with focus on improved land use practices often attempt to generate medium-term to long-term on-site
returns for the farmer as well. The higher flexibility of local schemes reaches beyond the consideration of more diverse
land uses for service provision, because monitoring and adapting to local conditions is easier, the inclusion of various
types of land tenure is also more common in local schemes (Porras et al., 2008). Based on their global review of PHES
cases, Stanton et al. (2010) consider those PHES schemes that “adopt an all-inclusive approach in terms of identifying the
stakeholders; those that have been able to evolve over time and adapt for more effective and comprehensive resource
management, and those that have been flexible enough to take advantage of linkages between local, private bilateral
programs, and the larger national incentive programs“ as most successful.
The report by Stanton et al. (2010) represents an attempt to catalog the use of PHES across the world and the financial
resources that are spent for this purpose. A major insight of this report is that the national PHES programs of China,
Mexico, Costa Rica, and the US (see Table 5.5; national PHES programs exist as well in South Africa, China and the
Philippines) form, in monetary terms, the largest group of PHES schemes but the least innovative interventions. This
is because they are often more or less a different way of using governmental resources and tax revenues to pay for
conservation. Nevertheless, these national schemes create a demand for hydrological ecosystem services which seems to
provide incentives for conservation (Stanton et al., 2010). While the American and Chinese national programs are the
largest, the emerging leader in terms of experimentation with government payments for hydrological ecosystem services,
according to the authors, is Latin America. New PHES designs, both in terms of how the payments are made, as well as in
how their effects are measured, monitored, perfected, and replicated are experimented with mainly in Latin America. The
use of trust funds to engage public and private sector resources, for instance, is a particular Latin American innovation.
Martin-Ortega et al. (2012) reviewed 38 different PHES schemes in 10 Latin American countries and analyzed four
principal characteristics: (i) context of the scheme (location, spatial scale and year of implementation); (ii) stakeholders
(different parties involved for (1) implementation and management in form of initiators and intermediaries; and (2)
participants in form of sellers and buyers of services); (iii) targeted service and actions; and (iv) contract details (land use
specified, duration, payment amounts and type, valuation technique). In accordance with previous global and regional
PHES reviews, Martin-Ortega et al. (2012) identified a larger number of schemes implemented at the local level (74 %)
and about 18 % having at least a locally implemented component but are considered as partly national schemes. The
remaining schemes are considered national programs. Of the 42 % of the cases where one or more environmental threats
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Country Program name Year Description
Colombia Plan Verde 1999 National governmental forestry plan aiming at recovering forest cover
while protecting micro-watersheds, regenerating areas affected by forest
fires and degraded mangroves. Driven by the government’s recogni-
tion of the need to protect the ecosystems that influence hydroelectricity
production, drinking water supply and irrigation.
Costa
Rica
Programa de Pago por
Servicios Ambientales
1997 Government-led scheme rewarding forest owners for protection of water,
carbon sequestration, biodiversity protection and landscape beauty from
forests. Most of the funding still relies on state funds derived from a
fuel and water tax, with increasing participation from the private sector
(especially hydroelectric projects).
Mexico Programa para
el Pago por
Servicios Ambientales
Hidrológicos
2002 Country-wide scheme targeting areas of well-preserved natural forest for
protection of their hydrological function in critical watersheds and over-
exploited aquifers and proximity to water sources that supply settlements
of more than 5,000 inhabitants, which might in the future take over the
payment through their own local government and/or water utilities.
Table 5.5: National programs of Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services in Latin America; from Porras et al. (2008)
were specified within the objective of the schemes, deforestation and land cover loss was by far considered the biggest
threat (77 %), followed by water pollution (32 %) and water over exploitation (23 %). Cattle expansion (10 %) and other
threats (14 %) including lack of water treatment facilities or lack of access to water or sanitation and forest fires were
mentioned as well.
The numerous reviews on PHES over the last decade document both a growth in number and a growth in investment
in this instrument. A large number of local schemes and several national programs have been established. After more
than a decade of experience with the instrument, the number of applications is still increasing while the instrument is
applied in a broader context and continuously improved. Although only PHES schemes where local governments play a
role will be considered in the following assessment, in the context of IWRM operationalization, the preliminary conclusion
that PHES are able to engage a broad variety of public and private beneficiaries from hydrological ecosystem services can
be drawn. However, the longest and most wide-spread experience with the application of PHES exists in Latin America.
While in South America a trend towards schemes in form of water funds can be observed, there are many applications
of local schemes in Central America. Because of their wide-spread popularity, PHES schemes of Latin America, and
especially Central America, have been subject to specific reviews and peer-reviewed publications in form of comparative
assessments (see Table 5.4). Based on these comparative assessments the principal implementation steps of PHES schemes
are described and analyzed with respect to a potential contribution to the operationalization of IWRM in the following.
5.2.1 Typical implementation process of PHES
In order to identify potential contributions to the operationalization of IWRM, the general implementation process
of locally organized and at least partly user-financed voluntary contractual agreements on Payments for Hydrological
Ecosystem Services is documented in this section. Contrary to traditional policy instruments (e.g. command and control or
environmental taxes), the implementation process of these local PHES schemes is characterized by a bottom-up procedure
with different actors participating in the process of instrument design and implementation. However, there is always some
influence from higher governance level as they provide the general legal, institutional and economic context. The typical
setup of local PHES is illustrated in Figure 5.3.
The most common point of departure for the development of a PHES schemes is the perception of degradation of water
resources, often associated with land use changes (e.g. deforestation or increasing agricultural activity), and often also
disappointment with past measures that failed to address environmental degradation adequately. Although there are cases
were the idea of a PHES scheme comes from the supply side, e.g. in the case of protected forests which are endangered by
deforestation, it has been repeatedly stressed that demand driven PHES are more promising since beneficiaries are aware
of an environmental problem and do not have to be “convinced” of it. However, according to Landell-Mills and Porras
(2002), most (early) PHES schemes have emerged as a result of growing willingness to pay among beneficiaries, most
often related to an improved understanding of the benefits provided by watershed and the increasing threats to these.
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Figure 5.3: Conceptual framework of Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services; from Brouwer et al. (2011)
In developing countries PHES often represent a response to failed governmental regulation, while in more developed
countries, new government regulations for improved water quality have been identified as a significant force behind
investment (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002).
According to Hedden-Dunkhorst et al. (2010), in many cases intermediaries such as governmental and non-governmental
organizations, research teams, or consultancies play a vital role in initiating and subsequently implementing a scheme
based on their skills and expertise. The role and importance of different actors and intermediaries will be discussed in
Section 5.2.2.
In general, the establishment of a PHES schemes require several technical and coordinating steps (see Figure 5.4)
which ideally should be carried out in order to become a successful scheme (cf. Engel et al., 2008; Tacconi, 2012). The
implementation process provides a number of synergies with the requirements for IWRM operationalization. Even when
PHES implementation is carried out without considering potential linkages to the IWRM operationalization, it still yields
results that are beneficial to the IWRM process. As mentioned before a prevailing feature of the PHES implementation
process is that solving the problems of fit and interplay is an inherent part of it. Moreover, several common operational
constraints of IWRM may also be overcome. The general steps of PHES implementation are presented in the following.
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Figure 2.2 Payments link upstream and downstream stakeholders in watershed services.
2.4 Checklist: building a case for payment schemes
Link upstream land and water use and downstream benefits
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? ????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????-
shed services. Use up-to-date scientific knowledge and, where needed, expert analysis and 
new data collection.
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Use indicators to define baselines and track progress
?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
a payment scheme. 
Understand the needs and capacities of stakeholders
?? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
by landholders.
?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
ensure that payment schemes are appropriate to their needs.
Build a case for investment in watershed management
?? ???????????????????????????????????????
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
services and create support for the concept of a payment scheme.
Plan what needs to be done to develop a payment scheme
?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
cesses for building public awareness and leading change.
Figure 5.4: Payments link upstream and downstream stakeholders in watershed services (Smith et al., 2006)
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Four principal steps towards PHES implementation can be distinguished and grouped into a preparatory and an
instrument application and execution phase:
• Preparatory phase
– Bio-physical cause-effect relationships between land use and service provision
– Socio-economic valuation of provision of and benefits from ecosystem services
• Instrument application and execution phase
– Negotiation between stakeholders towards agreements on land use
– Continuous realization of agreed actions, payments and monitoring
The first two steps represent an application of the hydrological ecosystem service concept for a given river basin context.
These steps identify, in a preparatory manner, the appropriate scale for management, i.e. application of the PHES scheme,
by addressing the issues of fit and interplay. The last two steps form the actual application of the instrument in form of
reoccurring events. The individual implementation steps will be described and analyzed in the following with regard to the
extent they address the operational constraints identified in Section 3.3 and how the instrument provides complementary
incentives towards IWRM operationalization as part of a policy mix.
The very first step of implementation represents the bio-physical assessment. This implies the identification of potential
areas for the provision of hydrological ecosystem services and potential beneficiaries of these services. As described
in Section 4.4 the logic of the ecosystem service approach here addresses the problem of fit, as defined by prevailing
ecosystem properties and identified cause-effect relationships, by taking into account the institutional interplay with
potential beneficiaries. Research institutes or universities are often engaged to carry out a biophysical assessment of the
current state of the water resources and try to identify potential areas of service provision. This way an appropriate size
for a management unit is identified based on hydrological linkages between provisioning areas and beneficiaries (Tacconi,
2012). It is no surprise that hydrological ecosystem services payment schemes are local, often involving watersheds that
supply urban or rural settlements in their proximity. Hydrological linkages between upstream actions and downstream
water impacts are less verifiable with increasing size of river basins and perceived links by beneficiaries and suppliers are
less likely (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). Hence, unless downstream beneficiaries believe that they will receive sufficient
gain from upstream watershed protection, they may not be willing to pay. Typical spatial scales of PHES implementation
identified by Brouwer et al. (2011) in a review of 47 schemes are illustrated in Figure 5.5. Hence, a typical spatial scale of
provider and buyer interaction is in almost 50 % of the cases reviewed by Brouwer et al. (2011) smaller than 1000 ha.
47% 
11% 
11% 
11% 
4% 
16% 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 
< 1000 
1,000 - 2,000 
2,000 - 3,000 
3,000 - 10,000 
10,000 - 100,000 
>100,000 
Share of PHES schemes out of a total of 47 
Area of PHES 
schemes (ha) 
Mostly 
national 
schemes 
Figure 5.5: Identified scales of operation of PHES schemes; from Brouwer et al. (2011)
The geographical localization of provisioning areas and beneficiaries provides the baseline scenario which is aimed
to be maintained, in case of an precautionary objective, or to be improved when degradation has already occurred. For
this baseline scenario spatially explicit identification of different land uses and the status of water resources is needed. If
historic information is also available, e.g. land use information or hydrological information, a deteriorating trend may be
identified. Often these are the first data acquisitions at the scale of the considered river basins. Hence, if this baseline
scenario is carefully determined, very useful information (e.g. on land uses, soils and their properties, water quality and
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Benefits from HES provision Hydrological Ecosystem Service (output) Possible provision proxy (input)
Avoided drinking water
filtration costs (sediment)
Reduced sediment load in drinking water
(municipal water plant intakes)
Riparian vegetation buffers; intact
natural land cover; intact floodplain;
Avoided dredging costs /
reduction of reservoir lifetime
Reduced sediment input in hydro reservoirs undisturbed river channel
Avoided water filtration cost for
industrial users (sediment)
Reduced sediment load at industrial water
intake points
Avoided dredging costs / loss in
agricultural productivity
Reduced sedimentation of irrigation systems
Avoided drinking water treat-
ment costs (livestock bacteria)
Reduced bacterial load (fecal coliform, fecal
enterococci) in drinking water at municipal
water intake
Riparian buffers or forests
Water-based recreation Water quantity and quality (suspended
sediment, bacteria, nutrients) in surface
waters used for recreation
Riparian buffers or forests; natural
land cover; intact upstream
vegetation (water holding capacity)
Avoided damages to human life,
health, property
Avoidance of flood water levels in water
bodies in populated and cultivated areas
Functional headwater and floodplain
wetlands and forests
Avoided drinking water
shortages
Drinking water availability (soil water holding capacity;
vegetation reducing runoff)
Avoided industrial and
agricultural water shortages
Water availability for industrial and
agricultural users
Avoided reductions in electricity
generation
Water availability for hydro power
generation
Table 5.6: Specific benefits from hydrological ecosystem services and related proxies for provision; based on Kroeger (2012)
quantity) are gathered which are often lacking for IWRM operationalization (referred to as information gap in Section
3.3). The studies on hydrological function and the impact of human induced land use changes of the páramo ecosystems
in the Andes by Buytaert et al. (2005; 2006; 2007), for instance, built the basis for the development of water funds
(Goldman-Benner et al., 2012). Although hydrological studies in this complex form are an exception, survey on land
uses, soil properties and basic hydrological parameters (e.g. precipitation, climate variables, river discharge) are carried
out in many cases in order to build a theory of hydrological ecosystem service provision and identification of important
provisioning areas. Specific benefits from hydrological ecosystem services and potentially related proxies for provision are
summarized in Table 5.6.
In a next step a socio-economic valuation of potential hydrological ecosystem services to be provided is done, often
carried out either by NGOs or university and research institutes. This is the first step to prove the feasibility of a PHES by
identifying potential service providers and service buyers as well as their respective opportunity, replacement, restoration
or avoided costs. Although the different stakeholders involved in this process are usually not in direct contact at this
phase of implementation, they may already get a perception of how service provision is valued by different counterparts’
acceptance or willingness to pay. In some cases, the bio-physical assessment and the economic valuation of identified
hydrological ecosystem services is carried out together in form of scientific studies. At best the biophysical assessment
provides scientific evidence of certain land use effects on the provision of hydrological ecosystem services for the considered
river basin which serve as an argumentation basis to engage service buyers and providers. This is rarely the case in practice,
instead, cause-effect relationships between land use and alternation of hydrological functions (on-site) form the basis for
assumed service provision. Moreover, in many cases the cause-effect relationships are instead based on shared beliefs, for
instance with respect to a general role of forests for the provision of services (Engel et al., 2008; Muradian et al., 2010).
However, the establishment and communication of cause-effect relationships between land use and service provision is
required to engage potential service providers and, more importantly, service buyers. The awareness that certain land uses
may maintain or improve service provision to beneficiaries is a requirement for estimates of willingness to pay for them
(Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). For at least 9 out of 38 of the PHES schemes reviewed by Martin-Ortega et al. (2012)
a Willingness To Pay (WTP) study was documented, technical studies as biophysical assessments were reported for 11
schemes. However, their review did not find information on opportunity costs studies.
Particularly favorable conditions for implementing a PHES scheme are present when potential upstream provisioning
areas are characterized by low opportunity costs (e.g. marginal agricultural land), basic hydrological cause-effect
understanding exists and downstream water users are able to compensate for service provision (e.g. larger urban areas,
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Promoted land use Example Reference
Conservation and protection of
existing ecosystems
In Costa Rica most PES is allocated per hectare of land
protected each year
Russo and Candela
(2006); Sánchez-
Azofeifa et al. (2007)
Voluntary forest conservation contracts in Norway Barton (2010)
Agricultural practices aimed at pro-
viding environmental services and
on-site economic returns for farmers
Agroforestry contracts in the PSA Programme in Costa
Rica, Sumberjaya in Indonesia, and Jesus de Otoro in
Honduras
Corbera et al. (2007)
Silvo-pastoral projects in Colombia, Nicaragua and
Costa Rica
Pagiola et al. (2007)
Best management contracts in the Catskill-Delaware
Watershed in New York
Appleton (2002)
Reforestation for commercial
purposes
Six national PES schemes and approximately 11 small
local watershed schemes promote reforestation
Porras et al. (2008)
Rehabilitation of degraded
ecosystems for protection
Removal of alien tree species, Working for Water in
South Africa
Binns et al. (2001)
PCJ in Brazil to restore riparian forests Porras et al. (2008)
Table 5.7: Examples of promoted land uses in PHES schemes; based on Porras et al. (2013)
commercial agriculture, industry, hydro power). However, as it is a complex task to link land use actions in a spatial
and temporal manner to specific outcomes, Tognetti et al. (2006) stress that making uncertainty explicit may be critical
for managing buyer expectations and maintaining their cooperation in the long term. Agreements on how to deal with
uncertainty is also critical in negotiating an equitable distribution of costs and benefits between service providers and
beneficiaries.
In the preparatory phase of PHES implementation intermediaries play a crucial role in identifying supply and demand
of hydrological ecosystem services. Although NGOs and international agencies are often leading this phase, there are also
actors from the supply and / or demand side involved with a principal interest in improving the service provision in the
future. In two thirds of the reviewed schemes Martin-Ortega et al. (2012) identified various driving actors, in more than
40 % of the cases a national or local NGO as the leading driver at the origin of the scheme followed by municipalities
and governments or governmental agencies (23.7 and 18.4 % respectively). In around 16 % of the schemes participants
themselves, i.e. buyers and sellers, are among the promoters (Martin-Ortega et al., 2012). They assume that when
different entities, with different capacities and knowledge, are involved, the program is more likely to get implemented.
There is an inherent motivation to gather as much information as feasible about the potential demand and supply side.
As a result, on the one hand, a process of land use categorization (at least in areas of high or low potential for service
provision) within the area of hydrological influence takes place in order to demonstrate possibilities for improvements in
service provision to potential service buyers. On the other hand all water users and potential beneficiaries of hydrological
ecosystem services are identified to create the demand side. Thus, already in this preparatory phase the problems of fit
and interplay are addressed to find the right scale for the implementation of the instrument, driven by inherent incentives
of the instruments implementation logic to do so. The specific biophysical and socio-economic context make up the
framework for this endeavor. At this phase of the implementation process all potential stakeholders on the supply and
demand side may be addressed across sectors, e.g. different land use sectors such as agriculture, forestry, nature reserves
as well as different water use sectors such as irrigation agriculture, water using industry, hydro power generators, water
supply companies and fisheries. Since this process is based on the principles of the ecosystem service concept and not lead
by a regulator with respective administrative boundaries, an appropriate fit is achieved through the identified ecosystem
cause-effect properties.
Porras et al. (2008) and also Martin-Ortega et al. (2012) found out that forest conservation and management as well as
reforestation are most often associated with improved hydrological service provision, but increasingly general watershed
conservation / restoration and improved agricultural practices (e.g. agroforestry) are recognized to be potentially beneficial
as well. Examples of typically promoted land uses in PHES schemes are listed in Table 5.7.
Following the bio-physical and socio-economic assessments the actual process of negotiation is carried out. Again
intermediaries play an important role in this phase in order to involve all relevant stakeholders as well as in moderating
the process. On the supply side, providers of hydrological ecosystem services have to be engaged. This requires that
they are legitimated to manage the targeted land (either through existing formal property rights or informal established
rights to use the land) and are willing to provide the service. The definition of services provided is often based on land
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use proxies, hence, the size of different provisioning areas has to be determined and an agreement on the land use
proxy has to be reached. According to the findings of Engel et al. (2008) and Martin-Ortega et al. (2012), in general the
payment is determined directly by an action (input related) and not by the results of the action on the actual hydrological
ecosystem service (output related). Martin-Ortega et al. (2012) revealed that about three quarters of the PHES schemes
they reviewed include a bundle of ecosystem services, and about half of them include not only water related services,
but also other types of services (e.g. carbon sequestration). However, a very large majority of the schemes focuses on
improving extractive water supply (91.3 % of the cases), while about one third of the cases have specific focus on water
quality or water quantity. Moreover, improving the in-stream water supply, for instance to improve water flow regulation
for hydropower production, is targeted in 53.3 % of all reviewed case studies (Martin-Ortega et al., 2012). A review of the
IIED identified the maintenance of dry season flows, protection of water quality, and control of sedimentation as the main
concerns of 61 studied payments for ecosystem services form forested watersheds (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002).
During the negotiation process it is usually determined how to deal with conditionality and additionality in the
application of the scheme. The outcome of this process has far reaching consequences on the eligibility of participants both
on the provider and buyer side, on the outcome of the PHES in terms of land use changes and service provision as well as
on the baseline assessment and monitoring of the program. Most of all, the latter aspects can increase both the transaction
costs of the scheme and the opportunity costs of the service providers and will consequently lead to lower availability of
financial resources for actual payments. The reduced availability of financial resources for actual payments and a possibly
higher payment amount because of higher opportunity costs of providers will in total lead to a much smaller area to be
contracted within the PHES scheme. Hence, higher stringency in conditionality can lead to a reduced volume of service
flows obtainable for a given PHES budget (cf., Kroeger, 2012).
Besides the definition of conditionality terms, stakeholders involved in a PHES scheme need also to address the issue of
additionality, thus, defining whether a certain measure can be qualified as an additional action as opposed to an action that
the participant (i.e. provider) would have realized anyway without compensation. The additionality feature of measures
in the context of PHES is the core of how the instrument relates to other policy instruments. However, this aspect will be
discussed in the following chapter, based on an in-depth case study analysis.
Tognetti et al. (2006) stress that in considering additionality it should be kept in mind that the development of
institutional capacity needed to effectively respond to watershed degradation can also have other benefits. According to
Landell-Mills and Porras (2002), the institutional capacity building, that forms part of a PHES scheme can lead to social
cooperation in other matters, development of skills, opportunities for clarification of land titles, and increase of scientific
understanding, and environmental education (cf., Tognetti et al., 2006).
Hence, the negotiating process of a PHES scheme is basically about finding agreements in the context of conditionality,
additionality and voluntariness of the instrument. This often implies an exchange of values and perceptions on what
should and what not be compensated. Hence, PHES may be embedded in a policy mix among other regulatory instruments
(e.g. establishment of protected areas based on command and control) such as those needed to deal with activities agreed
to be ineligible for compensation. Furthermore, some actions may only be defined eligible for in-kind compensations, e.g.
through the provision of material for fencing of restricted land use zones or capacity building to improve agricultural land
use without continuous payments in the future.
The potential to engage private sector actors in conservation financing and activities is evidenced by a majority of
private service buyers and seller, i.e. providers. The private sector, local and national government, local and international
NGOs, community groups and donors are all participants in PHES schemes as buyers, sellers, intermediaries, brokers
and providers of support services. Grieg-Gran and Porras (2012) report a generally good level of participation from
smallholders and poor communities in local PHES schemes, because these schemes have been able to adapt to local
circumstances, taking time to build up trust among the landowners and find ways around obstacles such as lack of clear
land titles. For instance, in the PHES case of Los Negros in Bolivia, where the NGO Fundación Natura facilitated discussions
between upstream and downstream landowners, followed by the introduction of a payment scheme with initial donor
funding. The NGO used local recognition of landholdings where formal land titles were missing (Asquith and Vargas,
2007).
Tognetti et al. (2006) argue that the willingness of potential beneficiaries to pay for hydrological ecosystem services
with public good characteristics (being difficult or expensive in limiting access to them), depends not only on the demand
but also on beneficiaries’ confidence in the effectiveness of the proposed management actions to ensure service provision.
Moreover, potential buyer need to be sure that they will have access to the stream of benefits, i.e. access to the provided
service. Hence, according to Tognetti et al. (2006), the value of watershed services will depend on:
• The integrity of ecosystem functions or processes that support service provision
• The scale at which impacts or benefits have economic significance and
• The effectiveness of institutional arrangements needed to insure provision and access.
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Payment
[ha/year]
Activities
compensated
Hydrological
services
Service buyer Service seller Location
US$ 45 Reforestation Salinity control,
freshwater supply
Downstream
farmer association
Government and
upstream
landowners
Murray Darling
Basin, Australia
US$ 230 Reduced-input
farm management
Water quality
control,
freshwater supply
Perrier Vittel
(Mineral water
company)
Upstream farmers Rhine-Meuse
Basin, France
US$ 45-116 Protecting, sus-
tainably managing
and replanting
forests
Freshwater supply,
wildlife habitat,
cultural heritage
and identity
National Forest
Office and Na-
tional Fund for
Forest Financing
(FONAFIFO)
Private upstream
landowners
Costa Rica
US$ 48 Protecting, sus-
tainably managing
and replanting
forests
Hydropower, reg-
ulation of flows,
sedimentation
control
Hydropower
company and
FONAFIFO
Private upstream
land owners
Sarapiqui water-
shed, Costa Rica
US$ 125 Soil conservation Sedimentation /
water quality con-
trol, regulation of
flow
US Department of
Agriculture
Farmers United States
US$ 170 Watershed
restoration
Freshwater supply,
wildlife habitat
State of Parana Municipalities and
landowners
State of Parana,
Brazil
Table 5.8: Examples of payment amounts for hydrological ecosystem services; from Smith et al. (2006) based on Perrot-
Maître and Davis (2001); Kumar (2005)
Thus, within PHES schemes it may become necessary to address rivalry over access to a limited supply of hydrological
services by developing of specific institutions, e.g. enforceable rules, through which access can be secured to those who
are paying for its provision. These institutions may also define responsibilities for actions needed to insure that services
are provided (cf., Ostrom, 1990).
However, besides the engagement of service buyers it is equally important to convince sufficient providers to join a
scheme because hydrological ecosystems service provision is most likely to be characterized by threshold effects depending
on the spatial and temporal extent of land use changes (see Section 4.2). Hence, Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) highlight
that cooperation is a key requirement when it comes to the supply and demand for ecosystem services. A successful scheme,
thus, may depend on strengthening cooperative and hierarchical arrangements allowing beneficiaries and providers to
formulate group payment strategies and tackle free riding of non-paying beneficiaries.
Main recipients of payments for their role as service providers are landowners and farmers (mostly private, but in some
cases public landowners or cooperatives of landowners). Martin-Ortega et al. (2012) identified this recipient group in
96.4 % of all cases in their review, however, it is often unclear whether farmers or land users also own the land since
many case study documentations do not specify this6. In less than 5 % of the cases, the authors identified local and
national NGOs as well as park administrations as sellers. The number of hydrological ecosystem service sellers varies
widely. Martin-Ortega et al. (2012) document PHES schemes with only one seller to more than 800 sellers, with a median
of 18 and an average number of 55 sellers.
The buyer side of PHES is generally more heterogeneous than the seller side. The largest buyer group are hydropower
producers or domestic water users (Porras et al., 2008; Martin-Ortega et al., 2012). Irrigating agricultural producers and
national or international NGOs are also common buyers but to a much lesser extent. Again the number of buyers differs
largely, according to Martin-Ortega et al. (2012) ranging from one single buyer (e.g. a hydro power company) to 18,700
buyers (individual consumers in an association of domestic water users), with a median number of 8 buyers.
Examples of different negotiation results (payment amounts, activities to be compensated and hydrological ecosystem
services aimed at) of PHES in practice are summarized in Table 5.8.
6 Farmers are explicitly reported as service providers in 14.6 % of the cases, while landowners are mentioned in 77 % of the observations
(Martin-Ortega et al., 2012).
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The flexibility of PHES schemes with regard to the promotion of different actions to improve hydrological service
provision and differentiation in respective payment amounts, i.e. compensations, is stressed by Martin-Ortega et al.
(2012). 42 % of the cases reviewed by the authors include some kind of differentiation in actions to improve hydrological
ecosystem services. Five different features were identified to classify for different compensation: (i) the type of activity
(e.g. forest conservation, reforestation or improved agricultural practices); (ii) the land feature and type (e.g. slope or
forest type); (iii) the number of practices applied; (iv) the surface covered; and (v) other features (e.g. type of ownership
of the land, land use history or the status quality of the area) (Martin-Ortega et al., 2012). In most cases (75 %) the type
of activity is the determining feature for the payments.
The second part of the instrument application incorporates the continuous realization of agreed actions, payments and
monitoring of agreed actions. There are usually three mechanisms in place to achieve this: a supervising mechanism
composed of a technical and a governance supervision, a financing mechanism and a payment mechanism. This typical
PHES set up is illustrated in Figure 5.6.
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users 
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Figure 5.6: Organizational structure of a PHES scheme; based on Pagiola and Platais (2005)
The realization of agreed actions is often assisted by a technical supervision carried out by a specialized organization. For
instance, capacity building on improved agricultural practices may be carried out by a governmental or non-governmental
organization, such as a technical institute or a NGO experienced in agricultural land use improvements. This form of
technical assistance may facilitate an upward connectivity to a higher governance level which provides assistance on
demand of the parties involved in the PHES scheme. Assistance is often provided, although resources and capacities are
scarce when a specified demand is placed. Moreover, technical assistance may also be provided in order to identify services
and eligible land uses related to service provision, monitoring of impact on services and if necessary periodical adjustment
of eligible land uses. At best technical experts from specialized organizations are involved in this supervision and potential
service providers as well as buyers are consulted in order to find a consensus on land use linkages to service provision.
Besides the technical supervision, there is also a governance supervision needed to negotiate additional agreements on
payments and to resolve disputes on ongoing agreements. The involvement of representatives of actual and potential
service providers and buyers is crucial for successful governance supervision and durability of a scheme.
Furthermore, a financing and a payment mechanism are required. These mechanisms are not always organizationally
separated. A financing mechanism is in place for the collection of payments and for managing the fund if necessary. The
payment mechanism in turn has its function in contracting with the service sellers, monitoring the implementation of
agreed actions and execution of payments. The latter may be done in a transparent manner to outsiders in order to
promote engagement of potential service providers. The majority of PHES schemes studied by Martin-Ortega et al. (2012)
involve periodical cash payments (mostly through specified PHES water fees) and includes different payment levels,
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depending mostly on the actions involved and the type of land use. In schemes where a large number of stakeholders
(buyers and sellers) are involved, payments tend to be channeled through intermediaries (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002).
This allows buyers and sellers to contract out the negotiation and conclusion of deals, overseeing implementation and
enforcing contracts. Moreover, intermediaries may be valuable for pooling funds from a group of beneficiaries and / or
collecting user fees.
If agreed land uses do not lead to the desired outcomes of the service provision they may require revision. As a result of
the conditionality criteria, the motivation for monitoring of land use and service provision arises. Thus, besides baseline
information a PHES scheme, in an ideal case, also provides continuous information on land use and hydrological services.
Monitoring implies additional transaction costs but is a prerequisite to prove the failure or success of introduced land
use measures. Moreover, conditionality means that noncompliance has to be addressed and consequences, for instance
exclusion from the payment scheme, have to be defined.
The monitoring of agreed actions of service providers in most cases is, as well the provision of ecosystem services,
based on the compliance with agreed land uses (Engel et al., 2008). If a separate monitoring of hydrological services is
lacking, it is impossible to verify that the promoted land uses result in the provisioning or maintenance of the ecosystem
service that is being paid for (cf. Wunder, 2005). According to Grieg-Gran and Porras (2012), very few PHES schemes go
beyond monitoring compliance with agreed land management practices to actually measuring trends in service provision.
The meta-analysis of Brouwer et al. (2011) on 47 PHES schemes revealed that for 47 % of the schemes a monitoring on
quantified objectives was documented. In this context, important issues have to be dealt with in order to find agreements
between providers and beneficiaries in terms of additionality and conditionality of payments.
Pagiola and Platais (2007) stress the particular strength of local PHES schemes by directly involving local actors as
the actors with the most information about the value of the service. Thus, local actors have a clear incentive to ensure
that the mechanism is functioning well, can observe directly whether the service is being delivered, and have the ability
to re-negotiate or even terminate the agreement if needed (Engel et al., 2008). Local actor involvement, hence, makes
efficiency improvements more likely by reducing transaction cost (Pagiola and Platais, 2007).
5.2.2 Actors and institutional roles in the governance and management of PHES schemes
The importance of actor-oriented incentives to overcome problems of fit and interplay in order to operationalize IWRM
from bottom-up has been highlighted in Section 3.4. Thus, based on the identification of typical PHES implementation
processes, this section focuses specifically on actors and institutional roles in the governance and management of PHES
schemes.
According to Smith et al. (2013), there are typically four principal stakeholder groups involved in a PHES scheme:
• Buyers and beneficiaries of ecosystem services who are willing to pay for them to be safeguarded, enhanced or
restored.
• Sellers and providers; land and resource users whose actions can potentially secure supply of the beneficial service
• Intermediaries and facilitators; who can serve as agents linking buyers and sellers and can help with scheme
design and implementation.
• Knowledge providers; these include resource management experts, valuation specialists, land use planners,
regulators and business and legal advisers who can provide knowledge essential to scheme development.
In the local schemes that are considered here in the context of IWRM operationalization, the buyer side always includes
actual users of the provided hydrological ecosystem services, but may be complemented by national governments that buy
services as part of a national scheme. Typical service buyers are local public or private water suppliers, municipalities,
hydro power producers, industry and irrigation agriculture. Thermal power plants, which require large quantities of
water for cooling, have so far not been engaged as service buyers. The service buyers generally join the PHES scheme
voluntarily, but water end users (e.g. domestic water users) are often forced to buy the service, i.e. to pay a fee, through
their water suppliers. However, the service providers or sellers, in most cases private farmers or forest owners, communal
landowners, and in some cases government or NGOs managing protected areas, do generally join a scheme on a voluntary
basis (Porras et al., 2008; Brouwer et al., 2011). Blackman and Woodward (2009) analyzed the drivers for participation in
a PHES scheme of the private hydroelectric sector in Costa Rica based on semi-structured and open-ended interviews
with participants and non-participants. They revealed that, both participants and nonparticipants, besides stating that the
main benefit of participation was forest protection and the provision of environmental services, also emphasized improved
relations with local communities and with government regulators.
Table 5.9 summarizes the main stakeholders from different sectors and highlights their principal incentives for
participating in a PHES scheme. While private sector stakeholders perceive incentives in form of reduced costs and
increased security of service provision, the public sector and local communities see additional incentives in improvements,
when complying with their role, and in gaining more influence in decision-making processes.
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Sector Stakeholder Incentives for participation
Public Water companies, local governments Water quality, water regulation, avoided sediment costs
Hydropower generation companies Water flow regulation, avoided sediment costs
National environmental authority Strengthening, financing and fulfilling protected area
management plans, resource conservation
Local environmental authorities Strengthening, financing and fulfilling protected area
management plans, resource conservation
Water authorities Management of watersheds, resource conservation
Irrigation zones Water regulation, avoided sediment costs
Private Water companies Water quality, water quantity, water regulation
Hydro power generation companies Water regulation, avoided sediment costs
Bottled water and soft-drink companies Water quality, water regulation, avoided sediment costs
Agricultural associations Water regulation, avoided sediment costs
Industries Water regulation and water quality
Local
Communities
River associations, water boards,
irrigation boards
Participation and investment decision-making, resource
conservation
Indigenous communities Participation and investment decision-making
Table 5.9: Stakeholders participating in Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services schemes and respective incentives for
participation; based on Calvache et al. (2012)
Greiber (2009) identified potential stakeholder groups involved in the planning, negotiation and implementation
processes of PHES. These stakeholders as well as their typical roles are described in Table 5.10.
Figure 5.7 illustrates schematically the level of influence and interest of different stakeholders participating in an PHES
scheme based on findings of Calvache et al. (2012) in the context of water funds. While some important intermediaries
such as multilateral cooperation agencies and international NGOs have a high level of interest in PHES, others usually
have a stronger level of influence, for instance public authorities at different governance levels. Hence, it is not surprising
that these actor groups act mutually to implement PHES schemes. However, service beneficiaries as well as local NGOs,
protected area agencies and community-based organizations often combine a high level of influence and interest in PHES,
the former as potential buyers and the latter as important intermediaries.
The PHES review of Martin-Ortega et al. (2012), revealed the presence of intermediaries in a large majority of schemes
(almost 80 %) with almost a quarter of schemes where various intermediaries are involved. According to the authors,
most often local NGOs (about 25 %), followed by multi-stakeholder trust funds (13 %; e.g. FONAG in Ecuador and the
FIDECOAGUA in Mexico) and municipalities (10.5 %) are involved as intermediaries.
Intermediaries and facilitators often play an important role in the initiation, the implementation process and the
subsequent execution of PHES schemes. According to Greiber (2009) and Hedden-Dunkhorst et al. (2010), they may
comprise the following central technical and coordinating tasks:
• Scientific advice to project developers, particularly regarding the identification of expected downstream services
• Design of payment mechanisms, feasibility studies, management plans and monitoring systems
• Facilitation of negotiations among all stakeholders by linking potential buyers and sellers while involving other
relevant stakeholders in the design process
• Stimulate and institutionalize inter-sectoral coordination and cooperation (e.g. between water, forestry, social
development, economic sectors)
• Provide information and juridical support to contract parties and stakeholders (e.g. on environmental monitoring
or the negotiation of legal transactions)
• Promote transparency and local acceptance for the scheme beyond contract parties
• Manage expectations and resolve occurring conflicts through stakeholder dialogues
• Land management capacity-building
• Collection of hydrological data and
• Contract administration, allocation of funds and payments.
Most PHES schemes are initiated by NGOs or international agencies, sometimes with municipalities as their counterparts.
The initial bio-physical assessment and socio-economic valuation are often carried out by these actors as well or through
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Stakeholder
group
Description, typical examples and roles
Beneficiaries Private or public instances who have a demand for the provision of hydrological ecosystem services
Providers • Private landowners; individual owners with clear and undisputed property rights;
• Communal landholders; farmers living on or drawing their livelihood from communal property;
• Private reserves; whether an individual or group, private entities registered as reserves and
committed to ecosystem conservation are the third most common supplier of watershed services;
• Governments or non-governmental organizations (NGOs); land owned and managed by govern-
ments or NGOs for conservation purposes;
• Informal occupiers of public lands; farmers living on public property, oftentimes designated as a
protected area, who may have long-standing rights to the land.
Donors • Government; providing municipal and national government funding;
• Private sector; making voluntary and required payments for water-related ecosystem services;
• Private individuals; paying household and agricultural fees for water use;
• Charitable foundations; making donations from their assets.
Beneficiaries and donors will often overlap.
Intermediaries Intermediaries (governmental entities, international agencies or NGOs) may link donors, benefi-
ciaries and suppliers of water-related ecosystem services, and aid in the development, adminis-
tration or operation of a PHES scheme.
Table 5.10: Potential stakeholders involved in the planning, negotiation and implementation processes of Payments for
Hydrological Ecosystem Services; based on Greiber (2009)
universities or research institutes. Intermediaries and facilitators, including national or local government agencies,
environmental NGOs, development NGOs and funding institutions, also operate at various stages of the process from
initial stakeholder dialogue to design, implementation and operation of the PHES, and are involved in most PHES. Porras
et al. (2008) identified in their global review on PHES schemes only “few schemes where the suppliers and the buyers
make arrangements for payment without the help of a facilitator at some stage of the process“. Some intermediaries act
primarily as facilitators having a transitory character, for example in assisting during initial stages of a scheme through
facilitating dialogue or information but withdrawing when the scheme is established and others take ownership (Porras
et al., 2008). International development agencies and NGOs often take this transitory role.
Porras et al. (2008) in their PHES review stress not having identified any facilitator operating as a market player,
taking on risk by buying hydrological services and selling them on to different users. This again documents the limited
market-like, i.e. purely Coasean nature of PHES schemes. However, intermediaries often play an important role in
determining payments through negotiation at the local level. According to Porras et al. (2008), here they may be needed
to create a negotiation forum and to assist the weaker party, usually the service providers, with a negotiating strategy. In
many schemes in South and Central America trusts have been created as intermediary structures.
Moreover, intermediaries are regarded as important both in the design and the operation of PHES (Porras et al., 2008).
The diversity of intermediaries and stakeholders involved with different tasks often leads to a variety of partnerships
between different types of organization, governmental and non-governmental groups, academia and international interest
groups. Buric et al. (2011) in the case of PHES schemes for urban beneficiaries characterize them as “multi-stakeholder
affairs involving national and local (regional / municipal) governments, community groups, individual landholders,
commercial enterprises, non-governmental organizations and various donors”. While governmental entities play an
important role in providing information and capacity, local intermediaries (e.g. NGOs, user associations or municipalities)
are of particular importance to strengthen the link between providers and users at the local level in a flexible manner
(Porras et al., 2008). Moreover, Porras et al. (2011) argue that the ability to find an intermediary to group small providers,
often dispersed, and thereby keeping transaction costs low is often necessary to safeguard the development of socially
equitable PHES.
The role of facilitators and intermediaries, especially public authorities, is also very important in the context of
monitoring. They can support monitoring and improved service provision measures, e.g. through capacity building for
sustainable agricultural practices, with the result of leaving more of a PHES budget for actual payments and reducing the
participation cost.
Especially in Central America, local municipalities play a special role as service buyers, facilitators and intermediaries.
Besides their role as service buyers in case of municipal water supply, they also play an active role in facilitating information
on land and water uses / users and often provide the legal basis for a scheme through municipal decrees (Pérez et al.,
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Figure 5.7: Outline of stakeholder influence on and interest in a PHES scheme; based on Calvache et al. (2012)
2002; Mejías Esquivel and Segura Bonilla, 2002). Moreover, municipal involvement may be needed to resolve disputed or
informal land uses and rights.
The Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SCD), one of the most important donors of local PHES with its
Programa para la Agricultura Sostenible en Laderas de América Central (PASOLAC) initiative in Central America, proposes
the establishment of Ecosystem Service Commissions (Comisión de Servicios Ambientales; COSA) for the management
of payment schemes in form of a custodian for the payment fund. According to the SCD, this inter-sectoral and inter-
institutional commission should be composed of representatives of all stakeholders involved in the PHES scheme. For
instance, in the context of a PHES aiming to protect drinking water resources from soil erosion and resulting sedimentation,
the commission would be composed of upstream land users, representatives of the municipality, the water supply company,
the civil society, a technical expert and a representative of the organization in charge of the payment fund. The commission
is in charge of assigning responsibilities for managing the payment fund, supervision of payment agreements and execution
as well as coordination of agreed activities for the implementation of the scheme (Pérez et al., 2002).
Water funds in South America have a similar intermediary structure in the form of fund boards. According to Goldman-
Benner et al. (2012), fund boards are composed of diverse stakeholders, including water users and service providers,
and makes decisions about how to use funds. In bringing together different stakeholders with multiple objectives, joint
decision making may divert service buyers’ investments from the services they most care about. Hence, Goldman-Benner
et al. (2012) stress that this may lead to large-scale, integrated water management with partnerships that “provide a way
to include social criteria as well as biophysical and economic measures in defining optimal investment portfolios“.
5.2.3 Constraints for the development of Payment for Hydrological Ecosystem Services
Just as any other policy instruments, PHES schemes have instrument specific weaknesses and require certain circumstances
in order to be successful. Criticism concerning the threat of commodification of nature through the introduction of
ecosystem services into a classical market economy have already been addressed in Chapter 4 and this criticism applies
equally to PES as expressed with the objection of the PES instrument when purely market-based for instance by McCauley
(2006); Robertson (2006); Redford and Adams (2009); Kosoy and Corbera (2010).
Redford and Adams (2009), for instance, outline seven problems with ecosystem services which they consider necessary
to be addressed in order to make the role of payment for ecosystems services in conservation clearer and arguments for
conservation stronger:
(1) The real risk that economic arguments about services valued by humans will overwrite and outweigh non- economic
justifications for conservation.
(2) Erroneous assumption that ecosystem services are necessarily benign implying a danger to limit the focus on
regulating ecosystem services to times and in flows that match human needs.
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(3) Environmental policy based on the optimization of ecosystem-service values will not necessarily lead to the
conservation of biodiversity, e.g. preference of exotic instead of native species for the provision of services.
(4) Maximization of single-service provision leading to increased ecological brittleness.
(5) Markets only exist for a certain range of ecosystem services, and some services are not amenable to pricing or
valuation, e.g. where a valuable service is provided by a biodiverse ecosystem (e.g., water yield from a forested
catchment), where that ecosystem is close to a major consumer, and where institutions exist to enable those
consumers to pay for the service they receive, ecosystem services may provide a powerful stimulus for conservation.
Elsewhere, they will not.
(6) As ecosystem services become increasingly scarce and valuable, people will compete to gain control over flows of
services and the ecosystems that provide them.
(7) Impacts of climate change on ecosystem service delivery are unknown and may cause identified cause-effect
relationships to become obsolete.
Furthermore, Amezaga (2006) highlights typical constraints for the implementation of benefit-sharing mechanisms
which may also be true for PHES. According to Amezaga, these constraints range from the need to find a compromise
among conflicting interests over the distribution of cost and benefits to institutional challenges and up-front costs of
engaging stakeholders in initial planning stages. In order to be successful, a common understanding and agreement about
the nature of the expected impact, the approximate magnitude of cost and benefits, and the areas of uncertainty must be
clear for all stakeholders.
Besides the general criticism on PES as a policy instrument, there are some principal constraints to the development of
PHES schemes. Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) identified transaction costs, demand-side constraints and supply-side
constraints as particular constraints toward PES development.
Transaction costs have considerable influence on the development of a PHES scheme since these costs reduce the
budget available for payments to service providers. Compared to other ecosystem services, e.g. carbon sequestration,
the cost of establishing a payment scheme for hydrological ecosystem service can be high due to the specific cost of
identifying potential providers and buyers, negotiating to implement a scheme, monitoring and analyzing service delivery,
documentation and record keeping and administration of contracts (Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). This is a result of the
nature of hydrological ecosystem services, the possibly large number of participants involved and often the absence of
cooperative structures to build negotiations on. Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) regard multiple-stakeholder transactions,
lack of cost-effective intermediaries and poorly defined property rights as main reasons for the particularly high transaction
cost in the context of PHES schemes.
PHES schemes between upstream and downstream communities frequently require a large number of participants,
especially on the side of service providers in order to become feasible. Hydrological threshold effects imply the coverage of
a minimum area of the river basin, often involving large numbers of land users, to cause the desired effects on service
provision. Broad participation is also essential to avoid free-riding in consumption and to convince beneficiaries to pay
(Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002). The number of potential participants as well as related transaction costs usually increases
with the size of the river basin. Several authors, Ostrom (1990); Rhoades (1998); Magrath et al. (1997) among others,
have highlighted the cost of multi-stakeholder participation. Besides transaction costs originating from multi-stakeholder
participation, additional costs arise from building organizational structures of intermediaries who bring buyers and seller
together. These intermediaries often require strong managerial, financial and technical skills. At best it can be built on
existing organizations, where these are absent often NGOs or community organizations are strengthened in their capacity
to function accordingly. However, this often needs higher investments (cf., Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002).
Another factor influencing transaction costs are property rights. According to Landell-Mills and Porras (2002), in most
cases insecure tenure remains a principle constraint against the development of schemes. However, in their review the
authors point out a number of innovative approaches to define property rights, e.g. in the form of transpiration credits,
salinity credits, watershed management contracts and conservation easements.
Examples for the transaction cost of two PHES schemes in Madagascar are summarized in Table 5.11.
PHES scheme Area [ha] No. of beneficiaries No. of providers Transaction costs
Drinking water supply
of the city of Fianarantsoa
3,500 150,000 196 Ä 15,456
Compensation: Ä 77,037
Drinking water supply
of the city of Andapa
910 30,000 32 Ä 16,419
Compensation: Ä 151,481
Table 5.11: Parameters and transaction costs of PHES in Madagascar; based on (Bidaud et al., 2013)
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Several factors that undermine demand for hydrological ecosystem services are mentioned by Landell-Mills and Porras
(2002) as further constraints to scheme development. Of course, in order to be willing to pay for the provision of
hydrological ecosystems services, potential buyers need to be aware of potential benefits from specified land uses. Lack of
confidence in or scientific evidence of cause-effect relationships between land use and service provision may significantly
lower the willingness to join a payment scheme on the buyer, i.e. demand side. Moreover, Landell-Mills and Porras
(2002) stress that “where beneficiaries are not involved in designing the payment system and ensuring against free-riding,
they may be unsupportive”. Participation of potential service providers is equally important as payments should meet
their needs to engage them as well. Thus, the active participation of these key stakeholder groups in the design and
implementation of PHES schemes is essential. This has been explicitly acknowledged by the US Environmental Protection
Agency, for instance, by issuing specific guidelines on stakeholder participation in its Water Quality Trading Assessment
Handbook (EPA, 2004). Furthermore, Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) highlight the lack of willingness to pay as an
additional constraint to the development of a PHES scheme because of undermined demand and stress two mayor reasons
for this from literature:
(1) Resistance of stakeholders that are used to receiving watershed protection services for free. This is particularly
damaging where more powerful entities are determined to face down efforts to force them to pay the full costs of
water provision.
(2) Lack of finance, especially where the government is the buyer (in Vietnam, for instance, government payments for
watershed protection are too low to attract the necessary landowner participation; (cf. Sikor, 2000)).
Transaction costs and factors that undermine demand are not mutually exclusive. Often increasing transaction costs
result in undermined demand, for instance.
Finally, Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) also regard factors that undermine supply as potentially hindering PHES scheme
development. The authors acknowledge a widespread lack of awareness of potential opportunities to exploit positive
externalities. Even when land users are aware of their role in providing services, downstream beneficiaries are most
likely willing to pay when they perceive their water supplies as threatened. However, Landell-Mills and Porras (2002)
see potential for land users to be more proactive in bargaining for payments by taking positive externalities into account
when making land use decisions. This allows them to determine the minimum payment they are willing to accept in order
to abandon their plans. With this information they are in a position to initiate a bargaining process. A final aspect that
may undermine supply is a lack of credibility in service delivery. It has to be clear how service providers will alter service
delivery. If the provider side wants to establish a payment scheme, it may have to offer some form of insurance scheme
to minimize risks to downstream buyers where reliable, site-specific hydrological data illustrating clear land use-service
provision linkages is missing.
Apart from general criticism on PES (cf., Redford and Adams, 2009) and constraints to scheme development (cf.,
Landell-Mills and Porras, 2002), there are also critical reviews specific to the functioning and implementation requirements
of PES. Wunder et al. (2008), for instance, examined 14 PES case studies to identify whether the scheme, i.e. program,
succeeds in generating the desired ES. The authors identified four critical issues related to the function of PES schemes and
several other issues with regard to achieving environmental goals. The four issues related to the functioning of schemes
are: enrollment of potential ecosystem service providers, compliance of ecosystem service provision and additionality as
well as land use-ecosystem service provision linkage.
In general, enrollment of potential hydrological service providers is not difficult in practice as long as there is no
significant mistrust concerning buyer or intermediary compliance. According to Wunder et al. (2008), in most cases
applications from service providers exceeded by far the available funding. However, high disposition of potential service
providers is not always given for the most critical provisioning areas if opportunity costs significantly exceed the payments
offered.
The issue of compliance with agreed actions is an important one and requires some kind of monitoring. The common
proof of compliance is achieved through site inspections, in the case of the FIDEICOMISO scheme in Mexico additionally
through remote-sensing satellite imagery since it is integrated in the national PHES scheme. Monitoring implies transaction
cost which can vary widely depending on the characteristics (e.g. size and accessibility) of the area to be monitored as well
as on the temporal interval. It is important that service providers and buyers agree on a feasible practice of monitoring.
Moreover, agreements on monitoring require agreements on sanctions in order to ensure compliance. The principal
sanction in most PHES schemes, according to Wunder et al. (2008), is the loss of future payments, either temporarily or
permanently, and in some cases reimbursement of previous payments. However, there are no systematic studies on the
effectiveness of different types of sanctions to achieve compliance.
With regard to ensuring service provision compared to a situation without a payment scheme, compliance is strongly
related to additionality because it considers whether agreed actions (or non-actions) would have been done even in the
absence of payments. In practice, situations without intervention in form of business as usual scenarios are extremely
difficult to determine. Wunder et al. (2008) document just one case where additionally is formally quantified for various
ex ante scenarios. However, more attempts to assess additionality have been realized, most of them in Costa Rica, in an ex
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post manner with divergent results (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006; Sánchez-Azofeifa et al., 2007). Experience of many
user-financed PHES schemes provides reasonable good evidence of high additionality. (Wunder et al., 2008) report that in
the case of Pimampiro in Ecuador, for instance, previous deforestation trends were reversed in the scheme area, while
deforestation continued apace in surrounding areas. Additionality can most easily be achieved, i.e. monitored where
explicit land-use changes are agreed, for instance reforestation or structural changes in agricultural practices. Land use
changes which are markedly different from observed land use trend may also have higher additionality. In some cases
additionality can be assumed if land use changes occur within the scheme area, while promotion of the same land use
changes are not achieved elsewhere, despite being promoted as well. Wunder et al. (2008) provide such an example with
the success of the PROFAFOR PES in establishing more than 22,000 ha of forest plantations on degraded lands in Ecuador,
while a variety of traditional subsidy-based reforestation programs elsewhere in the country failed to achieve significant
results.
Improvement of the provision of hydrological ecosystem service is still not secured based on provider enrollment,
compliance and additionality alone. Additionally, the assumed cause and effect relationship between land use changes
and service provision has to be true as well. Reis et al. (2007) stress that this is the most important biophysical aspect
influencing the success of a PHES scheme. As has been discussed in Section 4.2, clarifying these cause and effect
relationships is a complex issue for hydrological ecosystem services, especially when the relationship has been little studied.
There is much controversy whether assumed cause-effect relationships eventually are true, especially when considering
the role of forest for quantitative aspects of water provision (Chomitz et al., 1999; Bruijnzeel, 2004; Calder, 2004).
There are just a few PHES schemes where a thorough scientific investigation of land use linkages to hydrological service
provision has been realized. Exceptions are South Africa where the water consumption of invasive alien species has been
well-documented (cf., Turpie et al., 2007) or the Los Negros PHES in Bolivia where the role of cloud forest in increasing
dry season flows was studied(cf., Le Tellier et al., 2009). However, although land use linkages to service provision are not
always clearly identified it is important that providers and beneficiaries agree on some kind of principle assumptions of
them which have to be verified in the future through measurements and monitoring. Moreover, in areas deemed to be
suitable for conservation in order to secure continued service provision, the precautionary principle provides sufficient
reason to do so. This precautionary logic has been the basis for many water user-financed PHES in Costa Rica (cf., Wunder
et al., 2008). Some relationships between land use and service provision, however, are reasonably well established, e.g.
erosion control by perennial vegetation (Hope et al., 2007). As most PHES schemes lack a profound scientific basis of
cause-effect relationships it is very much advisable to provide for sufficient monitoring and measurements in order to
learn more about them and to react accordingly.
This form of continuous learning has been repeatedly stressed by adaptive approaches of IWRM operationalization (see
Section 2.4). Wunder et al. (2008) argue that it seems more reasonable to expect user-financed schemes to adapt this
learning approach with a focus on monitoring because users have a strong incentive to ensure that their money is spent
effectively. Moreover, the smaller scale of user-financed PHES makes it easier to observe whether the desired services are
being generated or not. Hence, PHES schemes provide an incentive to gather site-specific hydrological data. In the long
run, more robust explanations for land use and service provision linkages will be either beneficial on the willingness to pay
or lead to a revision of previously assumed linkages in order to improve the scheme’s outcome. In the end, increasing
knowledge on land use linkages can even lead to discarding a PHES scheme if service provision may not be sufficiently
affected by land use changes alone. Hence, the instrument itself may control its suitability with regard to the problem to
be solved.
Besides these four issues determining the provision of desired hydrological ecosystem services, Wunder et al. (2008)
consider three additional aspects that help to identify (i) whether ecosystem services are provided on a long-term basis
(permanence); (ii) whether environmentally-damaging land uses are displaced to areas outside the scheme area (leakage);
and (iii) whether the program creates perverse incentives. Duke et al. (2011) also regard leakage and perverse incentives
as well as additionality as particular pitfalls of PES schemes.
Permanence of a PHES scheme depends on its continued and sustainable financing. For user-financed schemes continuous
payments depend on maintaining buyers’ willingness to pay. As long as buyers are satisfied with service provision or
the agreed land use changes, they will probably continue to finance a scheme. It is important, thus, to improve the
available knowledge on service provision and the impact introduced land use changes have on it (Pagiola and Platais,
2007). The permanence of schemes supported by governmental financing again depends on a continued governmental
budget allocation for this purpose. During the execution of a PHES scheme, permanence can also be compromised when
participants exit the scheme, e.g. by not renewing their contracts or by violating agreed terms. Incentives to exit a scheme
on the provider side can be present when potential benefits of alternative activities increase. Theoretically, payments may
be adjusted to increasing or declining opportunity costs of service providers, however, most PHES schemes have been in
operation for too short a period of time to confront this situation in practice (Wunder et al., 2008). Some authors, for
instance Swart (2003), have doubts whether actions towards service provision will be maintained once payments end.
A feasible way to increase the probability of permanence is presented by the promotion of services providing land uses
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which also provide permanent on-site benefits, e.g. schemes focusing on planting trees base expectations of permanence
beyond the end of payments on the expected benefits from sustainable timber harvest. According to Wunder et al. (2008),
some schemes apply “short-term payments on the premise that the practices being supported are privately profitable
once established, and thus will be retained“. This form of incentive can be suitable to introduce transitions toward more
sustainable land use.
Wunder et al. (2008) further mention leakage, a situation where environmentally-damaging activities are merely
displaced rather than reduced, as another concern regarding the effectiveness of PES. This problem is especially important
for global services like carbon sequestration. However, for spatially explicit services such as hydrological ecosystem
services, the presence of leakage will depend on the specific scale of intervention. If undesired land use is displaced outside
the considered river basin, than leakage is at least not affecting service provision but may have negative impacts elsewhere.
However, case study documentations of PHES schemes have not yet raised concerns about leakage. Usually monitoring
provides a good means to reduce the risk of leakage and particular contract design addressing this issue can further reduce
this risk. The relatively small size of user-financed PHES schemes makes them leakage unlikely (Wunder et al., 2008).
Furthermore, PHES schemes have to take care not to create perverse incentives to potential service providers. A typical
example of such an undesired incentive is when offering payments for reforestation could induce deforestation (Engel
et al., 2008). Pagiola and Platais (2007) stress that schemes focusing on additionality are particularly at risk of creating
perverse incentives if payments are offered only in the presence of clear threats of degradation, then potential applicants
may be induced to create such threats. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) provides an example how to avoid this
kind of incentives through careful contract design in specifying that only areas deforested prior to 1990 would be eligible
to sell carbon credits from reforestation. However, PHES schemes can also introduce additional positive incentives, for
instance if deforestation is declared an exclusion criteria for receiving payments in the future, hence, even non-participants
may retain forests in order to maintain the option to participate. Tattenbach et al. (2006) highlight that a PES scheme in
Costa Rica has this option value creating effect for forests. To avoid the problems of leakage and the creation of perverse
incentives, Duke et al. (2011) argue that PES schemes require strong institutional capacity facilitating monitoring and
oversight.
The PES instrument has also raised concerns about its influence on equity, especially on the poor in developing countries.
These concerns are often expressed in the context of Coasean PES with focus on efficiency. Specific concerns relate to the
ability of the poor to participate in schemes. One important obstacle to participation of the poor is the transaction cost of
participation. Therefore, Costa Rica established a system of collective contracting to reduce participation cost for poor
participants. Insecure land tenure can also impede the participation of the poor since they may only have use rights to the
land without ownership. However, in local PHES schemes the problem of land tenure has been successfully overcome.
Moreover, Zilberman et al. (2008) stress the importance of land distribution and service productivity as important criteria
where the poor land user may benefit. Investment costs are another issue which may cause problems for poor participants.
Specific land use changes, e.g. reforestation, may require initial investments which poor participants may not be able to
cover. This problem is often addressed by upfront in-kind payments of the material required to comply with the agreed
land use.
Pagiola et al. (2005) argue that PES may address poverty mainly by making payments to poor natural resource managers
in upper watersheds. However, the impact depends on how many PES participants are in fact poor, on the poor’s ability to
participate as well as on the amounts paid. The authors stress that here can be important synergies with poverty reduction
goals when the scheme’s design is well thought out and local conditions are favorable, while there may also be adverse
effects where property rights are insecure or if less labor-intensive practices are encouraged. Moreover, Pagiola et al.
(2005) point out that designing payment mechanism so as not to exclude poor land users is probably the most important
step in reducing adverse effects on the poor. Keeping the transaction costs as low as possible and developing creative
responses to problems of insecure tenure can achieve this. Where strong local organizations, e.g. community groups or
NGOs, assist in organizing participants and providing a forum for discussing solutions to problems as they arise, pro-poor
scheme design is easier (cf., Pagiola et al., 2005).
In any case, it should be kept in mind that PHES schemes are not primarily designed for poverty reduction but to address
environmental management problems. Hence, benefiting the poor is only a possible beneficial side-effect. It cannot be a
guiding principle for provider selection since areas of potential service provision are not necessarily correlated with poor
lands user or owners. However, beneficial impacts of PHES on poor participants have been documented by Suyanto et al.
(2007) for a case in Indonesia where service providing land uses, here agroforestry systems of shaded coffee plantations,
also created on-site benefits to service providers. Bond and Mayers (2010) claim that “there is little evidence of PWS doing
any harm to poor people” based on their multi-country evaluation of case studies. However, payments are usually closer to
the WTA of providers than to the WTP of buyers since the latter is often more difficult to identify. Hence, it is assumed
that payments, in most cases, do not significantly improve household incomes of service providers but schemes may offer
new opportunities to gain income which in the long-term can be significant. Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) summarize
what they consider the most important constraints to the development of pro-poor PHES schemes (see Table 5.12).
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Constraint Explanation
Costs of organizing
multiple-stakeholder
schemes
Poor people tend to hold smaller plots, making co-ordination of supply more complex and
costly. Poor beneficiaries may be more numerous and water use be informal and unregulated,
making it more costly to incorporate them into payment schemes
Poorly defined /
insecure property rights
Poorer groups tend to be the worst effected by insecure tenure as they lack the contacts,
power and know-how to formalize their property claims
Lack of stakeholder
participation
In negotiations around instrument design and payments, poorer individuals and groups are
often most vulnerable to exclusion because of lack of skills to ensure their voice is heard
and lack of political representation
Ability to pay Where potential poor beneficiaries lack financial resources to pay, they have no influence
over the allocation of resources to watershed protection
Low awareness of
service payment
opportunities
Poor people tend to be least well-educated about payment opportunities for hydrological
services, and least able to initiate bargaining with downstream beneficiaries. They are less
powerful and lack essential marketing, negotiation and coordination skills
Lack of credibility in
service delivery
Where landowners’ property rights are insecure, they are in a weak position to promise
delivery of services. It is more difficult for poor service providers to guarantee forest
protection since they need to maintain flexibility to respond to unexpected shocks
Table 5.12: Constraints to the development of pro-poor Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services schemes; based on
Landell-Mills and Porras (2002)
Embedding PHES schemes with a policy mix of other governmental regulations is important to prevent that PHES
schemes reinforce entrenched inequities, and to promote participation opportunities to weaker groups (Landell-Mills and
Porras, 2002).
5.3 Addressing the institutional challenges of operationalization and provision of incentives toward IWRM
The experiences with local PHES schemes revealed several instrument characteristics which are promising in the context of
IWRM operationalization. Three aspects are particularly important: the incentive provided by PHES schemes to different
actors to overcome problems of fit and interplay (see Sections 3.1 and 3.2), the way how the instrument addresses
operational constraints (Section 3.3), and how the instrument fits into existing policy mixes (Section 3.4).
With regard to the provision of incentives to solve problems of fit and interplay in the IWRM context, PHES bear several
specific advantages compared to other policy instruments. If conditionality and additionality are part of PHES design, the
typical implementation process as described in Section 5.2.1 provides several important incentives in the context of IWRM
operationalization:
(1) Realization of bio-physical assessments and monitoring in order to understand cause-effect relationships between
different land uses and hydrological service provision.
(2) Involvement, interactions and agreements between multiple stakeholders (ecosystem service providers and buyers
as well as additional intermediaries) across sectors and administrative boundaries.
(3) Long-term commitments for service provisioning and financing as well as the establishment of organizational
structures.
The PHES implementation process in the context of IWRM operationalization is illustrated in Figure 5.8.
The realization of bio-physical assessments and the involvement, interactions, and agreements between multiple
stakeholders basically represent the ecosystem service approach to solve the governance problems of institutional fit and
interplay in IWRM implementation, as discussed in Section 4.4. The outcomes of this process are, in an ideal case, spatial
land use planning based on a river basin or a convenient part of it as planning unit, an established stakeholder dialog, a
baseline assessment and a monitoring program of hydrological ecosystem services as well as organizational structures for
a context-specific management. As the documentation of typical PHES implementation revealed these outcomes are not
always achieved due to design limitations of the scheme or a lack of resources. However, although bio-physical assessments
and economic valuation could be improved, the stakeholder dialog is actually most important as it facilitates negotiations
on land uses, even though it is based on commonly shared beliefs rather than scientific evidence. For the permanence of
PHES schemes, however, it is important to monitor land use and / or service provision in some mutually agreed form. This
allows for continuous learning on bio-physical cause-effect relationships.
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Figure 5.8: PHES implementation in the context of IWRM operationalization (Author’s work)
It has to be stressed that the stakeholder negotiation process and the agreements on land uses occur within practical
problem contexts which means that the outcomes are both context-specific and problem-oriented. Hence, they represent
an expedient form of resource management (cf., Section 2.4) from bottom-up which works best when all stakeholders
are involved. Stanton et al. (2010), for instance, highlight the role of PHES as a mechanism for collaborative action
because the implementation process entails policy decisions requiring negotiations between multiple stakeholders including
providers, beneficiaries, and intermediaries. According to Stanton et al. (2010), it is the negotiating process among the
different actors that often leads to more effective and sustainable agreements which are vital to better land use and
planning. Moreover, PHES implementation facilitates more awareness among all actors involved of the inherent benefits
provided by ecosystem and hydrological services (Stanton et al., 2010). Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) also stress the
potentially valuable role of PHES schemes in supporting coordination “by offering a transparent and efficient way of
managing participants’ interaction, a mechanism for sharing benefits to secure broad participation, and a mechanism for
self-financing“.
PHES schemes play an important role for the establishment of commonly agreed institutions (e.g. rules for land use) and
also for the development of organizational structures. According to Landell-Mills and Porras (2002), PHES schemes have
frequently spurred the creation of new organizations. Instead of posing threats to existing organizational arrangements,
PHES schemes have complemented and strengthened existing hierarchical and cooperative structures (Landell-Mills and
Porras, 2002).
In the context of their global review of PHES schemes, Lin and Nakamura (2012) stress the unique governance
characteristics of PHES schemes in including intermediary organizations which “create a societal opportunity for enhancing
ecosystem functions through mutual economic willingness-to-pay and willingness-to-accept payments between downstream
and upstream stakeholders”. Moreover, they highlight this connecting function of intermediaries as a critical starting
point for integrated management. Actually, intermediaries often fulfill similar functions as RBCs but enjoy trust from all
stakeholders since they act as brokers in their interest. This is a significant advantage of the PHES instrument compared to
other instruments commonly applied as mandatory top-down approaches of political or membership linkages. The basic
interest of an intermediary in a PHES scheme is to involve as many stakeholders as possible based on functional (bio-
physical) linkages and engage them in the form of contractual agreements. In order to increase trust among stakeholders in
organizational structures often provided by intermediaries, stakeholder representatives participate in the decision-making
of these organizations. This active stakeholder involvement and participation is another advantage of local PHES schemes.
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Implementation step Efficiency consideration IWRM context
Bio-physical cause-effect rela-
tionships between land use
and service provision
Inclusion of potential provisioning ar-
eas limited to those areas with high
service potential and low opportu-
nity costs
Broad consideration of land uses having an
impact on water resources
Socio-economic valuation of
provision of and benefits from
ecosystem services
Concentration on few service
providers with largest service
providing areas
Consideration of benefits from hydrological
ecosystem services beyond those appreciated
by potential buyers
Negotiation between stake-
holders towards agreements
on land use
Direct negotiations between buyer
and sellers with individual agree-
ments on actions and payments
Negotiating process as a broad forum to ex-
change different positions and participatory
decision-making in a policy mix context
Continuous realization of
agreed actions and payments
Conditionality on service provision
(output-based)
Flexibility in additionality and conditionality
according to commonly agreed goals
Table 5.13: Comparison of PHES implementation steps under e ciency optimizing consideration and in the context of
IWRM (Author’s work)
Besides directly addressing the problems of fit and interplay, PHES schemes have to be considered in the context of
operational constraints described as information, capacity and funding gaps in Section 3.3. The bio-physical assessment
and the economic valuation of service provision as preparatory elements for a PHES scheme can potentially contribute to
closing information gaps at the level of IWRM operationalization. If conditionality and additionality are agreed principles,
then strong incentives are provided to measure and monitor land use and service provision. Furthermore, the local
assessment and negotiation of hydrological service provision based on defined land uses has certainly capacity building
elements for local actors. Moreover, when PHES participants are involved in decision-making processes, important
management skills are trained as well. Thus, the capacity gap is also addressed by PHES schemes in facilitating a form of
co-management by PHES participants where local capacities and knowledge are included, e.g. on the opportunity costs of
land use changes or their impacts on ecological functioning. Finally, PHES schemes, as originally intended, contribute
to financing of water resources management by tapping local resources. Hence, PHES schemes are potentially able to
co-finance IWRM operationalization through payments from beneficiaries of hydrological ecosystem services. This could
reduce the funding gap of IWRM operationalization and incorporate resource costs into water prices (as proposed, for
instance, by the EU-WFD).
Some aspects of PHES implementation may compromise PHES efficiency in straight economical terms of conservation
but are beneficial in the context of IWRM or a broader development context. For instance, in order to increase the efficiency
of PHES, only service providers with the lowest opportunity costs and the highest expected (relative) service provision
should be considered (achieving environmental goals at the lowest cost). For the purpose of IWRM implementation, it
is useful to involve all service providers, i.e. stakeholders, even if there are no beneficiaries readily identified. Thus,
the IWRM objectives of involving all potential stakeholders with externalities may cause higher transaction costs (e.g.
for additional capacity building and cooperation) which could be unfeasible under plain efficiency considerations. A
stronger involvement of intermediaries also implies additional transaction costs, but a stronger involvement of local
governments as intermediaries may be justified because of IWRM subsidiarity objectives and public good characteristics of
services. Moreover, this provides opportunities for co-managing and co-financing. Table 5.13 summarizes the principal
implementation steps of PHES schemes under primarily efficiency optimizing considerations compared to implementation
in the context of IWRM.
Considering PHES implementation in an IWRM context seems reasonable since several operational tasks are equivalent.
However, in an IWRM context PHES implementation would be required to be broader, thus, implying additional transaction
costs. For instance, bio-physical assessments may not be limited to potential provisioning areas for actual hydrological
services demanded but should include principal sustainable use considerations. This could lead to a more comprehensive
land use planning including areas which are not of particular interest in a plain PHES context.
Considering PHES beyond individual market transaction and recognizing the role of local governments in caring for
externalities that effect society as a whole (e.g. those beneficiaries of ecosystem services now and in the future which
cannot be easily identified and engaged as user, i.e. payers) allows regarding them as instruments for co-management and
co-financing of water resources management (cf., Gutman, 2003). Hence, local governments and other intermediaries
may share the costs with ecosystem services buyers. Moreover, a redistribution of costs between up- and downstream
parties may result in a more equal distribution according to perceived benefits (Reis et al., 2007).
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Hydrological service Examples for benefits Benefit characteristics Benefit type
Water flow regulation Maintenance of dry season flows
for water supply, flood control
Non-exclusive, non-rival Public good
Erosion / sedimentation
control
Reduction of landslides risk or
reservoir sedimentation
Exclusive or non-exclusive,
non-rival
Depends on characteristics of the
resource system and beneficiaries
Public or club good
Improved water quality Nutrient and chemical load
control, salinity control
Exclusive or non-exclusive,
non-rival
Depends on characteristics of the
resource system and beneficiaries
Public or club good
Increased water supply Groundwater recharge,
increased available surface water
Non-exclusive, rival Public good or com-
mon pool resource
Table 5.14: Benefit characteristics and type of hydrological ecosystem services; based on Reis et al. (2007)
Moreover, as documented by the common implementation practice of PHES schemes, ecosystem service beneficiaries
and providers are involved in the policy process and can actively influence the outcomes. However, considering the
multitude of ecosystem services in healthy ecosystems, it is impossible to engage all potential beneficiaries as ecosystem
service buyers unless there is an obligatory fee that applies to all. While those who benefit most, e.g. major water users in
a river basin, may possibly be engaged as service buyers there remains sufficient rationale for public authorities to engage
as service buyers on behalf of the less easily identifiable beneficiaries of the present and the future. This explicitly includes
society’s benefits from non-use values. In this sense public authorities comply with their role as stewards for sustainable
natural resource management. Moreover, public authorities as stewards or buyers of currently non-use values are in line
with the idea of safe minimum standards and the precautionary principle as a central element of environmental policy.
Public authorities may also assume responsibility for those ecological values which may not have been properly expressed,
e.g. as stated preferences, in a valuation process.
Private beneficiaries and public authorities as beneficiaries on behalf of the society, acting as ecosystem service buyers
reassigns traditional roles of natural resource management. In the traditional context of command and control regulation,
public authorities design and set the formal rules that private actors have to comply with, thus, roles are assigned for the
regulator and those being regulated, i.e. for those who actively define the policies for what is right and wrong and those
that have to respond passively. In contrast, in a situation where public authorities and private actors are taking similar
roles as ecosystem service buyers there is much more room for mutual policy design, since traditional hierarchies are
offset.
Besides being a buyer of ecosystem services, public authorities are often important facilitators of knowledge on laws or
improved practices, acting as coordinators between different buyers and network agents in connecting different public
and private parties, e.g. involving other governmental organizations from different policy sectors (Tognetti et al., 2006).
This way they have potential to improve stakeholder involvement and public participation in the policy design and
implementation process. Public authorities (i.e. local governments), thus, can promote co-management and co-financing
for IWRM. In this context, Reis et al. (2007) propose to determine the degree of public authority involvement in policy
mixes containing PHES schemes based on the public good characteristics of hydrological ecosystem services. According to
the characteristics of excludability and rivalry of benefits from hydrological ecosystem services illustrated in Table 5.14,
three general categories can be identified (cf. Reis et al., 2007).
One category encompasses hydrological with public good character, for instance flood protection. Public good services
are non-rival and non-exclusive as it is practically impossible to exclude anyone from the benefits. For payment schemes
addressing this kind of services it seems reasonable if a public authority provides incentives for upstream communities
to supply the service on behalf of a larger benefiting society (cf. Reis et al., 2007). However, by making public goods
exclusive they may be transformed to toll or club goods. This second category of services incorporates hydrological
services related to improved water quality, for instance reduced sedimentation or reduced flow of nutrients, chemicals or
salinity. These services can be made exclusive through regulating the access to the water body, while they will always
remain non-rival. Here again, a payment scheme seems suitable where a government agency pays upstream providers and
regulates downstream access to the water body by setting prices. The service automatically becomes exclusive in cases
where only one private beneficiary, e.g. a hydro power company, is present. In this case direct payments often work well
without the need for downstream institution building. Reis et al. (2007) argue that in the case of multiple beneficiaries,
e.g. irrigation systems, user payments could also work if the community is able to exclude community members that do
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not pay even if the use is non-rival. Finally, Reis et al. (2007) introduce hydrological services with common-pool resource
characteristics of rivalry and non-excludability. This category includes all services related to increased quantitative supply.
Contrary to public good services, if access to the service is made exclusive on the buyer’s side, these services can be traded.
According to Ostrom (1990), three prerequisites have to be met in order to exclude service beneficiaries who do not
contribute to its supply:
• Clearly defined boundaries: Clear definition of who has the right to utilize the service, and clear definition of the
boundaries of the common pool resource itself
• Monitoring
• Graduated sanctions
According to Reis et al. (2007), individual service users “will only be able to reach excludability if they establish an
institution that secures clearly defined boundaries and adequate tools for monitoring and sanctioning, i.e. if they cooperate“.
However, irrespective of the kind of hydrological service category cooperation among providers is often necessary due
to the fact that the service usually cannot be provided by a few single landholders (Adhikari and Boag, 2013). This is
especially true for developing countries where providers will most likely be smallholders and a measurable environmental
benefit for downstream communities will only be ensured if they collaborate.
The categorization of hydrological services with regard to excludability and rivalry characteristics by Reis et al. (2007)
provides some useful reasoning whether a PHES scheme may be based on a direct payment mechanism between upstream
and downstream individuals / communities / corporations, and to which extent the action of government agencies is
advisable. Since several hydrological services can feature public good characteristics, public authorities acting as service
buyers or at least contributing to payments seems reasonable. Some non-rival services can be made exclusive or are
practically exclusive, thus, governmental involvement as a buyer may not be necessary. However, PHES schemes for rival
and non-exclusive hydrological service, according to Reis et al. (2007), rely heavily on the level of cooperation on the
beneficiaries’ side. While in the context of payments for a private good competition is the main driver, here cooperation is
needed to establish a payment scheme. Thus, as PHES schemes are based on cooperation and not on competition they
may not be considered as actually market-based.
Consequently, Reis et al. (2007) point out that “the key question is therefore not, whether markets should be introduced
instead of cooperative institutions or government regulations, as they do not represent an alternative for the management
of water resources. The question is rather, whether market-like mechanisms are an appropriate tool for resolving the
problem of unequal cost and benefit sharing in watershed management within a certain institutional framework based on
cooperation or public regulation”. According to the authors, PHES schemes may also be considered as a means to promote
cooperation among water users where there are no institutions for common-pool resources management or where such
institutions do not work properly.
Considering the above discussion of property rights and public good characteristics it becomes clear that there is
often also a public or common good concern which justifies the involvement of governmental actors in PHES schemes.
Participation of public authorities in PHES schemes means involvement of those establishing (formal) rules and those
being affected by the rules. Here an important characteristic of PHES schemes is that participants can influence the rule
making process, while existing formal but also informal rules may be considered. This allows for the flexibility required to
meet specific local contexts.
Although considered merely an economic instrument, PHES are characterized by communicative and informative
instrumental aspects as well as a strong interaction with command and control mechanisms. In fact, PHES can induce a
discussion on how ecosystem services should be provided, e.g. through compensation or legally enforced protection. As
a result of the PHES establishment different service providing areas and suitable uses are identified. This information
represents, on the one hand, a baseline scenario for future ecosystem service improvements and also the basis for
land use planning based on river basins, which is a major element of river basin management plans usually used to
implement IWRM. This requirement of the PHES implementation process, thus, can easily serve the purpose of IWRM
operationalization. Furthermore, areas which are most vulnerable for hydrological ecosystem service provision (e.g.
spring areas, riparian areas and steep slopes) are in most cases protected by law but lack of enforcement has still lead
to degradation. Here, local PHES have the potential to contribute to an improved enforcement of the existing rules
based on the communication aspects of PHES and the provision of material, e.g. to build fences around these areas. The
benefits from IWRM implementation are often not tangible right away, while PHES can demonstrate benefits and trade-offs
in a demonstrative manner. Another aspect is the funding needed for IWRM implementation which in most cased is
provided by federal subsidies. This creates dependencies at lower governmental levels and funding is often insufficient or
lacking. PHES can contribute partly to IWRM funding through tapping of additional financing sources if elements of PHES
implementation are also used for IWRM purposes, e.g. land use zoning or baseline assessment and monitoring. Thus,
PHES offer the possibility to facilitate context-specific integration based on solving the problems of fit and interplay in
an interdependent manner. The relationship of ecosystem service providers and users can possibly define the degree of
integration (spatial and sectoral) based on related transaction costs.
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5.4 Summary
PHES originally evolved as market-based instruments in order to improve efficiency in environmental conservation.
However, as different economic conceptualizations have shown, the instrument provides advantages over traditional
regulation instruments. Practical application of PHES schemes reveals that stakeholder interaction and finding mutual
agreements seem to receive more attention than strictly market-based efficiency consideration. This is especially true
for local schemes where stakeholders, i.e. most importantly service providers and buyers, come to agreements on land
uses and context-specific definition of conditionaliy and additionality. Hence, local PHES have the potential to improve
stakeholder involvement and public participation in policy design and implementation in water resources management.
Furthermore, incentives provide the motivation for stakeholder actions and introduce behavioral change by involving
those that actually have a stake in the local IWRM process in order to identify the right scale for management based on fit
and interplay.
There are several steps inherent to the PHES implementation process that are equally important for IWRM operational-
ization: communication of the river basin as the management unit, involvement of up- and downstream stakeholders, data
acquisition of water and land uses, identification of hydrological cause-effect relationships, exchange of value perceptions
and preferences. These implementation steps are mutually required and facilitate cooperation. The majority of steps to
implement IWRM on the local level are often not taken yet (Akhmouch, 2012), but as evidence from case studies suggests,
they are taken within PES projects when hydrological ecosystem services are considered. Moreover, these PHES schemes
often provide the financial resources and a conceptually inherent necessity to carry out these steps which otherwise
would possibly not be done. Thus, it can be argued that where PHES schemes are carried out, critical elements of the
IWRM process used to be absent or at least lacking implementations. The documentation of many PHES case studies
suggests that their implementation includes several tasks that are also part of the operationalization of IWRM, more
specifically the elaboration of river basin management plans, for instance, land use planning on the basis of river basins.
Furthermore, within PHES schemes organizational structures are established that fulfill similar tasks to those of river
basin committees. However, compared to committees that are installed in a top-down manner the PHES organizations are
more context-specific and based on particular functional linkages rather than political or membership linkages. It can be
concluded that PHES schemes provide critical incentives to engage different stakeholder across sectors and administrative
boundaries and to build up knowledge on SES needed for practical management. Thus, PHES may possibly be more than
just an end of establishing economic incentives for conservation, but also a means for the operationalization of IWRM.
This additional objective (i.e. side effect) of PHES may justify higher transaction costs and efficiency trade-offs.
The PHES implementation process offers several opportunities to overcome some principal implementation gaps of
IWRM operationalization (see Section 3.3) like the information, capacity, and funding gap. For other implementation gaps,
e.g. administrative gaps, it can be a suitable stepping stone. PHES schemes may also benefit from stronger involvement
of public authorities and other networking intermediaries because they can reduce their share on transaction costs and
provide additional motivations to engage service providers (e.g. those with more or less high opportunity costs but also
high potential for service improvement). Public authorities can provide resources for capacity building and knowledge
generation.
This chapter considered general characteristics of PHES and the specific implementation steps of local voluntary
contractual agreements as a potentially suitable instrument to foster IWRM operationalization. In principle, these PHES
schemes have the potential to address the problems of fit and interplay in order to find the most appropriate scale
for management based on context-specific interactions of natural and human system’s characteristics. Thus, spatial
and temporal phenomena are being considered not only in the context of ecology but also in the context of social
interactions. Moreover, both, PHES schemes and the IWRM operationalization process, may provide mutual benefits.
However, documented difficulties and limitations of current PHES practices have to be addressed. This requires basing
PHES schemes on clear and consensual scientific evidence, linking land uses to the provision of services, flexible, ongoing
and open-ended contracts and payments, multiple sources of revenues which are sufficient and sustainable over time,
monitoring of compliance, land use changes, and the provision of services; and the flexibility to allow adjustments to
improve their effectiveness and efficiency in order to adapt to changing conditions (cf., Mayrand and Paquin, 2004). This
way better evidence can be gathered from the beneficial impacts of sustainable land-management practices on water flow
and quality, and on the ability of payments to influence the behavior of landholders. In achieving this, PHES may become
an integral part of water resource management and allocation policy (Porras et al., 2008).
As the global review of PHES case studies has demonstrated, most experience and documentation on PHES schemes
exists in Latin America. With respect to the land area and population covered there is a somewhat higher amount of cases
in Central America than in South America. The largest number of local PHES schemes is located in Central America. The
following chapter analyzes the process of IWRM implementation in Nicaragua and draws on a Nicaraguan case study
evaluation of a Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services scheme for possible conclusions on the extent to which this
and other schemes in Nicaragua may facilitate further IWRM operationalization on the river basin scale. Nicaragua is
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chosen, because although there is no national PES scheme several local PHES schemes have already been implemented.
Moreover, the implementation of PHES has been accompanied by significant national efforts to implement IWRM. These
are the reasons for choosing Nicaragua as an empirical case study example in order to assess the potential role of local
PHES in the context of IWRM operationalization.
136 5 The concept of Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services
6 Contributions of Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services to IWRM in Nicaragua
The role of PHES in the context of the IWRM implementation process refers to user-financed publically and/or privately
organized PHES. Based on the findings of the previous chapter, it is assumed that these user-financed PHES could play
an additional role as part of a bottom-up strategy for IWRM implementation due to their functional role and realization
procedure. In order to analyze the role of PHES schemes in an empirical context, Nicaragua is chosen as a reference
country. In Nicaragua, the IWRM process is initiated at the national level but still lagging behind in operationalization.
However, predominantly local user-financed PHES are being established at the same time.
This chapter describes the IWRM implementation process in Nicaragua until today. It briefly analyzes the principal
implementation gaps and operationalization constraints against IWRM implementation. The implementation process of the
PHES scheme in the Gíl González river basin is documented and used as a case study to demonstrate the general findings
of the potential of PHES to contribute to the operationalization of IWRM as discussed in the previous chapters. While the
Gíl Gonzáles case is used to provide details of the implementation process other experiences of local PHES schemes in
Nicaragua are also frequently referred to. Together the schemes form the basis for an analysis of the contribution local
PHES schemes make to the operationalization process of IWRM in the context of a broader policy mix.
6.1 The process of Integrated Water Resources Management in Nicaragua
The legislative regulation of the use of water resources in Nicaragua began in 1904 with the establishment of the Civil
Code. During this time the government’s priority was to regulate the access to water resources in order to promote
agricultural activities. Therefore, the Civil Code promoted the private management of water and other natural resources
through specific laws based on the ownership of land. In 1919 and 1923 the use of superficial water resources for the
generation of energy was regulated by governmental decree. Through this decree the central government formulated
the requirement for concessions for the use of public waters by the executive power. The General Law on Exploitation of
Natural Resources was approved in 1958 which included water as a natural resource of state property whose use shall be
regulated by a specific law. In 1969 a governmental decree established procedures for the control of agricultural water use
through the National Index of Wells. However, the use of this index was interrupted during the political revolution in the
1980s which has led to the use of water basically free of charge in small- and large-scale irrigation (cf., Gómez et al., 2012).
The index of drilled wells has recently been reactivated by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. However, during the
1980s the promulgation of the National Constitution marked an important step for the country’s environmental regulation.
The constitution establishes the authority of the state as the custodian and administrator of all national natural resources.
Moreover, the constitution creates two institutions, which even today have important functions for water management: the
Nicaraguan Institute of Natural Resources, now called Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources (Ministerio del
Ambiente y los Recursos Naturales; MARENA), and the Nicaraguan Institute for Territorial Studies (Instituto Nicaragüense
de Estudios Territoriales; INETER). The evolution of IWRM in Nicaragua has its origins partly in the 1980s when the
Municipality Law (Law No. 40: Ley de Municipios, 1988) was issued, which initiated the decentralization of natural
resources management by passing over responsibility and household budget from the central government to the local
municipalities.
The Municipality Law was reformed in 1997. With this reform the municipal activity in the areas of policies, ad-
ministration and finances was newly regulated. The reformed law transfers the competence for all areas related to the
municipality’s socio-economic development as well as the conservation of the environment and natural resources within
their territory. The financial resources to execute these competences, according to the law, originate form own revenues
as well as fiscal transfers from the central government. Other competences established in the Municipality Law refer
to the planning, standardization and control of the use of the soil as well as urban, peri-urban and rural development
(Art. 7). These competences empower municipalities to make land use planning decisions within their territory. Thus,
local governments are able to define specific areas, e.g. for urban settlements, agricultural use and nature conservation.
Additionally, municipalities are empowered by the law to develop, conserve and control the rational use of the environment
and natural resources as the basis for the sustainable development of the municipality by forming initiatives in these areas
and contributing to their monitoring, supervision and control in coordination with corresponding national entities (Art.
7). This allows municipalities, through their councils, to legislate the protection and conservation of the environment
and natural resources located in their territory and to coordinate activities with corresponding governmental agencies at
higher political levels. These responsibilities turn municipalities into important actors for IWRM operationalization at the
management level.
Finally, the law states that the provision of basic water, sanitation, and electricity services to the population shall be
a municipal responsibility. Besides the assignment of this responsibility, the law remains unclear regarding the transfer
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of assets from the central government. However, according to Walker and Velasquez (1999) direct service provision by
the municipalities is not a general practice in Nicaragua. The municipalities of Matagalpa and Jinotega, for instance,
where the Nicaraguan Institute of Aqueducts and Sewers (INAA; national regulation agency for water supply and sewer
systems) delegated administration to the local authorities in 1992, following local government pressure, are some of the
few successful exceptions. In most other cases, municipal water supply is provided by the state owned company ENACAL
being the principal national operator of water supply and sewer systems.
The politics of the 1990s were strongly influence by external factors and international developments in the environmental
sector. Policies with tendencies to reduce the role of the central state and to promote more participation of the private
sector and the civil society as well as a general process of decentralization responded to the establishment of the Dublin
Principles and the international agreements of the World Summit of Rio de Janeiro both in 1992 (see Section 2.1).
Consequently, in 1994, the Government of Nicaragua introduced sustainability criteria for the use and management of
natural resources, the Environmental Action Plan. A core theme of the plan was the formulation of a national policy and
associated strategies for the rational development and management of water resources. Following the Environmental
Action Plan, the Nicaraguan and Danish Governments agreed on the implementation of a Nicaraguan Water Action Plan. A
Danish Consortium of consultants was contracted to carry out the Nicaraguan Water Action Plan in cooperation with local
experts. The Action Plan is considered the first step towards integrated water management through the development of
policies, legislation, institutional adjustments and technical solutions to identified problems (Milton, 1998). Among the
results of the Water Action Plan presented in 1998 were proposals for a National Water Resources Policy and a draft for
a National Water Law (Ley General de Aguas Nacionales). This represented an important input to the promulgation of
the first National Policy on Water Resources (Política Nacional de los Recursos Hídricos, Decree 107-2001) in 2001. This
policy considers the integrated management of water resources as a principal management paradigm. Several additional
laws followed addressing the management of forest resources and the violation of environmental protection among others.
According to Milton (1998), a key recommendation of the action plan was “the establishment of an independent and
neutral water authority, recognizing the continuing contribution of the National Water Resources Commission, and the
need to harmonize and put into operation its functions“. Moreover the Action Plan identified the following major obstacles
to the implementation of IWRM in Nicaragua at this time:
• Indecision and lack of political will to press on with institutional changes
• Budget and financial restrictions on the part of the institutions involved in water management processes
• A weak institutional structure
• Lack of definition of functions and responsibilities of organizations involved
• Institutional coordination almost non-existent
• Scarcity of technological resources
• A notable lack of human resources training in the sector
• Insufficient monitoring and control of water quality
• A notable lack of basic knowledge on the availability and condition of the resource
However, major recommendations of the Water Action Plan on actions toward IWRM implementation have not been
implemented by the Nicaraguan parties. According to Milton (1998), this “indicates the lack of ownership and driving
force of the project at the national level”. Nevertheless, the Water Action Plan was prepared in an attempt to translate the
guiding principles of the Dublin-Rio process into a national water resources strategy. The National Commission of Water
Resources (Comisión Nacional de Recursos Hídricos, CNRH), an inter-institutional body created in 1983 composed of the
heads of six state agencies concerned with water management and members of the National Assembly, was reactivated and
reorganized during the implementation of the action plan. According to Marisa (2000), the principal outcomes were “the
recognition of the need for a unique water authority to regulate and administer water resources in quantity and quality,
a coherent water policy, a proposal for a comprehensive water law, and an action program to implement the required
changes“. Hence, the action plan contributed to the definition of requirements for integrated water resources use and
management.
However, the action plan already recognized that creating a unique authority to regulate water resources in quality
and quantity could result in conflicts with the existing Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources. Furthermore,
Marisa (2000) argues that the action plan still follows a top-down approach where users are perceived as passive rather
than active actors. Although the participation of non-governmental stakeholders in the execution and management phases
is recognized as important, emphasis is put on governmental actors.
In 1996 the General Law on the Environment and Natural Resources (Law No. 217: Ley General del Medio Ambiente y
los Recursos Naturales), for the first time in a legal context, referred to river basins as the appropriate spatial unit for
management and use required to guarantee sustainability of water resources. Moreover, the law declared water resources
as a public domain and reserves the property of coasts, river channels and lakes as well as the riparian area within 30
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meters from the maximum river, lake and ground water levels for the state. The General Law on the Environment and
Natural Resources is the main regulatory instrument for water source protection and pollution control. The law allows
creating of a National Environmental Commission and a Special Procurator for the Environment and Natural Resources. It
gives the Nicaraguan Institute for Territorial Studies (INETER) and the Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources
(MARENA) powers to organize the environmental and territorial structure of the country. Furthermore, the law creates
the National Environment Fund and establishes the National Environmental Information System (Walker and Velasquez,
1999). The General Law on the Environment and Natural Resources recognizes the municipalities as the main actors in
environmental regulation within their territory and established, in a broader sense than the Municipality Law alone, the
fields of action of municipal authorities with respect to environmental regulation.
The Nicaraguan environmental policy, initiated with the General Law on the Environment and Natural Resources,
basically relies on command and control instruments which consist of quality standards for effluents, environmental
permits for new investment projects, and the regulation of the use of pesticides and other toxic substances (Nuñez Ferrara,
1998). Due to implementation difficulties, these instruments have neither been very effective in reducing pollution
nor in controlling the use of natural resources, including water (cf., Lutz et al., 1994; Chacón and Pratt, 1996; Pagiola
et al., 2002). Implementation difficulties stem from the lack of appropriate financial resources assigned to the Ministry
of the Environment and Natural Resources for enough trained staff and the financial resources to monitor and enforce
regulations (Nuñez Ferrara, 1998; BCN, 2000). Furthermore, the ministry does not have the capacity to penalize those
who do not comply with the norms (Marisa, 2000). According to Nuñez Ferrara (1998),in 1999 the personnel allocated
to environmental protection by MARENA counted only 22 persons at the central national level and 31 in the rest of the
country. Moreover, the environmental command and control instruments implemented at the end of the 1990s were not
accompanied by economic incentives, which has further restrained compliance (cf., Marisa, 2000). Although the need for
economic incentives to promote the reduction of waste and waste water at the source was discussed during the drafting of
the General Law on the Environment and National Resources, this was not followed by specific instrument development.
Finally, in 2007 almost a decade after the first draft in 1998, the first National Water Law (Law 620: Ley General de
Aguas Nacionales) was passed. The National Water Law establishes the general framework for IWRM policies in Nicaragua
including all international principles. Moreover, with the new water law, the three key IWRM change areas of the Global
Water Partnership (GWP) for the adaptation of IWRM through (1) an enabling environment, (2) assignment of institutional
roles, and (3) appropriate management instruments were addressed and recognized (see Section 2.1). The law pursues
the objective to establish the institutional and juridical framework for the management, conservation, development, use of
all water resources of the country (superficial, subterranean, residual or of any other nature) in a sustainable and equitable
manner. At the same time it guarantees the protection of other natural resources, ecosystems and the environment in
general. The law puts emphasis on the integrated management of the resource based on river basins, sub-basins and
micro-basins. The use of the resource for human consumption is granted as a priority before agricultural, ecological,
industrial and other uses. The guiding principles of the National Water Law are:
• Water is a strategic resource of national priority
• Knowledge on hydrological processes is a prerequisite for the effective management of water resources. The state
provides all necessary resources to gather sufficient information
• The preservation and protection of water resources is a fundamental task of the state
• Responsible management and the provision of water resources for human consumption is of highest national priority
• The management of water resources is based on the integrated management of surface and sub-surface water
resources, their multiple uses and the interrelationships of different ecological media (water, air, soil, flora, fauna
and biodiversity)
• Public participation
• Polluter Pays Principle for those who pollute and compensations for those who use efficiently and cleanly
• Precautionary principle
• Subsidiarity principle (ANA, 2010)
According to the National Water Law, water resources planning implies the elaboration of a National Water Resources
Plan through the National Water Authority (Autoridad Nacional de Agua, ANA) as the basis for River Basin Management
Plans and Programs executed by RBOs. River Basin Management Plans have to be approved by the National Water Resources
Council (Consejo Nacional de Recursos Hídircos, CNRH). These plans form an integral part of the planning process of
water resources. The CNRH periodically evaluates the implementation advancements of the National Water Resources
Plan and the River Basin Management Plans. The National Water Resources Plan and the River Basin Management Plans
are published in the governmental communication tool La Gaceta.
The National Council for Water Resources is (re)created (based on the former National Commission of Water Resources)
by the National Water Law as the ultimate instance of the IWRM framework representing the principal normative and
highest strategic policy level for water resources management. The National Council for Water Resources is composed
of representatives of the Ministry of Environment and Natural resources (MARENA), the Ministry for Agriculture and
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Forestry (MAGFOR), the Ministry of Health (MINSA), the Ministry of Industry and Commerce (MIFIC), the National
Institute for Territorial Studies (INETER), the administration of water supply and sewage, the administration of energy,
a representative of the Ministry of Energy and Mining, a representative of the National Commission for Water Supply
and Sewage (Comisión Nacional de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado Sanitario, CONAPAS), one representative of each of
the Regional Councils Autonomous Regions of the Atlantic Coast, four representatives of the productive sectors, and
four representatives of user organizations. Through this multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder composition the council is
designed to be a forum for consultation and participation at the highest political level. Moreover, the council represents
a consulting and cooperation facilitating organ with the purpose to approve the general politics in the context of water
resources and to supervise the tasks executed by the ANA. Thus, according to the National Water Law, the specific functions
of the CNRH are:
• Elaborating and updating the National Water Resources Policy
• Approving the National Plan for Water Resources as well as the plans and programs for river basins
• Providing consultancy and inter-sectoral coordination for the integrated management and planning of water
resources
• Resolving committed issues concerning water management as well as revenues and income of the National Water
Authority (ANA)
• Approving the establishment of RBOs and River Basin Committees (RBC)
• Approving concessions (after consultation of all sectors and actors involved) for strategic water uses or those which
involve more than one sector, river basin or requiring the construction of large size hydraulic works
• Approving its internal regulation
Hence, the principal responsibilities of the CNRH relate to strategic tasks concerning approval and supervision of national
water politics.
The CNRH is an attempt to coordinate the different water-related tasks of existing governmental institutes and ministries
at the national level in order to concentrate the authority to regulate water in both quantity and quality. The principal
water-related governmental institutes and ministries and their respective tasks which are supposed to be coordinated by
the CNRH are:
• The Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources (MARENA) in charge of preparing protection plans for
natural resources and control of water quality.
• The Ministry of agriculture and forestry (MAG-FOR) responsible for the development of agriculture activities,
including industries, forestry, irrigation, and control of agrochemicals as well as the establishment of protection
plans for soil and water resources.
• The Ministry of Health (MINSA) controlling aspects of water supply and sanitation, water quality, and agrochemicals.
• The National Institute for Territorial Studies (INETER) in charge of the physical land use planning, inventories and
characterization of water resources.
• The Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM) regulating the use of water for hydro power and geothermal activities.
This illustrates that several of these organizations have overlapping mandates regarding the protection of water resources
quality and quantity. Their sectoral vision in planning and administration, seldom considering the effects on other users and
on the environment, has hindered cross-sectoral cooperation and resulted in ineffective management of water resources
(cf., Marisa, 2000). Consequently, several of the tasks of the water-related institutes and ministries have been reassigned
to the National Water Authority through the National Water Law in order to improve coherence in water policy. However,
the CNRH remains the highest instance for water resources management and approves the principal activities of the ANA.
In order to realize an Integrated River Basin Management (IRBM), the National Water Authority has been empowered by
the National Water Law to establish River Basin Management Plans and to submit them for approval to the CNRH. Further
tasks of the ANA are to supervise the water use in river basins and to grant authorization and concessions for water use of
any kind (Baca et al., 2012). According to the National Water Law, ANA carries out the following technical-normative
functions:
• Formulating and elaborating the National Plan of Water Resources
• Coordinating the elaboration of Water Resources Plans for river basins and supervising compliance
• Elaborating hydrological balances for river basins in coordination with competent authorities
• Proposing regulations for river basin management, including aquifers
• Realizing the characterization of water bodies for their potential uses
• Proposal of declarations of zones of protection, nature reserves and bans for hunting to competent authorities
• Granting, modifying, extending, suspending or terminating the concession of titles and licenses for water use as
well as permits for the dumping of sewage into water bodies of the public domain
• Regularly conducting studies and analysis on economic and financial valuation according to supply source, location
and type of use, that support the criteria for the collection of water rates and charges, including payment for
hydrological ecosystem services
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• Proposing classification declarations of high-risk areas for flooding
Thus, ANA regulates, administers and supervises the management of water resources at the national level in all aspects.
Besides technical-normative functions ANA must also comply with the following technical-operational functions:
• Managing and supervising in an integral manner and on the basis of river basins, all national water resources
and preserving and controlling their quantity and quality. Elaborating the management plans of different aquatic
ecosystems together with MARENA and municipal councils concerned
• Managing and supervising public hydraulic works of the state
• Establishing, organizing and managing the Public Registry of Water Use Rights
• Organizing and coordinating the National Water Resources Information System in order to determine the availability
of water in quantitative and qualitative terms as well as to identify its use and users
• Constructing public hydraulic works or contracting third parties for construction
• Conflict resolution of water uses
• Formulating and applying programs to implement volumetric measurements of all water uses
• Defining requirements and alignments to establish of districts and units of irrigation and drainage
• Executing additional and transient technical-operational functions of River Basin Organizations as defined by the
National Water Law
• Acting as a review body for decisions made by River Basin Organizations
The National Water Law intends to establish River Basin Organizations as dependent derivatives of the ANA at the
level of the 21 principal national river basins. These RBOs function as governmental bodies with technical, operational,
administrative and legal functions, coordinated and harmonized with the ANA in order to manage, control and supervise
the use of water resources at their corresponding river basins. If there is no RBO, the ANA will immediately execute all
technical and operational functions on a temporary basis until a RBO has been assigned. The establishment of RBOs
represents the principal mechanism of decentralization provided by the National Water Law.
The RBOs are to be composed of a directive council, a director as well as administrative and technical entities. The
council incorporates a delegate of the ANA chairing the council, all mayors of all municipalities forming part of the river
basin as well as a delegate of INETER, MAGFOR, MINSA and MARENA. The council may invite additional parties, e.g.
representatives of water user associations or from other governmental authorities, if this is considered convenient. The
directors of the RBOs are assigned by the National Council for Water Resources and proposed by the ANA.
River Basin (Sub-Basin or Micro-Basin) Committees (RBC) are created by the National Water Law to promote the
participation of the civil society in the IWRM process. The establishment of River Basin, Sub-Basin and Mirco-Basin
Committees shall be promoted by the respective RBO on the basis of the spatial dimensions, the quantity of water resources
and the diversity of water uses within the river basin. The ANA establishes mechanisms for the RBOs that promote
the formation of River Basin Committees and their approval through the CNRH. These committees are composed of
representatives of all water users of the different water uses within the river basin, representatives of the directive council
of the corresponding RBO, representatives of the regional autonomous council (in case of the autonomous regions of
the Caribbean Coast of the country) and representatives of accredited NGOs. RBCs shall consist of groups with an equal
number of representatives of water users, the civil society and governmental actors.
The committees represent fora for consultation, coordination and agreements between the RBOs, governmental entities,
municipalities, NGOs and the water users of the respective river basin. The committees participate in the formulation of
plans and programs which are elaborated by the RBOs or the ANA and are supposed to safeguard better administration of
water, the development of hydraulic infrastructure and their services, the management of financing mechanisms which
allow supporting activities above the conservation and protection of water resources. Plans and programs of lower order
committees have to respect the frameworks provided by higher order committees, RBO or the ANA (ANA, 2010). Thus,
RBCs provide the basic means of public participation in the IWRM process. They represent the only organizational
elements where (local) non-governmental actors, e.g. water users, may be included.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the organizational framework for IWRM in Nicaragua as established by the National Water Law.
The arrow on the left indicates the decision-making power of the different organizations and their respective level of
influence in policy making. Although organizational structures are provided for the normative, strategic as well as for the
operational level and mechanisms for decentralization and public participation are included, the decision-making power
and influence on policy making is concentrated at the national level.
The IWRM process in Nicaragua is now at a typical stage of implementation (see Section 2.1.2). Several important
steps for the establishment of an enabling environment and the assignment of institutional (i.e. organizational) roles, for
instance through the National Water Law and the creation of the CNRH and the ANA, have taken place at the national
level and subsequent steps of decentralization and the application of management instruments at the operational level are
designated by law and regulations. However, in the context of the Nicaraguan IWRM process the emphasis is placed on
applying the IWRM concept at the constitutional and associative central governmental levels rather than the operational
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Figure 6.1: Illustration of the organizational framework for IWRM in Nicaragua (Author’s work)
level and this is what García (2008) has identified as “major hurdles” of IWRM implementation in Latin America. As a
result, García (2008) argues that “the achievement of institutional reforms proved to be extremely difficult in practice,
especially those related to the water allocation among competing uses function“. This is true for Nicaragua. Hence, the
Nicaraguan IWRM process encounters the typical problems of IWRM implementation and operationalization just as many
other countries do (see Section 2.3). The problems of institutional fit and interplay are addressed in a more ore less
“standard” fashion without specific mechanisms to recognize site-specific problem contexts. Moreover, Nicaragua struggles
with the principal operational constraints as discussed in Section 3.3. These implementation gaps of IWRM in Nicaragua
are discussed in detail in the following section in order to illustrate the specific problems involved in the operationalization
of IWRM.
6.1.1 Implementation gaps
The implementation process of IWRM in Nicaragua as described in the previous section dates back to the 1990s when the
topic was strongly promoted by the international (donor) community. Since then, it has been a long way towards the first
steps of realization. The National Water Law, a major milestone for the IWRM process, required almost a decade to be
passed. Moreover, it took another 3 years to establish the organizational framework, most importantly the National Water
Authority (ANA), and to appoint a director. And this is only the beginning, other important organizations such as the 21
RBOs for the mayor river basins of the country and possible river basin committees at the sub- and mirco-basin level are
still not in place which also applies to several regulations of instruments announced by the National Water Law such as the
Public Registry of Water Use Rights. Thus, the initial IWRM process in Nicaragua can be characterized as lengthy at least.
At the moment the ANA is elaborating a new National Policy on Water Resources (PNRH) because several weaknesses of
the national water policy from 2001 impede the proper functioning of the ANA (Morales, 2012). Since the National Policy
on Water Resources represents the master instrument of the national IWRM process, it is supposed to provide strategic
orientation to all other IWRM related instruments. Without a new National Policy on Water Resources none of the other
steps, e.g. the creation of RBOs and River Basin Committees, will advance.
Although the National Water Law has some delegating elements and presents itself as a decentralized organ, in reality it
concentrates the IWRM process at the national strategic policy level in pursuing a top-down approach towards IWRM
implementation. The decision-making process of all organizations introduced is determined from top-down and principally
based on central governmental power (as illustrated in Figure 6.1). While municipalities are at least included in RBOs,
representatives of the civil society are not. The planning and management of water resources is supposed to be realized
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through the ANA at the national level by means of the National Policy on Water Resources. The elaboration of River
Basin Management Plans is delegated by the ANA to the RBOs. However, the national plan precedes the river basin
plans reducing the decision-making power at lower levels (Novo and Garrido, 2010). Moreover, the regulatory decree
of the National Water Law states that RBOs will be installed if financial and human resources of the ANA permit this.
The financial resources for the establishment of RBOs and for the elaboration of the National Policy on Water Resources
and River Basin Management Plans is supposed to be provided by the National Water Fund (Fondo Nacional del Agua).
Furthermore, besides donations from development cooperation agencies, the fund will be alimented through revenues
from water fees. For the introduction of water fees an additional law has to be passed. However, both the fund and the
law for water fees have still to be created. Additionally, water fees water users and uses have to be identified first before
water fees can be applied. This is meant to be achieved through the National Registry of Water Use Rights which also
still needs to be established. As a result the limited financing of the ANA impedes the establishment of RBOs, leaving
all responsibilities to the ANA. Hence, a central agency remains in charge of water resources planning for different river
basins without defined proceedings for stakeholder involvement and public participation. Furthermore, the ANA proposes
all regulations on how RBOs should manage water resources. These regulations determine how RBO carry out their
functions, what organizational structures look like, how to finance them and all other questions related to the proper
functioning of RBOs. Additionally, any ANA proposal must be approved by the CNRH.
Currently, the ANA is assuming all strategic and operational decision-making power without being able to delegate
these functions, at least partly, to lower levels such as RBOs. As a result, the ANA has to set priorities in its tasks based on
strategic considerations. For instance, at the moment, the ANA is focusing on the realization of technical studies (including
delimitation of the principal river basins of the country) capacity building and investments in equipment to strengthen
its institutional capacities for IWRM development. A further focus is on establishing the laws and regulations, e.g. the
National Registry of Water Use Rights and the National Water Fund, which are still lacking fulfill the functions assigned to
the ANA by the National Water Law. However, operational priorities of specific management context cannot be attended to
because of the prevailing resource and capacity constraints.
However, apart from the struggles of assigning institutional roles and establishing further rules and laws or the proper
functioning of the new water law, the IWRM process in Nicaragua addresses the principal implementation gaps of
institutional fit and interplay. The mismatch between hydrological and administrative boundaries (the administrative gap
conceptualized as problem of fit, see Section 3.1) has already been recognized as a problem by Nicaraguan politics in the
1990s and solving it through the establishment of river basins as management units was stated in the General Law on the
Environment and Natural Resources in 1998. However, until the National Water Law had been passed this was merely a
good intention. The new water law places strong emphasis on an integrated management of water resources according to
the boundaries of river basins and calls for the creation of RBOs at the level of the country’s major first order river basins
as the organizational framework. However, the principal focus for solving the problem of fit is placed on the first order
river basins, while the level of sub-basins and micro-basins is also taken into account with the respective establishment
of sub-basin and micro-basin committees. However, the lower levels have much less weight in decision-making since
their roles are limited to consultative ones without decision-making power. Moreover, it remains unclear how and by
whom these committees will be established. Since all organizational structures are to be proposed and approved by
upper level bodies, there is a strong top-down influence on IWRM implementation at present. The strongly pronounced
hierarchical structures of strategic plans as the basis for river basin, sub-basin and micro-basin management plans illustrate
this top-down approach. Thus, there is not yet an instrument in place that takes the specific natural context and related
properties into account. On the contrary, the fundamental basis for all other management plans is the National Policy of
Water Resources which still has not been passed. This is again exemplary for the general lack of institutions, organizations
and specific laws that are needed for the proper functioning and operationalization of IWRM. Moreover, as long as RBOs
and RBCs are not established, the ANA has to solve the problem of fit based on a national perspective and it is probably
impossible to consider specific natural and social local contexts.
With regard to addressing problems of institutional interplay, the National Water Law actually includes important
improvements. An attempt is made to bundle the formerly dispersed roles and sectoral functions of different ministries
within the CNRH, in form of a coordinating organization. Thus, the new law has simplified and clarified the distribution
of competencies and roles among different governmental entities at the national level (cf., Novo and Garrido, 2010).
Improvement of horizontal interplay is achieved through the establishment of the CNRH, composed of formerly dispersed
and sector-oriented ministries, water sector organizations as well as mayors, representatives of water users and the
industry. Thus, horizontal interplay is provided at a normative and strategic level by the CNRH which is in charge of
approving national water policies and general River Basin Management Plans. However, operational tasks of IWRM
implementation are carried out by the ANA and may be delegated by the ANA to RBOs. The ANA itself takes the form
of a water ministry since its director has the function of a minister. Several operational functions, formerly executed by
sectoral ministries, have been dedicated to the ANA through the new law. If the ANA delegates some of its tasks to RBOs,
further horizontal interplay can be achieved through memberships of representatives of water-related ministries, mayors
of the respective river basin and the ANA. Hence, the National Water Law places strong focus on political and membership
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linkages at the strategic level without considering functional linkages at the lower level. Furthermore, repartition of roles
and mandates of the river basin and local level remain unclear as these are to be assigned by the ANA. In addition, the
processes of river basin management plan development, the formation of RBOs and River Basin Committees (RBC), the
involvement of stakeholders and public participation is not described in the new law. According to the new law, local and
regional governments take part in both RBOs and RBCs, but it is not clear what role they will play within their political
borders, in particular concerning water regulation and management competencies (Novo and Garrido, 2010). The role of
municipal governments has to be clear since Law 40 and Law 28 grant municipal and regional autonomy for regulating
and managing water resources within their respective boundaries. However, the law assigns responsibility for granting
authorizations for agricultural water use for small irrigation systems for lands smaller than 3 hectares. Concessions and
licenses for large water and sanitation systems as well as for hydroelectric and agricultural purposes (areas of 20 hectares
or more) are granted by ANA, while “for agricultural lands between 3 and 20 hectares, neither the water law nor its
regulation states which agency is in charge of granting water use permits“ (Novo and Garrido, 2010).
Apart from the general process on the national level, the IWRM process is also characterized as a multi-level process.
This means that an integration of different policy levels from local to national level (or even to an international level
if transboundary river basins are considered) is required. This should occur from top-down as well as from bottom-up.
Municipalities have a long tradition of being in charge of managing the natural resources within their administrative
boundaries and the elaboration of Environmental Management Plans (Plan de Gestión Ambiental) is common, but these
policies are often developed without coordination with other organizations (e.g. neighboring municipalities or federal
agencies) and are generally based on command and control measures or subsidies alone. Municipalities often do not have
sufficient motivation for coordinated action at the river basin when applying regulative command and control or subsidy
measures to improve natural resource use (Lee, 2000; Anderson et al., 2008). Hence, vertical interplay between the lowest
policy level and higher policy levels is often lacking.
With regard to operational constraints, the present IWRM process still encounters insufficient financing, while roles
and mandates between different governmental levels remain unclear. Insufficient financing is a clear result of the lack of
implementation of financing instruments as defined in the water law. The law introduces financing instruments such as
water fees as well as the instrument of PHES but how these should work still needs to be defined in special laws. As long
as these laws have not been passed, the ANA, RBOs and basin committees do not have financial autonomy. Moreover, the
lack of these financial resources impedes the institutional and organizational development. According to López Nolasco
and Jiménez Otárola (2008a), the implementation status of the water law and its proposed instruments for financing is
operationally insufficient for the river basin management application with tangible results. However, the lack of finance
is basically a political problem causing important legal and organizational structures to remain drafts, for instance the
law on water fees or the creation of the National Water Fund (cf., López Nolasco and Jiménez Otárola, 2008a; Novo and
Garrido, 2010).
In 2008, less than 2 % of the national household budget was assigned to ministries and organizations in the environ-
mental sector. The lack of human resources is equally evident. The National Forestry Institute (INAFOR) for instance
has around 310 employees for the whole country (about one person per 425 km2) and this ratio is similar for the
Environmental Ministry (MARENA). These figures illustrate the institutional weaknesses, which are predominant in
the context of compliance with environmental instruments of direct control and financing mechanisms provided by the
national legislative framework (López Nolasco and Jiménez Otárola, 2008a). Moreover, this funding gap subsequently
translates into capacity and information gaps. Accordingly, Novo (2010) summarizes the principal challenges of IWRM
operationalization as follows:
• Lack of budgets, political will, personal capacity, information, monitoring and communication networks
• Legal contradictions between the Civil Code and the National Water Law on water use rights
• Problems with land property titles
• Political and hydrological boundaries do not coincide
• Intermediary structures between central and local governments are missing
• Absence of organizations and plans with respect to river basins
Moreover, Novo (2010) criticizes that the National Water Law is not known to the general population which impedes
public participation in operationalization. The lack of knowledge about environmental legislation and policies among the
population is wide-spread, especially in rural areas (Novo and Garrido, 2010), and in many cases the local needs and
problems up- and downstream remain unaddressed and local environmental policies are often planned without involving
affected (often upstream) populations (Lee, 2000). According to a survey among a broad group of stakeholders of the
IWRM process in Nicaragua, Novo and Garrido (2010) identified that “[...] the lack of information is recognized as
the major constraint for the water law implementation. By lack of information academia, international organizations,
and public organizations refer to the lack of a comprehensive information system for both surface and groundwater
withdrawals and land and agricultural input use”. Hence, the lack of comprehensive water information and inefficient
coordination mechanisms “[...] makes planning, control, and enforcement of the water law difficult and opens up the
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Remaining tasks toward IWRM operationalization according to stakeholders
Updating and enforcing the legal framework and policies applied to water resources at national level
• Updating the National Water Resources Policy and approving the National Water Resources Plan
• Developing plans and programs for basins, sub-basins and micro-basins
• Establishing of national and watershed committees
• Preparing and approving of the Law on Fees for Disposal and Use of Water Resources
• Encouraging the establishment of incentives for conservation actions, protection and rational use of water, through
the development and approval of a Special Law of Payments for Environmental Services
• Increasing the budget allocated to various governmental institutions related to the area of water resources, so that
there is greater investment in equipment, technology and capacity building of human capital
• Developing action plans for micro-basins
• Protecting and conserving of the sources, especially in the upper watersheds
• Approving the Law on Territorial Planning with watershed management approach
Strengthening community organizational structures
• Promoting and strengthening watershed committees and irrigation districts
• Strengthening local committees for the prevention, mitigation and response to natural disasters
Strengthening knowledge management at national level
• Promoting education and awareness campaigns on the use and conservation of water sources
• Studies to identify critical areas with high levels of risk
• Preparing an inventory of all existing water sources at national level, indicating their current state and their main
environmental stressors
Developing actions to ensure the quality of water for different uses
• Regulating and controlling the use and extraction of groundwater for profitable uses
• Regulating the application of chemicals used to develop agro-industrial activities
Table 6.1: Priority tasks for integrated water resources management at the national level (GWP, 2013b)
space for strategic behaviour“ (Novo and Garrido, 2010). As a result of these operational constraints, Novo and Garrido
(2010) conclude that an advancement of the water law implementation on the level of municipalities seems more feasible
following a bottom-up approach rather than a top-down one.
Akhmouch (2012) in authoring a OECD study on IWRM implementation in Latin America, highlights similar aspects
as remaining governance challenges in Nicaragua: the mismatch between hydrological and administrative boundaries
(problem of fit, i.e. administrative gap), horizontal co-ordination across ministries (horizontal interplay), lack of local
and regional governments’ capacity to design and implement water policies (capacity gap as an operational constraint),
allocation of water resources across uses (residential, industrial, agriculture) and limited citizen participation. The National
Stakeholder Consultations on Water recently carried out by the GWP (2013b) in Nicaragua to monitor the IWRM process
draws similar conclusions and summarizes remaining tasks in order to advance IWRM operationalization (see Table 6.1).
The IWRM process in Nicaragua, thus, may be best described as still in an initial stage with regard to actual implementa-
tion and operationalization. While the National Water Law is in principle a standard and modern water law, implementing
its guidelines and enforcing its rules represents a significant challenge in the Nicaraguan context (Novo and Garrido,
2010). As pointed out, there are still many legal, organizational and institutional steps required until the IWRM process
may start to drip down to actual operational levels of river basins and below. This process will probably take several years
and requires continuous political will and donor support. Moreover, the IWRM process as designed by the National Water
Law runs the risk to become a typical blueprint approach from top-down which has been largely criticized for failing to
operationalize IWRM (see Sections 2.2 and 2.3).
Hence, it can be conclude that the critical elements of IWRM operationalization concerning institutional fit and interplay
at the operational level are still not in place. As a result decentralization and context-specific operational solutions to
locally and regionally perceived problems have not been achieved. The principal reasons for this represent, on the one
hand, typical operational constraints characterized by a general lack of funding, capacity and information and, on the other
hand, a lack of mechanisms in the general IWRM policy of Nicaragua to solve the problems of institutional fit and interplay
in relation to specific local contexts. The latter refers to a missing bottom-up complement of IWRM operationalization.
Figure 6.2 illustrates how the problems of fit and interplay are addressed in the present IWRM process of Nicaragua. At
the moment, the operationally important part of this process, namely to find the right management scale (grey shaded
area in Figure 6.2) is still not provided by the organizations and mechanisms in place.
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Figure 6.2: Institutional fit and interplay as addressed in the Nicaraguan IWRM process (Author’s work)
However, the inclusion of PHES as a management instrument in the National Water Law raises hopes that this instrument
may provide a complementary mechanism for context-specific IWRM operationalization from bottom-up. The law defines
that the objective of PHES as a management instrument, is the elaboration of the economical, technical, legal and
environmental basis required to organize a permanent payment. Hence, PHES schemes are considered to be a management
instrument complementary to other economic as well as command and control instruments (Art. 14). In Art. 26, the law
defines the realization of economic valuation studies and the analysis of water according to its form of supply, type of
use and location as an ANA task in order to support the collection of water fees as well as payments for hydrological
ecosystem services. Moreover, Chapter III of the water law is dedicated to hydrological ecosystem services. In Art. 93, the
law states that the identification of hydrological ecosystem services should be given special attention in regions, basins,
sub-basins and aquifers subject to advanced environmental degradation, with an increased risk of resource degradation,
rapid changes in vegetation cover and wildlife extinction as well as risks to the population caused by climate change (ANA,
2010). Furthermore, the chapter specifies areas where PHES schemes can be established:
• Groundwater recharge, including secondary forests and tropical forests
• Springs
• Contaminated receiving water bodies
• Over exploited aquifers
• Wetlands
• Natural and artificial reservoirs and estuaries
• Lakes, lagoons, rivers of touristic, recreational or productive use with quantitative and qualitative problems (Art.94)
Finally, in Art. 95 the ANA is declared responsible for the implementation mechanisms of claims and payments for
hydrological ecosystem services in order to finance PHES schemes in a sustainable way. To fulfill this task, the ANA will
ask other organizations for support and participation. At the end of Chapter III of the law, the nature of PHES is clarified
as being an incentive for the conservation, protection, and rational use of water and other natural resources of determined
river basins. PES will be regulated through a special law. The ANA will supervise that suppliers of hydrological ecosystem
services will receive a fair compensation and payment for the services they supply.
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Apart from recognizing PHES as a management instrument in the National water Law, the PHES instrument has been
referred to repeatedly in several other laws and decrees. An overview of environmental laws concerning IWRM is given in
Table 6.2.
Name of Law Reference to PHES Year
Law No. 40: Law of Municipal-
ities (Ley de Municipios)
Assignment of municipal sovereignty (decentralization) of environmental policies and
financing; Municipal competencies include the development, conservation and control
of a rational use of the environment and natural resources as a basis for sustainable
development of the municipality and the country by promoting local initiatives and
contributing to monitoring, surveillance and control of protected areas in coordination
with federal agencies
1988
Law No. 217: General Law
on the Environment and Natu-
ral Resources (Ley General del
Medio Ambiente y los Recursos
Naturales)
Creation of the National Environmental Fund (Fondo Nacional del Ambiente), which
aims at the development and financing of programs to improve environmental protection,
conservation, restoration and sustainable agricultural production. Contributions to
this fund ought to come from environmental licensing (e.g. for timber extraction),
environmental fines and taxes, donations and additional sources
1996
Law No. 462: Law of Con-
servation, Formation and Sus-
tainable Development of the
Forestry Sector (Ley de Conser-
vación, Fomento y Desarrollo
Sostenible del Sector Forestal)
Creation of the National Forest Development Fund (Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Fore-
stal) as an autonomous funding source to finance strategic programs and projects for the
forestry sector. At present, the fund prioritizes the financing of actions of social interest,
reforestation and restoration as well as the protection of source areas for domestic water
supply in river basins. PES are introduced as one option for financing. Three PHES
projects are financially supported by this fund (FONADEFO, 2012)
2003
Law No. 475: Law on Citizen
Partizipation (Ley de Partici-
pación Ciudadana)
Guarantees the right to form associations of citizens and organizations of different
sectors to give all members of society the opportunity to participate in local instances
for the formulation of public policies, self-organized development projects and to realize
programs in order to improve the provision of public community services. By municipal
decrees (see Law of Municipalities), local management committees for PHES or water
management in general can be assigned certain tasks
2004
Law No. 647: Law on Reforms
and Additions to Law No. 217
(Ley de Reformas y Adiciones
a la ley No. 217)
Inclusion of PES as an environmental management instrument within the General Law on
the Environment and Natural Resources (Law No. 217). Creation of a system of valuation
and Payment for Ecosystem Services as an environmental management instrument with
the objective to value and establish PES and to generate financing and incentives for
environmental conservation, preservation and sustainable use of natural resources
2008
Law No. 559: Special law
on Delinquencies against the
Environment and Natural Re-
sources (Ley Especial de Deli-
tos Contra el Medio Ambiente
y Recursos Naturales)
Regulation of violations of the General Law on the Environment and Natural Resources
(Law No. 217)
2005
Decree: 01-2007: Regu-
lation of Protected Areas
(Reglamento de Áreas Protegi-
das)
Regulation of Protected Areas 2007
Law No. 620: National Wa-
ter Law (Ley General de Aguas
Nacionales)
Conceptualization of Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services. Introduction of
water fees for the use and diversion of water
2007
Table 6.2: Nicaraguan environmental laws and references to the Concept of PHES (Author’s work)
Although the PHES instrument has received considerable recognition in the Nicaraguan environmental legislation, a
national PHES scheme, as in the case of Costa Rica or Mexico, has not been established. Nevertheless, the Nicaraguan
approach pursues the establishment of national funds (for hydrological or general ecosystem services) again designating a
central role of the ANA, in the case of hydrological ecosystem services, as intermediary for the implementation of schemes.
However, so far not even one PHES has been implemented by a central governmental institute or agency such as the ANA.
By contrast, several locally organized and user-financed schemes have been implemented in the last decade. River basin
management in Nicaragua is largely concerned with managing land for the right use in order to prevent negative impacts
to downstream water uses. Nicaragua is an agriculturally dominated country with a very small industry sector and its
main water users are public water suppliers, public hydro power producers and mostly private irrigated agriculture. All
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of these water users rely on (upstream) areas for water provision. The PHES concept is addressing these circumstances
directly and is gaining popularity in Nicaragua for this reason.
PHES may possibly be more than just a means of establishing economic incentives for conservation, but also a means
for the operationalization of IWRM contributing to address problems of spatial fit and institutional interplay more directly
and context-specific. This additional objective of PHES may justify higher transaction costs and efficiency trade-offs since
these transactions are also required as part of a necessary IWRM process.
6.2 Application of the PHES instrument in Nicaragua
While the formal IWRM process with the creation of an enabling environment by laws and national policies, the
establishment of institutions and the assignment of responsibilities as well as funding is slowly progressing from top-down,
the implementation of Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services schemes at the river basin level, in form of locally
organized schemes, is several years ahead. In 2000 the first Nicaraguan PHES schemes entered a preparatory phase
with bio-physical assessments of the state of natural resources (land use assessment, soil mapping and water resources
assessment) at the respective river basin level. At the same time, different stakeholder groups (water and land users as
beneficiaries and providers of hydrological ecosystem services) were identified and economic valuations of the hydrological
ecosystem services were carried out as part of this preparatory PHES process. 11 locally financed payment schemes (three
of them were implemented as environmental funds) for hydrological and other ecosystem services, mainly biodiversity
and carbon sequestration, have been documented until now (Talavera, 2007; Kammerbauer et al., 2010). Examples of
payment schemes considering hydrological ecosystem services are summarized in Table 6.3.
Municipalities Sub-basin; size Service buyer and immediate beneficiaries Start
Belén, Buenos Aires
and Potosí
Río Gíl González; 68 km2 Private sugar company CASUR, plantain producers,
public water supplier for Belén, Buenos Aires and Potosí
2008
Río Blanco Río La Golondrina; 10 km2 Municipal water supplier (Empresa Municipal
Aguadora de Río Blanco; EMARB)
2002
El Regadío, Tisey
and La Estanzuela
Río Estelí; 27 km2 Municipal water supplier 2007
San Pedro del Norte Río Paso los Caballos; 72 km2 Municipal water supplier 2001
Table 6.3: Case study examples of Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services schemes in Nicaragua (Author’s elabora-
tion)
Almost all PHES schemes have been initiated with the support of international development cooperation agencies as
intermediaries in order to promote financial sustainability of environmental conservation actions. As illustrated in Table
6.3, several laws in Nicaragua, issued after the PHES had commenced, include some references to PHES, but are still
far from being implemented or institutionalized. Thus, the establishment of legal and institutional frameworks on the
national level seems to lag behind what has already been established, in practice, on the regional or local level.
The following section documents the implementation of the PHES scheme in the Gíl González river basin in Nicaragua
as a case study example. The Gíl González PHES scheme is deemed a successful locally organized scheme and was selected
as a case study for The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) initiative this year (Hack et al., 2013). The
author was involved as an external expert during the whole implementation phase of the scheme from 2008 until 2011
and the subsequent and still ongoing execution phase. The following documentation of the implementation process
illustrates how practical PHES implementation provides potential opportunities to solve common problems of spatial fit
and institutional interplay as described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Furthermore, it is the basis to assess the instruments
functional role within a broader policy mix for IWRM implementation.
6.2.1 The payment for hydrological ecosystem services project in the Gíl González river basin
The Gíl González river (sub-)basin is located in the southwest of Nicaragua forming part of the Rio San Juan river basin,
the largest river basin in Nicaragua. The Gíl González river flows from west to east with a length of about 25 km until
it empties, after passing through the Ñocarime Lagoon, into the Lake of Nicaragua, the greatest freshwater reservoir of
Central America. The Gíl González river basin is shared by the municipality of Belén (upper part of the basin) Potosí and
Buenos Aires (lower part of the basin).
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With about 67 inhabitants per km2 the river basin has a moderately high population density (INIFOM, 2011). While
the lower part of the river basin is more densely populated and agricultural production is more intensive, the upper part
of the basin is characterized by dispersed settlements, few infrastructural developments and predominantly subsistence
agriculture of poor farmers (Hack et al., 2013).
The climate of the region is tropical with a prolonged dry season of five to eight months, with average annual
precipitation between 1000 and 2000 millimeters and a generally bi-modal pattern of rainfall, with a shorter and a longer
dry period. Given that the prevailing winds in the ecoregion blow from the northeast or east to the southwest or south and
most of the ecoregion has mountain systems running from northwest to southeast, the Pacific side of Central America,
where the Gíl González river basin is located, receives a lesser amount of rain than the Caribbean side. Typically, dry
sub-tropical forests can be grown on a wide variety of soils and represent the original endemic vegetation in lowland and
pre-montane areas from zero to 800 meters elevation (Marín et al., 2005; González-Rivas, 2005; Tarrasón et al., 2009;
Dirzo et al., 2011).
However, in the last decades large parts of the upper river basin have been deforested due to agricultural expansion for
the cultivation of corn, beans and rice on a subsistence level and the need for wood for construction as well as for cooking.
Deforestation is a serious problem for the whole region as it accelerates soil erosion, decreases agricultural production and
increases turbidity, which directly affects downstream water users (Dirzo et al., 2011). Importantly, it is assumed that
deforestation decreases the amount of recharge to aquifers by increasing surface runoff. Deforestation along rivers also
increases the risk of the rivers drying up because of the increased exposure to the sun.
Today, extensive cattle ranging is often practiced as well, as a means to diversify farm income. However, the more fertile
lowland areas are cultivated by richer farmers who cultivate sugarcane, rice and plantains. This translates into a situation
where the more disadvantaged part of the population is forced to cultivate in the upper areas of the river basin due to
higher land prices in the more fertile and accessible lowlands (Hack et al., 2013). Thus, fragile soils and ecosystems of
the upper river basin areas are damaged resulting in a reduction of infiltration rates and therefore a reduction of river
discharge and lowering of the groundwater table, soil erosion, and contamination of the river system by animal feces
(Hack et al., 2013). Hence, any change of poor farmers’ existing production systems to more sustainable systems would
result in additional costs for a largely marginalized population group.
Empirical data from the Gíl González river basin, based on hydrological assessments of individual watershed areas with
different land uses and measurements of water tables of local wells (CIRA, 2007; Hack, 2010, 2011), indicates that the
complex land use change of the past has led to decreased river discharge, especially during the dry season from November
until April, and to a deterioration of the river’s water quality. Apart from ecological problems, this has also resulted in
economic consequences for the downstream water users, particularly to the privately owned sugar company CASUR. The
company cultivates sugarcane on 54 km2 along the shore of the Lake of Nicaragua from which it produces sugar, molasses
and energy. It is the biggest water user of the region. 10 km2 of the total cultivation area are located within the lower part
of the Gíl González river basin. About half of the sugar production is exported (reference year of 2008). With 1600 direct
and several thousand indirect employees the company is also an important employer for the region.
The sugarcane production is strongly dependent on the availability of surface and ground water for irrigation during the
dry season. The increasing scarcity of inland water resources, i.e. decreasing river flow as well as lowering groundwater
tables, and deteriorating water quality (CIRA, 2007) convinced the company to invest in the upper part of the Gíl González
river basin to improve the hydrological service provision. This investment resulted in the establishment of a payment
for hydrological ecosystem services concept as a Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) project between the German Agency
for International Cooperation (GIZ), the municipality administration of Belén and the private sugar company CASUR in
Nicaragua.
The implementation process of the PHES in the Gíl González river basin is very similar to the typical implementation
process of local PHES as analyzed in Section 5.2.1. Hence, a distinction can be made between a preparatory as well as an
application and execution phase.
The preparatory phase includes the identification of principal bio-physical cause-effect relationships between land use
and service provision. The scheme in the Gíl González catchment considered the provisioning and regulating services of
freshwater in terms of water quality, quantity and especially timing of flow. In this context, especially the role of shrub
vegetation, secondary forests and dry tropical forest cover for water infiltration into the ground and as a regulator for
torrential precipitations in the rainy season was investigated.
The PHES scheme in the Gíl González river basin had its origin in the revision of the municipal strategic development
plan of the municipality of Belén and a redirection toward a development plan with focus on river basins incorporating
elements of participatory land use planning and watershed management. The municipality recognized the severe
environmental degradation within its territory and decided to apply the PHES instrument to reverse this degradation. As
one methodological step of the plan preparation, the existing river systems and watershed areas were prioritized regarding
their importance as drinking water for the rural and urban population and for the agricultural production of the former.
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The territory of the municipality of Belén forms part of seven river basins. The prioritization of a river basin was based
on 14 criteria: basin surface within the municipality’s territory, population density of the river basin, existence of prior
studies of water quality and quantity, existence of areas prone to flooding, water contamination, use conflicts, protection
zones (actual and potential), irrigation water use, agricultural use potential, forestry use potential, social organization and
productivity, status of access roads and presence of supporting NGOs. Moreover, the river’s ecological function regarding
the Nicaragua Lake was also taken into consideration.
The decisive criteria for the prioritization of the Gíl González river basin were the largest surface within the territory
of the municipality, the second highest population density, the existence of a prior study on water quality and quantity,
the level of social organization and productivity as well as good accessibility. Moreover, the Gíl González river basin was
chosen for being the most important mainly due to the fact that the urban population of Belén derives its drinking water
supply from this river system. Furthermore, the Gíl González river basin provides agricultural plantations, sugar cane and
rice producers with irrigation water.
In this second step, using GIS technology, satellite imagery from 2005 was interpreted to determine land use in the
municipal territory on a scale of 1:50,000 (INTELSIG, 2008). Additional information on land uses in the recent three
decades was retrieved from aerial photographs of the project site. This land cover information was overlapped with soil
type information, hang slopes and geological features in order to determine land use conflicts. Information on soil classes
and land use was provided by recent field surveys (Acuña et al., 2008a,b,c; Rodríguez et al., 2003a,b). Further hydrological
data was gathered from 6 rain gauges with daily records within a range of less than 20 km from the catchment and
climatological data of 3 stations with daily records of temperature, wind speed, humidity, air pressure, insolation with a
distance of less than 30 km from the catchment. Additionally, there are measurements of river discharge and groundwater
tables from recent years (CIRA, 2007; Hack, 2011). A summary of the information available prior to the PHES scheme
execution and its temporal and spatial resolution is given in Table 6.4.
Data Temporal resolution Spatial resolution
Precipitation 1958 - 2008 (daily) < 20 km from the catchment
Climate 1999 - 2007 (daily) < 30 km from the catchment
River discharge 1965, 2006, 2008 - 2009 (monthly) Every 5 km along main channel
Soil 2002, 2006, 2008 Whole catchment field survey
Vegetation and land use 2004, 2008 Whole catchment field survey
Hydrogeology 2006 (single) 3 wells in the catchment
Potable water production 2003 - 2008 Lower catchment
Census 2005 Village level
Table 6.4: Geophysical and socio-economic data base (Hack, 2010)
These materials were used to identify and classify hydrologically critical areas of the river basin. The source areas of the
headwaters as well as riparian areas of the main stream and its tributaries were prioritized for protection. Within the Gíl
González river basin, also areas of moderate and severe land use conflicts were determined which would be the areas
where conservation, land cover recuperation and soil conservation measures should be implemented in order to promote
future rainfall infiltration rates.
Parallel to this process the Center for Aquatic Resources of the National Autonomous University of Nicaragua (CIRA-
UNAN) was involved in establishing a baseline for the monitoring of river discharge volume and water quality (CIRA,
2007). The initial bio-physical assessment was mainly driven by intermediaries acting as facilitators for the development of
a PHES scheme. Besides the GIZ as donor and project initiator, the Association of Municipalities of the Rivas Department
(AMUR) and the Center for Aquatic Resources contributed with assessments of soils, land uses and water resources
too. The Association of Municipalities of the Rivas Department is an organization represented by the 10 governments
of the member municipalities of non-profit and non-partisan character, whose main objective is to strengthen municipal
autonomy. A principal objective of AMUR is the development of land use planning in the Rivas Department.
The bio-physical assessment carried out identified severe land use changes in the past as the principal cause for the
degradation of hydrological ecosystem services (CIRA, 2007; Acuña et al., 2008a,b,c). In a second step of the preparatory
phase, the principal beneficiaries of these services were addressed as part of a socio-economic valuation process. The
private sugarcane producer CASUR was identified as the main beneficiary, while the municipal water supply of Belén
provided by ENACAL and commercial producers of plantains and vegetables were determined as benefiting as well. All
beneficiaries are characterized by extractive uses of water. The most critical time of service provision is at the end of the
six months long dry season from February to April. Besides quantitative aspects of service provision, benefits are derived
from improved water quality, especially in the case of the municipal water supply, where high water quality standards are
demanded.
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Figure 6.3: Organizational framework supporting the payment scheme; based on (Hack, 2010)
At first, the GIZ contacted CASUR to obtain information on water consumption and willingness to pay for service
provision (AMUR, 2013). The municipality of Belén joined this socio-economic valuation process as service providers are
located within its municipality. The previously identified areas in the Gíl González river basin with land use conflicts, then
allowed identifying potential hydrological service providers. Within the selected local communities a broader participatory
land use zoning process was initiated and sustainable use standards were agreed upon. In order to identify opportunity
costs of land use changes, it was considered how much had to be paid to recuperate degraded lands in the upper part of
the catchment area and how much had to be paid to protect intact dry forest remnants and gallery forests. Incentives to
introduce soil and forest, i.e. land use conservation measures were negotiated, in cooperation with the local population.
Finally, the participants of the valuation process decided to orientate the payment amount on the opportunity cost each
farmer would incur if he left land out of production, i.e. a hypothetical annual average rent per 1 ha of his land. A study
executed in Belén to determine land prices concluded that the medium land rental price per ha in the middle and upper
watershed is US-$ 36 / ha / year (Hack et al., 2013). Thus, the valuation and negotiating process in this case study was
focused on the opportunity cost of land use changes representing the minimum payment to achieve service providers’
willingness to accept. The willingness to pay, on the beneficiary side, was not explicitly assessed. However, the main
beneficiary, CASUR, accepted the determined payment amount, regardless of actual benefits of service provision being
higher or lower. This procedure of input-based service valuation is typical for local PHES, as documented in different case
study reviews (see Section 5.2).
Finally, the concept of a payment for hydrological ecosystem services scheme was introduced with the support of
the local municipality, the GIZ and CASUR in form of a public private partnership (Flores Barboza et al., 2011; AMUR,
2013). A cooperation contract was signed by the three supporting parties, establishing individual duties of each party
in order to implement the PHES scheme. An executive office for the scheme administration was installed at CASUR.
Furthermore, a scheme coordinator was contracted and a managing committee was constituted as the body responsible for
the management of the PHES scheme. The managing committee consists of representatives of the municipality of Belén,
CASUR, the GIZ, AMUR, governmental ministry branches of the Rivas Department (MAGFOR, MARENA, National Forestry
Institute INAFOR, National Agricultural Institute INTA) and representatives of hydrological ecosystem service providers.
Beside the managing committee, there is also a technical committee which is composed of the scheme coordinator,
technical personnel of public authorities (municipality, INTA, INAFOR, MARENA, MAGFOR), and representatives of service
providers. The technical committee is in charge of elaborating and implementing capacity building activities and provides
general technical assistance. Figure 6.3 illustrates the scheme’s organizational framework, the composition of all parts of
the framework and their respective responsibilities.
The organizational framework regulates and supervises the transactions between service provider and service buyer
allowing the realization of payments. To support a participative decision making regarding the design of the payment
6.2 Application of the PHES instrument in Nicaragua 151
Ecosystem as service provider 
(upper part of the 
Gíl González catchment) 
Contractual 
agreement 
Responsible for 
the service provision 
(Landholder) 
Payment fund for the 
provision of the service 
(Management committee) 
Service user 
(e.g. CASUR) 
Payment / 
Compensation 
Measures 
improving service 
provision 
Figure 6.4: Payment scheme of the Gíl González catchment; based on (Hack, 2010)
scheme and the definition of measures to improve the service provision, all stakeholders are equally represented within
the organizational framework. Therefore, the established organizational framework, consisting of a managing committee,
a technical committee, and a coordination unit, includes representatives of the service providers (land users of the upper
river basin), the service buyer, the local municipality administration, the GIZ and technicians from several federal ministries
for capacity building and technical assistance concerning conservation measures.
The payment scheme is supervised and monitored by the multi-stakeholder management committee. Thus, payments
are not executed directly, but intermediate through a fund which is administered by the managing committee. With the
engagement of service providers and buyers as part of the management committee, a greater ownership, transparency
between different actors and the general public as well, increased trust among the stakeholders could be achieved (Flores
Barboza et al., 2011).
The service buyers pay a fixed amount per year for the use and conservation of the hydrological service into a project
fund and service providers receive an annual payment for taking their formerly cultivated land out of production and
instead reforest and conserve existing forest. Most of the land now under protection or reforestation was previously used
either as pasture for cattle or for the cultivation of maize, beans or rice. In one case forested land was included as well in
order to protect it. The payment scheme is shown in Figure 6.4.
Measures Description; payment / compensation
Conservation of
existing forest
Protection of exiting forests; 36 US-$/ha/year
Expansion of
existing forest
Reforestation of degraded areas; 36 US-$/ha/year
Expansion /
recuperation of
gallery forest
In a period of 4 years every farmer had to plant annually at least 300 trees in a 50 meter stretch
from the river bed until a 200 meter broad stretch was reached (established by the Environmental
Law to protect forests along rivers); 36 US-$/ha/year
Establishment of
complex fences
The participating farmer had to remove the vegetative material and establish the living fences.
The National Forest fund paid an additional 0,5 US-$ for each tree established. In addition every
farmer received: a) barbed wire in order to protect forest from cattle grazing and b) different
types of endemic fruit tree seedlings
Additional
measures required
to receive payment
Establishment of fire protection lines around forests (Rondas). Removal of dead wood material in
forests in order to avoid forest fires. Participation of land users in technical workshops with topics
demanded by farmers. Precondition to receive payment for the above mentioned measures.
Table 6.5: Summary of conservation measures and respective payments or compensations; based on Hack et al. (2013)
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In order to participate in the PHES scheme, every service provider had to sign a formal contract, in which the mutual
agreements and obligations were formally established. Moreover, participating land users only received payments after a
technician of the technical project committee had visited and evaluated the accomplishment of the agreements (AMUR,
2013). Hence, the PHES scheme contains conditionality on input, i.e. compliance with agreed conservation measures and
(monetary) payments are realized ex-post.
Table 6.5 shows the list of conservation measures for which farmers received remuneration in cash and remuneration in
kind.
The introduction of the PHES schemes resulted in a very high initial demand to participate on the service provider side.
However due to a limited initial financial volume of the fund, the project had to limit the number of signed contracts
to those land users who still had forested areas on their lands, and focused on those who were working in areas which
required an urgent regeneration of vegetation cover. At the beginning, only the municipality of Belén and CASUR, as
service buyers, and the GIZ contributed to the payment fund. In 2010 and 2011, the National Fund for Forest Development
(Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Forestal, FONADEFO) and INAFOR with funding provided by the National Forest Program
(NFP) of the FAO, also contributed to the fund (see Table 6.6).
Payer type Name 2008 and 2009 2010 and 2011 2012 Total
Service buyer CASUR 48,000 32,000 33,140 111,140
Municipality of Belén 12,000 9,741 7,826 29,567
140,707
Governmental funds FONADEFO - 20,000 - 20,000
INAFOR (FAO-Facility) - 10,500 - 10,500
30,500
International donor agency GIZ 52,000 35,000 8,175 95,176
Table 6.6: Financial contributions of water users and donor agency (US-$); based on Hack et al. (2013)
When the payment scheme was implemented, interested land users had to present registered land titles (legal property
rights) since a legal agreement had to be signed between service buyer and service provider to ensure mutual commitment.
This circumstance limited the participation of land users as service providers to a certain extent and only 105 ha of land
with official land titles could be included in the scheme for improvements in hydrological service provision. This area was
considered far too small to have a considerable impact on water production. Therefore, the project decided to apply a
more flexible model in which farmers who presented a formal statement from the cadastral department of the municipality
that no land claims from third parties existed, were able to take part. Since 2008 the number of participating farmers has
increased continuously.
6.2.2 Impact and success factors of the PHES scheme
The PHES scheme was an important means to initiate a dialog among different public and private actors at local and
regional levels such as up- and downstream land and water users, people in rural and urbanized areas and different
local governments. Before the scheme’s establishment, no open dialogue existed between the upstream municipality of
Belén and the downstream hydrological service demanding sugar cane producer. However, mental blockades on both
sides had to be dismantled in order to create a constructive negotiation basis. On the one hand, the sugarcane company
CASUR had to struggle with a negative image regarding their environmental impact due to the practice of burning harvest
residues and cutting trees in order to fuel their sugar refining process. On the other hand, the municipality of Belén
was forced to act against advancing environmental degradation in the upstream part of its territory. In this situation,
the hydrological ecosystem service concept seemed to appeal to both side as a feasible way to finding a solution. The
bio-physical assessments, which were carried out in the preparatory phase of the scheme, provided scientific and technical
arguments that convinced CASUR of the need for hydrological service provision (AMUR, 2013). Hence, a main factor
for the successful establishment of the PHES scheme was CASUR’s demand for these services. CASUR recognized its
dependence on hydrological ecosystem services and the resulting costs due to their deterioration. As a result, the company
was willing to invest in the protection and the restoration of parts of the ecosystem. In addition, CASUR gained a positive
recognition from society through the initiative, which was also an incentive to participate in the scheme.
Moreover, land users in the upper part of the river basin were willing to change their land use in order to comply with
the service provision requirements. A certain awareness of the importance to act by mitigating the present environmental
problem, that had originally been caused by their own collective action, encouraged their participation, although the
payment does not fully compensate their opportunity costs.
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Having discovered common interests among these critical stakeholders, a continued moderated dialog between the
stakeholders finally made an institutional arrangement possible. As in many other locally organized PHES schemes, this
initial moderating process was supported by an intermediary, in this case the GIZ.
Besides its role as the principal service buyer, CASUR acted as an important facilitator for the execution of the scheme
by providing accommodation for the scheme coordinator and also employing the coordinator. Moreover, CASUR carried
out several discharge measurements for baseline identification of service provision and provided further climatological
data from the company owned climate station.
The conformation of the managing committee, including the representatives of the municipality of Belén, CASUR,
the GIZ as well as upstream land users as service providers was very important for the acceptance by potential service
providers as well as for trust building. Through the involvement of representatives of service providers in the managing
committee, they could participate with voice and vote in the decision-making process concerning the scheme design, e.g.
with regard to the interpretation of conditionality and additionality. Moreover, the service providers have the ability to
express their views and concerns about the scheme’s progress.
The management committee for the river basin was constituted and now plays an important role in the development
and implementation of sustainable land management plans that consider protection and cultivation zones. Also, the
committee structure guarantees the selection of participating land users based on scientific criteria, e.g. land users possess
land in areas formerly identified as hydrologically sensitive and are willing to apply appropriate conservation measures,
avoiding the introduction of political elements and allowing for a transparent monitoring of provider’s compliance with the
signed contracts since all participating stakeholder are equally represented. With the establishment of an organizational
framework consisting of representatives of all stakeholder groups, development and management of water resources is
starting to get more participatory, following a cross-sectoral approach.
Furthermore, due to the increased public awareness of environmental problems and the success of direct payments to
service providers, land users now participate much more actively in the municipal council meetings in which the municipal
budgetary lines for next year’s investments are agreed upon (Hack et al., 2013). In these meetings, land users now defend
the financial contribution of the municipality to the PHES fund and even demand the increase of financial contributions to
this fund. The PHES process changed people’s perceptions on water, which is now considered as a finite and vulnerable
resource while gaining economic importance. Participants as well as non-participants of the payment scheme recognize
environmental protection as a main objective of the payment concept. These changed perceptions were expressed during
a field survey (Schuchmann, 2010) and at several workshops which formed part of the systematization process of this
project experience (Flores Barboza et al., 2011). In general, there is a lot of interest to participate in the project as a service
provider. Problems with access to the payment scheme because of uncertain property titles and possible marginalization of
non-participants were not expressed by the interviewees (Schuchmann, 2010).
Through the PHES scheme, an area of 513 ha is now (2013) under conservation and 36 km of complex fences (wind
breakers) have been established (see Figure 6.5). Furthermore, a total of 93 hydrological ecosystem service providers have
been engaged in these actions and have been compensated either in kind or through monetary payments (AMUR, 2013).
The initiative contributed to the conservation of an important area of the upper part of the river basin ecosystem and
public awareness regarding the costs of ecosystem degradation and the interconnection of ecosystems in the uplands and
lowlands was raised considerably (Hack et al., 2013).
Figure 6.5: Images of conservation zones established within the PHES scheme (Source: Author)
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2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
No. of contracts 29 -1 +10 +60 0 98
No. of service providers 29 -1 +10 +55 0 93
Male service providers 21 -1 +8 +45 0 73
Female service providers 8 0 +2 +10 0 20
Hectares contracted 105 +3 +72 +332 -5 507
Km of complex fences 0 0 +36 0 +3 39
Table 6.7: Evolution of project participants and conservation measures from 2008 - 2012; based on Hack et al. (2013)
However, the actual improvement of service provision still remains uncertain since longer monitoring is necessary to be
sure about the conservation effects. Another important challenge is the introduction of conservation measures to improve
water quality, since activities have been addressed primarily to water quantity until now. Although the conservation
measures applied to improve the available water quantity, may also have a positive impact on water quality, e.g. reduced
soil erosion and agro-chemicals, some sources of water quality deterioration have not yet been addressed, e.g. problems
with coliform bacteria introduced by animal feces. Finally, a better understanding of the relation between land uses and
their impacts on hydrological services would contribute to the implementation of more effective conservation measures.
The introduced payment scheme for hydrological ecosystem services is very perceived positively by the participating
land users as a secure and continuous income source over the negotiated contract period of five years, although some
beneficiaries regard the project solely as an environmental protection measure without significant economic importance to
them. In addition, land users value future benefits from reforestation such as fruits, fuel wood and an increase of land
value. About half of the beneficiaries would include more land into the payment scheme and there is a high interest to
participate in the scheme as a service provider (Schuchmann, 2010), although the amount of payments does not fully cover
the economic losses if land is completely taken out of production for reforestation. At the same time, the maintenance of
reforested areas is labor intensive and does not imply additional reward. Therefore, it is necessary to diversify conservation
and restoration measures to generate additional income. In 2012, at least the payment amount per ha and year could be
raised from 36 US-$ to 41 US-$ and additional in-kind payments (e.g. material and tools) could be provided. Table 6.7
illustrates how the number of participants and the size of the conservation area have increased since 2008 (first year of
payments).
When considering the principal issues of potential ecosystem service providers’ enrollment, compliance of ecosystem
service provision and additionality as well as land use-ecosystem service provision linkage, required for the proper function
of PHES (as defined by Wunder and Albán (2008) and discussed in Section 5.2.3), the case of the Gíl González PHES
could solve initial problems of provider enrollment and achieved expected levels of compliance with agreed conservation
measures. Furthermore, there is sufficient reason to believe that additionality could be achieved. However, whether the
measures taken will in the end affect hydrological service provision is still unclear since the evaluation and monitoring
period is still too short. The monitoring and measurement of river discharge and groundwater levels initiated during the
implementation of the scheme has to be continued to verify assumed land use linkages to service provision.
Effects of leakage and perverse incentives resulting from the implementation of the PHES scheme have not yet been
documented. The question of permanence of the scheme has to be considered differentiated. Several measures introduced
by the scheme do not require permanence in terms of payments, for instance the establishment of complex fences as
wind breakers and the protection of riparian areas, since they are based on voluntary agreements. However, continuous
payments are negotiated for reforestation and the protection of forested areas. The municipality of Belén and CASUR
continue to contribute with financial and other resources without a designated end. Negotiations with additional service
beneficiaries such as ENACAL and the cooperative of plantain producers (APLARI) have been initiated but have not
achieved agreements. Their ability to pay may differ from that of the sugar company and has to be considered along with
possible effects on the end users of their products. In case of the water supply company the local water charge may increase
(financial overloading of poor water users / service buyers since water has to be, to a certain extent, considered as a basic
good). The integration of additional water users in the project holds the possibility for conflict resolution, because former
competitive water users could share common interest as service buyers and this may open room for additional bargains
and water saving strategies. In order to identify their water use (water source and volume) and plantain production, 25 %
of the registered plantain producers of the municipalities of Belén, Potosí and Buenos Aires have been interviewed. Based
on this information a payment per area of cultivation was proposed to the plantain producers.
On the supply side, the option of service provision has to become a serious alternative to unsustainable (agricultural)
land use by increasing its economic importance. A more feasible way could be to look for synergies between certain
agricultural (e.g. agroforestry) and non-agricultural (e.g. rural tourism) practices and the provision of hydrological
services so that an income complementary to the payment can be achieved. In this context it is also important to find a way
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to generate complementary income in the short term and to take non-monetary benefits (i.e. compensations) into account.
These synergies could also represent a viable strategy to establish alternative or additional development perspectives for
rural communities and reduce the risk of creating perverse incentives, e.g. receiving payments for land use change that is
already enforced by law.
6.3 Contributions to solve the problems of institutional fit and interplay
In the following section, the contribution of the different PHES implementation processes towards IWRM operationalization
is assessed. The assessment illustrates the specific contribution to solving the problem of spatial fit, improving institutional
interplay and improving local decision-making. In the context of water resources management integration, in the first
place, refers to deliberately moving away from fragmented approaches of sector policies. As far as the physical integration
within a river basin is concerned, this involves integration of land and water management, surface water and groundwater
management, water quantity and quality, and upstream and downstream water-related interests. This challenge was
introduced in Section 3.1 as the problem of spatial fit.
The implementation process of PHES schemes in Nicaragua, like the one in the Gíl González river basin, in general
departs from a common problem situation which is based on a shared belief on land use and hydrological services linkage.
It is thus commonly believed that changed land use in the past years or more often decades, e.g. deforestation for
agricultural purposes or pasture, in upstream areas of the river basin, had caused rivers to run dry, groundwater tables to
lower and/or water quality to decline. It is further believed that a reversal to former, closer to natural state land uses
can enhance water quality and quantity downstream. Thus, the assumed physical cause and effect relationship is based
on the geographic unit of the river basin. Actually, because of the size of many PHES schemes in practice, some river
basins should be called sub-basin or micro-basin since the basin size in question varies from 10 km2 to 70 km2 (see Table
6.3). However, as the PHES example of the Gíl Gozález river basin shows, this spatial extent represents the actual level of
local impact and problem perception. In the case of the Gíl González river basin, the positive correlation between forest
coverage and dry season flow was perceived as a proven fact because in micro-basins where the portion of forest left
was higher than in others of similar size, dry season flow was present while in others it was not (Flores Barboza et al.,
2011). The logic of upstream lands that provide hydrological ecosystem services and downstream beneficiaries, which are
connected through the surface or sub-surface water flow of a river basin, is inherent to the PHES concept. Therefore, it
addresses water resources management from “source to tap” (cf. Mitchell, 2005). The policy instruments of Environmental
Management Plans (Plan de Gestión Ambiental) and Local Development Plans (Plan de Desarrollo Local), which have been
developed by the municipalities for their respective administrative boundaries, are now developed in the PHES scheme of
the Gíl González river basin on the river basin basis, considering the administrative areas of the three municipalities Belén,
Potosí and Buenos Aires. For this reason, soil and land use maps, previously developed separately for each municipal
area, were combined in order to develop maps covering the whole river basin as a common area for environmental and
development action.
In order to improve the understanding of the right fit of measures introduced by the PHES scheme, monitoring of land
use changes and river discharge at different points of the river basin are continuously carried out to learn more about
cause-impact relationships (see Figure 6.6).
Figure 6.6: Discharge measurement carried out for baseline assessment of hydrological service provision (Source: CASUR)
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PHES scheme Organizations Respective tasks of organizations Stakeholders involved
Gíl González
(Hack, 2010)
Managing committee Administration of the PHES fund, su-
pervision and monitoring of land use
changes / forest protection and ecosys-
tem service provision
Service buyers (CASUR, mu-
nicipalities of Belén), service
providers, GIZ
Technical committee Capacity building for service suppliers,
awareness raising and educational ac-
tions
Members of the Manag-
ing committee, CASUR, rep-
resentatives of MARENA,
MAGFOR, INTA, INAFOR
and AMUR
La Golondrina
(Baltodano, 2008)
Municipal council Makes decisions on water management
and provision as well as the administra-
tive process of the payment mechanism
Mayor and three representa-
tives of the municipal parlia-
ment
Administrative council Execution of the PHES and supervision
of the water supplier, control of pro-
tected areas, promotion and amplifica-
tion of the PHES including additional
Service buyers and providers
President of the munici-
pal water supplier and four
members of the civil soci-
ety (one school director and
three service providers)
Estelí / El Regadío
(Ardón Mejía and
Barrantes, 2003;
FAO, 2010c)
Water committee Administration, management and main-
tenance of the water supply service,
preservation and restoration of the river
basin, execution of the PHES
NGOs (PASOLAC,
MOPAFMA), local mu-
nicipality, water users and
service providers
Table 6.8: Examples of established organizations, respective tasks and stakeholders involved in selected PHES schemes
(Author’s elaboration
The river basin, as a geographical reference has further implications for the implementation of PHES concerning the
institutional framework and stakeholder involvement. As the institutional interplay analysis suggests, implementing IWRM
does not necessarily require the creation of new all-encompassing organizations, but rather a change of working practices
to look at the bigger picture that surrounds each stakeholder’s actions and to realize that these do not occur independently
of the actions of others. IWRM implementation seeks to introduce an element of decentralized democracy towards the
way water is managed with an emphasis on stakeholder participation and decision-making at the lowest appropriate level.
In order to manage water resources sustainably and equitably all needs and uses of water, and therefore all respective
stakeholders and relevant institutions behind those, have to be considered and integrated in the decision making process.
This requires cooperation and coordination across policy sectors, stakeholder groups and often administrative units. This
in turn, often results in problems of institutional interplay (see Section 3.2). Whereas traditional environmental policies in
Nicaragua, basically municipal environmental management or development plans, have been elaborated within individual
municipal boundaries without much consideration or consultation of different stakeholder groups, especially without the
consideration of populations in areas far from the municipal capital, the implementation of PHES requires an assessment
of the different stakeholders as well as a negotiation process among them to reach agreements. Water users as well as land
users are considered for cooperation as either potential service buyers or service providers.
In the Gíl González PHES scheme, these stakeholder groups were, in a first step, identified and in a second step
entered into a dialog with the aim of finding solutions for cooperation. Although the PHES concept has a conservationist
background, it does not represent an explicit sector policy instrument, since it focuses on the cooperation or functional
linkage of ecosystems, the facilitation of ecosystem services through certain land uses and beneficiaries from those services
from all sectors. Hence, the logic of cooperation among service providers and buyers is not bound to predefined policy
sectors. The PHES concept uses the strategy of “issue linkage“, a strategy that makes the solution of an issue that is of
concern to another actor dependent on the solution of an issue that is important to oneself (Mostert, 2003; Dombrowsky,
2007a), to bring up- and downstream parties together. In this case, the basis for this “linkage” is an intact ecosystem that
provides the desired services and the solution to spatial fit as described above. This way the PHES concept facilitates
a simultaneous discussion of issues formerly considered independent, e.g. environmental degradation, agricultural
production and water supply, for a joint settlement.
The negotiating process in the Gíl González case as well as in other PHES schemes in Nicaragua was facilitated by the
municipal authorities with the aid of donor organizations and ended in the establishment of organizations responsible for
carrying out the PHES implementation and execution. Table 6.8 provides examples of organizations, their respective tasks
and the stakeholders involved in selected PHES projects.
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It is clear that PHES do not develop in the absence of prior environmental legislation, institutions and policies, but rather
come up as an alternative or often a complement to traditional environmental policy instruments as the case of Nicaragua
shows. Many attempts to allocate financial resources to environmental protection through different types of funds (e.g.
National Environmental Fund, National Water Fund) were made in Nicaragua, but have failed in the past for different
reasons. Problems of institutional interplay exist because institutions are poorly developed, e.g. the National Water Fund
is still not supported by institutional or structural mechanisms for its implementation; the law on water use fees needs to
be approved before fees can be charged. In addition, the National Environmental Fund, the National Cleaner Production
Fund and the Fund of Private Forest Owners did not have the expected impact of channeling financial resources to the
environmental sector (López Nolasco and Jiménez Otárola, 2008b). Contrary to “artificial“ superimposed organizations
that lack capacity and legitimacy (Lankford and Hepworth, 2010, cf.,), the organizations established through the PHES
(e.g. management committee or the river basin committee in the Gíl González River Basin) are a result of the willingness
to cooperate to address perceived problems. Institutional interplay was further promoted due to the participation of
land users and ecosystem service buyers in the definition of potential areas of ecosystem service provision and mutual
agreement on measures to improve ecosystem service provision that allow for compensation through payments.
Moreover, the actual political commitment at the local level, even where several municipalities are involved, is
an important outcome of the PHES schemes established in Nicaragua. In all PHES schemes in Nicaragua, the local
municipalities take an active role and contribute to the scheme with financial and human resources. Awareness building
actions are a core element of PHES in order to involve service providers and buyers. Practical experience has shown that
it was more difficult to involve providers than buyers in some schemes, while the opposite was true in other schemes.
Poorer service providers, often because of lower opportunity costs, were more easily available as service providers than
land users with higher incomes. Nevertheless, the view of upstream land users as exploiters of renewable resources is
changing to one where they are seen as possible stewards for nature, using practices in synergy with ecosystem processes
and functions (FAO, 2010a).
Experiences from the PHES scheme in the Gíl González river basins as well as other schemes in Nicaragua show that
there has not been much success in involving the national public water supply company ENACAL as a service buyer,
although it is present in all PHES schemes, except in the case of Río Blanco where the municipality took over the local
ENACAL branch (Flores Barboza et al., 2011). In the case of Río Blanco, water users even expressed willingness to pay for
the ecosystem service in addition to a water fee. In the case of Río Blanco, the municipally owned water supplier spent
part of the PHES revenue to cover production costs (FAO, 2010d). In all cases, there is stakeholder involvement on both
the supply and on the demand side although the benefits do not outweigh the costs of provision or real benefits are absent,
e.g. upstream land users often participate even if they are not better off economically. This is sometimes because of a
conservationist attitude or because of non-monetary benefits, e.g. inclusion in other development projects, compensations
in kind.
Apart from solving problems of spatial fit and institutional interplay, the availability of information on natural resources
in countries like Nicaragua poses an additional challenge for decision-making in the context of IWRM. Novo and Garrido
(2010) point out that “[...] like many other data-poor countries, Nicaragua lacks a complete spatial and temporal water
database”. Therefore, a very important step at the beginning of a PHES implementation process is the assessment of the
state of the ecosystem service and the main factors influencing its provision. In the case of hydrological ecosystem services
a thorough assessment and mapping of soil types, land uses and topography is required. Quantification of baselines (e.g.
river flow around the year, groundwater tables, water quality) of the current service status is also necessary to validate
comparatively a service alternation through monitoring later on. This information provides the basis for identifying
critical areas and conflicting land uses or other controversial actions (e.g. discharge of waste water) within the river
basin. As already described above these actions facilitate the formalization of the river basin as the area of action (spatial
fit), stimulate participation and cooperation with upstream land users (institutional interplay) and raise awareness for
environmental problems in a productive way. The initial bio-physical assessment is often carried out by universities
acting as consultants or by the National Institute for Territorial Studies. In the best case, this assessment is carried out in
cooperation with the land users in a participatory way, as in the case of the Gíl González River Basin (FAO, 2010a).
Established organizations with PHES schemes generally consist of a managing organization that administrates the
fund and that is responsible for establishing of legal contracts between service providers and buyers, and often also a
technical organization that is responsible for monitoring of the service provision, e.g. by documenting changed land use
and applied conservation actions, better also through direct measurements of services provided, and capacity building for
the service providers (see Table 6.8). The established organizations facilitate coordination and cooperation in actions of
conservation, e.g. the status of the conservation measures taken, the participation of service providers and water users as
well as the service provision is communicated regularly. The status assessment, the establishment of a system of payments
and the integration of new stakeholders can be realized by involving new stakeholders in the assessment actions and by
implementing a system of payments to encourage the presence of potential additional service providers (FAO, 2010a). By
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Figure 6.7: Functional role of PHES schemes in the Nicaraguan IWRM implementation process (Author’s work)
doing so, this may serve as a promotional action in order to engage additional providers and buyers. This was done, for
instance, in the case of the Gíl González PHES.
As a result of the PHES implementation process, in the next step a river basin plan is developed as a spatial planning
action including a zoning of the river basin for different uses, e.g. in form of environmental management and development
plans based on the river basin. The economic valuation of the considered hydrological ecosystem services is of particular
importance within the PHES implementation. Starting at the demand side, the willingness of water users to pay is assessed
based on the ecosystem service concept and their water use is quantified (at least roughly). The potential service providers
can be identified based on the conflicting uses already assessed. Their cost to provide the service has to be estimated as
well. A process of promotion and communication of the payment mechanism often accompanies this economic valuation
(Flores Barboza et al., 2011). Capacity building in soil conservation measures and water saving actions for service
providers and water users often are also included (FAO, 2010b). If the PHES is agreed upon, legal and administrative
actions are required to implement the scheme, thus, municipal decrees are applied to establish a fund for the payments
and one or more institutions to manage the PHES project. Although there is still no national law that regulates the
establishment of PHES, several municipalities could put PHES in action by creating administrative institutions and rules
for the payment mechanism (e.g. municipal environmental funds) through municipal decrees. This demonstrates that
a feasible decentralization is possible. The municipal decrees and resolutions establish PHES funds, administrative and
management institutions and provide room for public participation (Juárez Martínez, 2008).
In the context of the national IWRM process in Nicaragua, local PHES schemes, like the Gíl González scheme can
possibly be a complement to achieve context-specific fit and interplay at the sub-basin level. As could be shown, through
the involvement of hydrological service providers and beneficiaries in planning and management processes, horizontal
interplay at the sub-basin level is achieved across sectors and administrative boundaries. The PHES management committee,
in its facilitating role for spatial development planning through the establishment of protection and cultivation zones
within the PHES schemes, has served as a pilot for the Inter-municipal River Basin Committee of the Gíl González River
which was established in 2010 (CIRGG, 2010) and recognized by the ANA in 2012 (ANA, 2012). The principal objective
of the Inter-municipal River Basin Committee is to coordinate the application of policies, plans, environmental actions
and conservation financing mechanisms that contribute to the sustainable and shared management (CIRGG, 2010). The
establishment of the RBC demonstrates that the organizational development of cross-sectoral and cross-administrative
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IWRM structures from bottom-up can be promoted through a PHES scheme. The official recognition of the RBC by the
ANA is one form of vertical interplay, another form of vertical interplay was achieved through the cooperation with other
governmental agencies, e.g. INTA and INAFOR, in terms of technical assistance and support in monitoring land use
changes. Furthermore, the PHES in the Gíl González river basin could overcome critical operational constraints of funding,
capacity and informational gaps through co-management and co-financing by public and private stakeholders. Hence,
in the case of the Gíl González sub-basin, current gaps in the institutional and organizational framework of IWRM in
Nicaragua could be overcome. This is illustrated in Figure 6.7, the grey colored parts in the figure are formal IWRM
elements which are still lacking.
Hence, PHES schemes can contribute to the national IWRM process by providing mechanisms for horizontal interplay at
the management level and vertical interplay through the establishment of RBCs and upward connectivity to higher level
sector organizations such as MARENA, MAGFOR, INTA and INAFOR. Moreover, the facilitation of horizontal interplay
at the management level is directly related to the solution of the problem of institutional fit. Hence, PHES schemes can
obviously provide for the appropriate scale, based on interrelated solutions of fit and interplay, of a management unit as it
is perceived and expressed by locally involved stakeholders. The application concept of hydrological ecosystem services
represents a means of achieving this.
In the context of the IWRM process in Nicaragua, PHES schemes bear the potential to complement the processes of
horizontal interplay at the national level by contributing mechanisms for horizontal interplay at the management, i.e.
operational level and vertical interplay from bottom-up. The vertical interplay from bottom-up may be readily picked
up by a contrarian process of vertical interplay such as the creation of RBOs, as defined in the water law. Hence, PHES
schemes can fill a significant implementation gap at the operational end of the IWRM process in Nicaragua.
6.4 Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Service as part of a policy mix for IWRM
Considering the Gíl González PHES scheme as part of a broader mix of policy instruments, the instrument has proven to be
more flexible and context-specific than other regulatory command and control instruments provided by the National Water
Law. This context-specificity is particularly important to address problems of fit and interplay at the operational level.
However, this is more due to the informative character of the PHES instrument, e.g. communicating the benefit flows
within a river basin and how these are determined by different actors and actions, than due to strong economic incentives.
Nevertheless, the instrument provides incentives, although not economically driven, to engage different upstream and
downstream stakeholders in cooperation as well as in exchange of values and perceptions on hydrological functioning,
i.e. service provision. Furthermore, the interaction of stakeholders in discussing the role of different land uses and their
impact on hydrological ecosystem services facilitates the consideration of existing regulatory instruments. In the context
of defining additionality and conditionality as well as in avoiding perverse incentives, a rule-making process takes place
which concludes in agreements on which kind of land use is appropriate for specific sites, if it should be rewarded and how
it should be rewarded. Thus, actions which violate existing regulations considerably, e.g. cutting down trees in riparian
areas, may not be considered socially justifiable and it may be decided that restoration activities should not be rewarded
beyond the provision of restoration materials. The rule-making process has further implications as it promotes the process
of land use planning on the basis of river basins.
Although the PHES instrument basically represents an alternative, i.e. a complement to other forms of environmental
regulation, the instrument can strengthen other existing regulation and promote further institutional development. In the
Gíl Gonzalez PHES, for instance, the instrument promoted the introduction and diffusion of command and control policies.
The question of what is illegal and should not be compensated has been discussed and led to existing formal rules being
communicated and informal ones being contradicted. In several cases the identification of critical areas led to conservation
actions that did not form part of the PHES scheme. For example, the protection of water holes and riparian areas in the Gíl
González river basin in order to improve water availability during the dry season was not monetarily compensated but is
still an agreed measure among scheme participants. Moreover, the implementation of the PHES schemes was accompanied
by several awareness raising actions focusing on the upstream-downstream relationships and possible solutions for these
problems (FAO, 2010b; Flores Barboza et al., 2011). Upstream land users could learn about the negative impacts they may
have on downstream water users, but also got to know which actions are actually prohibited by law, e.g. use of riparian
areas for agriculture or distortion of water source areas. These awareness raising and educational actions resulted in
a variety of individual voluntary actions, e.g. the conservation and protection of riparian and headwater source areas
with fences, water saving in irrigation systems and the installation of water meters in different households. Furthermore,
through technical assistance from federal agencies the upstream land users learned about their on-site benefits from
actions that result in improved service provision for downstream water uses, e.g. soil conservation measures that increase
soil moisture and reduce erosion of fertile lands.
Table 6.9 summarizes formal rules which have been established in relation to the implementation of the Gíl González
PHES. All of these legal initiatives have a cross-administrative character originating from the basin perspective introduced
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Type of formalization Description
Intermunicipal declaration Declaration of the Intermunicipal Ecological Park “Laguna de Ñocarime” for the protec-
tion, conservation, restoration and sustainable management of the Ñocarime Lagoon
Intermunicipal decree Decree on the protection of forests in Potosí and Belén
Intermunicipal decree Decree on the restriction and prohibition on the use of agrochemicals in areas close to
water bodies
Intermunicipal decree Decree on the management of solid wastes
Intermunicipal regulation Regulation of the organization and functioning of the Intermunicipal Committee of the
Gíl González River Sub-basin
Municipal decree Decree on the Institutionalization of Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services in
the Municipality of Belén
ANA confirmation Conformation of the Intermunicipal Committee of the Gíl González River Sub-basin
Table 6.9: Formal rules established within the process of PHES implementation and spatial planning in the Gíl González
River Sub-basin (Author’s elaboration
through the PHES scheme. Additional actors took part in this process. For instance, the NGO Foundation Ñocarime in
promoting the establishment of the Intermunicipal Ecological Park “Laguna de Ñocarime“ and the Nicaraguan Foundation
for Sustainable Development (Funación Nicaragüense para el Desarrollo Sostenible, FUNDENIC).
Hence, the establishment of formal rules illustrates how municipalities together with representatives of the civil society
are applying conservation laws, for instance, through the designation of protected areas (Municipal Park, Ñocarime
lagoon). The declaration of the Ñocarime Lagoon and its surrounding wetlands as a protected area was the first protected
area established by several municipalities jointly (Municipalities of Potosí and Buenos Aires, 2010). With the Decree on
the Institutionalization of Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services in the Municipality of Belén, the municipality
decided to formally introduce the PHES as a financial instrument for the conservation and the management of natural
resources for all river basins forming part of its territory. Besides the Gíl González river basin, this includes the basins of the
rivers Lajas, Tola, Escalante, Nahualapa, Ochomogo and Ñocarime (Municipality of Belén, 2011). The PHES instrument,
the decree on the protection of forests and the declaration of protected areas represent the principal policy instruments.
The establishment of the Intermunicipal Committee of the Gíl González River Sub-basin has formally introduced the
development of Integrated Water Resources Management Plans (Plan de Gestión Integral de Recursos Hídricos) as a
principal function of the committee. The committee consists of the mayors of the municipalities of Belén, Potosí and
Buenos Aires, representatives of water users, service providers and governmental agencies.
How the PHES instrument has influenced different land and water uses is illustrated in Figure 6.8.
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Figure 6.8: Illustration of the functional role of PHES within a policy mix (Author’s work)
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Implementation step/IWRM task Outcome Formal responsibility / means
Bio-physical cause-effect relation-
ships between land use and service
provision
Identification of provisioning zones, soils
and land use conflicts, land use zoning on
the basis of river basins
ANA or RBO through river basin
management plans
Water quality / availability assessment ANA through water balances and
quality baselines for all river basins
Socio-economic valuation of ecosys-
tem services
Identification of land users (service
providers) and water users (beneficiaries)
ANA through the National Registry
of Water Users
WTP for service provision, WTA for
changes in land use / service provision
Negotiation between stakeholders
towards agreements on land use
Agreements on land use and conserva-
tion measures to improve service provision
through active stakeholder involvement
ANA or RBO through river basin
management plans, RBC to achieve
public participation
Determination of conditionality and addi-
tionality
Different policy instruments regu-
lating land and resource use
Continuous realization of agreed ac-
tions and payments
Continuous financing of conservation ac-
tivities, payments for benefits derived from
hydrological ecosystem services
Financing achieved through water
fees
Table 6.10: Overlapping of PHES implementation steps with IWRM tasks in terms of outcomes. Formal responsibility
is indicated in case the task would be carried out in line with national legislation assignments (Author’s
elaboration).
The functional role of the PHES instrument affects land and water uses in different ways. On the one hand, PHES
schemes introduce incentives to voluntarily adapt more environmentally friendly practices where environmental regulation
is absent and land uses affecting downstream water users negatively are not prohibited by any formal regulation. On
the other hand, the instrument interacts with existing regulations for critical hydrological service provisioning areas, e.g.
riparian areas and water source areas, through clarification of existing regulations not successfully enforced in the past. The
instrument may provide incentives to comply with these formal rules (e.g., fencing, reforestation) once their importance
for service production becomes apparent. Furthermore, as the Gíl González PHES has demonstrated, the scheme promoted
the establishment of additional protection and conservation zones such as the Intermunicipal Ecological Park “Laguna de
Ñocarime”. Before the establishment of the scheme, local municipalities had not established any protection zones. Finally,
another impact of the functional role of the PHES instrument is the registration of water uses and users through the
identification of potential hydrological ecosystem service buyers so that the scheme can function. In developing countries
like Nicaragua, this information is often lacking and represents a significant obstacle to the development of water fees
and control of resource use. Establishing the PHES scheme in the Gíl González river basin meant that all commercial
water uses and users could be identified. Moreover, competitive water users are sharing a common goal in improving the
provision of a service they all depend on. In the Gíl González PHES, this has led to agreements among competitive water
users on how to use water more efficiently (AMUR, 2013; Sánchez et al., 2013).
According to the National Water Law, the ANA is responsible for creating RBOs and RBCs. Moreover, either the ANA or,
if established, a corresponding RBO is in charge of carrying out bio-physical and socio-economic assessments in order to
formulate Integrated River Basin Management Plans. However, at the moment the ANA does not have the capacity and
resources to realize these important tasks. Instead, the ANA’s role in the IWRM process at the operational level is limited
to a legally advisory one through the confirmation of RBCs which were established independently from the ANA’s activities.
This is documented in the case of the Gíl González PHES scheme and also in other projects, for instance, in the elaboration
of a River Basin Management Plan for the Coco River in the north of Nicaragua (Baca et al., 2012). For the moment, the
ANA has to focus on the IWRM process at the normative and strategic level, acting as a water ministry in progressing and
moderating the national IWRM dialog at the national level. More important than the arbitrary creation of RBOs from
top-down without specific regard to local context is the establishment of laws and further institutions, e.g. the National
Registry of Water Uses or the establishment of the National Water Fund, which are needed to take the IWRM process to an
operational level.
The implementation and execution outcomes of PHES schemes in Nicaragua assume several actions and establish means
which are formally under the responsibility of the ANA, a RBO or a RBC. Table 6.10 summarizes how these outcomes relate
to formal responsibilities according to the water law. Because of the limited capacity of the ANA to assume responsibilities
itself and in the absence of RBOs and RBCs, these outcomes represent an important input to the operationalization of
IWRM in a bottom-up manner. The confirmation of the RBC of the Gil Gonzalez river basin, which is a result of the PHES
scheme development, through the ANA demonstrates that the ANA is actually open to this bottom-up initiative.
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6.5 Summary
The Nicaraguan IWRM process is typical for developing countries in many aspects. The process started during the 1990s
when the issue was quite recent on the international political agenda. The development of the National Water Action Plan
in 1998 was strongly supported by the international donor community and marks the beginning of the IWRM process
in Nicaragua. However, it took almost another decade until the National Water Law was finally passed and the first
steps towards an enabling environment as well as the (re)assignment of institutional roles was implemented. Despite
progress at the national level in terms of strategic and normative enactment of IWRM, the operationalization of IWRM
at the management level has not been achieved. The establishment of the National Council of Water Resources and the
National Water Authority (ANA) represents an important step in improving horizontal interplay at the national level and
prioritization of integrated management approaches for water resources, however, the multitude of tasks still to be done at
the strategic level of IWRM, e.g. the establishment of the National Registry of Water Users or the passing of complementary
laws to achieve appropriate financing of the operational IWRM process, as well as limited resources and capacity, disable
the operationalization of IWRM at the river basin level.
In these circumstances, the PHES instrument can make remarkable contributions to IWRM operationalization at the
local level. The National Water Law actually introduces PHES as a management instrument in order to promote the
compensation of conservation measures and the rational use of water resources. The water law assigns the task of PHES
implementation to the ANA, in practice, however, PHES schemes are implemented and executed without contribution from
the ANA. These locally organized schemes, often initiated by international donor organizations and local NGOs, contribute
in many different ways to the operationalization of IWRM through the adoption of tasks formally corresponding to the
ANA, RBOs or RBCs as discussed in the previous section.
The main goal of water resources management is to make the best use of the water resources available. Externalities
and trade-offs are inherently part of water resources management making the coordination of different water uses
and of those actors that have an impact on water resources a due requirement. Since water resources management is
basically an allocation task for a finite natural resource, which is provided as a natural input (precipitation) and initially
influenced by the characteristics of the land on which it falls, considerations of different degrees of hydrological ecosystem
services provision from different types of land uses appear very much straightforward. The IWRM concept emphasizes
the integration of different policy sectors within the natural ecosystems of river basins as a spatial fit solution. The
coordination and cooperative challenges of institutional interplay which this implies have been addressed repeatedly
by IWRM promoters. Nevertheless, attempts to overcome these obstacles to IWRM implementation through new policy
instruments that explicitly incorporate approaches to solve them are still an exception. Water managers and agencies often
do not consider the value of hydrological ecosystem services resulting in the prevention of ecosystem degradation. Water
management has traditionally focused on single factors directed more toward individual concerns such as water pollution
control, water supply and allocation, and specific targeted water-use sectors, rather than considering them collectively. An
ecosystem services approach towards water management instead focuses on the broader goal of balancing and sustaining
ecosystem services as a prerequisite for meeting these (and other) sectoral needs.
In this context, the experience of PHES implementation in Nicaragua could demonstrate feasible solutions to the
problem of spatial fit at the sub-basin level. The problem of institutional interplay is solved by a plain problem-orientation
and solutions offered by the ecosystem service concept. This has facilitated cooperation across different sectors and the
creation of suitable institutions in a “fit for purpose“ way. The PHES implementation led to important improvements in
the knowledge base on natural resources, considerations of suitability of land uses and existing laws on environmental
and natural resource use. The availability of such a knowledge base is a prerequisite for sound decision-making in water
resources management.
If an integrated river basin planning and management becomes legally institutionalized, e.g. through a management
unit within a PHES project carrying out the tasks of a river basin committee or through linking PHES to statutory land
use planning, a sustained development of the river basin can be enabled. The Gíl González PHES demonstrated that the
instrument can promote site-specific and problem-related institutional arrangements keeping transaction costs as low as
possible and eliminate the establishment of new or additional institutions. Recognizing the success of the Gíl González
PHES, the neighboring municipality of Belén, the municipality of Tola, started to replicate the PHES scheme of the Gíl
González in another river basin with touristic installations as service buyers (AMUR, 2013).
However, it remains to be seen how basin committees created through the National Water Law, i.e. the ANA, will
affect these institutions created within the PHES process. The implementation and execution of PHES schemes is not
a substitute for IWRM, but because of the tasks that need to be done within their implementation and later on in the
continuous application, PHES can potentially contribute more to the IWRM process than other economic instruments.
While PHES apply to hydrological ecosystem services within a river basin or at least part of it, the IWRM process includes
further geopolitical levels. In this context PHES may improve the bottom-up process of IWRM implementation only half
way, IWRM needs to complement this process from top-down with national policies and general political agenda setting
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for IWRM. In Nicaragua, for instance, this is intended with the National Water Law and the National Water Authority.
Connecting local PHES projects to the national top-down IWRM process remains a challenge for the future. PHES, however,
also have limitations that should not be neglected and many of their positive “side-effects” (promotion of the river basin
as area of action, stimulation of decentralized and participatory management of water resources, communication of
river basin processes) are possibly only due to corresponding project design and small-scale projects. If the natural
environment is recognized not only as a provider of ecosystem services, but also simultaneously as threatened by pollution
and over consumption, the basic needs of intact ecosystems may be integrated by PHES concepts as well. In particular, the
consideration of over exploitation and downstream pollution control has remained largely unaddressed in the projects
reviewed. In PHES schemes where payment has been implemented on a per volume basis of the water consumed, there is
at least a small incentive to save water but not explicitly for the environment.
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7 Conclusions
This dissertation has documented, analyzed and interpreted the state of knowledge of the global IWRM implementation
process. Based on the assessment of global implementation reports and the scientific discourse of two decades general
problems of implementation and specific constraints to the process in developing countries could be identified. Moreover,
present IWRM trajectories and recommendations towards improvements of implementation and operationalization could
be derived from scientific and practitioner’s experience. Hence, the principal contribution of this dissertation in this basic
problem analysis is a clarification of the problem statement of IWRM implementation in developing countries and the
provision of guiding principles for improvements.
The solutions approaches identified were further conceptualized methodologically by applying the theoretical concept of
institutional fit and interplay. In the following, this dissertation asserted that problems of institutional fit and interplay need
to be solved interdependently with due regard to specific operational constraints of local context in developing countries
in order to successfully implement IWRM at an operational management level, i.e. operationalization of IWRM. Hence,
this dissertation compared different policy instruments to achieve this based on an actor-centered incentive approach. It
was argued that improvements require a mix of policies with specific instruments to enhance institutional fit and interplay
suitable for context-specific operational constraints. This dissertation could expose that traditional command and control
approaches for IWRM operationalization are insufficient and complementary instruments are necessary to address the
prevailing implementation gaps. The instrument of PHES was identified as a potentially suitable policy instrument because
it combines several beneficial characteristics of communication / diffusion and economic instruments with characteristics
of collaborative agreements. Applying the concept of institutional fit and interplay in the context of operational constraints
of developing countries to identify suitable policy instruments for improved IWRM operationalization, as done in this
dissertation, is a particularly novel approach.
In order to assess the potential contributions of PHES schemes to the operationalization of IWRM, the concept of
ecosystem services and their valuation as its theoretical basis, was examined concerning the solutions it provides to address
the governance challenges of institutional fit and interplay. In this context, the concept of hydrological ecosystems services
their valuation process was addressed specifically. This dissertation could contribute to understanding how the application
and valuation process of hydrological ecosystem services inherently define spatial relationships between potential service
providers and beneficiaries based on functional ecosystem linkages. Hence, it was illustrated how the concept can
positively influence the identification of appropriate context-specific scales for operational IWRM as a result of fit and
interplay interdependence. Additionally, a cross-sectoral and cross-jurisdictional integration effect of the concept could be
acknowledged. The concept of hydrological ecosystem services has not yet been considered in relation to problems of
fit and interplay in IWRM implementation as presented in this work. Hence, this dissertation could provide additional
insights in this regard.
In a further theoretical analysis, this dissertation documented, analyzed and interpreted the state of knowledge of
the economic conceptualization of the PHES instrument. This dissertation could bring forward supporting arguments
for a less market-based and therefore a stronger multi-faceted incentive-based interpretation of PHES. Based on a broad
meta-analysis of global and regional PES scheme assessments, the principal characteristics of the instrument and its
implementation could be identified. A comprehensive instrument characterization of this kind is a further significant
contribution of this dissertation which has not been done yet to a similar extent. The characterization and instrument
assessment provides important insights with regard to the typical roles of different actors and the provision of incentives for
behavioral change towards IWRM. Moreover, it contributes to understanding how the instrument can potentially address
institutional challenges of IWRM operationalization in the context of general operational constraints. However, locally
user-(co-)financed PHES schemes as a particular type were identified as especially conducive to engaging stakeholders and
to promoting public participation.
Finally, the role of the PHES instrument in the context of a national IWRM process was assessed based on an empirical
example taken from Nicaragua. This dissertation provides a comprehensive documentation of the national IWRM process
in Nicaragua and its principal implementation gaps. The generalization of implementation gaps and specifically operational
constraints made before could be confirmed for the Nicaraguan IWRM process. Moreover, the shortcomings of a formal
top-down implementation approach based on command and control instruments alone could be highlighted as well.
Further valuable findings can be derived from this dissertation for other developing countries with a similar IWRM process
through the analysis of contributions of locally user-(co-)financed PHES schemes to solve the problems of institutional
fit and interplay in Nicaragua. Additionally, this dissertation revealed how the PHES instrument fits into an existing
policy mix in Nicaragua and how it interacts with other regulations. Hence, this work provides guidance on how to
improve context-specific fit and horizontal interplay at the operational level of IWRM as well as on how to complement
the primarily top-down directed IWRM implementation from bottom-up. Hence, this dissertation could document that the
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PHES instrument is more than a tool to finance nature conservation. Indeed, it could be shown that the implementation
and execution process of PHES schemes fulfills several other tasks which are essential for the operationalization of IWRM.
In the following, the general aims of this dissertation, regarding the objective of investigating how and to which extent
PHES fits in the IWRM process and what role PHES can potentially play to further operationalize IWRM, are addressed
specifically by answering the questions defined in the introductory chapter.
Why is IWRM still not widely implemented, despite having been promoted strongly by the international community
over the past three decades?
The general problem analysis of the global IWRM implementation process in this dissertation could reveal that
while IWRM is increasingly implemented at the national level through new legislation and organizational development
corresponding to IWRM objectives, the operationalization of IWRM at the river basin level lags far behind. Blueprint, often
all compassing, approaches of IWRM implementations were identified as a major problem. These ‘standard packages’ do
not consider special contexts and problem situations in specific river basins and therefore fail to find the right scale for
management and to engage the relevant stakeholders. Besides the complexity of the top-down comprehensive integration
task, additional constraints in form of scarce financial resources, capacity and weak governmental performance pose
further challenges to IWRM operationalization in developing countries. Hence, many scientists and practitioners advise to
focus on more pragmatic, expedient or light approaches toward IWRM implementation, especially at the operational level,
instead of overly comprehensive and complex approaches. Being more pragmatic does not imply discarding integration,
instead integration should be based on specific problem contexts resulting from natural and human system interactions.
Thus, applying IWRM principles to a specific problem context as an interpreted form of IWRM is assumed to be a more
promising approach to start IWRM operationalization.
A focus on interactions of human actions through linkages provided by the natural system presents a useful means to
achieve context-specific integration. Moreover, if benefits can be derived from these interactions and linkages, IWRM
operationalization is facilitated. Context-specific approaches are supposed to provide more flexibility to address operational
constraints and political problems. As a result of these insights, an adaptive IWRM concept, based on poly-centrism and
social-ecological-systems theory, was developed. Adaptive IWRM emphasizes solutions based on the linkages of social
(human) and ecological (natural) systems. A general principle of adaptive IWRM is to base management actions on a
process of continuous learning about natural and human system interaction. Being aware of the need for a more adaptive
approach, local action contexts are seen as fundamental when effective changes in water resources management are
to be achieved. To put IWRM into context, this means moving from global, exogenous ‘solutions’ to local, endogenous
plans of action. Thus, the key to improving IWRM implementation is to address the institutional and political challenges
typically encountered when implementing integrated approaches. These challenges are problems of institutional fit and
interplay, lack of participation, equity and accountability, as well as the general mismatch with needs and conditions
in specific places. Therefore, a problem and people-orientated approach is recommended that avoids the pitfalls of the
‘one-size-fits-all’ attempts which often characterize mainstream implementation.
In order to improve IWRM implementation from bottom-up, the importance of social-ecological-system’s interactions
is highlighted. Both scientific communities (the one focusing stronger on the human system and the one stressing the
natural system) acknowledge that a context-specific and problem-oriented approach is necessary to achieve this. Since
humans are the central drivers of ecosystem change but at the same time firmly dependent on the goods and services that
ecosystems provide, this interdependency has to be reflected in IWRM as well.
This dissertation has contributed to an improved understanding of the global IWRM implementation process and it has
highlighted the status and principle problems of IWRM implementation in developing countries. Moreover, this dissertation
has elaborated the main arguments and findings of the contemporary scientific discourse on the concept. Finally, this work
could identify the current development trajectories of the concept and derived prevailing implementation recommendations
to improve IWRM operationalization. These contributions to the problem analysis of IWRM implementation in practice
ended in a generalized problem statement which constitutes the basis for the following methodological conceptualization
of IWRM implementation.
What are the principal implementation gaps and core problems of the concept’s operationalization in developing
countries?
The methodological conceptualization of the IWRM implementation problem applied in this dissertation could demon-
strate that, in order to operationalize IWRM at the river basin level, the principal problems that need to be resolved relate
to achieving context-specific institutional fit and interplay. Institutional fit corresponds to the specific properties of the
ecosystem, i.e. the natural system, to be managed and interplay corresponds to the interaction of institutions and users of
the resource, i.e. the human system. Both, fit and interplay, interdependently define the right management scale, thus,
integrating the specific natural and human system context. The common implementation gaps of IWRM incorporate the
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issues of institutional fit and interplay as well as additional issues of prevailing operational constraints. These operational
constraints include funding, capacity and informational gaps which are of special importance in the context of IWRM
operationalization in developing countries. Specific policy instruments are needed to improve IWRM operationalization in
developing countries. On the one hand, there are several environmental policy instruments, often representing command
and control instruments. On the other hand, these instruments, despite their advantages, have important limitations with
regard to common operational constraints. Moreover, conventional environmental policy instruments do not specifically
address the problems of fit and interplay and their interdependence. Thus, solutions to operationalize IWRM have not yet
had the expected success.
The typical IWRM implementation which addresses problems of institutional fit and interplay separately, basically
through political and / or membership linkages, was not able to operationalize IWRM in developing countries. This
dissertation contributed to document this failure and provided suggestions to finding ways how to solve problems of
fit and interplay interdependently while taking operational constraints into account in order to find the right scale for
operational management based on natural and human systems’ characteristics.
What are the specific requirements for instruments to improve IWRM implementation?
Different policy instruments have different advantages and disadvantages. Traditionally, environmental regulation has
relied on command and control instruments. However, economic instruments have gained importance in the past because
of their flexibility in achieving environmental goals, even beyond standards.
Policy instruments differ in terms of their rationale and implementation mechanisms but also with regard to the
assignment of roles to different actors, e.g. more active or more passive roles, and the provision of incentives to encourage
actors to change their behavior. In practice, however, combinations of different policy instruments aiming at combing
individual instruments’ advantages and overcoming disadvantages proved to be most effective, especially in the context
of IWRM where multiple actors from different sectors are addressed and stakeholder involvement as well as public
participation is important for success. In developing countries, for instance, experiences with the application of command
and control instruments for environmental regulation alone have had very limited success. This policy failed for a number
of reasons including limited resources, restricting a proper enforcement of the instruments for environmental regulation,
problems of corruption and conflicts with informal rules. Moreover, in societies where environmentally damaging land use
results from subsistence farming practices, it is hard to enforce rules with sanctioning consequences.
Command and control instruments have the advantage of being clear and easy to understand, but lack the flexibility
and ability to provide incentives for stakeholder involvement and participation. However, command and control as well as
classical economic instruments influence actors’ behavior through changes in the external structure of objective options
and constraints but they have limited influence on actors’ internal structure responsible for behavioral motivation to act in
a certain way. The internal structure of actors’ decision-making is often influenced through communication and diffusion
instruments. Collaborative agreements represent policy instruments that are able to influence both, the external and the
internal structure. Relying on command and control instruments alone will not lead to improvements in institutional fit
and interplay at the operational level.
Based on the methodological conceptualization of IWRM implementation gaps as problems of institutional fit and
interplay in a context of operational constraints, this dissertation contributed to assessing how different policy instruments
can improve IWRM implementation as part of a policy mix. The importance of taking a more actor-centered approach
in providing incentives for actors to engage in institutional design and decision-making was highlighted. Hence, the
requirements of complementary management instruments to improve IWRM operationalization were summarized as
follows: (a) being flexible enough to match human and natural system context, (b) addressing ecosystem characteristics
and interactions of humans with the natural system at the right scale, (c) providing incentives for cooperation and
collaboration across sectors and administrative boundaries at the identified scale, (d) encouraging social learning, self-
regulation and participation, and (e) embedding management instruments in a diverse institutional and social system
(compatibility with existing regulations).
A top-down approach from the national level may provide a framework for greater collaboration among principle
stakeholders through formal guidelines, but cannot ensure collaborative outcomes per se. Critical factors for active
stakeholder engagement are building trust, working relationships and incentives to negotiate in order to evolve a common
interpretation of the problem on which collective action should be focused. To achieve this, more flexibility is necessary to
address different contexts and different problem perceptions, e.g. of costs and benefits from certain management actions.
PHES have recently become very popular in developing countries in order to overcome the disadvantages of regulatory
command and control instruments. These instruments are based on the ecosystem service approach and allow environmen-
tal problems to be addressed more flexibly and context-specifically. As part of a broader policy mix among existing policy
instruments, they seem to be a promising complement to traditional instruments as they combine elements of economic
and communication instruments with collaborative agreements.
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Do the ecosystem services concept and PHES, in general, bear potential to contribute to improvements in IWRM
implementation?
The ecosystem service concept is increasingly applied as a governance framework to communicate the socio-economic
dependence of humans on natural ecosystems. The concept highlights the relationship between ecosystems as service
providers and humans as beneficiaries. This implies a spatial and temporal cause-effect dependence, thereby responding
to the interrelated problems of fit and interplay. Moreover, human activity determines the provision of hydrological
ecosystem services through a specific land use as well as the demand for services through water uses. Hence, the ecosystem
service concept integrates land and water uses across sectors and administrative boundaries in a context specific way. The
valuation of ecosystem services allows identifying social preferences for the provision of these services and may look at
the supply and demand side. Moreover, the valuation process can be critical for identifying priorities in decision-making
on land and water uses and communicates different value perceptions. Additionally, previously unknown or neglected
use and non-use values of ecosystem services can be revealed. In the case of hydrological ecosystem services and their
valuation, the spatial relationship of provision and demand becomes apparent and integration may occur accordingly.
The concept of hydrological ecosystem services is especially appealing because it provides a variety of spatial, temporal
and scale-dependent relationships. Besides addressing these relationships in an ecological sense, the concept also addresses
them with regard to socio-economic and cultural aspects in the context of analysis and valuation as well as supply and
demand. So far, spatial and scale aspects of human and natural systems’ interactions have merely been considered in
the ecological context alone. The hydrological ecosystem service concept expands this perception by linking ecological,
spatial and scale dependent characteristics through institutional mechanisms across spatial scales of service provision
and service benefits in order to include, i.e. integrate, and activate different stakeholders of land and water uses to
promote (better) collaboration between them. The understanding of ecosystem services as a result of ecosystem functions
stemming from ecosystem structures and processes provides for new perspectives and consideration of scales. Ecosystem
structures and processes function at different spatial scales ranging from very local over regional to global scales where
they manifest themselves in different manners. Consequently, the assessment and valuation of hydrological ecosystem
services requires a spatially explicit methodology. Thus, the application of the hydrological ecosystem services concept
implies considerations regarding the scale of provision and the impact of benefits as well as appropriate reference units for
provision and demand. Moreover, the distribution of roles of service providers and beneficiaries defines spatial scales
of actions based on underlying bio-physical cause and effect relationships. Different provider-beneficiary constellations
then result, dependent on the type of (hydrological) ecosystem service considered. This provides additional flexibility for
the identification of appropriate management scales. This dissertation could illustrate how the concept of hydrological
ecosystem services can contribute to the critical process of identifying the right management scale based on the functional
scale at which ecosystem processes operate and the decision-making of key stakeholders should take place.
In the context of ecosystem-based land use planning, the ecosystem service concept has special significance because it
directly addresses the relationship between the natural and the human system by connecting the social definition of space
(area of perception and action) with the physical definition of space (distances, relative positions, boundaries). Hence,
the hydrological ecosystem service concept provides a suitable framework to conceptualize the link between the natural
system and how different actors value and use it. The variety and values of ecosystem services, thus, can be assessed at a
scale relevant for the ecosystem service provision and political action to influence them, e.g. a river basin or a specific part
of it where functional linkages and benefits show considerable interaction.
Besides mapping service provider and beneficiary relationships based on ecosystem functioning, the hydrological
ecosystem service concept can identify how different actions affect the provision of ecosystem services and how those
actions affect different beneficiaries. Hence, trade-offs can be considered in a broader context of potential on-site and
off-site costs of provision as well as benefits from delivery. Providers and beneficiaries, as key stakeholders identify and
articulate the ecosystem services which appear valuable. This valuation can go beyond monetary use values, but often
money is used as a common currency for comparison in order to aid decision-making. In the context of valuation, it has to
be clear that value expressions can be highly volatile and are generally subjective. Thus, a specific expression of value
has to be regarded as being strongly dependent on the body that articulates this value. Therefore, ecosystem services
are valued according to specific benefits instead of the ecosystems themselves or their structures, process or functioning.
One way to take action against the threat of the instrumentalization of nature for specifically valued services at the cost
of others can be to improve the underlying processes and structures of ecosystems through increasing biodiversity and
system resilience as the basis for ecosystem functioning.
Despite its pitfalls, the valuation of ecosystem services allows the development of payments for ecosystem services
mechanisms as a useful complement to conventional command and control instrument to operationalize IWRM. Especially
in developing countries and in contexts where command and control instruments are not feasible, PHES reveal significant
advantages in providing a coherent context to incorporate stakeholders and complex biophysical processes into a consistent,
learning-based management scheme. The PHES logic provides incentives to address specific functional provider-beneficiary
relationships, thus, crossing sectoral and administrative boundaries. On the one hand, PHES schemes offer a framework to
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define appropriate scales for management and, on the other hand they provide incentives for beneficial behavioral change
of key actors. Moreover, the implementation process of PHES is actor-centered in order to solve functional cause-effect
linkages and allows participants to enter into a rule-making process.
In a context where ecosystems are increasingly dominated by human uses and their alternation, a focus on ecosystem
functioning seems particularly useful to define a desired ecosystem state. Often a reversal to a pristine state, i.e. a state
before human impact, is illusive and trying to achieve improvements in ecosystem structure and processes that facilitate
important ecosystem functioning (e.g. self-regulation of water quality) is more meaningful. The role of biodiversity to
achieve this is often extraordinary. Thus, defining desired ecosystem conditions (reference) based on a resilience and
flexibility considerations equilibrium instead of a static stability could shift attention from the restoration of the pristine,
to the achievable and functional aim of rehabilitating stressed ecosystems. In the EU this way of thinking has led to a
process of revision of the ‘static’ goal of a good ecological status towards a status definition of the ecosystem’s potential
for ecosystem processes or structures that provide the relevant ecosystem services (cf., Josefsson and Baaner, 2011).
Considering potential ecosystem structures and processes as the basis for ecosystem services of a desired ecological status
possibly yields greater benefits than a focus on biological quality elements in isolation from the broader natural system
and its role within this system.
Payments for Hydrological Ecosystem Services (PHES) have gained significant popularity in the field of natural resources
management in developing countries. The wide-spread and increasing application of PHES in Latin America, Asia and
Africa as well as in North America and Australia documents the high expectations in the instrument. Besides a number of
national schemes, especially locally organized PHES schemes are growing in number.
With regard to IRBM, this dissertation has demonstrated the benefits that a typical implementation process of a PHES
scheme can bring about. These benefits include the identification and engagement with stakeholders at management level
relevant for IWRM operationalization, the associated characterization and assessment / documentation of hydrological
ecosystem services, the establishment of agreed cause-effect relationships and definition of objectives, the agreement on
and implementation of selected measures to achieve objectives (e.g. service provision and on-site benefits), and also the
monitoring and continuous evaluation of achieved land use changes and service provision. A fundamental element of
PHES schemes is the engagement with relevant stakeholders representing providers, protectors and users of the ecosystem
services. It is their interaction and interchange of value perceptions that determines the principal scheme design and,
thus, the rule making process for actions to be promoted. In conventional IWRM operationalization, there is no agreed
method for selecting stakeholders, e.g. to form part of an RBO or RBC, instead stakeholders are assigned by prescription
in a formal top-down manner. In contrast, in a PHES scheme, stakeholders are engaged based on site-specific functional
linkages of natural and human system interactions. There is an inherent motivation of PHES schemes to involve all relevant
stakeholders in the participation. This implies actual actor-centered incentives for participation. Moreover, agreements
on actions to improve service provision in the form of shared decision-making increases local ownership among actors.
Hence, local actors can contribute to decision-making and gain political importance / power with their knowledge, e.g. on
the land uses related to service provision.
At the beginning the promise of PHES schemes has been on efficiency gains (through better targeting of conservation
measures) however, the experiences with PHES schemes documented in this dissertation could highlight several other
benefits of at least equal importance. An important benefit is the possibility to align local aspirations (bottom-up) with
top-down regulatory priorities as well as the engagement of stakeholders and empowering them to act to improve their
communities, often through trusted intermediaries.
Furthermore, (because of their focus on functional linkages) PES schemes bear potential for the integration of cross-
sectoral issues beyond land and water uses. The ecosystem service concept and payment schemes based on it can be
perceived as a linking concept between water management and other sectors such as nature protection or climate change
mitigation and adaptation for instance. Hence, payment schemes can be a focal point when linking different national
and local environmental policies for flood protection, marine ecosystems, reduction of diffuse pollution and biodiversity
strategies, just to name a few. PES schemes for hydrological ecosystem services have successfully been linked with
objectives like improving the beauty of a landscape for tourism, sustainable farming, carbon sequestration and biodiversity
conservation.
Despite promising advantages, PHES schemes are also confronted with significant challenges. One of the most important
challenges is related to the uncertainties with regard to the identification and measurement of ecosystem services. Often
the necessary data to derive past, present and future cause-effect relationships is missing. Apart from unclear cause-effect
relationships, spatial and temporal scales of service provision are also often unknown. Consequently, actions to improve
service provisions are basically assumed and based on shared beliefs. At best, this is clearly communicated among
stakeholders in order to avoid disappointments. In order to enter into a learning process, it is important to monitor
compliance with agreed actions as well as monitoring and measuring changes in service provision. This monitoring
and measuring is also important to maintain the interest and good will of stakeholders. The effective engagement with
stakeholders, the monitoring and measuring of actions and outcomes requires resources which will reduce the available
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funding for payments. Hence, the spending on transaction costs for stakeholder engagement and monitoring has to
be balanced with the spending on payments. Here, the stakeholders involved have to set their priorities very carefully.
For local PHES schemes, financial support from the national policy level can be very helpful. Complementary national
payments can be justified when national priorities or political interest can be safeguarded within a scheme. Avoided
deforestation, for instance, can be of national interest for climate change mitigation, besides being locally important
for the provision of hydrological ecosystem services. The ability of PES schemes to link different sectoral policies, thus,
represents an advantage with regard to the integration of top-down outputs and bottom up desires.
In developed countries, PHES are already a cost-effective alternative to reduce water treatment cost where diffuse
pollution problems are present (e.g. in the USA) and are also increasingly recognized as a way to co-finance IRBM and
a means to involve relevant stakeholders (e.g. in the UK, Australia and Canada). There is potential to link different
environmental policies (e.g. biodiversity and flood protection, sustainable agriculture and tourism). There is also cost-
effective achievement of good ecological status, identification of environmental and resource costs for the cost recovery for
water services in the context of the EU-WFD.
In Art. 9 of the EU-WFD, water users are asked to contribute to the cost recovery of water services including resource
costs1 and environmental costs2. Furthermore, in Art. 11 the WFD calls for cost-effective measures to achieve a good
ecological status. The inclusion of resource and environmental costs for water services aims at internalizing external
effects of economic activities by charging water service uses the full cost. However, environmental and resource costs were
not sufficiently defined in the WFD. Moreover, there are no methodological guidelines regarding their practical assessment
and inclusion in the economic analyses of the WFD. Hence, the hydrological ecosystem services concept and PHES are now
increasingly considered for guidance and as a practical means for implementation. The hydrological ecosystem services
concept can also potentially contribute the definition of water services in a broader context of benefits derived from water
and related land ecosystems. At the moment, the consideration of water services for which costs including environmental
and resource costs should be recovered are limited to drinking water provision and waste water treatment for which
pricing systems already exist. However, water services can be interpreted in a much more comprehensive sense as general
hydrological ecosystem services, thus, benefits that society derives from ecosystems. This could lead to the inclusion
of water services which have been traditionally ‘free of charge’ in many countries, e.g. water for irrigated agriculture,
industry and even navigation and hydro power. Thereby, the financing of the sustainable provision of these services could,
on the one hand, be shared between a larger number of users and, on the other hand, additional actors can be integrated
in the policy process. The ecosystem services approach and PHES are now applied experimentally, for instance, in the
context of the EU-WFD implementation in the UK, promoted by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(DEFRA) of the British government.
In developing countries, the contribution of PHES schemes to finance IRBM is even more important than in developed
countries as resources are especially scare. The improved engagement of stakeholders at an operational level of IWRM
through PHES schemes is equally beneficial in developing countries. Beyond this, PHES schemes can reduce capacity
and informational gaps through the identification of bio-physical cause-effect relationships between land use and service
provision (baseline assessment) and the monitoring and measuring of outcomes. The bio-physical assessment within
scheme establishment is an important contribution to the land use planning process based on river basins and cadastral
development. Moreover, PHES schemes interact with existing formal rules and can improve their application.
The interaction with existing formal and informal rules is a result of the negotiating process between service providers
and beneficiaries. In this process agreements have to be reached on how the provision of hydrological ecosystem services
can be maintained or improved. In the negotiating process, it is important to agree on terms of conditionality and
additionality of service provision. This often implies a discussion on which actions should be implemented and how they
should be rewarded. In this rule-making process compliance with existing regulations, e.g. to protect riparian areas or
steep slopes, becomes an issue and stakeholders agree on uncompensated compliance. Through targeted incentives, PHES
can provide short-term tangible benefits to land users in order to promote long-term behavioral changes towards IWRM.
Moreover, compared to other policy instruments, PHES can bring about a transition from monitoring compliance with
command and control regulations toward site-specific monitoring of compliance according to agreed service provision
measures or monitoring of actual service provision. This facilitates a learning process as suggested by adaptive IWRM
approaches.
1 Resource costs are defined by the European Commission (EC) as “the costs of foregone opportunities which other users suffer due to the
depletion of a resource beyond its natural state of recharge or recovery“ (e.g. groundwater mining) (WATECO, 2003). In 2004, the definition of
resource costs was extended by the European working group ECO2 by adding the costs of inefficient allocation of water by existing institutions
(Brouwer, 2004).
2 Environmental costs are defined by the EC as “the costs of damage that water uses impose on the environment and ecosystems and those who
use the environment“ (WATECO, 2003). According to recommendations of the ECO2 working group, these costs should be measured in terms
of lost environmental benefits, where these benefits are measured using environmental valuation methods such as contingent valuation, travel
cost methods, or hedonic pricing (Brouwer, 2004).
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The PHES implementation practices reveal that intermediaries play an important role for the design and execution
of schemes. These intermediaries can be divided into two principal types. During the preparatory design phase of
PHES schemes, intermediaries often act as facilitators or knowledge providers in order to reveal bio-physical cause-effect
relationships which functionally connect service providers, i.e. land users, with beneficiaries and to create an enabling
environment. In the subsequent execution phase, intermediaries are usually involved as moderators, trusted managers
of funds and technical supervisors or advisers. The intermediary type which is present during the preparatory phase is
often an external organization, e.g. an international donor agency or an agency of the national government, while the
intermediary during the execution phase is generally made up of local stakeholders and trusted organizations. Hence, the
former is of a transitory kind and the latter is enduring, possibly, by establishing an intermediary structure to form the
basis for RBOs or RBCs.
What are the contributions of PHES schemes in a specific empirical context of IWRM implementation?
The Gíl González PHES scheme implementation in Nicaragua could demonstrate that horizontal interplay across sectors
and municipal boundaries can be achieved from bottom-up, although top-down structures, e.g. an RBO or RBC, are still
missing. The Gíl González PHES scheme successfully initiated IRBM at the sub-basin level through active stakeholder
involvement, basin-wide land use planning and the establishment of an RBC. Moreover, municipalities were strengthened
in their role as local environmental managers and attained co-financing from a private water user. Additionally, the
Gíl González PHES scheme could attract additional funding from the FONADEFO and the FAO-Facility network. This
co-financing is a significant contribution to achieve effective decentralization of the IWRM process through territorial
planning, catastral development and land use planning at the sub-basin level.
Besides improving the IWRM operationalization from bottom-up, the PHES instrument plays an important role in
relation to other environmental regulation. The case study from Nicaragua could demonstrate that the implementation
of the PHES scheme has led to diffusion and increased acceptance of existing formal rules on land uses and enabled a
redefinition of traditional roles in environmental policy-making. The assessment of the Gíl González PHES scheme, in this
dissertation, could demonstrate a significant contribution to the co-management of water resources at the operational
level. Through the bio-physical assessment and the identification of land as well as water uses fundamental conditions to
initiate actual natural resource management could be achieved. Hence, local actors assumed tasks which according to the
water law were assigned to the ANA. Because of a variety of constraints, the ANA is still not able to fulfill these tasks.
In order to take advantage of local PHES initiatives, the ANA could actively promote PHES development from bottom-
up. Hence, the ANA could take the role of an intermediary to ensure that bottom-up development meets top-down
requirements. Moreover, recommendations for the establishment of river basin management plans could assign local
initiatives to assist ANA with its tasks, e.g. bio-physical assessment, registration of land and water use, economic valuation,
and the creation of organizational structures in form of an RBC. These opportunities to link local and national policies
may be taken up in the context of the Law for the National Water Fund, the Law on PHES and the National Registry of
Water Users which are still to be established. Furthermore, the knowledge gained through local PHES schemes could also
be incorporated in the National Environmental Information System (Sistema Nacional de Información Ambiental; SINIA).
The inclusion of PHES schemes as a management instrument in the National Water Law in Nicaragua is probably an
advantage for the further dissemination of such schemes, although a specific law on PHES still needs to be passed. For the
design of this specific law, it seems reasonable to build on experiences and lessons learned from PHES schemes already
implemented. The typical implementation steps and different roles of actors, as identified and analyzed in this dissertation,
deserve special attention. The PHES law and the law which will establish the National Water Fund provide opportunities
to integrate PHES schemes more explicitly in the operationalization of IWRM, thus, describing their functional role in this
process.
Can general recommendations be made on how PHES may contribute to the IWRM process?
Nicaragua represents a typical example for IWRM implementation in developing countries characterized by improve-
ments in horizontal interplay at the national level, formal provisions for vertical interplay and improvements of fit through
RBOs, but incomplete implementation because of resource constraints. Other developing countries can probably learn
from Nicaraguan PHES experience. The facilitation of local PHES development as part of IRBM at the operational level can
represent an attractive option to local actors. Facilitation could formally be achieved, for instance, by including PHES, or
at least the assessment of hydrological ecosystem services and their monitoring, in the development process of river basin
management plans. However, mechanisms for upward connectivity, i.e. vertical interplay from bottom-up, are needed
to link local IWRM progress at the lower operational level with IWRM at higher operational and strategic levels. This
linkage can usually be provided through membership linkage, thus, strategic stakeholders within a PHES scheme, e.g.
municipalities, automatically become members of higher level organizations. These higher level organizations, RBOs for
instance, can serve as a diffusion platform of best practices and may coordinate different local activities.
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However, it is important to stress that the PHES instrument is only one option among other legislative measures or
infrastructures to substitute hydrological services more efficiently. PHES schemes can have negative environmental and
social (e.g. on equity issues) impacts and combinations with other efforts will often be required to avoid them. As a policy
mix, in combination with command and control instruments, PHES schemes can be applied to conservation actions to
achieve a state above a commonly agreed duty of care. Command and control instruments would then be applied below
compliance of this duty of care. Especially in developing countries, where the rules in use often differ significantly from
formal rules, it is important that a rule-making process takes place to define the duty of care standard, as shown by the
implementation of local PHES schemes. This standard may develop dynamically providing a smooth transition towards
actual compliance with formal command and control regulations. Intermediaries can play an important role as moderators
to ensure equal participation of weaker actors and as knowledge providers with regard to existing formal rules.
The establishment of (local) PHES schemes requires time, leadership, particular biophysical and social conditions, and
has to fit with national and regional laws. The initial costs for bio-physical assessments, economic valuation, stakeholder
involvement and persuading efforts to gain sufficient support for the scheme development involve large upfront costs.
Favorable bio-physical and socio-economic river basin features are given when downstream service users are able to pay
and actually depend upon hydrological ecosystem services for their economic, social or cultural well-being. In most cases
this implies a particular awareness of the existing dependence or a perceived responsibility for environmental stewardship,
i.e. corporate responsibility in the case of enterprises. Moreover, services are often already in a state of deterioration or
are threatened to cease altogether. Such perceived threats can drive the incentive to invest in conservation measures.
Often service beneficiaries need to deem compensations for service provision as being justifiable in order to be willing
to pay, thus, social relationships between upstream and downstream actors can play a significant role for the willingness to
join a scheme. In many cases, downstream beneficiaries feel solidarity with poorer upstream land users. Potential service
buyers are generally enterprises, that use water as a significant production factor, or public authorities, as is often the
case in water supply. Indeed water suppliers represent the largest group among all service buyers. But as different PHES
schemes in Nicaragua have demonstrated, public water suppliers are often difficult to engage. Moreover, since the water
supply is often highly subsidized in developing countries, payments for hydrological ecosystem services need to be justified
against other costs that need to be covered as well, e.g. investments in infrastructure and maintenance or the real cost of
water production. Many water users in developing countries cannot pay the actual cost of water supply. Here the situation
is very different from the one in developed countries where those costs are often better covered by existing water prices.
Nevertheless, PHES can serve as an important communication tool to stress the value of ecosystems.
As resources for IWRM operationalization are scarce, considerations beyond the hydrological ecosystem service concept
in terms of cost and benefit sharing through PHES schemes are justified. Nevertheless, payments do not have to be
monetary and may instead take the form of material compensations or even social appreciation. In the Andes, reciprocal
agreements, for instance Reciprocal Water Agreements in Peru (Martinez et al., 2013), have developed because there was
no social acceptance for monetary payments. It has even been argued that monetary payments may potentially erode
other motivations for conservation. At best, mutual agreements on the specific form and extent of compensations are
reached between providers and beneficiaries. Often this increases the sense of ownership among participants.
The degree of stakeholder interaction and involvement in decision-making certainly depends on the geographical
size of action. For small-scale local PHES stronger stakeholder involvement and participation in scheme design and
implementation is possible compared with larger scales. In purely national schemes, the other extreme to local ones, there
is often no participation at all in the scheme design and very limited participation, often only on the provider side, in the
implementation process. However, the experience with water funds in South America raises hopes of striking a balance
between local participation and a larger spatial impact. This often implies that provider and beneficiary groups take some
form of social organization through group representatives. At best, these forms of social organization already exist and
have been legitimized. An example of such an organization is the association of plantain producers in the Gíl González
river basin.
In Mexico, experiments were made with a combination of local and national funding for PHES schemes in the form of
water funds (FIDEICOMISO). If payments from local beneficiaries are insufficient to engage sufficient service providers,
this combined financing can provide a solution. Moreover, financial contributions from other policy levels are justified
since benefits are derived not only locally and regionally but also nationally and beyond. A mix of funding sources
may be facilitated by considering additional ecosystem services such as biodiversity conservation (IPBES, TEEB) and
carbon sequestration (REDD) as a bundle. However, for the operational IWRM hydrological ecosystem services are most
appropriate.
Complex bio-physical cause-effect relationships which are often not well understood and difficult to communicate
can be a further limitation to the application of PHES schemes. In many societies, forests are considered as especially
valuable for the provision of hydrological ecosystem services, however, other ecosystems may often also provide these
services. Although PHES schemes in practice do not follow a strict market logic and rather focus on broader stakeholder
involvement and participation, efficiency and equity issues need to be carefully balanced for the long-term success of
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schemes. This means that the areas with the highest service provision potential and the lowest relative opportunity costs
should be given priority. In the end, to be successful the often assumed cause-effect relationships need to be verified.
Hence, for accountability purposes the monitoring and measuring of service provision is necessary. Hydrological models
may support the bio-physical assessment and monitoring if sufficient information is available to run them. However, not
all hydrological models can be used to provide information about hydrological ecosystem service at any desirable site so
that provision and benefits can be identified.
While water resources are the integrating factor within IWRM, the ecosystem service concept establishes hydrological
ecosystem services as the integrator of different sectors and administrative units. This places stronger emphasis on the
interactions between land and water users. While the concept of hydrological ecosystem services considers only the
supply side, it is also conceivable to place stronger consideration on the demand side by looking at competing water uses
representing different service beneficiaries. Leaving water in the river can also be considered as a hydrological service and
worthy of compensation, either by downstream beneficiaries of this service or others. Experiences with PHES schemes
aiming at reducing water uses to the benefit of others have been made in the USA and Australia. Thus, in principle, PHES
schemes may also work among competing beneficiaries.
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